How Successful was Soviet Foreign Policy under Khrushchev and Brezhnev
How Successful was Soviet Foreign Policy under Khrushchev and Brezhnev?
Weighing up the success of Soviet foreign policy from the years 1953 to 1982 has been a matter of great dispute between historians. However, it has been recognised that after the Second World War the Soviet Union 'played a clear and decisive role in defining the shape and pattern of world politics'1. Both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras were characterised by highs and lows regarding diplomatic and economic relations with the United States, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Third World and the Communist-bloc.
The ambiguous meaning of the word 'success' makes this debate all the more difficult. The problem with this is that what may have been seen internally as a success may have been viewed by the outside world as a failure. It is all dependent upon the ideological aims of the soviet leadership of the time, whether it is peaceful coexistence, as pursued by Khrushchev or détente which was implicit in the Brezhnev era. The waves of cold war which characterised the post-war period meant that the struggle to improve relations was complex, and so success can not only be explained in terms of improved foreign relations, but also by strategical gains over other powers.
The Khrushchev era has been described as one of peaceful coexistence with a definitive competitive edge.2 This is displayed in the number of crises and developments which occurred in the near decade he was in rule of the Soviet Union. These can be loosely pinpointed as the 1955 signing of the Warsaw Pact, the Hungarian predicament of 1956, the Berlin ultimatum in 1958, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In this era Khrushchev also attempted to develop the soviet standing in the newly liberated third world, however I will focus on relations with the West, the US and China in answering this question.
In order to contemplate the success of Khrushchev's foreign policy, it is first important to determine his personal views and his ideological outlook which coloured his policies. Khrushchev has been described in many ways, from a 'colourful, impulsive individualist... the bold iconoclastic reformer... the ambitious adventurer'3 to a 'hare-brained schemer'4. However, most accounts agree on the fact that he was passionate about his foreign policy, taking active and visible interest in all such affairs5. He certainly was an individual and from the beginning set out to destalinise the system and pursue a more active role in world leadership. This policy was to gain him enemies as many other leaders did not appreciate his overbearing and personalised conduct of foreign policy6; however, he was accepted as the 'preponderant and almost exclusive spokesman in foreign policy'7 He aimed to achieve a working relationship with the capitalist West in order to improve socialist standing in the world. This peaceful coexistence was interrupted periodically by his struggle with maintaining communist unity in the soviet-bloc as well as in China, and actions in these areas made it hard for the West to put a great degree of trust into a communist leader.
If peaceful coexistence was Khrushchev's main aim in foreign policy, then we must look at events which occurred during his time in office and judge whether or not these could be deemed as a success relative to this aspiration. He believed that peaceful coexistence 'could and should develop into peaceful competition for the purpose of satisfying man's needs in the best possible way'.8
Firstly, the signing of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 may seem on the surface to be a positive action for diplomatic relations, but then one must consider that it was signed as a counter-attack against the formation of NATO in the West. Much of Khrushchev's foreign policy moves were conducted in an offensive manner, as a result of a move made which the Soviet Union would perceive as a threat. By 1964 the Eastern European-bloc had involved into an imperialist system with each country being a member of the Warsaw Pact9. Moscow tolerated some experimentation with governmental systems, but expected communist ideology to remain firm.
This is why the problems in Hungary were tackled so forcefully, and so with regards to the preservation of communist rule in Eastern Europe, was a success. The reason for popular dissent in Eastern Europe at this time was due to Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' of 1956 in which he denounced Stalin and displayed his hopes for fundamental reform. In October an armed revolt became the consequence of a demonstration in Hungary, after a more liberal government headed by Nagy had come to power. Soviet troops felt it was necessary to intervene. Khrushchev believed the situation was too deteriorated to settle peacefully, particularly when Nagy decided to remove Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev's reaction here was fundamentally defensive. He feared the loss of the Soviet-East European bloc and felt the need to maintain security.
However, The American reaction to this would lead us to believe that this may not have been a diplomatic success. Far from the view of Khrushchev that such matters were internal and should not affect the pursuit of peaceful coexistence, the US were quick to take the crisis as an indication of the mounting Soviet aggression and so placed medium-range missiles directed at the USSR in Turkey, Iran, Japan and West Germany, and then rejected a Soviet plan for a nuclear free zone in central Europe10.
The United States was one of the biggest problems for the ...
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However, The American reaction to this would lead us to believe that this may not have been a diplomatic success. Far from the view of Khrushchev that such matters were internal and should not affect the pursuit of peaceful coexistence, the US were quick to take the crisis as an indication of the mounting Soviet aggression and so placed medium-range missiles directed at the USSR in Turkey, Iran, Japan and West Germany, and then rejected a Soviet plan for a nuclear free zone in central Europe10.
The United States was one of the biggest problems for the Soviet Union. Khrushchev was keen to maintain peaceful relations with the US, but would not compromise his hard-line Socialist intentions to do so. As Rubinstein tells us Khrushchev 'inched toward a limited accommodation of the West, based on the preservation of the territorial status quo'.11 The US would not turn a blind eye to events in Western Europe and so any crises in the West due to Soviet intervention was likely to cause tension with the US.
One of the main points of tension for US-Soviet relations in Khrushchev's era was West Germany and Berlin. He opted to press the issue to the US in an attempt to resolve it. He feared that the West was going to give Germany nuclear weapons which would be a threat to the Soviet regime. So in 1957 he gave the US an ultimatum. Either they sign a treaty with Germany, or the USSR would do so and East Germans would be free to close access to Berlin. Even though this ultimatum was not a great success for Khrushchev as President Eisenhower declined the ultimatum, it did result in their meeting at Camp David which ended in a promise to ensure better negotiation and agreement. This result was a success for Soviet foreign policy as it meant increased relations with the US and left Khrushchev 'euphoric'12 and preparations for a summit conference in Paris began.
However, such friendly relations were not to last as in 1960 the Soviet military shot down a U-2 spy plane over the Urals as it was violating international law regarding over flights. Despite the fact that this was a diplomatic triumph for the USSR over the US, such a serious provocation for both sides threatened the summit. In due course the summit went ahead but with little trust in the ratio. Khrushchev stormed out when Eisenhower refused to apologise for the acts of espionage. 'The fragile spirit of Camp David quickly dissipated'13 and the small period of détente expired.
Khrushchev's last attempt at gaining superiority over the US without confrontation was his decision in 1962 to place missiles in Cuba, directed at the US. Khrushchev's motive for this was yet again a defensive measure. The US had missiles in Turkey so it was reasoned that placing missiles just off the coast of Florida would restore nuclear parity. Also, this would give the USSR a socialist ally in the West, right on the doorstep of the biggest capitalist superpower in the world. However, Khrushchev failed to calculate the severity of the American reaction to this. In a move that Yanov claims 'lacked subtlety and sophistication'14, Khrushchev had managed to bring the world to 'the brink of nuclear war'.15 Not the sort of actions one would expect from a man who supposedly pursued the policy of peaceful coexistence.
The US did not offer to resolve the issue diplomatically, the Soviet Union was ordered to remove the missiles or face a nuclear war. The US Strategic Air Command was put on the highest state of alert. Eventually, Khrushchev decided against risking nuclear war with the US, in the knowledge that this would result in the obliteration of the USSR. Khrushchev was forced to announce publicly the dismantling of the weapons and was required to step down.
This sequence of events was catastrophic for Khrushchev's career. In 1964 he was forced to retire, most probably due to the humiliation that he had caused the Soviet Union in the face of the West. In 1963 the Soviet Union signed a Limited Test Ban treaty with the US in an attempt to curb the likelihood of such a standoff occurring again; however, it was too late to deny that Khrushchev had demonstrated the military weakness of the Soviet Union to the world. He had posed 'the most dangerous Soviet challenge to the US'16 and had lost. The Soviet strategic position had worsened, Khrushchev had lost the chance to equalise the balance of power.
In his battle to retain good relations with the US, Khrushchev had sacrificed the support of the second largest communist power, China. He saw China as potentially the most dangerous nation to the Soviet Union, alongside Germany, if they gained nuclear weapons. The major antagonism between the two was their diverged opinions regarding the US. Khrushchev desired to court the US, and use the benefits of their capitalist system to allow the Soviet Union to grow. The Chinese believed that a communist state should not woo a capitalist superpower such as the US and instead focus on extending the revolution.
Disagreement had turned to hostility by 196017 and the two most powerful communist parties parted. Nevertheless, Khrushchev tried to maintain good relations with China which was difficult as Mao Zedong was appalled by his barefaced denunciation of Stalin. A major obstruction to resuming a state of peaceful coexistence between the two states was that Chinese communists did not believe that peaceful coexistence was a desirable path to socialism. They were more willing to accept war on that path to socialism, something that Khrushchev thoroughly disproved of. China believed that the US was a 'paper dragon'18 and held no respect for the Soviet's timidity in the face of the US threat. Khrushchev criticized China for being dogmatic 'left-adventurists' who were set on a world war.19
This highlights an area in which Khrushchev's foreign policy was not particularly successful. By alienating China he split the communist international movement and demonstrated how the 'Soviet Union's relationship to the world was rich in paradoxes';20 Khrushchev maintained a socialist state but still valued relations with capitalist economies. However, his relations with these were not consistent either.
Brezhnev's collective leadership came to power on 'a wave of sobering disappointments' with Khrushchev's ostentatious experiments.21 Brezhnev attempted to adopt a policy of détente and in the twenty years he was in office he achieved highlights such as the nuclear treaties of 1969, the SALT talks in the early seventies and the 1975 Helsinki Accord, along with some predicaments such as the 1968 Prague Spring, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Polish Risings of 1980.
Brezhnev concentrated on arming the Soviet Union, rather than bluffing about arms as Khrushchev has been accused of. In this manner Brezhnev created a new dialogue with the US. He sought to expand international détente and linked this with economic détente, increasing Soviet economic independence by enlisting the resources of capitalist economies, a policy which proved successful as the Soviet wealth and technological abilities began to grow.22
The Prague Spring was the first major event that Brezhnev tackled in leadership. Dubcek attempted to reform the Czechoslovakian Communist Party based around the slogan 'socialism with a face', making the party more open to democratisation. Brezhnev showed he tolerated this to an extent, but when he believed there was a real danger of the loss of Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev abandoned any attempt at a political solution and set about purging communist members and replacing the government.
From the point of view of the maintenance of Soviet rule throughout Eastern Europe, this was a success for Brezhnev. His reasoning for the invasion were made clear in his renowned 'Brezhnev Doctrine' in which he stated that the socialist commonwealth was duty bound to intervene where socialism was under threat in a member country.23 However, Czechoslovakia remained resentful of the Soviet Union and this soured relations with the West, halting political reform in Eastern Europe and slowing economic reform at home. It also had the effect of demonstrating that when given the autonomy, communist parties could initiate reform and win public support.24 Brezhnev's view that this was an internal communist affair and should not disturb relations with the West was proved to be rather naive.
Nevertheless, the US carried on with détente and managed to agree on a number of arms treaties. In 1968 the US, the UK and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and further discussions regarding arms control resulted in the SALT agreement of 1971. Brezhnev hoped to institutionalise these meetings with the Western powers and carry on with regular meetings which characterised détente. Throughout most of the late sixties to early seventies he was very successful at this, as Nogee asserts, 'The number and variety of these agreements was unprecedented in Soviet diplomacy'.25 The Moscow Summit of 1972 is another example at Brezhnev's diplomatic success during this period of improving relations with the US, for him, this was a personal triumph. He believed that these relations were permanent, friendly and cooperative. There was an 'extraordinary rapport'26 between Nixon and Brezhnev. However, after the Watergate scandal Nixon's domestic influences deteriorated which was reflected in subsequent summits and by 1974 the US had a new President, Ford, who was less committed to détente.
The Helsinki Accord of 1975 was a success for Brezhnev in Europe, settled the post-war borders and regimes and laid the foundations for détente and status qup in Europe, Described by Suny as 'the apogee of international détente' it came at the last moments of worldwide détente.
The invasion of Afghanistan was a success for Brezhnev in terms of retaining the communist rule in Eastern Europe; however, in relations to associations with the West it only served to confirm the opinion of anti-détente campaigners in the West that the Soviet Union was still only interested in the world expansion of communism. The decision to rescue Afghanistan by quashing the insurgents who disagreed with the new socialist government's reform of traditional life in Czechoslovakia in 1979 outraged Islam and reinforced the 'anti-hegemonist' case from China. The US made the decision to withdraw from talks regarding SALT II and to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games. This, coupled with the already frosty relations between the US and the Soviet Union, served to worsen the USSR's standing in détente.
The timing of the invasion could not have been much worse for the USSR.27 Brezhnev seemed to have ignored the wider consequences of his actions. However, in regards to internal socialist policy it was important for Brezhnev to retain his authority over the communist-bloc, assuming that this was not an issue which would affect relations with the West. This is a theme which was recurrent throughout the rule of both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and was one of the main reasons that détente was doomed to failure.
The Polish risings of 1980-1 were the breaking point for détente with the West. The loss of Poland was deemed 'completely unacceptable'28 to the Soviet Union, despite the fact that an invasion would be catastrophic for Brezhnev's diplomatic prospects. Reagan and Thatcher had already resisted détente and the Soviet actions in Poland only served to authenticate their rhetoric. Brezhnev and his leadership lost their legitimacy, and their rule 'sank into terminal decline'.29 It revealed to the world the underlying weakness of Soviet power in the East and the fragility of communist loyalty to the state outside the USSR.30
Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev aimed to improve international relations whilst maintaining rule in the communist-bloc. This resulted on relations with both the West and the communist bloc becoming fractured beyond repair. However, they both were willing to offer to embark on a reduction of tensions with the West; such personal initiatives were unheard of from the Soviet leadership before Khrushchev. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union was brought into world politics, challenging the US for paramountcy.31 One of the reasons that ultimately both reigns were rather unsuccessful with international relations in the eyes of the West was due to the fact that both failed to recognise that domestic and foreign affairs were intertwined, a change to one led to a change on the other.
References
Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years, (Oxford, 1983)
R. Lowenthal, 'The Soviet Union in the Post Revolutionary Era: An Overview' in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 1-23
Vernon V. Aspaturian, 'Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties' in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 129-163
George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics, (London, 1982)
Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd Edition, (Harper-Collins, 1989)
Marie Mendras, 'Policy outside and Politics Inside', in Archie Brown (Ed.) Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, (London, 1989) p. 127-163
Robert V. Daniels, 'Political Processes and Generational Change' in Archie Brown (Ed.) Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, (London, 1989) p. 96-127
Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 3rd Edition, (Oxford, 1988)
Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999)
William Taubman, 'Khrushchev and Détente: Reform in the International Context' in Robert O. Crummey (Ed.), Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, (Illinois, 1989) p. 144-156
Alexander Yanov, 'In the Grip of Adversarial Paradigm: The Case of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev in Retrospect' in Robert O. Crummey (Ed.), Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, (Illinois, 1989) p. 156-182
Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 2nd Edition, (Longman, 1993)
Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998)
Jonathan Steele, The Limits of Soviet Power: The Kremlin's Foreign Policy - Brezhnev to Chernenko, (New York, 1983)
Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999) p.1
2 Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999) p. 43
3 R. Lowenthal, 'The Soviet Union in the Post Revolutionary Era: An Overview' in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 1
4 George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics, (London, 1982) p. 271
5 Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999) p. 42
6 Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999) p. 62
7 Marie Mendras, 'Policy outside and Politics Inside', in Archie Brown (Ed.) Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, (London, 1989) p. 141
8 Nikita Khrushchev in P. E. Mosley (Ed.) 'The Soviet Union 1922-1962, A Foreign Affairs Reader' cited in Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 3rd Edition, (Oxford, 1988) p. 30
9 Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd Edition, (Harper-Collins, 1989) p. 118
0 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 411
1 Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd Edition, (Harper-Collins, 1989) p. 337
2 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 413
3 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 414
4 Alexander Yanov, 'In the Grip of Adversarial Paradigm: The Case of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev in Retrospect' in Robert O. Crummey (Ed.), Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, (Illinois, 1989) p. 177
5 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 417
6 Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd Edition, (Harper-Collins, 1989) p. 339
7 Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 2nd Edition, (Longman, 1993) p. 270
8 William Taubman, 'Khrushchev and Détente: Reform in the International Context' in Robert O. Crummey (Ed.), Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, (Illinois, 1989) p. 149
9 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 412
20 Marie Mendras, 'Policy outside and Politics Inside', in Archie Brown (Ed.) Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, (London, 1989) p. 128
21 R. Lowenthal, 'The Soviet Union in the Post Revolutionary Era: An Overview' in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 11
22 George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics, (London, 1982) p. 207
23 Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 2nd Edition, (Longman, 1993) p. 321
24 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 428
25 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 3rd Edition, (Oxford, 1988) p. 270
26 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 3rd Edition, (Oxford, 1988) p. 273
27 Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years, (Oxford, 1983) p.
28 Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999) p. 83
29 Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 2nd Edition, (Longman, 1993) p. 323
30 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 446
31 Vernon V. Aspaturian, 'Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties' in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 134
Lydia Dawson
