Napoleons style was often unique and focusing on his 14 April 1796 dispatch “one discovers that Bonoparte’s talent for dramatic and descriptive writing lay in emphasising the decisive nature of his victories”7. His style was simple, it was forceful, dramatic and achieved its purpose of gaining the attention of the French public.
It was not just the use of the popular press that enabled Napoleon to return from Italy so overwhelmingly popular amongst the French public. “Napoleon supplemented his efforts by carefully timing the arrival of his captured art or “trophies of conquest”8. This essentially acted to amplify his successes and prolong public attention to his military triumph.
“Napoleons combined propagandist efforts produced for the French public not only the image of a seemingly invincible general and a peacemaker, but also that of a man of cultural refinement and intellect. Essentially a universal man to whom nothing was impossible”9. To a great extent it was the fostering of this image that made possible the coup d’etat of 18-19 Brumaire. “No one would deny the significance of Napoleons military victories in making possible the overthrow of the Directory; but his skill in presenting these victories in the most variable manner, and particularly in creating the impression of his own personal responsibility for them, was essential for success as the victories themselves”10.
Once Napoleon achieved political dominance in France what becomes evident is his need or desire to take total control of the direction and content of his propaganda activies, and essentially be in complete control of his own myth. “Napoleon planned, wrote, produced and organised. Hence every action of his had a vigorous indelible stamp”11. Francois Furet has argued that Napoleon left no one else the task of publicising him. His dispatches his proclamations and all correspondence with the directory all reveal a great talent for getting himself noticed by himself and no one else.
The centralisation of political authority and military leadership in the hands of one man gave him unusual tactical advantage in the distribution of pro Napoleon material. “But where the immense skill of Napoleon is evident was his meticulous supervision of every phase of the composition and distribution of war news”12. Napoleon himself wrote, or at least edited all the main bulletins of the Grand Army, and there is little evidence of polishing or other alterations in the accounts by anyone else.
Napoleon refused to delegate tasks relating to the publication of items that would influence the French public and their perceptions of him. “In part this arose from his infinite capacity to command the wide canvas of his empire in terms of policy and of detailed administration, in part it was due to his refusal to acknowledge the need for help or to brook a possible rival”13. The main benefit Napoleon enjoyed as a result of his personal style over all wartime literature was the great inspiration it brought to his soldiers who served in his great armies. Large numbers felt motivated by this and it is no wonder that the old guard stayed faithful to the end. However the disregard for help or a delegation of tasks led to Napoleons administration having a weak ministry and a distinct lack of central staff that was to hinder him in the future as his span of control widened over Europe.
As well as controlling the content and volume of materials during wartime periods, Napoleon ensured the precise timing of the materials and the manner in which they were to be published. Strict instructions were sent to officials as “the proper timing of news for the best possible effect was a point to which Napoleon gave careful attention”14. If it were impossible to shut out other accounts of battles he would ensure his version of a particular battle arrived first. This meticulous planning and management of publications was to prove never more important to Napoleon in the final bulletin of the Russian campaign. “The emperor was extremely anxious to have the bulletin arrive in Paris just long enough before his own return to permit excitement over his defeat to die down but not long enough to encourage anti-imperial intrigue”15. This essentially is where the very core of Napoleons genius lay, as even in defeat he was able to manipulate an event into his favour.
While unfavourable news or even counter propaganda was often masterfully blocked by Napoleon, it has to be said that the amount of anti-Napoleonic material was limited due to the failings of opposition within France and Europe. The British made the biggest attempt to release counter propaganda, which was designed to minimise the popularity of Napoleon. However they were handicapped on several fronts as “not only was the control of most of the European press in the hands of Napoleon for the greater part of a decade and a half, but the British had relatively little in the way of victorious news to export”16. The majority of victories were Napoleon’s and this left the British playing a constant game of catch up, as they were reduced to the tiresome and unpalatable task of endlessly minimising the extent of the emperor’s victories.
The main opposition to Napoleon were also faced with the complex problem of how to infiltrate their views into any of the classes in French society. Whereas many other absolute leaders or dictators have neglected or subjected particular pockets of society to ill treatment, this was not the case in Napoleonic France. Indeed “Bonoparte’s cabinet brought itself into daily contact with all the classes of society”17. This played a detrimental role in creating the Napoleonic myth as no pocket of society was neglected or left open for opposition gains.
It can also be said that Napoleon’s attitude to his image was a pragmatic one, “as once he entered eminent public life, his career became a continuously changing calculation as he adapted his remarks to the situation and the recipient”18. This enabled him to remain flexible and create the same Napoleonic myth throughout Europe not just France.
While Napoleons methods of implementing propaganda were largely successful there were fundamental weaknesses, that at times hindered the growth of his image and the administration as a whole. Napoleon relied heavily on the paper the Monteiur to distribute positive information and images that would portray him in a favourable manner. However his refusal to delegate or set up different propaganda campaigns left him relying on the Monteiur to attempt to influence foreign countries in the same manner. However “It published many violent diatribes, designed for home consumption, which could only weaken it’s effect abroad”19.
Napoleons frequent use of military bulletins, which had been so successful for him, proved to backfire when in bulletin XXIX (December 1812) he actually admitted the collapse of the Moscow campaign. This was so vital because it was thought to be even greater than it actually was and it was the first reversal that had been reported to the French public. The main criticism that can be attributed to Napoleons technique was the overriding theme of his lack of delegation. Even when some information was not particularly important, he was often obsessive in his complete control. However it can be argued that without this degree of control Napoleon might not have been able to create the myth of military genius so effectively and implement his largely successful propaganda techniques.
What is so striking about the Napolonic myth is the power it still possesses today. Much of the Napoleonic legacy still exists in France and Europe today as people still respect civil government, the metric system and the Napoleonic code. However his military genius is the where people still associate Napoleon the most and this is particularly suprising as Napoleons military achievement are not as striking as some believe them to be. The fact is Napoleon was defeated in three major battles, Aspern in 1809, Leipzig in 1813 and by Wellington at Waterloo in 1815. As well as this two of his battles at Eylau in 1807 and Wagram in 1809 were virtually draws. If we compare this to Wellington’s record we see that there is a substantial difference as Wellington was never defeated. This emphasises Napoleons ability in fostering a popular belief of military genius and supremacy. Although Napoleon himself can take credit for much of his myth, historians, his audience and even circumstance were vital to the myth.
Individuals such as the Duke Of Wellington have said, “his presence on the field makes a difference of 40,000 men”, numerous memoirs published in the 1820’s including O’Meara’s Napoleon en exil, ou une voix de Sainte-Helene (1821), massive canvasses of battles, and the propaganda pictures of Napoleon and his family have contributed to the fascination in the Napoleonic legend. So in this sense much of the myth surrounding Napoleons military genius was carried forward by individuals and historians who were drawn to the aura of his legend.
In conclusion “Napoleons military and political genius does not fully determine or explain the success during his lifetime or his post humous fame”20, we must look instead to how Napoleon created his myth through the effective use and timing of the instruments of propaganda that were available to him. So in this sense “the Napoleonic legend was created no less by the pen than by the sword”21.
1 A.Harvey, Napoleon: The myth pp. 12-16
2 A.Harvey, Napoleon: The myth pp. 12-16
3 W.Hanley, The Genesis of Napoleonic propaganda
4 W.Hanley, The Genesis of Napoleonic propaganda
5 W.Hanley, The Genesis of Napoleonic propaganda
6 O.Conelly, Blundering to glory, Napoleons military campaigns p.112
7 W.Hanley, The Genesis of Napoleonic propaganda
8 W.Hanley, The Genesis of Napoleonic propaganda
9 .R.Holtman, Napoleon and propaganda p.147
10 J.Mathews, Napoleons military bulletins p.138
11 B.Jones, Napoleon: Man and myth p.203
12 J,Mathews, Napoleons military bulletins p.140
13B.Jones, Napoleon: Man and myth p.203
14 J.Mathews, Napoleons military bulletins p.140
15 J.Mathews, Napoleons military bulletins p.141
16 R.Holtman, Napoleon and propaganda p.148
17 J.Mathews, Napoleons military bulletins p.142
18 H.Parker, Napoleons self changing image to 1812 pp.
19 R.Holtman, Napoleonic propaganda p.245
20B.Jones, Napoleon man and myth p213
21J.Matthews, Napoleons military bulletins p.139