Is the Cultural Revolution best characterised as a top-level power struggle or a mass movement?

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Is the Cultural Revolution best characterised as a top-level power struggle or a mass movement?

‘In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is the masses who must liberate themselves. We cannot do the things for them which they should do for themselves. We must trust the masses, rely on them and respect their creative spirit…We must not be afraid of disorder.’ (Mao Zedong quoted in Chan et al, 1980)

Mao’s epic return to the political limelight on July 16th 1966 not only stunned the masses of China, but also sent shockwaves rolling through the political establishment. Amidst rumours of illness and death, Mao surprised everyone by springing back on to the scene and swimming 15km of the Yangzi River at Hangkou. A tremendous feat for a man 73 years of age; reports in the media quickly hailed him as superhuman. This was indeed the comeback that Mao had desired, having felt increasingly threatened by his ‘advancing age…and his concern that his senior colleagues were seeking to shunt him aside’ (Spence, 1991, 603). In 1965, Mao had become angry at the extent to which the Politburo under Liu Shaoqi, and the Secretariat under Deng Xiaoping had taken policy making into its own hands. Having retreated to Shanghai where he gathered with hard-line Communist intellectuals, he set about planning the initial stages of what Mao felt would reignite his Communist Revolution. For him, developments over recent years showed that the Chinese political garden had become ‘overgrown with anti-socialist weeds’ (Spence, 1991, 603).

Corruption within local authorities had become widespread following increased autonomy gained during the Great Leap Forward. Chen Yun who conducted an assessment of local peasant’s livelihoods in the summer of 1961 for the CCP, highlighted the bad morale in the countryside and discovered widespread dissatisfaction with the way politics was being conducted in rural communities. Both the Socialist Education Campaign and the ten points presented at the Central Committee Resolution in 1963 attempted to subject the authorities to the ‘four cleanups’. Mao and his associates were thus trying to re-impose their suzerainty over these areas of society, where they felt that a bourgeoisie comeback was most likely to be staged.

Disenchantment following the disasters of the Great Leap was not exclusive to the countryside. Within educational institutions, a dramatic cut in the number of University places available meant that students became fiercely competitive. Diminishing job opportunities in the cities resulted in qualified graduates having to face the prospect of a lifetime working in the countryside. Even though a move to the countryside was seen as a means of proving one’s ‘revolutionary determination’, it soon became recognised as a ‘dumping ground for cities’ (Chan et al, 1980, 400/01). Performance was no longer judged solely on academic achievements; political convictions as well as class origins became essential components to gaining a place at University. The former fuelled an incessant desire within students for proving their commitment to the Communist cause; whilst the latter introduced a system whereby the standard of one’s education depended on class background. The polarisation of the student classes coupled with ever increasing divisions amongst the political elite, formed the foundations upon which Mao could unleash the Proletarian Cultural Revolution and rid Chinese society of all ‘reactionary bourgeois ideology’ (Spence, 1991, 601).

The Cultural Revolution was an attempt, spearheaded by Chairman Mao, to rid China once and for all of the ‘shackles of old’, and to pursue independent and self-reliant development (Xing, 2001, 141). Nevertheless, despite Mao’s endless quest for a socialist utopia, his perpetual revolution, particularly between 1966 and 1969, inflicted scars that would never be forgotten.  Indeed, the Cultural Revolution is recognised and has been referred to as a ‘colossal catastrophe in which human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and civilisation itself were unprecedentedly trampled….the whole of China tumbled into insanity’ (Yan and Gao, 1996, 529). Years of work and progress were sacrificed: a whole generation of youth went without education; factories and farms lay idle. China fell even further behind the industrialised powers of the world.

This essay aims to assess the importance and responsibility of various groups and organisations in dictating the path of the Revolution. As described by Gordon White (1974, 20), the Cultural Revolution ‘involved a dynamic interplay between leader and masses’ and must therefore be looked at in such light. The author will thus begin by looking at the factions that emerged within the top tier of the political elite. Dietrich (1998, 179) identified three distinct organisations within which clear divisions existed with regards to the goals of the Cultural Revolution. These were, [1] the People’s Liberation Army under Lin Biao, [2] the so-called Cultural Revolution Small Group under Chen Boda and Jiang Qing, and [3] the State Council with its central ministries under Premier Zhou Enlai. That Mao played a pivotal role in promoting the Cultural Revolution and had an influence on its explosive and violent events seems indisputable. However, each of the groups below Mao had different political ideals and aspirations and thus tried to influence his decision-making accordingly. With reference to these groups, the author will assess the influence of Mao and the Political elite in steering the events of the Revolution.

It was Mao who realised the importance and influence of the masses. It was he who called on the masses to bombard the headquarters and had been quick to criticise anyone who disagreed. Even though he had moved to empower the people, it must be noted that he was not always in control, as Wang supports, ‘neither Mao nor his close associates, who had launched the movement, were able to control it’ (1990, 1). Indeed, the masses had begun to interpret the Cultural Revolution as a struggle between the new bureaucratic class struggling to stay in power and the powerless masses who ‘were progressively learning to comprehend the nature of their oppression and the possibilities of mass power’ (Unger, 1991, 28). It is important not to underestimate the importance of the masses in instigating and steering the Cultural Revolution. The author will therefore look at the student Red Guard movement and their role in discarding of the ‘four olds’ within Chinese society attacking anything remotely connected with the West, capitalism, the Soviet Union or intellectualism. The impact of the workers who became involved at a later stage, taking power from the local government and party authorities, will also be assessed. Though the workers avoided the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution, they remained politically influential for much longer and, in the views of some academics, had ‘far greater impact than the student Red Guards’ (Perry et al, 1997, 2).

The Cultural Revolution is still a hotly disputed period with differing accounts as well as interpretations of events. One of the most contentious issues concerns the duration of the movement; whether it concluded with the convening of the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 – or whether it ended with the arrest of the Gang of Four and the death of Mao in 1976. Mao himself had added to the confusion by referring to the Cultural Revolution in the present tense in 1974; indeed, it was not until 1977 that the bureaucratic use of the term ‘Cultural Revolution’ was discarded. Even so, for many of the ordinary Chinese, it was generally considered to have ended in 1969 (Chen, 1992, 74).  This essay will concentrate on the period between 1966 and 1969, given that this was the most active and violent period of the Cultural Revolution. The author recognises that many academics feel that the Cultural Revolution did not end until 1977, however, for the purpose of this essay; the author will concentrate on the initial 3 year period of the Revolution.  

In 1965, Mao Zedong had retreated to Shanghai having felt that he was losing his authority in day-to-day political decisions. Clear divisions were emerging within the elite of the Communist Party about the future development of China. According to Hinton, these fundamental differences appeared in every sphere of politics (1972, 41). The most high-profile example of this was seen between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi. Mao, who was becoming increasingly aware of their ideological differences, realised the necessity of quick preventative action necessary to halt Liu and his colleagues from ‘eating into his decision-making powers’ (Maitan, 1976, 99). Mao, supported by colleagues such as Lin Biao and his wife Jiang Qing and her followers; felt that the party leadership required a thorough shake-up and needed to return to the policies of the late 50s, echoed in a somewhat diluted form in the Socialist Education Movement of 1963 and 1964. Liu Shaoqi and colleagues such as Deng Xiaoping were opposed to such radicalism, forewarning them that the abolition of the work teams would be a serious mistake.

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Lin Biao, who was appointed Defence Minister in 1959, was an essential factor in the launching of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, his successes within the army were essential in allowing Mao the confidence and ability to ‘risk a profound upheaval in the Party apparatus’ (Maitan, 1976, 100). Without this support, Mao would have struggled to gain backing for his revolutionary plans given the influence of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping who were striving to continue with the readjustment phase. Indeed the army, following an attempt to clampdown on corrupt local officials, had grown more autonomous gaining increased powers to ...

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