However, there is a common dualist defence to this issue which is to ‘reply that all physical things have incorporeal entities associated with them’ (Smith and Jones, p51). One can use an analogy of a driver (the soul) operating within a vehicle (the body) where the driver is entirely limited by the parameters the vehicle can operate within. A person operating a plane is able to do much more with the equipment than the same person riding a bicycle in the same way that a soul can do more with a human body as it allows them to communicate intricately and effectively as opposed to a soul in a Chimpanzee’s body which can only communicate on a very basic level. Thus it follows that the soul evolves parallel with the body and does not necessarily follow the physical evolutionary laws that the body does as it is essentially immaterial and not bound by laws of nature. Although this is a sound defence, I believe that this position is weakened by the fact that it sacrifices the traditional dualist position of Descartes and accepts a form of limited soul or mind.
The second main scientific argument as to why the idea of having a soul as an entity separate from the body is a false one is the principle of causal closure. In brief, this principle means that all physical events that occur in our world are in some way completely attributable to other physical events that have occurred in the same physical sphere. As the idea of a soul is one that exists purely in time and not physical or measurable space it is incredibly difficult to see the causal connection between the physical and non-physical entities. As the dualist aims to defend this connection and claim there is a stage that bridges the gap, it is clear that they ‘can only mention further happenings that fall squarely on one side or the other of the great divide between physical events and events in the immaterial Minds’ (Smith and Jones, p.54). Causal closure also implies that some form of energy has to be transferred into another, which makes the soul a difficult starting point for a causal chain as an immaterial object lacks the ability to hold or transfer energy in the same way a physical object such as a muscle can.
However, even some of the fiercest critics of dualism concede some ground to the idea of an incorporeal soul when they state that ‘nothing is known of how it governs the bodily engine’ (Ryle, p.21) and that ‘mental events can cause physical events’ (Smith and Jones, p52). The defence for dualist thus argues that we lack significant understanding about the non-physical world as we have not yet acquired the correct tools for examining its methods. Nevertheless, neuroscientists can still counter this argument with modern research that shows that manipulation of certain physical areas of the brain, such as the hypothalamus, can result in behavioural changes that were previously attributed to the existence of a mind, and it is logical to support an argument sustained by scientific evidence as opposed to one based on a lack of such evidence. Another dualist argument for the existence of a soul is that it seems bizarre for a material object such as the brain, not entirely different in terms of physical composition to other organs of the body, to be capable of such abstract concepts as thought and emotion. Morton condenses this problem effectively when he points out that ‘it is very hard to imagine how a material structure such as the brain can produce thinking and feeling’ (Morton, 2004, p.317).
In conclusion, I do not believe that I have a soul but the arguments of the dualists have created sufficient doubt to convince me that it is not impossible that I might have a soul. I think that in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence, of which even Descartes himself was a supporter of using as a basis of understanding, it seems sensible to apply Occam’s razor and assume that the simplest answer is the correct one, that of no external incorporeal soul or mind existing.
Bibliography
Rene Descartes, Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, Penguin, London, 2003.
Adam Morton, Philosophy in Practice, Blackwell Paperback, 2004.
P. Smith and O. Jones, The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 4, Course Readings.
G. Ryle, The concept of Mind: Descartes’ Myth, Chapter 1, Course Readings.
Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, Westview Press, 2005.
