However, scholars such as D. Carr have challenged White’s contention that historians impose ‘structure’ and ‘meaning’, on reality, through narrative. Carr draws on a number of phenomenological perspectives to argue that narrative is a constitute aspect of human life. Human reality is structured upon narrative: an isomorphic relationship exists between ‘reality’ and ‘narrative’. Human agents understand experience through a ‘protentional-retentional’ process, where ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ are sequenced. Narrative is not imposed on historical reality but drawn from it: narrative inheres ‘in the events themselves’ and ‘is an extension of one of their primary features’. In this respect, the historian uncovers a narrative structure that is inherent in human activity, rather than using literary devices to superimpose coherence or ‘meaning’ on reality. However, simply because narrative is a constitutive part of ‘reality’ or ‘experience’ this does not convincingly show that historians do not super-impose literary motifs on ‘reality’. Historians construct not the narratives of historical agents but rather narrativise these ‘actors’ themselves. Historical narratives do not have to correspond to the ‘lived’ narratives of historical agents. Carr’s attempt to make ‘narrative forms’ consistent with the concept of ‘reality’, within history studies, is ultimately unconvincing.
White’s argument, however, has been criticised from a number of other angles. In particular, the notion of ‘trope’ and its relationship to ‘emplotments’, ‘mode of argument’ and ‘ideology’ is problematic. As Vann notes, ‘it is not clear…whether the tropes operate largely or entirely unconsciously’. Secondly, White conception of ‘events’ as inert or passive objects waiting for the historian to classify and imbue them with ‘meaning’ is open to question. In this respect, Golob argued that White’s emphasis on various historians differing emplotments of the “same set or sequence of events” points to a quasi-positivist understanding of events as “out there” to be “observed”. Scholars such as Jenkins and Harlan, in drawing on Derridan deconstructionism, completely dismantle the apparatus of historical ‘reality’. Language is understood not as conveying or representing ‘reality’ but as constituting it. Traditional historical concepts such as the stable ‘self’, linear ‘time’ and the capacity to apply critical methods to reveal ‘truth-claims’ are undermined. As Ankersmith puts it: “Historical time is a relatively recent and highly artifical invention of Western civilization. It is a cultural, not a philosophical notion. Hence, founding narrativism on the concept of time is building on quicksand’. Concepts of ‘reality’ and even the nature of history itself are brought into challenge. Reality becomes nothing more than a word beinging with ‘r’ and ending with ‘y’; it is part of a discourse that supports relationships of power and domination. Post-modern history, Jenkins contends is emancipatory and liberating; freeing history from elistist notions such as ‘reality’. In particular he argues that any genre of discourse (theory, ideology, etc) is ethical “if and only if it is the aim of such genres – were they ever to become hegemonic – not to close down opposition genres’. In this respect, ‘reality’ is unattainable and meaningless, history should appropriating what is useful not what is ‘real’: “What is at issue…is not our ability to know the past but our ability to find the predecessors we need”. Historical studies should, on this reading, discard the notion of ‘reality’ as simply a discursive construction. It is not only ‘reality’ that ‘expunged’ from the ‘vocabulary’ of the historian, it is the whole ‘vocabulary’ that is re-evaluated; criticised for support networks of discursive power-relations.
The deconstructionism of Jenkins and Harlan is unhelpfully reductive. However, the insights of post-structuralism cannot be ignored. In particular, the role of ‘language’ in articulating ‘meaning’ and ‘relationships of power’ has convincingly challenged foudationalist notions of reality. Historical scholarship should not, however, give up the notion of ‘reality’ and collapse into a literary quagmire or be reduced to ‘fiction’. Approaches which engage with post-structuralism but retain notions of ‘critical method’ are needed. For example, ‘internal realism' argues that all knowledge is relative to particular epistemic contexts. Some scholars seem to have adopted Wittgenstein’s contention that knowledge of the meaning of a concept presupposes a capacity to apply it; knowledge of its truth-conditions. As Lorenz notes ‘if the meaning of a concept did not presuppose knowledge of its truth conditions’ then a language-user would be unable to tell the difference, for example, between someone in pain and someone who was not. In this respect, different paradigms or conceptual frameworks will yield different ‘facts’. Lorenz further notes that historical narratives are configured around normative notions. It would be more fruitful for these to be explicitly argued over rather than concealed under the mask of a spurious ‘objectivity’. Both facts and values have to be justified through argumentation. Recent scholarship seems to have been influenced by the principals of ‘internal realism’. Kurtz, for example, points to how conceptual paradigms determine the variable or evidence drawn upon. In this respect, definitions of peasants are, in Walker and Cohen’s terminology, ‘scope statements’. It is suggested, by Kurtz, that definitional frameworks such as J. Scott anthropological materialism and Popkin’s rational actor approach are examining different peasants. In contrast, it is more relevant and useful to compare the empirical findings of Wolf and Scott. In addition, Paige and Popkin both pose competing paradigms for understanding similar ‘peasants’. Thus, the definition adopted influences the content of ‘analyses. It could be argued that an explicit definitional pluralism aids ‘analysis’ of specific ‘peasants’ and provides a barrier against excessive generalization. Reality is thus, partially, restored by ‘internal-realism’; it is relative to particular conceptual paradigms or frameworks.
A problem with ‘internal realism’ is that it tends to circularity over conceptual categories and ‘facts’. Another approach to understanding how ‘reality’ can be retained, in some degree, within historical studies is ‘narrative theory’. White’s notion of ‘narrativity’ paradoxically provides a barrier against the more radical forms of linguistic relativism. As Partner notes ‘formal theory, narrative theory, could actually be deployed as an effective defensive weapon against some of the more threatening dislocations that postmodernism has visited on history’. In this respect, the ‘Holocaust’ has recently has been an area where the implications of post-modern thought have debated. Linguistic relativism in rejecting truth claims seems to open up the possibility that events such as the Holocaust could be denied. The ‘Holocaust’ should be understood as a ‘category’ for organising and classifying the practices of German Nazi government. It is thus a ‘narrative category’. Although, ‘holocaust’ is a category it is one ‘emploted’ on a set of ‘real events’. White’s retention of the existence of ‘real events’ sets limits on the forms of convincingly ‘narrative’. In the context, of the Holocaust it has to be understood as a ‘real event’, the probabilities of evidence limit the forms of ‘narrative’ produced in relation to it. It would be illegitimate, given the ‘evidence’, to base ‘narrative’ on a denial of the Holocaust. Language has to be understood within a material context, as relating to sets of linguistic and extra-linguistic relationships. Speigel coins the phrase ‘the social logic of the text’ to denote how language is socially generated both as a discursive and within a social context: ‘Even if one accepts the poststructuralist argument that language constitutes the social world of meaning, it is possible to maintain that language itself acquires meaning and authority only within specific social and historical settings’.
Thus, ‘reality’ in historical scholarship has to be understood as more than simply a word beginning with ‘r’ and ending with ‘y’. In particular, it signifies the historical professions commitment to ‘honest’ scholarship and defends against ‘propaganda’. As Graton notes, in his historisation of the footnote, it is only the retention of a ‘critical source’ analysis method that:
‘makes it possible to resist the efforts of modern governments, tyrannical and democratic alike, to conceal the compromises they have made, the deaths they have caused, the tortures they or their allies have inflicted’.
The ‘linguistic turn’ revised traditional epistemological and ontological concepts. In suggesting how ‘language’ operates as a discourse to articulate meaning, the basis of traditional scholarship was subverted. However, post-structuralism while useful should not be accepted wholesale. An understanding of how ‘discourse’ operates in material context is vital. How a linguistic and extra-linguistic reality relate to one another. In this respect, frameworks such as ‘internal-realism’ offer a step towards noting the relativity of knowledge while retaining the concept of ‘reality’ and ability to judge ‘facts’. Similarly, White narrative theory allows for some degree of ‘reality’ in the form of stable ‘events’ or ‘facts’ that are subject to only a limited number of ‘narratives’. For instance, the Holocaust cannot be denied as an ‘event’ but can be is unfortunately still open to neo-Nazi narratives that are sympathetic to it. Normative issues should be made explicit in historical narratives and, as Lorenz, notes should be sites of argumentation. Although, diminished ‘reality’ is more than simply a word beginning with ‘r’ and ending in ‘y’.
G. Spiegel, The past as text : the theory and practice of medieval historiography , (Baltimore ; London : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) p. 195
It should be noted, however, that Bury, after the First World War, became increasingly disenchanted with ‘scientific’ frameworks of ‘causality’ and instead emphasised historical ‘contingency’. Fritz Stern, The Varieties of History, (Vintage books, 1956) p. 210
For discussions and debate on the nature, implications and problems of post-modernism see F.R. Ankersmit, ‘Historiography and Postmodernism’ History and Theory 28 (May 1989), 137-153; Perez Zagorin, ‘Historiography and Postmodernism: Reconsiderations’ History and Theory Vol. 29 (Oct 1990) 263-274; F. R. Ankersmit, ‘Reply to Professor Zagorin’ History and Theory 29 (Oct 1990) 275-296; Lawrence Stone, ‘History and Post-modernism I” Past and Present 131 (May 1991), 217-218; Patrick Joyce, ‘History and Post-Modernism I” Past and Present 133 (November 1991)204-209; Catriona Kelly, ‘History and Post-Modernism II’ Past and Present 133 (November, 1991), 209-213; Lawrence Stone ‘History and Post-Modernism, III’ Past and Present 135 (May 1992) 189-194; Gabrielle Spiegel, ‘History and Post-Modernism, IV’ Past and Present 135 (May, 1992) 194-208.
D. Harlan, The degradation of American history (Chicago, Ill. : University of Chicago Press, 1997); K. Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London : Routledge, 2003).
K..Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London : Routledge, 2003) p. 32
Roger Chariter, (transl. LG. Cochrane) On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language and Practice, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997) p. 34
Chris Lorenz, History and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 3. (Oct., 1994), pp. 297-327. For a critical reaction to Putman’s views see Richard Rorty, ‘Putnam and the Relativist Menace’ Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993), 443-461; James Van Cleve, ‘Semantic Supervenience and Referential Indeterminacy’ Journal of Philosophy 92 (1992) 344-361; David L Anderson, ‘What is Realistic about Putnam’s Internal Realism’ Philosophical Topics 20 (1992) 49-83.
Similarly, Olafson also notes how narrative can be used to reconstruction human actions and lived reality. D. Carr, Time, Narrative and History (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1986) p. 117. F. Olafson, The dialectic of action : a philosophical interpretation of history and the humanities (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1979)
Leopold von Ranke, “On the Character of the Historical Science, in L. von Ranke, edited by G. Iggers K. von Moltke, The Theory and Practice of History (New York, N.Y. : Irvington Publishers, 1983, c1973) p. 33
M. Bloch, Historians Craft, intro. P. Burke, (Manchester University Press, 1992) p. 54
T. Kunh, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970)
Similarly, in the field of science Kuhn pointed to the way that ‘scientific paradigms’ were culturally specific and determined how ‘evidence’ was interpreted) E.H. Carr, What is History?(London, Penguin Books, 1987) P. 26
S. Sontag A Barthes reader (New York, Hill and Wang, 1982)
H. White, Tropics of Discourse: essays in cultural criticism (The John Hopkins University Press, 1978) p. 82
Similarly, Olafson also notes how narrative can be used to reconstruction human actions and lived reality. D. Carr, Time, Narrative and History (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1986) p. 117. F. Olafson, The dialectic of action : a philosophical interpretation of history and the humanities (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1979).
Richard T. Vann, ‘’, History and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 2. (May, 1998), 151
D. Harlan, The degradation of American history (Chicago, Ill. : University of Chicago Press, 1997; K. Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London : Routledge, 2003); K. Jenkins, Why history? : ethics and postmodernity (London ; New York : Routledge, 1999)
Deconstruction : critical concepts in literary and cultural studies (London : Routledge, 2003)
Frank R. Ankersmith, History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor (Berkeley and Los Angels: University of California Press, 1994) 33-34
K. Jenkins, Why history? : ethics and postmodernity (London ; New York : Routledge, 1999) p. 80
Jenkins goes a step further suggesting that we don’t need predecessors just post-modern ‘imaginaries’. D. Harlan, The degradation of American history, p. 199; Jenkins, Why History? p. 2
See Bonnie G. Smith,. The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998); J.W. Scott, Gender and the politics of history, (New York : Columbia University Press, 1999)
L. Wittgenstein (translated by G.E.M. Anscombe), Philosophical investigations (Oxford, etc., Blackwell, 1998)
Chris Lorenz, History and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 3. (Oct., 1994), p.310
Marcus J. Kurtz, Understanding Peasant Revolution: From concept to theory and case Theory and Society 29, 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
Henry A. Walker and Bernard P. Cohen, ‘Scope Statements: Imperatives for Evaluating Theory’ American Sociological Review, 50 (June 1985) p. 291
See J. Scott, The moral economy of the peasant: rebellion and subsistence in southeast Asia (New Haven, etc., Yale U.P., 1976); J. Scott, Weapons of the weak : everyday forms of peasant resistance (London : Yale University Press, 1987); S. Popkin, The rational peasant : the political economy of rural society in Vietnam (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1979)
see E. Wolf, Peasant wars of the twentieth century (London : Faber and Faber Ltd, 1971) J. Scott, the moral economy of the peasant (1976)
J. M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World, (New York, Free Press, 1975); Popkin, The Rational Peasant (1979)
Nancy Partner, ‘’ , History and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 171
O. Bartov, Murder in our midst : the Holocaust, industrial killing, and representation (New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996); Michael Dintenfass, , History and Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1. (Feb., 2000), pp. 1-20; Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca and London, 1994); Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca and London, 1998).
This is a view trenchantly adopted by Evans. R. Evans, In defence of history (London : Granta Books, 2001) p. 312
G. Spiegel, The past as text : the theory and practice of medieval historiography (Baltimore ; London : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) p.53
A. Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History, (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1997 p. 233
Chris Lorenz, History and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 3. (Oct., 1994), pp. 297-327.