On Khrushchev and Khrushchevism.

Martin McCauley in his chapter “Khrushchev as a Leader” describes the road of Khrushchev to the power and his reforms in different fields of the Soviet State. He asserts that, Khrushchev tried to change the society and state as an original leader rather than a transitory or traditional leader but failed due to the obstacles generated by the bureaucracy. McCauley perceives Khrushchev as a Stolypin of his time, who as his predecessor, lacked time required for the implementation of the reforms.

Given the time he could have fundamentally changed the Soviet system but by the time he was removed his innovations had still delicate roots that they could be extirpated. Since his goal was not the accumulation of personal power he put his own position at risk in a desperate attempt to remold Soviet society. 

I did not share the conclusion of McCauley. He presents the reforms of Khrushchev as his maneuvers to circumvent the bureaucratic apparatus established in the Stalinist period. However, as McCauley cites, Khrushchev created a new bureaucracy based on the Communist Party. He did not give up the centralized command economy but he created more confusion in the administration of the economy. His afford to give power to local authorities of the Party was not a move for decentralization but just a maneuver to defeat his opponents the First Secretary of the Communist Party. His attitude towards the opposition was also left in ambiguity. McCauley claims that he did not fear his opponents but despised them. So that, he did not used coercion as a means to defeat them. However, as McCauley stated in the start of the chapter, coercion was not an applicable means in the years following Stalin. The new leadership subjugated KGB to the state authority rather than to a leader, and eliminated Beria as a reminiscent of Terror.

Khrushchev’s reformations in the realm of economy were also could not be taken as original and fruitful reforms. They were political in nature, although the economic necessities were the incentives, the implementations was purely left in political hands, under Party control. His belief in the Marxist-Leninist ideals, the central role of Party, and his faulty comprehension of the problems make him a transitional leader just normalising the functioning of the Soviet system.

McCauley concentrated on the leader as most of the western scholars do. Grame Gill tries to focus on the ongoing trends in the Soviet system in order to understand the Khrushchev period and aftermath. Gill states that, there were two conflicting trends in the Soviet system: Institutionalization and personification of power. The Khrushchev reforms and obstacles he met should be analyzed in this perspective. The reforms of Khrushchev also reflected this dichotomy. He tried to develop the institutional structure of the Communist Party, tried to strengthen local branches. Besides, he was engaged in a policy of enlarging the political participation of the population. He used the slogan of “all people’s state” and all people’s party, which was exclusive during the dictatorship of proletariat period of Lenin and Stalin, thus Khrushchev innovation was detrimental to the very origin of the party. He also established new institutions such as Sovnarkhozy. However, he did not forego Stalinist methods during his rule either. He used one institution against other when he perceived it as necessary: Presidium over Central Committee or Central Committee over Presidium. He favored the people with whom he worked before, thus breeding clientelism. His failure and removal was also related to the same clashing trends. If he was a personal leader, he lacked means to defeat opposition, if he was in favor of institutions; there was no firmly established institution to rely on. I agree with the interpretation of Gill, which describes Khrushchev as a transitional leader, perceiving the pressures for institutionalization and for the maintenance of a leader dominant system. Gill favors the institutionalization trend, which gained the upper hand during the activist leadership of Khrushchev and rejected such a leader.

Since the main institution was the state, the chapter of Ronald Hill must take attention. He asserts that, Khrushchev fundamentally affected the theory and practice of the state system in the Soviet Union. The nature and role of State had been a main concern of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of which Khrushchev was an ardent follower. He inherited form Stalin, a powerful and centralized state organization. However, the ideology foresees the withering of state under communism. Khrushchev tried to achieve this goal by improving the representative role of the state against administrative role. He transferred certain functions to non-state organizations such as comrade’s courts, trade unions. Tried to popularize party by the slogan of “all people’s state” he aimed at indoctrinating the people by absorbing them into the system and strengthening the party against the state bureaucracy. However, he could not grasp the reality that state and party in the soviet system became synonyms. Also, the party amateurs could not function in the administration. Despite the fact that the localization reforms did not succeed and recentralisation, which started in the last years of Khrushchev, continued in the following period, the concept of “all people’s state” and the intertwining of party with state were also retained as a feature of the Soviet system.

The other aspect of the internal reforms of Khrushchev was the reforms in economy. Alec Nove briefly explains the conditions in the industry during the Khrushchev period. Khrushchev implemented his decentralization policy also in the realm of economy. Industry was also affected accordingly. However, decentralization was detrimental for a structure, which was established for a centrally controlled industry. Besides, the central planning remained in tact. Thus, decentralization produced ambiguity. Sovnarkhozy, which were established not only by economic requirements were inevitably subject to localism. Central planning, rapid and ambiguous decentralization and lack of market were the main causes of failure in the industrial field of Khrushchev’s reforms besides the military expenditure and orientation. They are endemic features of the Soviet system, which continued after Khrushchev.

In the agricultural policies, Khrushchev grasped the problems better. Smith argues that Khrushchev assured the administration of the importance of investment in agriculture for a general development of economy. He also realized the central control damages the agriculture, and tried to localize agricultural decision taking. However, the main obstacles in industry also impeded the agricultural development. Khrushchev gave the authority to local party representatives in kolhozy. The pressure from above continued to exist disregarding the necessities and conditions of the regions. Virgin Lands project, which was fruitful initially but central control and new techniques imposed by center turned to be counterproductive. The private production was continued to complement the low production of the general agricultural system, however the low level of production seemed to be a result of private production so peasant incentives were damaged further by restrictions on private production. Thus, again the system obscured any improvement in agriculture. However, Smith’s argument about the role of Khrushchev is not convincing. According to Smith, Khrushchev was aware of the problem but could not assure the surrounding, and the local authorities. In fact, many innovations presented by very Khrushchev became counter productive, Lysenko and Maize sowing affairs. The collective system was also a part of Khrushchev reforms. Therefore, Khrushchev should also share the responsibility for failure.

One of the factors affecting the problematic conditions in the field of industry was the labor problem. Filtzer perceives that the labor policy of Khrushchev was addressed to specific and urgent economic needs. The restrictions on the workers were relieved, trade unions gained some power in the first years of the rule of Khrushchev and wage reforms were introduced in order to increase working incentives. However, since Khrushchev could not renounce the traditional prerogatives of the system those reforms were not productive. Trade unions did not became real trade unions in the western sense, wage policies did not give up the main aim to differentiate personal worker on piece based wage determination, centrally prescribed norms in waging and production norms were still existing, which procrastinated the illegal adjustments made by local managers.

In the last analysis, all the reforms applied by Khrushchev were a direct result of the conditions.  Khrushchev was a part of the soviet system, not a radical reformer. However, he paved the way for the classic soviet state after a dictatorial one.