The vast majority of Spain’s industrial and population centres were in areas were the insurrection had failed. The socialist leader Prieto was not boasting when he broadcast that the Republic controlled, ‘the major cities, the industrial centres, all the gold and silver of the Bank of Spain, enormous reserves of men…’ The Republic had not been stripped completely of an army. There was a range of viable military options available. Two possible options that seem militarily obvious was a concentration of both navy and air force units on the Straights to prevent the transport of the Army of Africa or to despatch the virtually intact Madrid division by train to Seville and destroy the lightly held bridgehead of Colonel Yagüe at Algeciras. Both of these obvious military options could have isolated General Franco and his Army of Africa. It appears that none of these offensive military options were considered.
The Republican government instead sent the Madrid division to guard the Guadarrama passes while other troops either remained inactive or were brought to Madrid. The air force, although small and ill equipped, sent a small number of aircraft on ill planned and prepared attacks on scattered targets with little or no effect. The control of the navy by the Republic could have been a major blow to the insurgents. However the Republican navy, massively superior in numbers to the Nationalists navy, either stayed inactive in port or patrolled the straights half-heartedly. Republican strategy at this stage was hampered by an obsession with the defence of Madrid and the idea that time was on their side.
In defence of the Republic it is perhaps not surprising that emotions at this time were often stronger than common sense. Also hindering the Republic was its own loss of governmental control and the lack of communications. It is Thomas who succinctly states that, ‘with communications difficult or non-existent, each town would find itself on its own, acting out its own drama, apparently in a vacuum. There were soon to be not two Spain’s, but two thousand.’ The advent of revolution was the start for bloodletting on an appalling scale. Revolutionary committees (tchekas from the 1917 Russian organization) were formed and would undertake daily roundups, paseos, in search of fascists. Even wearing a necktie or not giving the correct socialist greeting could condemn an individual to a ‘trial’, some of which only lasted five minutes. Victims would then be taken to the Casa de Campo and shot. Among the victims were women in nightclothes and children in pyjamas. Reports would also reach other European states of the murder of priests, nuns and the burning of churches. Although Nationalist repression would be as bloody the damage was less of a concern to a military government. The international standing of the Republic would never recover with disastrous consequences for the long-term diplomatic efforts of the Republic.
What is clear is that taking quick decisions was never easy in Spain and with the dissipation of authority by the proliferation of committees and workers militia the Republic had difficulty in establishing co-ordinated central control. There was also the conviction among most groups on the left, particularly the anarchists, that military discipline was not something required by a committed revolutionary. The communists disagreed, and as there influence spread with the arrival of Russian military aid the scene were set for what became known as ‘the war within a war.’ A ‘war-inept military and civil leadership – warring political factions’, these problems typified the early days of the Republic. This division in Republican ranks might not have been disastrous had their opponents also been divided. However, this was not the case with Franco providing a united front with the creation of the Falange Espanola Tradicionlista y de las johns and with the Germany and Italy sending considerable military forces to support the Nationalists.
After missing the initial chance to smother the insurrection at birth the main hope of the Republic was to hold as much ground as possible while awaiting the onset of a general European war. Fighting a defensive war had the additional advantages of the difficult terrain in Spain that lends itself to that type of fighting. It is also easier to teach untrained troops defensive warfare rather than the complexities of co-ordinated, offensive action. The Republic’s crippling loss of trained junior officers would also be less noticeable by staying on the defensive. Defensive warfare is also less reliant on highly technical military equipment such as tanks and aircraft but requires plentiful amounts of small arms, machine guns and what has been called ‘the god of war’, artillery. Efforts to buy arms abroad had been desperate leading to the buying of antiquated small arms supplied with little ammunition and with a multiplication of calibres.
I would argue that the key shortage was in the artillery available to the Republic. The rebellion had left the Republic handicapped in numbers of artillery with 387 pieces while the Nationalists controlled 620. Artillery bought from abroad tended to be very old with worn barrels; many were supplied without the appropriate sighting mechanisms and were missing the correct gun carriages to move them quickly. Rarely was artillery supplied with the 2,400 rounds normally expected, indeed one order for guns arrived with 240 rounds; enough for two days of firing under battle conditions. Historians have commented on the erratic nature of Republican artillery fire and the large number of guns captured by the Nationalists, this has generally been blamed on Republican incompetence: lack of sights and the proper equipment to move the pieces supplies a more likely explanation. If the leaders of the Republic were committed to a defensive war the priority and finances should have been invested in the small arms and artillery supplied with the correct quantities of ammunition, rather than investing in expensive and complicated machinery such as tanks and aircraft. What has also been questioned was that no serious attempt was made to initiate guerrilla warfare,something that could have caused considerable problems for the Nationalists, especially in ‘safe’ rear areas.
The Republic undoubtedly contributed considerably too its own downfall. Prompt early action might have dealt a crucial blow to their enemies while a more co-ordinated, strategic approach by civilian and military leaders on the basic conduct of the war might have achieved the aim of extending the fighting into 1940 and finding allies amongst the democratic Western Powers. In the end these mistakes combined with foreign intervention, and Non-Intervention, would lead to the collapse of the Republic. However, what should not be doubted was the fighting spirit displayed by both Republican and Nationalist soldiers during the bloody battles to come.
Word Count 1616
Books
Beevor, Anthony, The Spanish Civil War (London: Orbis Publishing 1982)
Browne, Harry, Spain’s Civil War (2nd Ed, London: Longman 1996)
Hills, George, The Battle for Madrid (London: Vantage Books 1976)
Howson, Gerald, Arms For Spain The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (London: John Murray 1998)
Thomas, Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (3rd Ed, London: Hamish Hamilton 1977)
Thomas, Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: Hamish Hamilton 1977) p220
Quiroga even despatched the unfortunate General Prado to Saragossa in an attempt to reach a compromise with General Cabanellas. It was rejected and he was later shot along with his ADC. Thomas, The Spanish Civil War p224
Beevor, Anthony, The Spanish Civil War (London: Orbis 1982) p56
Browne, Harry, Spain’s Civil War, (London: Longman 1996) p38
Beevor, A, The Spanish Civil War p54
Beevor does make the point that the true loyalties of the Civil Guard came through later. The Assoltos proved more loyal to the Republic but were more of an urban force, and the big cities had a better prepared and more active working class. It is also worth noting that the training of these forces could be better than the average Spanish conscript.
Figures for combined army, air force, and Para-military. Republican 98,900. Insurgents 91,500. Hills, George, The Battle for Madrid, (London: Vantage Books 1976) p55
Browne, Harry, Spain’s Civil War, p39
Hills, G, The Battle for Madrid p56
Hills, G, The Battle for Madrid p50
The navy’s inaction could be explained by the lack of officers and the fact that the German pocket battleships Deutchland and Admiral Scheer were screening the ships transferring the Army of Africa. Beevor, A, The Spanish Civil War, p63
Thomas, H, The Spanish Civil War, p227
Hills, G, The Battle for Madrid, p44
Browne, H, Spain’s Civil War, p44
Indeed it could be argued that only one military force at that time could manage such attacks, the German Whermacht. It would take several years of war, and many setbacks before the officers and men of the British, American and Russian armies could even come close to perfecting co-ordinated attacking warfare.
Ten different calibres: 6.5, 7, 7.62, 7.65, 7.7, 7.707, 7.92, 8, 8.03 and 11mm. Gerald, Howson, Arms for Spain The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War. (London: John Murray 1998) p29
Howson, G, Arms for Spain, p29
Howson, G, Arms for Spain, p109
Howson, G, Arms for Spain, p109
The Spanish are credited in inventing modern guerrilla warfare in their successful campaign to evict Napoleon from their soil.