P2: After leaving the room, Mary learns something new because she now experiences what it is like to see color and has gained knowledge from this first-hand experience.
C: Because Mary learned something new after being exposed to color for the first time, she did not actually have complete knowledge of seeing color a priori. Therefore, knowledge is not completely based on physical features, as there is also a non-physical aspect to knowledge.
Therefore, Jackson’s main argument is that experiencing things first-hand can teach an individual about some non-physical features, even if the individual has complete knowledge of all physical features. If physicalism were true, then Mary would know everything there is to know in the world; however, this is false if Jackson’s argument is true. Although the first parameter and conclusion is true when viewed independently, the second parameter is truly up for debate. Jackson does have a good argument against the existence of physicalism, but physicalists have provided several counter-arguments to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument.
I will now present three counter-arguments to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. The first counter-argument, as proposed by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis, states that there is a difference between “knowledge-how” and “knowledge-that.” (Nemirow 1990, Lewis 1983) This has been deemed the “ability hypothesis.” In this case, knowledge-how is the knowledge of gaining the ability to do something and knowledge-that is knowledge concerning factual information. Although these two philosophers agree that Mary does learn something after experiencing color, they argue that the Knowledge Argument does not disprove physicalism because what Mary gained after seeing color was not knowledge-that but rather knowledge-how. For example, when Mary steps out of the room and sees color, she does not learn anything more about the color red because she already knows all that there is to know. Rather, she learns the ability to not just imagine what it is like but also to know and experience what it is like. Ultimately, this explains why Mary’s physical knowledge could not describe what it was like to see the color red and why there is a difference between having knowledge-that and knowledge-how. This counter-argument brings trouble to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument because Jackson assumes that Mary will be learning a new fact about the color red. However, if all she learns is an ability and how to connect the dots between her knowledge of the color red and the concept of the color red, then she has not learned any new facts about the color red and the idea of physicalism stands.
A second counter-argument, described by Paul Churchland, says that by having a complete knowledge of everything including physical features of the color red and the inner workings of the brain, eyes, nervous system, etc. then Mary could know what it is like to see the color red before leaving the room (Churchland 1989). This aims to falsify parameter 2 and say that she will not learn anything when she leaves the room, ultimately disproving the Knowledge Argument. Churchland argues that Jackson has not “adequately considered how much one might know if, as the first premise asserts, one knew everything there is to know about the physical brain and nervous system.” (Churchland 1989) Ultimately, Churchland thinks that knowing everything about the physical nature of the world, including how the brain and nervous system will react to new experiences, is an incredible feat and that this infinite knowledge will not be affected when Mary leaves the room. Churchland proceeds to discuss how musicians understand what every specific note sounds like individually and use this knowledge to put together chords using their imagination. When thought about from a “new experience” point of view, if Mary knows how every part of the body will react to seeing color for the first time, then she can create this experience in her head much like how musicians put together chords from individual notes.
The third and last counter-argument I will discuss is one proposed by Earl Conee called the “acquaintance hypothesis.” This counter-argument is similar to the “ability hypothesis” in the sense that both hypotheses believe that Mary did gain something after leaving the room (Conee 1994). However, unlike the ability hypothesis, the acquaintance hypothesis claims that Mary does not gain new facts or new abilities, but rather the ability to relate two epistemic understandings. This concept of being acquainted to something defends the idea of physicalism because it states that no factual knowledge is gained – what is gained is the ability to recognize prior knowledge in a new mode of presentation. Conee states that Jackson’s assumption that Mary would gain some non-physical and factual knowledge does not hold because the only thing gained from going out of the room would be “how to experience and acquaint oneself with the property.” Furthermore, some philosophers believe that Mary would know everything there is about the factual properties of seeing the color red and reaffirm that if Mary knows A and A is the same thing as B, but in a different form of presentation, then Mary already knows B but must get acquainted to B to understand this relationship. Therefore, Mary does not gain any non-physical knowledge and, if this reasoning is true, the Knowledge Argument is broken.
Although these counter-arguments to the Knowledge Argument are logical and backed by sound assumptions, there are several objections to each argument that question their respective validity. I will now provide my rationale as to why the first two counter-arguments are not strong enough to prove the idea of physicalism. The first counter-argument, the ability hypothesis, can be countered by investigating why one would classify being able to see red as an ability as opposed to a piece of knowledge. Several philosophers, including Conee, have stated that “the ability to imagine having an experience of a particular kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing what it is like to have that kind of experience.” (Conee 1994) Ultimately, simply gaining the ability to do something does not guarantee that this ability will be exercised. For example, a person who knows what it is like to see yellow and blue and has an infinite physical understanding of colors has the ability to know what green looks like if told that green is a 50/50 mix between yellow and blue. However, just because this individual has the ability to imagine what green looks like does not mean they will use this ability to imagine what green looks like. Furthermore, in the case of Fred’s ability to see red1 and red2, simply having the ability to see both variants of red does not make it possible for everyone to see these two colors – the inability to imagine how these two colors are different means there must be some form of fact that is unknown. Ultimately, I believe that being let out of the room would provide Mary with the ability to see color, but would also give her some form of physical knowledge that was not available to her simply by learning about it in a color-less environment. This counter-argument is not strong enough to disprove the Knowledge Argument.
The second counter-argument is not convincing enough to disprove the Knowledge Argument either because, although it is a possibility that infinite knowledge may allow you to know what it is like to see red without ever seeing red, there is no way of knowing if this is true because nobody has infinite knowledge and has experienced this situation before. It is not obvious whether an all-knowing individual can understand how everything will turn out – essentially it is saying that an all-knowing individual can predict how much rain would fall in a theoretical world for the next 100 years. Although this is possible, it is impossible to prove and should be thought of only as a consideration and not a reason to disprove. Also, when Churchland speaks of the musical notes example, it is true that a talented musician can piece together individual notes and create complex melodies in his head, but this requires the musician to know what the individual notes sound like in the first place. Similar to Mary who has no idea what red actually looks like, a musician with no knowledge of how individual notes sound cannot understand how a collective group of notes sound.
Although these two counter-arguments are not convincing enough to prove the idea of physicalism, I will now elaborate on why the last counter-argument does. Common criticisms of this “acquaintance hypothesis” are that non-physicalists may believe associating two similar things does imply non-physical knowledge gained, that having complete knowledge of something’s properties implies knowing how to identify the property itself, and that a conceptual representation does not imply complete knowledge. I will now provide my rationale as to why I believe this hypothesis defends physicalism and address these criticisms. In Mary’s case, she knows everything about the color red, including how it will affect her brain and nervous system. Therefore, by knowing all of these facts, the only thing that happens when Mary witnesses the color red is that she views what she already knows via a different form of presentation. For example, if an all-knowing person has never seen the Empire State Building but knows every physical trait and how it will affect his bodily functions when he sees it, then not only should he be able to create the relationship between what he knows and what he sees, but he also learns no new physical features about the Empire State Building. In comparison to Mary’s situation, after knowing everything about the color red it is impossible to say that she will learn something new from simply being presented the situation in a different fashion. Ultimately, one can think of this situation as comparing two states of mind. In the first state of mind, Mary knows everything about the color red but does not see it. In the second state of mind, Mary sees the color red and then knows everything about it. When comparing the two, Mary did not gain any physical or non-physical knowledge, but rather switches into a different state of mind without acquiring, reacquiring, or destroying any knowledge. Ultimately, the only thing that Mary acquires is knowledge of the relationship between the two states of mind and the ability to remember this relationship.
In this paper, I have analysed the Knowledge Argument, which questions the concept of physicalism and states that knowledge is composed of physical and non-physical aspects. After providing several counter-arguments to the Knowledge Argument, I conclude that physicalism can be justified by viewing Mary’s situation from a relationship/acquaintance point of view. Ultimately, I do believe that the world has non-physical features, but that the non-physical is simply an avenue to understand the physical. When thought about from the viewpoint of two different states of mind, the concept of physicalism is successfully defended and that complete knowledge can be synonymous with a complete understanding of physical features and fluency in the language of natural sciences.
Bibliography
Churchland, P. (1989). “Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson.” A Neurocomputational Perspective, Cambridge: MIT Press, 67-76
Conee, E. (1994). “Phenomenal Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 136- 50, Ludlow. (2004), 197-216.
Hare, Caspar. “Qualia.” Problems of Philosophy. MIT. Cambridge, MA. October 2012. Handout 14: Qualia
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, XXXII (No. 127), 127-136.
Lewis, D. (1983). “Postscript to ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain.” Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 130-32.
Nemirow, L. (1990). “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance”, Mind and Cognition: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 490-499.
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