The 170s BC marked a different approach in Roman diplomacy in Greek affairs. The long-standing aim of Rome was to maintain a balance of power in the Greek sphere and to prevent one power from being too powerful. In 171 BC, Rome deemed Macedon to threaten stability in the area and once it was beaten, Rome split it up into four client republics (Eckstein 2008: 365-6). Like the last Macedonian war, foreign policy was dictated by those using the sword! Roman commanders actively supported the creation of pro-Roman factions in polities (Polyb. 24.10.3-7; Eckstein 2008: 365-6). The new, post-war hard-line did produce a type of Greek politician who would pledge support to Rome in order to dominate their states, which is exactly what happened to the Achaean League (Eckstein 2008: 381).
Indeed, following Macedon’s defeat, evidence of Rome’s new approach can be seen in the decision to deport a thousand leading Achaean men with suspected anti-Roman leanings (including Polybius) to Rome (Paus. 7.10.11; Gruen 1976: 48). It is likely that this was done to ensure stability in the area rather than to control Achaean affairs (Gruen 1976: 50), and, as such, allowed pro-Roman politicians like Callicrates of Leontion to become influential in local politics (Errington 2008: 250-1). However, during the 160s BC, these pro-Roman factions disappeared in Greek states (Eckstein 2008: 365-6). Events reverted to type: between the years of 167-150 BC, there were no break-downs in the relations between the Roman Republic and the Achaean League; Rome continued to recognise Achaean dominance in the Peloponnese.
In 166 BC, when Delian residents who sought refuge and citizenship in Achaea were subject to law suits by the Athenians who had annexed the island, they asked to be treated under the simbolon as Achaeans, which the Athenians refused. When the case was referred in Rome seven years later, the senate ordered in favour of the League, the Athenians had to acknowledge Achaean law and treat the refugees as Achaean citizens (Gruen 1976: 51). It appears to have been the issue of Spartan autonomy which undermined the League’s position with Rome. Sparta had detached herself from the Achaean league in 149/8 and the Achaean general Damocritus was preparing to intervene.
A Roman legion under Q. Metellus had arrived in Macedon in 148 BC to head off a new Macedonian threat under Andriscus – it was imperative that Rome kept her allies in the region and so Metellus did not take umbrage when the Achaean council declined his request via envoy to delay action against Sparta (Gruen 1976: 56). Later in the year, Metellus sent another envoy to the League, requesting it to call off action against Sparta until a senatorial embassy had arrived but once again, it was rebuffed (Gruen 1976: 56). Even when, in the summer of 147, the Roman envoy Orestes delivered a message to the Achaean council, who were preparing to go to war with Sparta again, threatening them with war if they did not secede certain cities (Heraclea), the senate followed it up by another envoy preaching cordiality (Gruen 1976: 61); the contradictory envoys possibly implies that opinion in the senate was divided on what action to take. The Achaean strategos Critolaus asked for a six month delay on another Roman embassy on the matter, which the senate honoured (Gruen 1976: 63).
However, the League convened and declared war on Sparta. At the same time, the city of Heraclea, which wished to separate from the League and had appealed to Rome, came under siege by Critolaus. Metellus, who had defeated Andriscus in the Fourth Macedonian War, maintained a legion in Greece and thus was in a position to march against Critolaus to check the Achaeans (Gruen 1976: 65). Critolaus fled and was then defeated by Metellus at Locris. Metellus offered terms of peace in the spring and autumn of 146 but they were rejected both times by the Achaeans (Gruen 1976: 67). Eventually, an army under L. Mummius defeated the Achaean army at the Battle of Corinth in the same year, sacking the city and putting an end to the war; the League was then broken up (Numismatic evidence attests that the League’s bronze coinage was stopped around 146 BC, which supports the breaking up of the League: Warren 2008: 96). The question that remains is why the dramatic change in attitude from Rome?
Many scholars have argued on that the Senate had impatient, tiring of the Achaeans constantly disobeying their attempts at mediation in Peloponnesian affairs on the grounds that there is an absence of any other explanation (Gruen 1976: 69; McGing 2003: 79). This must have been true to a certain extent – Roman demands and generous treatment of the League had failed to prevent conflict in the Peloponnese (Gruen 1976: 69). Here, I might also add another suggestion: despite the on and off uprisings by Messene and Sparta, the League had come to control the entirety of the Peloponnese (see Fig. 1), which was a huge landmass (The region of Elis alone was near 2660km2 alone (Roy 2008: 263)) and made the Achaean League more than just a second tier power (Eckstein 2008: 362). Though Macedon had now been pacified, perhaps Rome had realised the League would continue to expand and would continue to be bellicose, thus threatening the balance of power in the region. If it was not checked, it might have even threatened Rome.
Rome’s aims in the Peloponnese for other Peloponnesian identities:
The first evidence of dialogue we hear between Peloponnesian powers and Rome comes during the First Macedonian War. In its attempts to prevent further Macedonian hegemony in Greece, the Romans sought allies in their war against Philip V. A treaty with Aetolia allowed further informal agreements (amicitia) with the poleis of Sparta, Messene and Elis (Polybius 18.42.7; Livy 26.24.9; Eckstein 2008: 90; Gruen 1984: 20). Peace was established in 205 BC and Rome withdrew its forces from the region. Yet, for the next five years until the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, Rome did not pursue any more agreements with Sparta, Elis or Messene (Eckstein 2008: 123); the agreements reached with these powers were informal and did not specifically tie Rome to any last guarantee – Sparta even dropped out of the war a year later (Gruen 1984: 77). Rome was already embroiled in another conflict, the Second Punic War and therefore it made sense for Rome to seek any ally or friend it could to deal with Philip. The senate certainly considered Greece as an important theatre but it could not commit to it because of the war against Hannibal (Eckstein 2008: 90).
Rome also displayed its obligations for ‘friends and allies’ during the saga of Nabis. He had originally allied with Rome during the First Macedonian War (Livy 29.12; 34.31). During the Second Macedonian War, Nabis switched sides from supporting Macedon to Rome in order to gain control of Argos; T. Quinctius also asked him to stop attacking the Achaeans (Livy 32.38-9). Later, Mabis claimed after refusing to liberate Argos, that he had never violated his ‘friendship and alliance’ with Rome, but the Romans refused him the status of ally because of his maltreatment of Sparta (his own polis) and Messene (Sherwin-White 1984: 62-3).
Considering Rome allowed the Achaean League to usurp power in the Peloponnese just a few years later, this demonstrates a remarkable difference in opinion; the League could effectively do what they want and get away with it, Nabis could not. The League had ‘earned’ their status as ‘friend and ally’ by fighting alongside Rome; those who were considered only as ‘friends’ were those who were considered inferior to free-states (Sherwin-White 1984: 66). In 195 BC, Sparta was even invaded by Flamininus and stripped of Argos, which was given back to the League (Livy 34.22-40)! Moreover, perhaps the disparity in treatment is explained by the fact that Rome simply thought that Nabis threatened stability in the Peloponnese (Eckstein 1987: 305). However, the peace settlement remarked that Sparta should remain independent (Eckstein 2006: 303).
Antiochus II, the Seleucid king began the Roman-Syrian War of 192-188 BC by marching his army through Greece and forcing states to join his side. We are told that some states in the Peloponnese, like Elis switched sides to support Antiochus (Eckstein 2008: 325-6). Though helping Rome in the war, the Achaean League used the situation to conquer Sparta, Elis and Messene - despite Flamininus raising objections to this. Nothing was done to prevent the League from doing so bar ineffectual reasoning (Livy 36.31.4-6; Eckstein 2008: 332). Flamininus even supported the inclusion of Messene in the Achaean League (Errington 2008: 240). It would appear that Rome was tolerating their actions, despite having proclaimed ‘freedom’ for Greece in 196 (Polyb. 18.47.6-7), and thus was sending out the wrong message (Eckstein 2006: 302-3).
In 191 BC, a Spartan delegation arrived in Rome asking for the return of hostages taken by Rome after Nabis’ defeat in 195, as well as the restoration of perioikic towns to Sparta (Polyb. 21.1.1-2). This request was initially brushed off by the senate (Polyb. 21.1.1-4), who told them to seek satisfaction with the Achaean council, which clearly shows a Roman deference to the League in local politics at the time. However, acknowledging the appeal on behalf of the Spartans was effectively went against the League’s constitution. It was supposed to be the League’s remit to deal with its own constituents and the effect of this promoted fragility in the Peloponnese. Over the course of time, the continual pleading to Rome just made its hand more powerful (Derow 2003: 66). The senate did send back the hostages in 190, though keeping Nabis’ son behind (Polyb. 21.3.4). For the most part of the early 180s BC, Roman embassies that passed through the Peloponnese preached a similar line to the Achaean League: they criticised the League for excessive violence against Sparta (Gruen 1984: 485). Q. Metellus did exactly this in 185 BC at a meeting of League magistrates (Polyb. 22.10.1-2).
Rome continued to seek for moderation of Achaean oppression of Sparta after 188 BC (Eckstein 2008: 348). An excuse for intervention was there, but it was never acted upon by Rome (Gruen 1984: 486). Another embassy under Appius Claudius Pulcher in 184 BC chastised the League for its recent massacre at Compasium and for ‘obliterating the Lacedaemonian constitution’ (Livy 39.36.3-4). However, Appius delivered another message warning the Achaeans of future action (Livy 39.37.18-9). A Messenian envoy under Deinocrates in 183 BC, asking again for secession from the League was rebuffed by the senate yet again and as a consequence, the Messenians revolted anyway (Plut. Phil. 18.3). Yet again, an envoy under Q. Marcius Philippus advised the League to consult Rome before taking action (Polyb. 24.9.12 ).
The year 164 BC saw a territorial dispute arise between Sparta and Megalopolis, which was a member of the Achaean League. An embassy under C. Sulpicius Galus was chosen to decide on the case, and Sulpicius followed a familiar line in deferring to the League by appointing Callicrates, a famous Achaean statesman to preside over the case (Pausanias (8.1.1-3))! The issue of Sparta’s membership in the League arose again around 150/49 BC when a Spartan embassy to the senate raised the issue over the territorial dispute with Megalopolis and it challenged the League’s jurisdiction (Gruen 1976: 55). The senate’s reply was consistent enough, deferring the dispute as a matter of League jurisdiction; the status quo was still being upheld to the detriment of the Spartans. The issue was raised again the following year by Sparta under Menalcidas, a former strategos of the League who used his position in the League’s hierarchy to push for Spartan independence. Once again, the senate deferred on the issue, but instead of making a decision to one side or the other, they opted to give a reply which was ambiguous, hence making the Achaeans think they had control of Sparta and the Spartans think they had a right to withdraw from the league (Gruen 1976: 55-6).
There was a dramatic shift in approach to regional Peloponnesian independence in 147 BC when the legate L. Aurelius Orestes requested that Sparta, amongst other poleis be omitted from the Achaean League (Paus. 7.14-15). However, this envoy was followed up with another in short succession explaining that the previous warning was just to scare them into behaving (Polyb. 38.9.6), but the change in tactic does appear to suggest that Rome could make Sparta and other poleis independent if it wanted to (McGing 2003: 79). It comes therefore as no surprise that real change in the Peloponnese came in the form of a Roman army, the head of which was able to dictate foreign policy on the march (Sherwin-White 1984: 2). The defeat of the Achaean League by Metellus and Mummius finally allowed Spartan, Elean and Messenian independence as the League was broken up; they were also awarded compensation by way of fines levied on the Achaean League (Paus. 7.16.10; Kallet-Marx 1996: 91-2).
The Achaean League’s response to Roman diplomacy:
We have discussed what the Romans wanted out of their relations with the Achaean League, as well as with other Peloponnesian groups like the Spartans and the Messenians, but what did the Achaean League want and expect out of the diplomatic relations with Rome? The fact that the relations broke down between these two would indicate that there were different objectives in their alliance with each other.
Why did the League choose to side with Rome in the first place during the Second Macedonian War? There was a very real fear of Philip as he was known to have committed atrocities in Thessaly. Perhaps more so was the fact Philip looked like he would not be able to protect them from Rome; the Romans themselves were not above pillaging and terror, as Flamininus and his brother Lucius proved (Livy 32.15.2-3; 32.16.14-5; Eckstein 2008: 281.). Siding with those whom they feared them most would at least serve them well in the short term. It certainly paid dividends in the Second Macedonian War when the League regained Corinth as a gift from Rome for helping in the war. Other acts of benefaction, such as the decision to ransom Roman prisoners they had acquired from the Punic wars back to Rome, went a long way (Plut. Flam. 13.6). No doubt the League was hoping for a reward for supporting Rome, but this was a long held ambition for the league (Eckstein 2006: 290-1; 2008: 288-9). The Romans tended to favour those who rewarded them (Kallet Marx 1996: 76), and this was one such example.
The League was not an ideal ‘friend’ of Rome. It was an independent and aggressive polity that decided on what was best for itself. Its benefaction by Rome was a result of a series of wise choices from 198 BC onwards (Eckstein 2008: 333). The only real ambition of the League was to ensure its survival and one way to do that was to obtain a proper alliance from Rome and it had been asking for some time yet it only got one after 189 BC (Gruen 1984: 33; Kallet Mark 1996: 189-90). They had continually asked for a formal alliance since the end of the Second Macedonian War (Polyb. 18.42.6-7); an Achaean vote in 192 on whether to have the same friends as Rome indicates no alliance had been established then either (Livy 36.32.2). Achaean deliberations were sooner made on grounds of practicality rather than loyalty. Polybius recalls a meeting in the autumn of 170 BC between his father Lycortas and Archon, where they weighed up the pros and cons of backing Rome in the Third Macedonian war or remaining neutral – despite the fact that had a formal treaty of military alliance with Rome (Polyb. 28.6; Eckstein 2008: 98-9, citing Eckstein 2002: 279 n. 34)! The attitude to Rome after 197 BC was one of taking advantage of Rome’s stance towards them.
Once the Achaeans had guaranteed Roman alliance, the next step was domination of the Peloponnese. The League had managed to incorporate Sparta, Messene and Elis into the League by force and they continued to quell insurrections by subjugation. Though the senate and regional legates always opposed this, apart from remonstration, the League was never overtly punished for this. When the League suppressed a Messenian revolt in 182-1 BC, the senate refused to support or condone the League’s actions (Eckstein 2008: 348). Also, Rome mostly deferred to the League in local disputes; a fragmentary decree from Olympia shows a decision made by the Achaean arbitral board being favoured by Rome (Gruen 1976: 50, citing Syll.3 665). Given the fact that Rome often withdrew its legions after major conflicts, it is no surprise to some extent that the League came to the conclusion that they could afford to ignore Rome (Eckstein 2008: 319, citing Gilpin 1988: 593-6). This was perpetuated by Philopoemen’s domination of the League; he refused to accept Roman legitimacy in attempt to solve the problems between Sparta and the League (Errington 2008: 239).
There was a shift in attitude on both sides after the Third Macedonian War. Though the League had deliberated to back Rome in the war, they eventually sided with the Republic. However, the League contributed little to the war and there were rumours of Roman suspicion (Polyb. 28.3.4-10), which were probably initiated by the League’s policy of waiting on events (Gruen 1984: 508-9): as shown by apt example of the League sending forces to aid the Roman consul Philipus until they were certain that the Romans were winning (Polyb. 28.13.1-4). The Romans were only too willing to no hear of cases where Greeks were undermining their efforts in the region and the League had to adapt to face that (Gruen 1984: 517). League politicians like Callicrates began to use Rome as a tool for disposing of enemies, just like he did of Polybius amongst a thousand political prisoners sent to Rome for being ‘anti-Roman’ (Paus. 7.10.7-10).
The upshot of this new situation was that Achaean statesmen had to walk a fine line between pleasing Rome and pro-Roman factions whilst maintaining a certain degree of autonomy (Eckstein 2008: 360). That said, the League spent fifteen years between 165 and 150 BC trying to convince the senate to return those prisoners with the senate only relenting in 150 BC (Polyb. 30.29.1, 30.30.1; Derow 1989: 319-20). There also seems to have been a swell of anti-Roman feeling in after 150 BC too (Derow 1989: 319-20).
The lack of decisive action by Rome thus far meant Roman warnings were still ignored, it’s bark was worse than it’s bite (Eckstein 2008: 364). There was no permanent Roman presence in the area, visits from senatorial legates were rare and often said the same thing as ones before. So it seemed worth taking the risk in offending Rome to solve urgent matters with military force (Errington 2008: 252). However, this was not the same in the year of 146 BC. The death of Callicrates during an embassy to Rome in 147 BC saw a more aggressive League come to the fore. The Achaean subjugation of Sparta was still continuing between in 147 BC under Diaeus and Critolaus, the two strategoi when the Achaean war broke out (Paus. 7.12-16). Critolaus’ request for a six month delay on a senatorial decision on the League’s military operations on Sparta effectively ended relations between the League and Rome and it was very much to the League’s surprise that they were attacked by Rome (Derow 1989: 322). The pace and ease with which the Roman legions under Mummius and Metellus defeated the Achaean League indicates that they had no idea what was coming.
Other Peloponnesian responses to Roman diplomacy:
We have seen what the Achaean League wanted out of their relationship with Rome, but what can we say about those other identities in the region? What were their aims? Quite simply, their aim was to throw off the shackles of Achaean oppression and they would try to use Rome to help them do just that. They had a limited amount of success doing this whilst the Achaean league enjoyed the benefaction of Rome. Sparta, Elis and Messene all pursued amicitia with Rome during the First Macedonian War to protect themselves from Macedonian aggression (Livy 26.24.9; Eckstein 2008: 90; Gruen 1984: 20). As was referred to earlier (page seven, paragraph one), this amicitia was informal and there was no punishment for Sparta for dropping out of the Second Macedonian War after having changed allegiances to Rome. Despite this, Sparta under Nabis saw Argos being liberated by the Romans and given to the Achaean League (Livy 34.22-40), yet Sparta was to remain independent (Eckstein 2006: 303).
The Roman-Syrian War saw the Achaean League forcibly annex Elis, Sparta and Messene to the League. Despite constant rebellions on behalf of Sparta and Messene, they were too weak to defeat the League and henceforth they had to plead to Rome for intervention, which for a number of years amounted to nothing. The fall-out of the Third Macedonian War saw a thousand leading politicians from Achaea being taken into custody by Rome (Paus. 7.10.11). This was an unexpected bonus for Sparta as Paul Cartledge points out; Sparta had done nothing for Rome and yet many anti-Roman and thus anti-Spartan Achaean politicians had disappeared! Following on from this, Sparta raised the issue of its territorial dispute with Megalopolis and with her border with Argos (Paus. 7.11.1-3; Cartledge & Spawforth 2002: 85-6).
There was a change of tack during Menalcidas' reign as strategos (151-0 BC) of the Achaean League, which he used to undermine the League from within. Whilst on an embassy to Rome, he tried to gain Spartan independence from the League. Clearly, Sparta was still aggrieved over previous Roman decisions in favour of the League (Gruen 1976: 55). The same was true of 149/8 BC where Menalcidas and Diaeus arguing in front of the Senate for the recall of Spartan exiles; this time, though the senate delivered an ambiguous and non-committal answer, it was different from the usual agreeing with the Achaean League, which showed signs that Sparta’s pleading to Rome was starting to have an effect (Gruen 1976: 55).
The aftermath of the Achaean war directly benefitted Sparta, Elis and Messene. Not only was the Achaean League essentially disbanded and the cities given their independence (Shipley 2005: 330), but the League was forced to pay fines to them (Paus. 7.16.10). All those years complaining to Rome about their treatment by the League had finally paid off!
Discrepancies in Polybius’ account:
The details of the events leading up to the Achaean war are described well by our ancient sources; however, there are a few problems with some of the statements made by Polybius, Pausanias and Livy. For example, Polybius often talks about how pro-Roman ‘sycophants’ dominated the League after 190 BC (24.8.6-10.10). This cannot be so: the Achaean strategoi we know of between 170 and 168 are Xenarchus in 175-4 BC (Livy, 41. 23.4, 41.24.1), Archon in 172-1 and 170-69 BC (Livy 41.24; Polyb. 27.2.11, 28.6.9) and Xenon before 167 BC (Paus. 7.10.9). They were all opponents of Callicrates (Gruen 1984: 500)!
Polybius also exaggerates the extent to which the impact Roman intervention had on Callicrates becoming strategos of the League (24.10.13-5). Callicrates, on his own, convinced the Achaean assembly to moderate their stance towards Sparta. He did not argue for them to both leave the League and he only had a letter from the senate backing his recommendation (Eckstein 2008: 369).
Polybius was anti-Callicrates mostly due to the fact that he blames his deporting to Rome on Callicrates; he was his political opponent in the Achaean assembly for several years (Errington 2008: 240). He was not the most impartial observer when it came to Roman involvement in the region, thinking that they had acted nefariously after the Third Macedonian War. Polybius’ position in Achaean and then Roman society later made him a ‘well-placed observer’ (Rich 1985: 95). Rome did try to intervene in Peloponnesian politics but most of the time, whatever the senate or legates tried to do, they were ignored; so even if they could act underhand in local politics, they were not listened to anyway (Rich 1985: 95)!
Conclusion:
As we have seen, Rome did try to maintain a stable relationship with the Achaean League. For the most part, Rome certainly did favour the Achaean League for quite some time due to its support in various wars. Though they were concerned with its expansionist policy before the Third Macedonian War, it was only until after the war that the Republic started to realise that if the League was not reigned in soon, it would start to dominate not just the Peloponnese, but then Greece itself! It was not just impatience with the League, but a dawning realisation that no matter what they did, the Achaean League would continue to follow its own interests. Other poleis in the Peloponnese suffered because of Rome’s disposition towards the League and this only actually changed after the final defeat of the League at Corinth. For the League itself, an alliance with Rome was just a way to guarantee survival in an area where many kingdoms and states had vested interests. Rome’s decision to go to war with them in 146 BC came totally out of the blue.
Bibliography:
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Pausanias. Description of Greece, translated by W.H.S. Jones, Litt.D., and H.A. Ormerod, M.A., in 4 Volumes. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1918.
Plutarch. Lives (Vol. 10), translated by B. Perrin, (Loeb Classical Library), Heinemann/Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1921
Polybius. The Histories, translated by E. S. Shuckburgh. London, New York: Macmillan. 1889 (Reprint 1962).
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