It is clear then that, even before Chamberlain gaining the Premiership, Britain had been following a Foreign policy of appeasement. Yet it is also true that Chamberlain's period of office gave appeasement a new drive; he believed in taking the initiative; he would find out what Hitler wanted, and show him that reasonable claims could be met by negotiation rather than by force. Anyway, public support for a policy of appeasement was high, many felt that Italy and Germany had genuine grievances: Italy had been cheated at Versailles and Germany treated too harshly. It was therefore believed that Britain should react with sympathy, and try to revise the most hated clauses of Versailles. In turn it was thought that this would remove the need for German aggression and lead to Anglo-German friendship.
Since the League of Nations seemed to be helpless. Chamberlain believed that the only way to settle disputes was by personal contact between the leaders, and that in this way he would be able to control Hitler and Mussolini, bringing them to respect International Law.
However many now regard this as a mistake by Chamberlain. He did not have to go it alone, and in many ways created problems with this tactic. For example, the U.S.A leader, President Roosevelt, had offered to join Chamberlain, and Russia, to a face off with Hitler and Mussolini. Yet, somehow, Chamberlain believed it would be better for Great Britain to deal directly, and alone, with the dictators. Chamberlain's own dubious explanation for this is that at this time there simply was no alternative. Britain was still trying to play the worlds policeman. However this particular constable was the village bobby. And a vain one to boot.
The classic illustration of Chamberlain's appeasement policy was provided in 1938. Until such time none of Hitler's actions had actually overridden the territorial frontiers established in 1919.
From March 1938 this changed, and it started with the absorption of Austria, (though this was more by accident than design) known as Operation Otto, German troops crossed the frontier and Heimwehr groups took over the local administration.
Union was formally declared on 13 March, Hitler in what is alleged he called "the proudest moment of my life", made a triumphant entry in to Vienna. A plebiscite of 99.75 % of a vote in favour was easily constructed. At this point it became clear that there would be no reaction from France. This unfortunate stance by the French (who were involved in a Governmental crisis at home) allowed Chamberlain to continue his policy of appeasement without loosing face politically, he remarked "In the absence of a powerful ally, and until our armaments are prepared we must adjust our Foreign Policy to our circumstances, and even bear with patience and good humour actions which we should like to treat in a very different fashion". Yet Britain had never actually stopped its armament building, and Chamberlain again lost the opportunity to change stance. A.J.P Taylor believes that Chamberlain, and not Hitler, " was the man who provided an opportunity which Hitler could take and who thus gave the first push to war" (A.J.P Taylor, Origins of the second world war, page 172). Taylor of course refers to the Sudetenland crisis, the classic illustration of appeasement.
The expectations of the 325 million Germans in the Sudetenland fringe were considerably increased by the Anschluss This is a direct result of Chamberlain following the policy of appeasement - logic dictates that what is good for the Goose is good for the Gander, and Chamberlain had set a president that had now come back to haunt him. The Sudetenland Fascist Party leader, Konrad Henlein's demands for the autonomy for Sudetenland Germans - "the eight points"- were accepted in September by President Benes largely because it had become clear that Chamberlain would not guarantee Czechoslovakia against German intervention.
Alarmed at this situation the British Cabinet met in emergency session. Lord Halifax, now the Foreign Secretary, believed that Britain should try to "keep Herr Hitler guessing" on what Britain's policy would be over the crisis. At the very last Chamberlain was astute enough to note in September that "no state, certainly no democratic state, ought to make a threat of war unless it was both ready to carry it out and prepared to do so" (John Chamley, Chamberlain and the lost peace, page94). Chamberlain's chiefs of Staff agreed, and in their opinion "to take the offensive against Germany now would be like a man attacking a tiger before he has loaded his gun" (A.J.P Taylor, English History 1914-1945, page 424). Taylor believes that Chamberlain used the military argument "as an after thought, to sustain a policy on which he had already decided. His overriding motive was that peaceful revision could avert a second European war".
On the 13th September the Czechoslovakia Germans attempted to revolt but failed. Never the less, Chamberlain had been contacted by Daladier and told that at all costs, German troops should be kept out of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain now had a free hand, and according to Taylor, he believed that this would give Europe a stable peace. On the 15th September Chamberlain flew to Munich and met Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
Chamberlain appeased Hitler by offering the separation of Sudetenland Germans (all areas where Germans made over 50 % of the population) from the rest of Czechoslovakia Hitler accepted and Chamberlain returned to London. Walter Runciman concluded his inquiry and recommended self determination for the Germans (which was handy) and this became very popular with the British national press. However the British Cabinet, French PM Daladier and President Bones ere not happy. They argued on 18th September that Hitler's real aim was to dominate Europe. Daladier was right. Just four days later (22nd September) Hitler stepped up his demands - more of Czechoslovakia coupled with the immediate entry of German troops to the Sudatenland. Benes could not agree to this and ordered the immediate mobilisation of the Czech army.
It now seemed that war was inevitable. Hitler invited Chamberlain and Daladier to a conference with himself and Mussolini (but no Czech official). Here Chamberlain agreed to a plan produced by Mussolini (but drafted by the German Foreign Office) - the Sudetenland was to be handed over to Germany immediately, the rest of Czechoslovakia would be guaranteed. The extremely important thing to note here was that Chamberlain had agreed that should the Checks resist, they would receive no help from Britain. To Chamberlain the relevance of four countries deciding the fate of a fifth was of no consequence, nor was the loss of the 35 or so divisions of Czech infantry. Chamberlain arrived back to Britain with his little piece of paper and received a rapturous welcome, for the pubic believed he had secured peace. However, Churchill believed that Munich was a "total and unmitigated defeat". Churchill was not the only disbeliever, for Chamberlain's First Lord of the Admiralty, Alfred Duff-cooper, resigned from the cabinet arguing that Hitler simply could not be trusted to keep any agreement. However Chamberlain would persist in showing his naivety and vainness in a letter to his sister shortly after the meeting with Hitler. Chamberlain wrote that "he had heard from Hitler himself, and it was confirmed by others that were with him, that he was struck all of a heap, and exclaimed "I can't possibly let a man of his age come all this way; I must go to London" of course when he considered it further, he saw that wouldn't do, and indeed it would not have suited me, for it would have deprived my coup of much of it's dramatic force. But it shows a side of Hitler that would surprise many people in this country".
This letter is damning evidence that Chamberlain was a vain man, and vainness allows logical thought to disintegrate Taking this letter as an example, Chamberlain says that he had heard from Hitler himself "and it was confirmed by others that were with him" of course it was confirmed the cliché "Ask my brother if I'm a liar" didn't seem to work for Chamberlain. Secondly the "that would not do" line Why would it not do ? What coup did Chamberlain believe he was achieving ? At any point did Chamberlain stop to ponder how history would portray him? Yes he did, but he was vain enough to believe that he could bargain with Hitler. That by doing so History would paint him as the peacemaker.
It seems clear that despite the mass of evidence that Hitler was not reliable; for example the way in which he increased his demands at Godesburg when he realised how committed Chamberlain was to maintaining peace at all costs, all costs including ignoring reports of ill-treatment by the Nazi state to German Jews, all of this evidence only points to the fact that Chamberlain fundamentally misunderstood Hitler. Chamberlain even went as far as to inform his cabinet, upon his return from Godesburg, that he had established some influence over Hitler, a man that he believed " would be rather better than his word" !
Such a flawed judgement was worsened, basically, because Chamberlain continued in office. In March 1939 Chamberlain backed down again. German troops entered the rest of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain protested, but took no action. According to Chamberlain the guarantee of Check frontiers did not apply because technically Czechoslovakia had not been invaded; German troops had entered by invitation. And sod any moral obligation obviously. By handing over Czechoslovakia, not only had Britain behaved dishonourably, but she had also contributed to the superb lines of Czech defence becoming worthless.
However, perhaps importantly for the rallying call to arms from the anti appeasers (and by this point there were slightly more than one or two) Chamberlain was now unable to justify Hitler's movements. By march 1939, and under pressure from the anti-appeasers Chamberlain wrote to the Polish Government promising that should their independence be threatened Britain would "at once lend them all the support in their power" (presumably the polish thoroughly checked this for any technicalities).
Incredibly though, even now Chamberlain was wavering. By April Britain was urging the Poles to give up the disputed territory of Danzig (presumably the Poles did check their agreement for any technicalities, however there didn't happen to be any, so Britain changed "technicalities" to "disputed territories", but promptly apologised for the inconvenience).
Pressure was now growing for an alliance with Russia. However this was a very sensible idea, so Chamberlain and Halifax continued their detestment of Communism (one week after the Anshluss Stalin had proposed a coalition against Hitler but it was rejected by Chamberlain) the negotiations dragged on without any positive result, consequently the Union grew tired of Chamberlain's stalling and signed a non aggression pact with Hitler on 24th August.
Chamberlain was not just out of his depth. He was a vain, cowardly man, out of his depth. He sent mixed messages to Hitler, Stalin, Czechoslovakia and Poland. As a direct result of his actions he allowed the two, utterly differing, ideologies to understand each other more than the aims and intentions of Britain, consequently creating a pact that had been unthinkable.
On 4th September 1939 Neville Chamberlain made a radio address to the German people:
"...nobody in this country any longer places any trust in your leaders word. He gave his word that he would respect the Locarno Peace Treaty; he broke it. He declared that he would not incorporate the Czechs in the Reich; he did so. He gave his word after Munich that he had no further territorial demands in Europe; he broke it. He has sworn for years that he was the mortal enemy of Bolshevism; he is now its ally.
Can you wonder his word is, for us, not worth the paper it is written on ?"
These words, almost every last one, create a simply magnificent piece of irony.
Magnificent, painful, upsetting, ironic.
