It was understandable for classical Muslim jurists to think of Muslims as a powerful established society able to wage war against the sources of threat. This is the same way any empire built its image and saw its mission. It is not very much different from the current American foreign policy missionary statements that are all over the media. But in our time the jurists and scholars are in a different situation, so they speak differently. Seeking to narrow the Islamic position to a purely defensive and peaceful position, the modernists used a methodology of selectivity and a mild tone that represents the reality of dependency and underdevelopment of Muslims rather than the text and jurisprudence of Islam. On the other hand, some Orientalists, either classical or modern, only highlighted the interpretation of jihad that equated it with offensive destructive war. So they were overly selective in their use of interpretations of some Muslim jurists while neglecting others; hence the Western prevailing use the term of jihad refers only to waging war. This type of jihad was also described in various ways. Sometimes it is equated with holy war - - and other times it is called the classical theory or modern theory of jihad.
In Muslim thought and Muslim jurisprudence, interpretations of jihad are related to other terms such as Dar Al- Islam (domain of peace) and Dar Al-Harb (domain of war). These terms’ relationships pertain to the classical Islamic vision of the nature of international relations. So, the Islamic schools of thought and international law differed according to the divergence (between traditionalists and modernists) concerning the basis of Muslim external relations with non-Muslims, whether it is war or peace. This divergence could be explained in terms of differences in methodology (applying abrogation rule or not) and in historical experiences (periods of Muslim strength or weakness).
A third trend of interpretation could be traced as a middle course based on the six following points:
First: Jihad is the striving of Muslims to fulfill their every responsibility and to serve the Islamic cause and principles in a manner consistent with the framework of Islam. It is not to be taken to mean warfare alone. Jihad in this sense is the active expression of the Islamic commitment, responsibility, and sense of duty wherever it is required in practical life. So, to interpret jihad only as an offensive or defensive war is to misunderstand the meaning of the word and the philosophy behind it. It is equally wrong to assume that jihad is a holy war in the Western sense.
Second: To interpret the basis of Muslim external relations as war or peace is to misunderstand the meaning of Islam. It is based on da`wah (inviting people to Islam), which needs jihad.
Third: Jihad as a basic Islamic principle neither excludes the possibility of armed conflict nor imposes peace as the sole alternative in all situations. So, it is necessary to pay attention to the variety of its meanings and applications in any specific situation. Only then will a better understanding of the motivations and consequences of any specific course of Muslim external relations be possible.
Therefore the question of when, why, and how to use force or a peaceful orientation should be carefully addressed and answered in light of the Islamic rules of warfare and with taking into consideration the realities of the contemporary world and the challenges that face Muslims.
In other words, the third trend of interpretation does not drop either war or peace for the absolute sake of the other. It stands for the comprehensive meaning of Islam, i.e., all principles, rules, and values of the message and experiences of Islam are valid whenever they are required in the light of changing circumstances in broad human life and experience. The dynamic use of the different phases of Qur’anic outlook is always needed.
Fourth: Jihad is an intellectual instrument and a key value pertaining to da`wah as the main base of Muslim-non-Muslim relations. Hence, war or peace is considered not as a basis of external relations but as instruments for da`wah through a process of jihad.
Fifth: According to this third trend of interpretation, the classical jurists’ thought was criticized as being influenced by the non-acceptance of Islam and adversarial stance towards Islam and the rising Muslim state by major non-Muslim powers. It was also criticized as giving absolute weight to the abrogation methodology, regardless of the total meaning, basic objectives and value system of Islam.
In other words, this middle trend of thought gives more weight to the integrity of the Islamic value system and to the nature of its constructive message. So, stressing the aggressive nature of jihad (i.e., fighting others just because they are not Muslims and forcing them to convert to Islam) could only be done by applying the rule, instead of being concerned with reviving human consciousness for establishing an egalitarian human society. So, this aggressive attitude was seen as reducing the Islamic mission to a kind of spiritual totalitarianism.
Sixth: This middle trend has also criticized the modern jurists who interpreted jihad in a purely defensive way to the extent that they based Muslim external relations only on peace. They were criticized of totally dropping the role of abrogation and underestimating the negative consequences of the unjust and aggressive Western policies towards the Muslim World.
Finally, I think that this middle trend of thought presents a broad and realistic understanding. It gives place to the different situations and contexts - weakness or strength - that could surround the Ummah (nation), it makes the jihad movement a necessary one aimed at correcting unjust relationships (military or peaceful), and it does not allow room for accusations or exaggerated claims either against or for Islam. The Muslim objection that adaptation to new circumstances might result in loss of identity is also out of place.
At last, according to this middle trend of thought, the spread of Islam and da`wah has taken several forms. This da`wah is the basis of the Muslim external relations, while both peace and war present extreme states of relations that contradict the nature of the Islamic mission. So, this trend differentiates between jihad and war; it refuses to equate jihad with holy war or to qualify jihad as legal or holy; it argues that the term “jihad” should not be used for a war until this war fulfills the legal conditions for launching it. As long as these conditions are not fulfilled, the launched war should not be called jihad.
Then what are these conditions? Who are responsible for launching jihad (defensive or offensive)? What is the relevance of the different Islamic historical experiences? What sort of these experiences illustrate the defensive or offensive jihad? Does the actual situation of Muslims in the world justify a defensive or offensive war? But what is the difference between a defensive and offensive one? And how can we understand the acts against the United States: do they represent a defensive war or an act of terrorism?
Level Two: The significance of historical experiences
Many prominent Orientalists have been selective in understanding jihad by equating it with offensive, destructive war and by qualifying Muslims as violent and non-tolerant. Other scholars have realized the difference between the various interpretations of jihad.
On the other hand, to serve national interests and power politics, the concept of jihad has been manipulated differently by both Western and Muslim statesmen and politicians.
The history of Muslim-Western relations provides us with various experiences that extend through two different periods in Islamic history. Thus, they illustrate the nature of historical and psychological background that surrounded both the classic Muslim thought (offensive war) and the modern one (defensive war). Social, psychological and historical factors decide what attitude shapes the history of a nation and what school of thought responds to its state of strength or weakness.
Hence, these experiences illustrate that jihad was not pursued only by military means, even during the period of extended Muslim power. At the same time, during the periods of Muslim weakness, the military means of jihad still exist besides the peaceful ones. Both instruments revealed new significance and gave different results.
1. During a period when large Muslim powers were playing a central world role, we can shed light on the following experiences:
a) The difference between the Umayyad and the first Abbassid caliphs. The Umayyads adopted and successfully executed a grand policy of fath (conquering). In contrast, the first Abbassid caliphs, although they were not less powerful, gave up the military fath orientation. They depended mainly on peaceful instruments to run external relations, with force used mainly for retaliation and defensive purposes.
b.) The similarity between the Mamluke and Ottoman use of peaceful means to run their power politics. Western historians, as well as Muslim ones who only equated jihad with offensive war, considered the flourishing peaceful relations between Mameluke sultanates and European kingdoms as a sort of relinquishing jihad. The first Ottoman capitulation to François King of France in the 16th century was also seen as a turning point towards a new era of Muslim foreign relations. According to the third interpretation of jihad (as a means of Da`wah either through war or peacefully), the use of peaceful means in these two experiences should be considered as a sort of jihad. These large Islamic states (Mameluke and Ottoman) based their external relations on jihad and adopted an Islamic frame of reference.
In other words, while a trend of modern Muslim writings interpreted all acts of jihad during the period of power in Muslim history in terms of defense, and many non-Muslim writers explained them as aggression against non-Muslims, it must be noticed, in light of the broad interpretations of jihad, that a realistic analysis of the use the term of jihad should take into consideration the internal and external contexts of Muslim states, whether strong or weak.
2. Through the last two centuries, the period of Muslim decadence, acts of jihad narrowed gradually and took new shapes. The Western attacks on and control of the Muslim world seriously challenged the classical approach of thought as well as the policies of Muslim states. The attacks were fatal because of the condition of both Muslim thought and power. Western attacks revealed and uncovered the decay of Muslims, rather than caused it. It became moot to argue over defensive versus offensive jihad. Total comprehension and understanding of the modern world could not be explained in terms of the classical thought. The new exigencies demanded new Muslim thought and policies.
These developments took the form either of apologetics or of protest and revolt against the Western adversary’s presence in the Muslim world.
Each of these two broad types of responses have taken various forms through the period of colonialism and after independence till now. Some of these forms have been proclaimed as jihad. The two types complement each other rather than being alternatives.
First: What about the colonialist period?
As a result of realizing Muslim weakness and technological backwardness and being in direct contact with the control of European thought and power, the apologetic trend appealed to liberalism and over-emphasized peace, freedom and tolerance. This trend was a weapon to reform Muslim nations. This reform was considered the main way to get rid of European occupation that threatened not only the land but all the values of Islam. This was typical of the ruling Ottoman elite and its movements of the nineteenth century and of the reformers who came in contact with the West even since the era of Rifa`ah at-Tahtawi.
The other response to the European domination was military. Aimed at the liberation of the Muslim land, it was organized by people and their traditional leadership, such as Al- Mahdi in Sudan, Al-Mokhtar in Libya, Al-Jaza’iri in Algeria, Isma`il Al-Shahid in India, Osman Dan Foudia in Africa, and so on.
All these liberation movements emphasized jihad more or less in terms of classical conceptions. But such a jihad war was bound to fail because the conditions essential for success were not present. The liberal approach to internal reform of government and society also failed.
During the First World War, jihad was proclaimed by both the Ottoman Sultan against the allied powers and by the Sharif Hussein against the Turkish rulers. They also failed. So, the rest of the Arab world failed to gain the promised independence. At the same time, the Balfour Declaration was issued and the aggressive Zionist project established its bases in Palestine.
These experiences brought disenchantment with Western liberalism, Western institutions and cooperation with the West.
In the inter-war period, the liberation movements were waged under various ideological discourses. Other ideological movements stemming from nationalism or Marxism accompanied the Islamic jihad. The Muslim Brotherhood was the main Islamic movement that adopted a comprehensive strategy for change. It proclaimed jihad both as military resistance against occupation and as social and spiritual reform.
Second: After the Independence of Muslims States
The use of jihad terminology, as well as jihad doctrine, was restricted and narrowed. The indicators were various and extended, causing confusion and renewed the debate of jihad versus terrorism.
1. The national policies terminology dropped the term jihad in favor of other terms such as national liberation movements, population liberation movements, and the right of self-determination. These terms stemmed from non-Islamic frames of reference. But on the other hand, some leaders used the term jihad in critical situations, mainly during wars with Israel. Otherwise, some wars between Muslims were also called jihad. After the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a comprehensive peace process between Arabs and Israel, national governments in the Muslim world adopted another discourse: the “adaptation to globalization” and to peace. So, jihad’s reputation worsened as long as it was considered to be a catalyst force against the negative consequences of globalization, and the catastrophic situations prevailing since the peace process with Israel was begun.
2. Some internal opposition movements that were called jihad proclaimed it against national governments. But their use of force in the name of defending Islam and Muslims against tyranny, corruption, dependency, and peace with Israel was equated with terrorism.
3. The doctrine of jihad was also used by the US and its allies to wage war against Communism in the Islamic world, especially in Afghanistan. After the end of the Cold War, the acts called jihad against the USA and Israel were escalated towards the end of the 20th century, when the unjust and offensive policies against Muslim peoples reached its peak on various levels. The foreign cultural and civilizational aspects that threaten Muslim people have added more critical challenges to the traditional ones, at the military and economic level.
Finally, in light of the previous analysis of theories and historical experiences, I can present the following remarks concerning the consequences of 11 September.
1. The cultural and civilizational aspects of the event, as well as of the global coalition against terrorism, show the extent to which the Israeli-American alliance has evolved. The Israeli aggression against Palestinian people is escalating intensively. It is a sort of state terrorism. It did not spark American opposition or condemnation. At the same time, policies fighting terrorism are firmly executed with the help of Arab and Muslim countries.
The term jihad is vanishing gradually, under the terrorism vogue. The war against terrorism has become the nightmare of Muslim governments as well as Muslim people. While the stability of the former has become at stake, the existence and identity of the latter has been dangerously threatened.
2. The distorted image of Islam and Muslims is used to an extreme to justify current international policies conducted against terrorism. Islam and the Muslim world are considered the main source of evil that the US should fight to protect humanity and civilization.
This is not new. Centuries ago when the Ottoman armies knocked at the gates of Vienna, the Orientalists drew a distorted picture of the Turks, the proclaimers of jihad. The motive was to mobilize European resistance against the great Ottoman sultans. Three centuries ago, the image of Muslims as backward, fanatic, uncivilized people was used again to justify expansionists’ targets, called the mission of the white man to spread modernity and the message of civilization.
Now at the beginning of the 21st century, while accusing Muslims of using religion to serve political aims, we can notice that the political discourse of the American administration reveals an alliance between the extreme religious right (Protestants) and the political conservatives. This alliance presents a threat not only to the Muslim world but to all the world. It adopts a strategy of absolute global American hegemony and is motivated by the theory of conflict of civilizations. The politics emanating from this strategy are unjust, intolerant, violent, arrogant, deeply interfering and extremely oriented to power politics.
These policies stimulated Arab and Muslim resistance. The use of any kind of force against these hegemonic policies is always condemned and equated with terrorism. From now on, since the Muslim people faced strong external and internal oppressions that blocked the capacity for opposition and the needed political and economic change, jihad will be pursued even in a way that will be considered as the hated terrorism. The Bin Ladin phenomenon is a typical case. He has acquired the admiration and approval of ordinary Muslim people because he took revenge for them. He found a new way to fight injustice where all ordinary ways had been closed.
So, we have to wonder if the current policies against the so-called terrorism are going to cure the cause of the disease or just cure the symptoms. Domestic and international scenes need to change dramatically in order to forge more justice and tolerance, not only for Westerners but also for Muslims everywhere, in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Balkans, Philippines, Afghanistan, and in all Muslim countries where Islamists are persecuted and restricted.
All the previous remarks lead me to conclude that in such international circumstances that do not favor Islam and Muslims, Islamic thought faces a big challenge because it is necessary to develop a new vision of jihad (especially regarding when and why to use force and by whom). Any thought that does not respond to the personality and identity of the Islamic Ummah will result in more confusion and could be very harmful to the Muslim Ummah’s response to serious challenges that threaten not only its territory and wealth but the very essence of the Ummah, its soul and its identity, i.e., jihad in its fullest and broadest meaning.
