In considering the process of change in the German Government 1890-1991, how far can the defeat in WWI be seen as a turning point?

The defeat in WWI was the key turning point in the process of Government as it caused it to suddenly fall from imperialism to becoming the most democratic in Europe, albeit via diktat. This change to peaceful, democratic methods was so monumental; it caused huge amounts of unrest in Germany as Nichols shows, the acceptance of military aid to crush the left “saved Germany from allied intervention”. Accountability; something unheard of under the Kaiser now existed via proportional representation which allowed fringe parties to punch above their weight. Another change was the creation of a president with executive powers, but subject to Reichstag approval, as was the upper house, this is in start contrast to the all-powerful Kaiser. Nichols hailed the change as “a true democratic advance for Germany, bringing peace and a more democratic system”. However he fails to acknowledge the dissent building within Germany and article 48. This is supported by Craig who called the same events “an aborted revolution which failed to change basic political attitudes and prejudices”, suggesting sections of society merely renamed themselves. Hinden seeks to take the middle ground, suggesting it was “a synthesis between progressive political and social ideas and the desire to protect traditional institutions”. This addresses the issues, especially as those institutions do cause great problems later on. Hinden also observes “foreign policy meant an unremitting effort to revise the treaty of Versailles”, this showed how many terms were simply ignored and agrees with Morris who states “Governments sought to restore independence lost to the allies. The first method was obstructions and the second fulfillment” Obstruction caused the occupation of the Ruhr, whilst fulfillment ensured the hatred of the right. However Morris fails to acknowledge that the Government enjoyed much success via various treaties.

The defeat of WWI is the key turning point due to the various clauses, resentment and fury of Germans as shown by Aldcroft that “Germany harboured a burning resentment against the victors and was determined to seek revenge”, the manifestation of which was WWII, thus making this the key turning point.

The defeat in WWI was not the key turning point in the process of Government as its core and key institutions remained the same. This is demonstrated by Groener’s proposal to Ebert in which only the left was to be crushed; whilst the right was given free rein, showed no change in the ideologies of the elite. Groner even claimed “there can be no talk of letting Reichswehr fight Reichswehr”. This is supported by Hinden who observes that the army “would tolerate the republic for the time being in its own interests”. This is seen in its oath to Hitler when the rewards were great and in its recruitment, of which 21% of officers came from the ranks of the nobility, something at odds with the republic, which showed the army remained the same. The judiciary was similar, giving little sentences if any to the right. Government was still dominated by the Junkers as many of the leading positions were consistently held by “vons” or military figures as the Bismarckian structure prevailed, showing how little and cosmetic the change actually was. However the most important reason as to why this is not the key point lies within the very heart of the republic; The president and article 48. These ensured the essence of German Government remained the same, something admitted by Stresseman who acknowledged that “he (president) must wear a military uniform and plenty of decorations”, showing that despite the apparent change to democracy, Germans both within and without Government had not changed, whilst the existence of article 48 allowed the rule by emergency powers and the dissolution of the Reichstag, allowing a virtual dictator. The defeat is not the key turning point in Government simply as the change were merely cosmetic to appease the allies, whilst those in power remained the same, along with the mindset of the German people, and so it’s the lack of actual change that means this cannot be the key turning point.

The Reichstag fire was the key turning point in changing German Government as it ended the democratic republic in all but name. The event, as F.T. Tobias claims that the government simply exploited the happy coincidence. Hofer disagrees, claiming the fire was started by the Nazis, something confirmed by Delis, and that “Goering knew exactly how the fire was to be started”. This allowed them to amplify the fear of communism as “Nazi propaganda blamed the entire communist movement”. The fire hailed the end of Weimar via the decree for the protection of people and state, thus ending privacy and giving the state total power, a hitherto unseen law, whilst relentless campaigning brought about the enabling act. Morris claims “German democracy was done to death by Hitler, but he was greatly abetted by so-called democrats who lacked the determination to keep liberty alive”, this scating analysis is largely deserved as only the SPD opposed Hitler, whilst the others simply allowed democracy to degenerate. It’s unfair to solely blame them as Jones states “The poverty (of the people and its effects) made Hitler chancellor”. The Enabling act irrevocably changed the process of government, which now existed via Gleichshaltung, although the greatest change was within the provinces, which whilst returning to a very Bismarckian era, was now under the control of various governors, making Germany a centrally run state for the very first time in its existence. The fire is the key turning point as not only did it lead to the end of Weimar, but to a totalitarian, centrally run state, thus the government was taken from democracy and plunged into the depths of fascism with many hitherto unseen changes.

The Reichstag fire was not the key turning point in governmental process as much of the change was a return to that of bygone years with institutions retaining their influence, ergo the ability of certain factions to block Hitler’s power such as the army and Church, as shown by Kershaw “There was no inevitability about Hitler’s accession to power. His path ought to have been blocked before the final drama of January 1933” a fact which makes them even more guilty for allowing Hitler’s ascension. One may argue the foundations of Hitler’s rise was laid down by Bismarck himself by “crippling democratic institutions in Germany, he laid the country open to future dictatorships”. However Jones takes both sides into account, as “The future seemed a race, which would win, Bolshevism or Fascism?”  This showed that whilst a dictator was inevitable, he disagrees with Kershaw’s claim by taking Barraclough’s view into account that a dictatorship was inevitable, thus disagreeing with Kershaw that Hitler’s rise was inevitable, but perhaps slightly agreeing in that the ascension may not have been by Hitler, but a communist.

The army was the single most powerful institution in Germany due to its power and saturation with the nobility, which agreed with Hitler’s nationalistic ideals, but its upper echelons remained highly suspicious of him, this led to the destruction of the SA to gain their support, showing that despite all the previous changes, the old system was still alive and strong, as a result the fire was not the key turning point as it didn’t end the democratic system, simply as one did not exist so as to be ended, instead the veil across the backdoor powerplays was removed and its players married to the Nazis. This shows that there was no change in government to something new or different, just a reversal to something that had existed for centuries. It is also too brief a period, as biozonia lasted 40yrs and so is more worthy of mention than an event which lasted a night.

The creation of sectors by the allies after WWII and the subsequent merger into bizonia was the key turning point due to the unique political minefield and processes that developed. Infact, the process of government was so changed; it simply ceased to exist, as “Germans did not have full political rights” as German government was reduced to a heavily censored local government. However this fails to consider East Germany in which there was no autonomy due to he oppression of Stalin. In the apparently democratic FRG, everything was pre-approved, creating a sham democracy. However the real change was in the destruction of the political elite, denazification sought to destroy the mindset that caused WWI/WWII, particularly the “stronghold of militarism” that was Prussia which caused the removal of all traditional members from politics, ending the stranglehold the nobility had to a more “in-touch” version by the people. However it is wrong to criticize the soviets on their approach as Ozment states “The allies dictated democracy to the west as much as the soviets dictated communism to the east”, showing the fundamental changes both sides caused German politics to change completely. This is supported by Pulzer who agrees that “The FRG was based on a new set of rules, with its emphasis on civil rights and decentralized government, forming a national political identity”, however he disagrees with Ozment that democracy was dictated and shows the key difference to the Nazi regime in that government is now decentralized. Duwell disagrees as “each of the 4 powers chose its own way of carrying out objectives”, showing that Pulzer’s assertion that all 3 western allies rules the same is mistaken. It can be argued Germany became 2 countries upon the creation of Bizonia until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, a 40yr situation that was longer than any other. This change in the fabric of Germany made it dominated by foreign generals for the first time ever with a uniqueness of change that was unseen, thus causing this to be the key turning point as a completely new, foreign system was imposed on Germany, with no similarities to previous eras.

The creation of sectors and the subsequent merger into bizonia was not the key turning point as similar changes have occurred in the past, such as the pre-unified Germany, in which it was split into various kingdoms, albeit of smaller size than the zones, that had the same power as the allies, infact they even share a geographical similarity, as those in the east were more authoritarian, dictatorial and controlled around half the country, than those in the west, mirroring the east/west divide. It is this similarity to 1866 that dictates this cannot be the key turning point, but also the similarity to 1918, “the Frankfurt Documents” of 1948 essentially resurrected the Weimar constitution, just with minor changes. Even the army was similar in fashion to 1866, as each province was allowed a small regional guard; identical to the kingdoms had their own, individual armies. It is this consistent duplicity of events and themes to various times in Germany’s past which prevents this from becoming the key turning point due to its recurring nature.

The years 1890-1991 were host to many turbulent events; each with its own unique ramifications that all affected Government and others. It is clear the defeat in WWI is the key turning point as it sets the scene for subsequent events, instilling a deep sense of resentment in the German psyche, so much so that Aldcroft comments, “German harboured a burning resentment against the victors and was determined to seek revenge”. This pustule of German hatred intensified over time, which when coupled with the events of the defeat and the lack of similarity to any event before or after in German history compels it to be the key point as all the others have a recurring theme to previous events that the defeat doesn’t have, thereby making it the key turning point.