Lin Biao, who was appointed Defence Minister in 1959, was an essential factor in the launching of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, his successes within the army were essential in allowing Mao the confidence and ability to ‘risk a profound upheaval in the Party apparatus’ (Maitan, 1976, 100). Without this support, Mao would have struggled to gain backing for his revolutionary plans given the influence of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping who were striving to continue with the readjustment phase. Indeed the army, following an attempt to clampdown on corrupt local officials, had grown more autonomous gaining increased powers to conduct duties normally associated with the Provincial authorities. The army became recognised as one of the most powerful political forces, particularly given its ability to influence at both policy-making and implementation levels. Lin Biao was devoted to strengthening ‘the vision of Mao as a great leader’ and forced millions of soldiers within the PLA to memorise his sayings (Spence, 1991, 596). With the help of Mao’s Little Red Book, Lin aimed to indoctrinate his army and to emphasize the values of service to the party. His campaign was intensified in early 1963 when he published the Diary of Lei Feng, a soldier who had recently given his life for his country and the revolutionary cause.
Lin’s campaign was further endorsed by the support of Jiang Qing, Mao’s third wife, and her close allies. Jiang Qing who did not become involved in politics until the early 1960s, had become ‘disturbed by the “traditionalist” and “feudal” content of Chinese art. Her views clearly influenced those of Mao who became increasingly disturbed with the problems he found in all forms of art. However, despite Jiang Qing’s enthusiasm to target cultural bureaucrats, much of her efforts were subdued by Liu Shaoqi and his associates who insisted that ‘feudal plays must continue to be staged because recent works were simply not as good yet’ (Dietrich, 1998, 164). Divisions amongst the political elite were further entrenched during 1964 and into 1965 as Mao became increasingly dissatisfied with what he saw as a lacklustre cultural rectification campaign.
It was the play of Wu Han, The Dismissal of Hai Rui from Office that signalled the climax in tension between opposing factions within the political elite. Wu Han was accused of ‘denying the key premise of Mao’s thought – that the masses constitute the motive force of history’. The eventual publication of this essay in Beijing forced the political elites into taking sides with regards to Wu Han’s play. Two groups formed and convened in Beijing and Shanghai respectively. The first was known as the Group of Five, directed by Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen and was largely composed of party bureaucrats and intellectuals associated with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. The second, comprising of radical or non-establishment intellectuals, was headed by Jiang Qing. Whilst the Group of Five were critical of Wu Han (largely a result of leadership pressure); they were opposed to it being used as a tool for assaulting China’s cultural system. Jiang Qing’s group on the other hand saw Wu Han’s work as evidence that China was still infested with ‘anti-socialist poisonous weeds’ and was determined to see the ‘socialist purification of art’ (Spence, 1991, 603).
On the 16th May, Mao’s wishes were answered with the repudiation of the Group of Five’s report and Peng Zhen, Mayor of Beijing was denounced, becoming the first high-ranking political victim of the Cultural Revolution. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping’s attempts to control the disturbances and extract evidence of revisionism from the Universities were undermined by Lin Biao, Kang Sheng and Chen Boda. Liu and Deng’s desperate attempts to suppress the student uprisings failed largely because they did not have control of the army. Further criticism was directed at Liu and Deng when Chen Boda attacked them for having ‘thought and style’ that was exactly opposite to that of Mao (Evans, 1997). Such condemnations meant that Liu and Deng as well as their close associates were accused of being representatives of the bourgeoisie who had infiltrated the Party leadership. Both Liu and Deng were ordered to present self-examinations and were forced to confess that the only way to redemption was in learning from Lin Biao. In October 1968, a group headed by Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng concluded that Liu Shaoqi was a ‘renegade, hidden traitor and scab’ and was swiftly dismissed from his posts and expelled from the CCP. This victory for the radicals over the so-called ‘capitalist roaders’ symbolised to the masses that no one was free from criticism. Furthermore, it banished the ‘number one capitalist roader’ from the political scene, signalling a triumph for the cause of the revolutionaries and was further glorified by Liu’s death in a provincial prison in 1969. For Mao, it was a rewarding achievement to succeed in dismissing two of the most powerful figures who he felt had, in recent years, treated him as a falling figure in Chinese Politics. Furthermore, the demise of these political giants showed the masses that indeed no one, regardless of stature, could stand in the way of the revolutionary determination of the masses of China.
Aggression amongst students in China had grown rapidly in the years preceding the Cultural Revolution. Following the failures of the Great Leap Forward, both University places and job opportunities had diminished casting a dark shadow of the younger generation’s hopes of a prosperous future. As a result, the state government had been forced to introduce new stringent admission criteria for University places. Had the criteria been solely based on academic achievements, a disproportionate number of pre-liberation intelligentsia would have dominated the higher education scene. The CCP thus introduced a system whereby ‘class origins’ as well as political performance would be taken into consideration when considering a student’s application. This new system resulted in students of differing class backgrounds being channelled into schools of different qualities, thus promoting friction amongst them. Competition that had once existed in the realms of academia now became centred on membership of the Youth League, and a clear gap emerged between members and non-members. As it had done in the PLA, Lei Feng’s diary led to further increased political activism within schools as well as placing greater emphasis on students’ origins and true convictions. Those deemed to originate from the bad classes were criticised and accused of being ‘white experts, not reds’ (Chan et al, 1980, 415). As a result, not only did this atmosphere create serious antagonism between students of opposing class backgrounds but also nurtured urgency to express one’s political convictions and dedication to the Communist cause.
The masses, in this instance the students, could be divided into ‘two antagonistic camps’: the Loyalist Faction (otherwise known as the Conservative faction) and the Rebel Faction (Chen, 1992, 63). Throughout the 60s, the class debate had intensified and had resulted in the polarisation of the ‘five red categories’ and the ‘black categories’. This divide finally resulted in a huge eruption of violence in the summer and autumn of 1966 when Mao called on the masses to rebel against the establishment. Students, in particular those who claimed ‘red birth’ – the sons and daughters of the revolutionary cadres, took this opportunity to regroup in order to further distinguish themselves from the ‘impure’ (Chan et al, 1980, 413). Disassociating themselves from the Communist Youth League and forming their own Red Guard Organisations, they set about launching the particularly violent ‘Four-Olds Campaign’, where everything associated with the old bourgeoisie was attacked. Whilst factions remained within the student movements, groups of largely middle-class background who were deemed too impure to be part of the ‘Old Red Guards’, joined the Red Terror movement in an effort to prove their revolutionary determination. Indeed, despite the clear divisions that separated the Conservatives from the Rebels, ‘both factions were acting ostensibly to protect the Mao Zedong revolutionary line’. The students were spurred on by rallies held by Mao in Tiananmen Square such as that of August 18th 1968, where Mao greeted a million Red Guards sporting one of their infamous armbands. Even though the students initially reacted to Mao’s commands and initiatives, some claim that even Mao himself, particularly during the first two years of the revolution, was not in control.
During the first three months of the Revolution, ‘black category labels’ were targeted through torture, abuse and killings with reports of genocide campaigns in the countryside. The intellectuals and the academics were indeed targeted but they only represented a portion of the victims (Chen, 1992, 71). As the Revolution unfolded, the opposing Rebel and Conservative factions became involved in full-blown warfare. As the conflict spun out of control, political leaders realised that intervention was necessary. Indeed, some of the most extreme Conservative Red Guards were criticised by Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and Chen Boda for ‘over emphasizing the importance of blood-line theory’ (White, 1976, 40). They were accused of manipulating such arguments in order to camouflage the political interests of the ‘privileged stratum’. Opposition towards the Red Guard movement increased during the early stages of 1968 following the intense violence during the summer of 1967: no longer were newspapers covered with editorials supporting the Red Guards; rather, they became increasingly critical of them suggesting that ‘we must struggle against selfishness and criticise revisionism’ (Perry et al, 1997, 20). It was indeed to spell the beginning of the student movement demise that had at one stage, seemed unstoppable. In December 1968, the Red Guard organisations were ‘officially disbanded on Mao’s command’ and many of the students were sent away to the countryside in an effort to ‘defuse their militancy’ (Perry et al, 1997, 2).
In late 1967, the leadership had looked to the work organisations as a means of curbing what they felt were student excesses. An example of this took place in Shanghai where Zhang Chunqiao (First Party Secretary-cum-Mayor of Shanghai) called upon the Workers’ General Headquarters for assistance in thwarting Red Guard initiatives, who had kidnapped the Writers’ Group Leader, Xu Jingxian. With their assistance, the Red Guards were soon defeated in Shanghai allowing for the students to be rapidly eclipsed by the workers. By the end of 1967 two huge worker coalitions, one radical and one conservative, had stolen the limelight from the Red Guards in Shanghai. Whilst the students movement was indeed waning, the workers took over their momentum and created what Perry et al described as ‘a more enduring and politically more influential mass organisation’ that ‘surpassed the Red Guards in both numbers and political significance’ (1997, 29). Crucial to the continuation of the masses’ influence during the Cultural Revolution, the workers attacked the work teams placed in the factories and subjected their factory managers to public criticism and beatings. Unlike the Red Guard Movement, the Worker’s General Headquarters in Shanghai attempted to avoid factionalism so that everyone could unite under their ‘General’ rubric (Perry et al, 1997, 32). The workers became actively involved in targeting the anti-socialist rightist deemed to have infiltrated the Communist systems. Nevertheless, great emphasis was placed on restricting striking and activism within the workplace as production was gravely affected. Calls for calm were in many instances ignored, however, when Mao made the call, for instance in Shanghai when he appealed to the workers to ‘pull themselves together and return to work’, he was often able to bring a greater influence to bear on the situation (Esmein, 1975, 127).
Whether this was indeed the case is a matter of intense debate. Academics have indeed postulated the concept of Mao’s influence over his subjects. Some feel that Mao was omnipotent and was entirely responsible for the events during the Cultural Revolution. Students of the Red Guard movement were often portrayed as mere recipients of Mao’s instructions rather than the original instigators of the Cultural Revolution. They were victims of the intense political indoctrination that Mao imposed on them to through his policies, the media, the PLA (along with Lin Biao), and mass rallies. As Tiewes and Sun support, Mao possessed absolute authority, ‘a power comparable only to that exercised by the most awesome emperors’ (1996, 166). In the years preceding the Cultural Revolution this had not been the case and Mao felt that he had lost his respect and command within the elite of the CCP. Leaders such as Deng and Liu had undermined his position of authority feeling that they no longer needed ‘his presence or his inspiration’ (Spence, 1991, 596). The Cultural Revolution was thus a last gasp attempt by Mao to reassert his stranglehold on the Party. With the assistance of Lin Biao and effective propaganda campaigns, Mao re-established his universal reverence amongst society and became commonly referred to as ‘our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman’ (Spence, 1991, 605). This transformation did not occur overnight however, and required great skill and thought on Mao’s behalf. He realised that in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie who were infiltrating the Party, he needed to return to the roots of the Communist cause and re-ignite the revolutionary zeal within society. Aware of the social discontent brewing within schools, Mao had seen the students as perfect candidates for instigating his Cultural Revolution. Both impressionable and fired with revolutionary determination, they were perfect for ridding society of the four olds and spreading fear amongst his opponents at all levels of society. Unlike adults, the students did not share the same fears about speaking up independently against those in power; this is why Mao decided that it was the ‘politically naive students who should take the first spontaneous action’ (Wang, 1990, 3). When Mao eventually called upon the masses to rebel in the summer and autumn of 1966, a combination of social tension and pure determination to carry out Mao’s revolutionary wishes resulted in an eruption of violence. To them, the ‘greatest liberator in history’, their ‘Confucius plus Lao-tzu plus Rousseau plus Marx plus Buddha....’ wanted them to launch a furious offensive to sweep away reactionary, decadent bourgeois and feudal influences as well as all old ideas, culture, customs and habits.
That Mao’s immense power and reverence within Chinese society played a crucial role in promoting the explosive and violent events of the Cultural Revolution seems almost undisputable. There is however, a clear difference in opinion regarding the interpretation of his power and influence during the Cultural Revolution. Some academics feel that Mao is almost entirely to blame for the catastrophes of the Cultural Revolution; others feel that he was merely the persona behind a movement driven by a plethora of opposing forces. Tensions between opposing classes within the realms of education had been mounting for a some time prior to the Revolution. Indeed, Mao’s call for an attack on the capitalist roaders was the perfect excuse for the students to turn this tension into full-blown violence. Even though Mao was responsible for opening the floodgates, some argue that this is merely all he did, and that the subsequent violence that erupted was something that he had not anticipated. According to Wang, although the masses hailed the slogans spun at them by the central machinery, their aims during the Cultural Revolution were ‘qualitatively different from those of the leaders’ (1990, 6). Furthermore, Wang feels that the rebel masses had little interest in the issues causing the cleavages at the top. For many, the anti-Liu campaign was of no interest or relation to them. They were far more interested in dealing with their immediate adversaries at local levels and found that the Cultural Revolution offered the perfect opportunity to do so. This argument is further supported by Dai Hsiao-Ai’s account of the Red Guard experience, when he explained that ‘we (the Red Guards) knew nothing of the real meaning of the Cultural Revolution and could not imagine its significance’(Bennet and Montaperto, 1972, 71). Rather than blaming Mao, some academics feel that there was a sense of ‘mutual exploitation’ that formed the basis of the relationship between the central authorities and the masses (Ling, 1972, 131). Yes, Mao was very successful in energising the masses but was unable to direct the movement. For Wang, ‘Mao and his retinue’ aims were essentially divergent from those of the masses. Although emotionally the masses were loyal to Mao, as “strategically rational actors” they had their own objectives to pursue’ (1990, 18). Indeed, the Cultural Revolution affected individuals differently depending on a number of socio-economic, political and geographical factors. In order to appeal to as great a number of the population as possible Mao, who was well aware of these differences, cleverly devised directives that were often ‘equivocal and inconsistent, leaving room for flexible interpretations’ (Wang, 1990, 20). This meant that although he was often not in control of the events that took place at local levels, he was perfectly capable of influencing and controlling some of them through his ‘ambiguous’ speeches.
Though Mao had felt threatened by some of his political adversaries (namely Liu Shaoqi) prior to the Cultural Revolution; there was no doubt that the events from 1966 onwards had served to strengthen his position as supreme leader of China. Indeed, Mao became recognised as the only ‘unchallengeable figure’ or ‘fixed point’ during the Cultural Revolution. The surprise fall and demise of Lin Biao was nevertheless a great shock to the masses who had looked to him as Mao’s main assistant in the Cultural Revolution and his heir-apparent. When Liu Shaoqi had been purged, the masses, though relatively uninterested by such developments, had been very supportive of Mao who had isolated him as the number one capitalist roader. However, the Lin Biao incident took the Chinese people by surprise and instilled a feeling of mistrust even directed towards Mao himself. As one civilian put it ‘We came to see that the leaders up there could say today that something is round; tomorrow, that it’s flat. We lost faith in the system’ (Spence, 1991, 617). When the people referred to the system they often failed to see that the person responsible for this was Mao himself. This style of governance typified Mao’s personality, one day he would say one thing wich would be completely reversed on the next, suggesting that he enjoyed exercising his power over others. He constantly shifted the boundaries within politics, regularly changing the attitudes and levels of radicalism of his policies. This in itself adds a further complex dimension to the Cultural Revolution movement, making interpretations of events increasingly difficult. Mao enjoyed keeping people on their toes, shifting his support for various factions on a regular basis. No one ever felt completely safe – the safest option was pledging one’s absolute allegiance to the Party and even then, if you weren’t from the right class background, there was no guarantee of avoiding persecution (Spence, 1991).
A further shift in Mao’s policies came when he allowed the return of large number of previously purged officials. ‘Between April 1969 and the end of 1971, the vast majority of officials ousted during the height of the mass movement returned to their posts’ (Sheehan, 2002, 9). Much to the dismay of the Gang of Four and its followers, Deng Xiaoping was allowed to return to the political arena in February of 1973 and by August had been re-elected on to the Central Committee. Deng’s return led to further power struggles at the very top-level right through until the eventual arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976. Such struggles oscillated back and forth in favour of the opposing groups. This was not helped by Mao’s constant shifting stance and support for various groups. Nevertheless, it was widely believed that the Cultural Revolution had come to an end following the convening of the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. As Sheehan notes, ‘at that point virtually all mass organisations had been compelled to suspend their activities’, furthermore Mao gave the reasons why the Cultural Revolution had been necessary leaving ‘few in any doubt that he was summing up a campaign which had run its course’ (2002, 3). However, as Chen points out, Dengists saw the three years between 1966 and 1969 as the most humiliating of their personal lives and felt the need to wipe them from the history books (1992, 74). Manipulating the statements of Hua Guofeng and Mao in 1977 and 1974 respectively, Dengists attempted to propagate the notion that there had been a ten year Cultural Revolution ending with the death of Mao and the arrest of the Gang of Four. This ten-year periodisation fitted the Dengist ‘power struggle paradigm’ perfectly and diverted the focus from the more painful and ugly three-year ‘social-conflict paradigm’(Chen, 1992, 74). Indeed, as the Dengists claimed, there had been an elite power-struggle lasting between 1966 and 1976; however, this had also existed prior to 1966. Mao’s tendency for constant shifting of political boundaries meant that his political inferiors were constantly on the alert for any opportunity to further their careers. As a consequence, the top-level power struggle was continuous but with a wily Chairman Mao always one step ahead, able to unsettle any colleague whom he thought was gaining too much influence and impinging upon his territory.
The masses were indeed the main driving force for the Revolution and its attack on the four olds of society between 1966 and 1969. Without their empowerment, the upheaval of society during the Cultural Revolution would not have been possible. Nevertheless, when referring to the ‘mass movement’, one must be aware that not all the masses were involved. Indeed, most of the Red Guard movement was controlled by the children of the ‘top level’ (Chan et al, 1980, 428). Even though the Rebel Red Guards fought the class divide that had been imposed upon them, large sections of the population remained relatively inactive. The xiaoyaopai were indeed such a group comprising of a large section of the population but did not however, join any mass organisations and never actively cared about what happened to their organisations (Wang, 1990, 3). Many academics argue that the students and workers went through stages of the revolution where they were beyond the control of the state. This may indeed have been the case for periods of the Revolution where Mao failed to direct the movement that he himself had instigated. Nevertheless, this was seen as part of Mao’s style of governance. He had not worked out a master plan for the movement prior to 1966 and was thus forced to react to difficulties as they arose. Indeed, it was impossible for Mao to foresee the response of the masses to their empowerment. Although many may argue that Mao had lost the control and direction of the movement that he himself had ignited, ultimately, when the masses were seen to be careering out of control, Mao, with the assistance of Lin Biao and his army were able to reassert their control.
The Cultural Revolution was characterised by a movement called for from above and answered and reacted to from below. It was a ‘conflict between a manipulative class of Party officials intent on preserving their power and a powerless mass of ordinary people, who had been repeatedly conned into seeing the Party apparatus as their champions against imaginary foes’ (Unger, 1991, 33). At the head of this group of officials stood Chairman Mao, a champion of the right to rebel against an oppressive system. Depending on whom one asks, he was either seen as the devil or a saint. As Wei Jingsheng puts it eloquently, ‘those who in 1966 had stood in Tiananmen like idiots, with tears in their eyes, before that man who stripped them of their freedom, returned courageously in 1976 to oppose him in that same place’ (quoted in Sheehan, 2002, 13/14). The Cultural Revolution was Mao’s last attempt at achieving his socialist utopian ideals. It was a two-sided exploitation movement driven by Mao and his elites’ attempts to direct the masses, whilst taking direction from the masses themselves. Unfortunately, Mao’s dreams of a perpetual revolution were ironically crushed by his own selfish ideals: ‘Whoever tries to immortalise revolution will himself kill the revolution’, sadly, that is exactly what Chairman Mao did.
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Indeed, Mao had accused Liu Shaoqi of turning the Politburo into his own Independent Kingdom and that the Secretariat had become Deng Xiaoping’s nest.
The ‘four cleanups’ were to be conducted ‘in the spheres of accounting procedures, granary supplies, property accumulation, and in the system of allocating compensatory work points in return for hours and types of labor performed in the communes’ (Spence, 1991, 592).
Up until 1964, people had been told that they would go for only 4 years and retain their urban cards. From 1964 onwards, new volunteers to the countryside were told that they may be there for life (Chan et al, 1980, 400).
Evidence of the freedom Mao wanted to give his subjects in fighting the Cultural Revolution was seen when he attacked Deng Xiaoping’s claim that the ‘party members must control the temperature’. Mao responded by insisting that ‘it is necessary to give the masses a free hand’ (Spence, 1991, 595).
Chen suggest in her work that ‘from now on, we adopt the 3 year Cultural Revolution periodisation, and call the other seven years by another name, say, “the Gang of Four Period – 1969-76”’ (Chen, 1992, 85).
The most high-profile example of this was seen between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi. Taking the example of agriculture, Mao wanted to see the countryside develop in a self-sufficient manner where the masses’ potential energy and creativity would be maximised. Liu on the other hand sought ways of maximising yield and production by channelling investment to areas of greater potential.
The PLA emerged from the period between 1966-1969 deeply involved in civilian politics and administration. It had committed 2 million troops to political activities and reportedly suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. Following the death of Lin Biao, the military began to disengage from politics.
Lin and Mao conducted ‘endless ideological campaigns featuring exhortations such as the following: Respond to Chairman Mao’s call to Learn Resolutely from Comrade Lei Feng’ (Dietrich, 1998, 166).
This attack was published in an article written by Yao Wenyuan, a close colleague of Jiang Qing in Shanghai (Spence, 1991, 601), who further critcised Wu by claiming that he wished ‘to replace the state theory of Marxism-Leninism with the state theory of the landlord and the bourgeoisie’. For many, his play was an indirect attack on Mao himself.
The Gang of Five’s report had called for ‘caution in Cultural Reform’ (Spence, 1991, 604)
There were 4 main reasons that students turned their focus to political performance: [1] A more strenuous and convincing effort to be politically active may allow admission to the Youth League. [2] Politics in the classroom was a good way of distinguishing oneself from other classmates. Academic work was nationwide. [3] Government reinforced the importance of demonstrating political dedication. The Youth League was considered glorious, like being a volunteer in the war’. [4] Rift with Russia strengthened the government’s resolve to safeguard the thinking of the new generation. (Chan et al, 1980, 407/08)
Revolutionary students claimed that people such as Peng Zhen had placed undue emphasis on scholarly achievement thus supporting bad and middle class students (Chan et al, 1980, 422).
The Five Red Categories were said to epitomise progressiveness and revolutionary virtue whilst the black categories were said to symbolise backwardness and counter-revolutionary wickedness. (Chen, 1992, 65).
‘The new Red Guards view was best articulated by a university student Tan Lifu, son of a deceased high-level cadre: Only those of the purest revolutionary blood were to be trusted in this hour of crisis’ (Chan et al, 1980, 427/8).
Such criticism came as violence reached what Jiang Qing felt was an ‘intolerable level’. She now denounced ‘ultra-leftist tendencies’ and praised the PLA as a champion of Proletarian Dictatorship. (Spence, 1991, 612).
Mao repented his initial faith in the students brandishing them as ‘politically immature’ and incompetent. He despaired of their factionalism and argued that they should have been ‘rallying under one banner’. (Dietrich, 1998, 194/5).
Mao was revered by many in society as a demi-god. Evidence of this cult amongst the Red Guards was seen when many of them trekked to Yunan reputed to be the place where Mao’s ‘revolutionary ideals had been realised’. The Red Guards ‘reverently wrapped up dirt from the plot once farmed by Mao and kept it’; behaving like religious pilgrims (BBC Four Documentary – Morning Sun).
Students were encouraged to “let Mao Tse-tung's thought occupy all positions; use it to transform the mental outlook of the whole of society; sweep away all ghosts and monsters; brush aside all stumbling-blocks and resolutely carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end!” (Peking Review, 1966, 17 quoted in ).
‘They (the masses) were not anxious about the danger of capitalist restoration, which for them was too hard to comprehend and irrelevant to daily life…. Liu was understood to have symbolised the force that had suppressed us. Beyond that, we did not have interest in criticising him’ (Interview with former influential rebel organisation leader in Wang, 1990, 7/8).
BBC Four’s ‘Morning Sun’ Documentary.
The fall of Lin Biao had played a major role in Deng’s ability to return to Beijing. Deng wrote two letters of self-criticism and pleas for repentance to the Central Committee. Thanks to the support of key figures such as Zhou Enlai and the fact that Mao considered Deng to be a rare talent; he was able to return to the Political arena and stage a comeback. However, following the death of Zhou Enlai, Deng was once again attacked in public and subjected to the third purge of his career.
‘The most definitive official interpretation of the Cultural Revolution is “Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution” in the “Resolution on the Historical Questions of the Party” passed by the 6th plenary session of the Central Committee on June 29, 1981.’ Chen describes it as an attempt by Dengists, political enemies and victims of Mao, to rewrite history (1992, 62).
‘Local troops as well as troops stationed in the area, are responsible for the carrying out of directives… They are empowered to arrest, imprison and try according to the law trouble makers, those who urge them on, and criminals who have killed or wounded people’ (Esmein, 1975, 145).
BBC Four Morning Sun Documentary.