Islamic Conquests up to 700 a.d. - Islamic Strengths / Roman Weaknesses?

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Islamic Conquests up to 700 a.d. - Islamic Strengths / Roman Weaknesses?

In the two decades after the Byzantine occupation of Ctesiphon in 629 the newly formed Islamic state had destroyed the Sasaninan Empire whilst severely damaged the Byzantine Empire.  These gains were by no means temporary.  Indeed our period sees the strengthening and expansion of these gains into northern Africa and the Mediterranean Islands. Yet, before Muhammad’s extraordinary rise to power there had been no Islamic state at all.  In a little over a decade Muhammad and his followers had converted a raft of separate and nomadic tribes into a state capable of defeating both the region’s great powers.  This conquest was as unexpected as it was remarkable.  I will attempt to highlight both the Arabian strengths and the Byzantine and Persian weaknesses before examining their relative importance.

 

The Arabs strength was primarily based on their unity.  Whilst nomadic warriors were mobile and effective, they had previously lacked the unity of purpose and unity of action to pose a serious threat to either of the great powers.  These nomadic tribes were more likely to raid the great powers in a snatch and grab fashion. For this reason neither empire devoted significant resources to the defence against the Arabs.  Instead Arabian allies, like the Ghassnids and the Lakhmids, were employed to keep the nomads in check.  In hindsight it is clear that if harnessed correctly these nomadic tribes, and their sedentary and tribal brothers, could provide an imposing and effective force.  It was Muhammad and most significantly the new religion of Islam that finally harnessed this power. It is important to note that Muhammad’s Islamic state did not destroy the tribal system that underpinned Arabian life.  Instead, we should see the Islamic state as a “supra-tribe”.  Muhammad and Abu Bakr utilised the strong control that tribal leaders could exert over their kinsmen by associating a tribal leader with the state.  The status of the leader and the status of the state were inextricably linked.  Thus the Islamic state’s leaders could rely on tribal leader’s to organise and control their own tribesmen.  Therefore we see the Islamic state, not as a mass of homogenous Muslims, but a series of tribes linked by Islam and a common acceptance, at least in the early stages, of centralised authority. 

 

Significantly the nature of Islam itself aided the development of social and political unity.  The umma, or community of believers, was based on principles that encouraged not only political and social cohesion but expansion. The monotheistic nature of Islam consciously implied the need to expand.  Muslims were taught that the House of Islam and the House of War were separate.  The people of the world could be sharply divided into Muslims and non-Muslims, and as the Qu’ran says “There is no God but God”.  By implying the universal and unique nature of god, and the overriding moral authority of God, Islam provided the impetus for political unification and centralisation.  As Muhammad was God’s presence on earth it is easy to see how he was associated with power.  His perceived relationship with God aided the construction of a legal system less reliant on blood feuds and retaliation, as well as legitimising centralised taxation and control.  Once Islam and the Islamic state’s power had been created and legitimised successive leaders furthered centralisation and control.  Sedentary tribes were given precedence over nomadic ones.  Indeed Nomadism was frowned upon by the Islamic state.  By emphasising the dominance of the sedentary tribes around Medina, notably the muharijun and the Quraysh, the state associated power with sedentary, centralised tribes.  Further actions show a desire for the nomads to settle.  Upon conquest individuals were only permitted to receive the lucrative ata, or stipend, if they settled: “the sooner one settles, the sooner one receives the stipend”.  This desire for settlement can surely be seen as a form of control.  By encouraging settlement the central authorities encouraged further control.

 

The centralised administrative structure enabled the Islamic state to organise and fund the conquests.  Traditionally historians viewed the Islamic conquests as economically driven migrations, but evidence points to a more organised and strategic movement.  The first settlers or soldiers that had conquered territories did not bring women, children and animals with them.  This implies a stage-by-stage approach to conquest: overpower the occupiers and then allow controlled migration.  The interpretation that the Islamic conquests were a collection of random and eclectic raids is also questionable.  It can be persuasively argued that the conquests were centrally controlled.  The best example of central directive authority is Umar’s decision to switch the great Khalid from the Iraqi frontier to the Syrian frontier.  Donner furthers these arguments by suggesting that the state had the power to tax and recruit from all tribes via state run agents.  He argues that Umar formed conquest parties by instructing his network of agents to contribute recruits to the Islamic cause.  No historian seems to suggest that the Muslims had any technological superiority over the great power, and in most cases they were numerically outnumbered.  It has been suggested that there were more Arabs fighting for the Byzantines than there were for the Muslims at Yarmuk.  Similarly, at the decisive battle of Qadisiyya, the Persians, under the command of Rustam, were numerically superior to the Arabs.  Evidence is sparse and unreliable, but the way in which the Muslims consistently defeated both empires suggests that in military terms they must have had some advantage.  Whether this advantage was due to intelligent strategy, religious fanaticism, a crop of talented generals or better communications is in some ways irrelevant.  It would be extremely hard not to suggest that the Arabs had some kind of military advantage.

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The Byzantine entry into Ctesiphon in 628 is a false indicator of Byzantine strength.  The Persians were suffering from a series of internal crisis’s and the Byzantines ultimate victory was largely a result of Turkish assistance.  Most significantly the entry into Ctesiphon was the culmination of two decades of damaging warfare with the Persians.  It was remarkable that Heraclius managed to raise the necessary resources to launch his counter-offensive against the Turks.  At the time the Persians occupied large parts of Palestine and Syria and the imperial authorities faced a financial crisis.  The melting down of bronze statues and ...

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