It is possible to clone mammals. Is it morally acceptable to clone a human being? Defend your answer against those who would not agree with you.

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It is possible to clone mammals. Is it morally acceptable to clone a human being?

Defend your answer against those who would not agree with you.

By: Martin Pierce Student Number: 1057404

In cloning for medical-research purposes the development of the embryo is halted as soon as a cluster of stem cells develops. The stem cells are then harvested for research purposes. Due to the fact that no infant is born (in fact the embryo never even gets past the blastocyst stage), it is argued that this type of cloning has nothing to do with human cloning. (Hatch Backs Limited Cloning, 2002). For this reason this paper shall take the statement "to clone a human being" as meaning cloning that results in a fully formed human and not on the cloning of embryos for the purposes of research.

The issues around cloning are in the main more ethical than theological and yet most of the objections to cloning come from religious sources, even if those objections are not religious in nature. The first objection is that cloning leaves God out of the process of human creation. This only makes sense though if your definition of God is of a being that plays a role in the birth of each member of our species. Even holding to this view it does not necessarily follow that cloning is comparable to playing God (Brannigan, 2001). How can science prevent a supposedly omnipotent and omnipresent being from doing anything, and if it is possible this raises serious questions about God's divinity and even our own. The second objection is that we are creating an infant independent of human sexual congress and thereby making impossible the divine inculcation of a soul. In vitro fertilisation is equivalent to cloning here as both involve conception of one form or another outside of the body without the need for sexual congress (Brannigan, 2001). Originally ethically suspect, in vitro fertilisation is today generally accepted in all circles including religious ones. It is therefore hard to imagine that God can endow the infant of in vitro fertilisation with a soul and not the infant that arises from cloning. In fact

"Some who consider themselves to be religious have argued that if God didn't want man to clone, "he" wouldn't have made it possible" (Brannigan, 2001, p. 105).

The question we need to ask those who object to cloning on religious grounds is that

"...they explain what it is about sexual fertilisation that so affects God's judgment about the child that results" (Kass & Wilson, 1998, p. 73).

A more sociologically relevant reason for opposition to these religious objections is that in a diverse society consisting of groups with different ethnic, religious and political backgrounds how can we allow restrictive religious points of view to define public policy (Brannigan, 2001).

The following scenario is one described by most people. That an almost infinite army of clones based upon a highly desired genetic code could be created and that all of these clones would be the same person as the original. Imagine a thousand clones of Einstein. Some of the moral questions raised in this scenario would be: are we diminishing the worth of a human life by making hundreds of copies, would we begin to see the clones as dispensable, as a commodity, would this violate or diminish their dignity? If this were the case then the answer to all of these questions would probably be yes. This however is not the case. This is a popular misconception. Cloning is not Xeroxing; a clone will not develop to be a carbon copy of the donor of its genetic material. For example the clone of Sigmund Freud, even though an exact genetic copy would still enter the world as a blank slate just like any other human infant and not as the reincarnation of the father of psychoanalysis.
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"...real human clones will simply be later-born identical twins--nothing more and nothing less." Cloned children will be full-fledged human beings, indistinguishable in biological terms from all other members of the species. (Brannigan, 2001, p. 102).

This is essentially a question of determinism. Does our genetic profile determine who and what we are and how we act? In the case of traditionally conceived identical twins we can see that this is not so. Even though they share the same genetic material they are obviously not the same person. Neither does this violate or diminish their dignity. This deterministic ...

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