Contrary to my findings, D. Lyons also puts forward alternative views, explaining that ‘cautionary rules…are practical aids that are that are recommended or adopted for the purpose of most efficiently and correctly applying and acting upon a given moral principle when the principle could theoretically be applied directly to determine the rightness or wrongness of acts.’ He also says that in the case of Act-Utilitarianism, ‘by contract, rules can be theoretically dispensed with’. What this means is that for rule-utilitarianism, the rightness or wrongness of and act is ‘dependent upon some utilitarian characteristic of the set of rules under which the acts fall’, rather than on ‘some utilitarian characteristic of the act itself’ as with act-utilitarianism. Nevertheless, Lyons writes that there are, in theory, ways in which act-utilitarian rules exist. These are rules that are strongly justifiable ‘by reference to the act-utilitarian principle and that indicate exactly the implications of the principle for particular acts.’ He gives the example of a theoretical act-utilitarian rule as ‘lying is wrong, except when its simple utility in a particular case is greater than the simple utility of veracity, all things considered.’ I feel that this is an inconsequential type of rule, similar to the rule-utilitarian who is able to adapt his rule to fit any given circumstance or situation. This pushes the rule-utilitarian very close if not entirely into act-utilitarianism, the implications of which I have discussed above. Lyons continues to comment that cautionary rules are more commonly connected with act-utilitarianism. These are ‘rules that are taken as summaries of what generally or usually has been the case, rules that indicate that acts of certain kinds are normally right or wrong, that in the past they have usually had (relatively) good or bad effects, and that they therefore may be expected to be right or wrong in the future.’ However, although potentially useful in deliberation, it is unlikely that these general rules could honestly be ‘generated from the act-utilitarian principle.’ Lyons believes that ‘a substantive alternative to act-utilitarianism on utilitarianism grounds’ is possible, due to the fact that ‘nothing is essentially lost or gained…by appealing to rules as such instead of applying the test of utility directly to acts.’
Interestingly, Baier holds that ‘act-utilitarianism must be rejected because it entails that we should never relax, that we should use up every available minute in good works.’ He is saying that act-utilitarianism is not preferable to rule-utilitarianism because of the amount of time wasted in considering what action to take. Smart states that ‘the act-utilitarian…acts in accordance with rules, in short, when there is no time to think, and since he does not think, the actions which he does habitually are not the outcomes of moral thinking.’ If he does have time to think, because the act-utilitarian has to consider what course of action to take, he may be too late to gain the best possible outcome. This can be illustrated by the problem of a man having to decide whether to enter a burning building to save two people trapped inside. By the time he has contemplated the positives and the negatives of the possible consequences and come to the conclusion that he will try to save them, too much time may have elapsed and they may have died. The rule-utilitarian is likely to argue that by following a general rule, for example, that one should always try and save the lives of others, the two people would not have died and the outcome would have been better. This notion of stopping to consider ones actions raises the idea of the infinite regress of act-utilitarianism, which is the idea that considering whether to act is an act in itself. Therefore, if this is true, the act of considering whether to consider whether to act is also an act; and so on to infinity. A rule-utilitarian would argue that an act-utilitarian will, therefore, never be able to make a decision about which action to take. He would be likely to argue that it is preferable not to have to stop to think, but to instead simply follow the generally accepted moral rule which is believed to be best under the circumstances. In response, the act-utilitarian would almost certainly counter these arguments by suggesting that a rule utilitarian could easily end up following the same process of infinite regression in deciding which rule to follow, which I would see as a perfectly valid point. Increasingly, it is difficult to argue that rule-utilitarianism provides any real alternative to act-utilitarianism.
Nonetheless, a serious weakness of act-utilitarianism is that, as indicated by Quinton, ‘the consequences of an action extend indefinitely into its future and, therefore, that an evaluation of its total consequences is logically impossible.’ This raises the issue of the extreme reliance of act-utilitarianism on the calculation of the ‘balance of pleasure and pain for the whole of humanity’ and hence on the capabilities of the individual to make such a decision. Rule-utilitarianism determines which action to take by applying general moral rules to maximize the general happiness, which completely eradicates the burden and complications of calculation that act-utilitarianism has to answer to, because potential consequences already exist due to the existing moral rules. This is a significant flaw to my argument that rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism collapse into one another. I would concede that this is a possible advantage of rule-utilitarianism over act-utilitarianism.
In contrast, a serious weakness of rule-utilitarianism is ‘the accusation of rule worship’. Rule worship occurs where a person follows the rules so precisely and will not deviate from them at all, even when he or she knows that their actions will not have the best possible outcome in that situation. This can be highly detrimental to the overall utility. A rule-utilitarian may counter this with the argument that ‘in most cases it is most beneficial to abide by the rule,’ but in my opinion this is irrelevant if you are looking at the consequences of a single situation. It seems irrational to an act-utilitarian to refuse to break a ‘generally beneficial rule’. A rule-utilitarian would probably put forward the view that it is wrong to kill. Now, let us apply this rule to Adolf Hitler, the mother of whom had his life in her hands. An act-utilitarian, would certainly argue that she should have killed him, because this would have been the outcome that would have been of the greatest benefit to society as a whole. A rule-utilitarian would refuse to say that Hitler should have been murdered as a child, despite the fact that this produces the worst income. Of course, this point of view has some merit, but the rule-utilitarian would argue that it is bad for society as a whole if people think that they can legitimately kill someone simply because their being alive will reduce the happiness of others. This is turn reduces overall utility and it is clear to see that it would not be good for any of us if people thought that they were legitimate in killing others. Act-utilitarianism, by abolishing rules, can cause social norms such as, ‘do not kill,’ to collapse. It seems to logically follow that if basic moral rules fail, then more sophisticated moral rules, derived from basic ones, will fail as well, leading to a chaotic state of society. Still, the act-utilitarian can attempt to solve this problem for us. They would suggest that if an action designed to maximize utility, in fact set a bad precedent for society, then this would have been taken into account as an overall consequence of the action and so the action would, therefore, not have been performed in the first place. However, I find it difficult to believe that a human could take into account the overall consequences for all of society of an action. As humans are not perfectly informed, perfectly objective or practiced at ethical reasoning, attempting to carry out the most socially correct action purely by human capabilities seems impossible. The rule-utilitarian would argue that following social rules created by the wealth of wisdom of generations before them is more likely to achieve the greatest outcome for utility. After all, rules are usually created for very good reasons.
In conclusion, I am inclined to believe that rule-utilitarianism cannot provide a genuine alternative to act utilitarianism. However, I will acknowledge that there are areas in which rule-utilitarianism appears to hold the advantage. Essentially, as ‘the consequences of an action extend indefinitely into its future’, it may never be possible to evaluate the true utility of an act-utilitarian action. On the other hand, if a judgment is made according to a morally accepted rule, future consequences do not, by the definition of rule-utilitarianism, have to be taken into account and so this problem is avoided. Individual human beings are not informed or rational enough to take into account the consequences for society as a whole and so their individual choices may not reflect what is best for overall utility. Based on this idea, relying on social rules formed through the wisdom of prior generations could be the best way to achieve the highest utility. Despite these points, I find it irrational that a rule-utilitarian would refuse to break a generally accepted moral rule when the keeping of that rule will knowingly produce a lower level of happiness, or even have bad consequences. I would agree with D. Lyons, when he said that if exceptions to the rule were permitted, rule-utilitarianism ‘would in fact consist of one rule only, the act-utilitarian one; maximize probable benefit.’ Fundamentally, the sheer fact that one form can so easily collapse into another leads me to believe that rule-utilitarianism can never provide a genuine alternative to act-utilitarianism.
Bibliography
- J.S. Mill – Utilitarianism
- Anthony Quinton – Utilitarian Ethics
- Smart and Williams – Utilitarianism
- Mulgan – Understanding Utilitarianism
- Glover – Utilitarianism and Its Critics
- B. Williams and A. Sen – Utilitarianism and Beyond
- D. Lyons – Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism
- J.L Mackie – Ethics; Inventing Right and Wrong
