Persian Gulf War Analysis

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

An Effective Use of Power?

A look at the Persian Gulf War and the War in Iraq

During the United States brief history, it has rarely been in a situation where it was directly threatened by a nation. This does not mean that it has not stepped in on plenty of conflicts though. As a super-power, and more recently a hegemonic power, the role of the United States has been to ensure the safety of not only its citizens, but of all human beings. In a more recent situation, the invasion of Kuwait was no exception to the responsibilities of the United States. What this paper discusses is whether the United States role in the Persian Gulf War was justified and that they did everything they could before relying on military action. International organizations have fought long and hard to develop international law focused on the law of war. Initially, these laws focused on the issues of traditional state-versus-state warfare. With the new age of warfare, international law must also attempt to regulate revolutionary and internal warfare and terrorism.

In order to exemplify these diverse concerns, we must determine when a war is necessary and how it should be fought. This is when the “just war” theory comes into play. The “just war” theory consists of two parts: The cause of war and the conduct of war. It is mainly believed that the just cause of war (jus ad bellum) exists in cases where the war is declared by a legitimate authority, is a last resort, waged in self defense or to establish/restore justice, and fought to bring about peace. The reasoning for going to war in the first place needs to be just and can therefore be recapturing things taken or punishing people who have done wrong. The US Catholic Conference took a much more contemporary view of just cause when they stated that "force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil, i.e., aggression or massive violation of the basic human rights of whole populations" (Douglas, p.71). We must also use a comparative justice approach on the matter in order to further prove a war as just. While there are clearly rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, in order to override the supposition against the use of force, the injustice that has been suffered by one party must drastically outweigh that suffered by the opposing party. There have been some theorists, such as Brian Orend, who have omitted this term by deeming it as fertile ground for exploitation by pugnacious regimes. Next, a legitimate authority must declare a war in order for it to fulfill another requirement of just war. Only suitably constituted public authorities may wage a war. Presently, the United Nations is seen as the main authority for determining whether a war is just.

A nation's actions are only deemed “just” if they are enacted with the right intention. This means that force may be used only when it is truly a just cause and solely for that purpose alone. An example may be correcting a suffered wrong, which is considered a right objective; while material gain or maintaining an economy is not. Following this, the probability of success must be considered. The use of arms may not be used in a pointless cause or within a case where “disproportionate measures are required to achieve overall success” (Young, p.27). Clearly a war should not be conducted unless it is by all means, a last resort. The use of force may only be conducted after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously attempted and exhausted. It may become clear that the opposing party is using negotiations only as a delaying tactic and will not make significant concessions. Lastly, the projected benefits of waging a war must be proportionate to the wars expected evils or harms that will result.

Once the war had begun, there are requirements set to ensure that combatants are continuing to act ethically. This part of the just war requirement is known as Jus in Bello. The first point states that just war conduct should be governed by the principle of distinction. The acts of war should “only be directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants who are caught in a situation for which they did not create” (Dastrup, p.179). Such prohibited acts include the bombing of civilian residential areas which do not include military targets and committing acts of terrorism or retaliation against ordinary civilians. Just war conduct should further be governed by the principle of proportionality. The force by which a nation uses must be proportional to the wrong endured, and also to the projected good that may result. The more disproportional the number of civilian deaths become, the more questioning a nation will have to endure as to whether they are following the guidelines of a just war. Lastly, just war conduct should be governed by the standard of minimum force. An attack must be intended to help in the military’s defeat of the enemy. This must be an attack on a military objective, in which the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be comparative and “not disproportionate in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated” (Woods, p.14). This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.

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The ongoing question has been whether the United States’ actions before entering the Persian Gulf War met the requirements of declaring a just war and whether the actions committed once in Iraq were adequate enough to abide by the standards of Jus in Bello. Using the “just war” theory outlined by Michael Walzer's “Just and Unjust Wars”, it states that the American-led coalition against Saddam Hussein's forces in the Persian Gulf War did not only prove his actions as unjustified, but it also legitimizes the response by the United Nations' coalition force (Walzer, p.7). The rest of the paper ...

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Before the Persian Gulf War took place, the United States remained patient, seeking to eliminate the threat posed by Iraq in a peaceful way. The just war theory states that a nation’s actions must be backed by a legitimate authority, which clearly was the United Nations. The United States fulfilled this requirement by awaiting UN approval before moving to the next step towards an invasion. Directly following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops, the “UN Security Council became active in passing a dozen resolutions which included the issuing of a sweeping condemnation of the Iraqi breach of peace” (Brands 2006, p.24). The UN continued by demanding the restoration of the situation to pre-August 1, 1990 conditions (before the invasion began). The UN Security Council continued threatening Iraq by setting up diplomatic and economic sanctions, which the UN had hoped would force Iraq to leave Kuwait. The UN asked the US to lead a coalition of troops in order to ensure the sanctions were carried out. This was mainly done through sea power. On November 29, 1990, the foreign ministers of the Security Council approved Resolution 678, which authorized all nations to enforce any preceding sanctions by all means necessary. This was a clear signal that the UN was allowing military intervention. In gaining the support of the United Nations, the Unites States was able to invade Iraq and defend Kuwait. The importance of gaining the support of the UN was enormous and it allowed for military support from many of the UN members. By allowing the UN to view all diplomatic attempts, they were able to see first-hand that the nations of the world were doing all that they could to prevent a war to no avail.

The United States knew that after Iraq refused all UN attempts to create a peace treaty, war would be the only answer. Once this realization had been met, the US had fulfilled the just war guideline of making every attempt to resolve the issue before turning to war. After reviewing the steps that the United Nations and United States took in order to get Iraq to leave Kuwait, it is clear that Iraq had no intentions of leaving. “Although the American-led coalition had the capabilities to do as it threatened, the Iraqi government apparently believed that it possessed the military muscle needed to neutralize any moves by the coalition”(Yetiv 2005, p.807). Thus, Iraq largely ignored the American threats made in the fall of 1990 and the winter of 1991. The UN and United States knew that if Iraq did not pull out after the economic sanctions had been enacted, which reportedly stopped all oil exports and reduced Iraqi imports by 90 percent, then Iraq would have to be moved by military force. Even after accepting this belief, the UN and all major powers worked up to the very last second in an attempt to avoid a war. George Bush made one last attempt at avoiding military use by overtly threatening Hussein. "A line has been drawn in the sand...Withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally and immediately, or face the terrible consequences"(Brands 2006, p. 24). The UN finally decided to impose a deadline of January 15, 1991 by which Iraq must comply with its demands. Once the deadline passed, it was clear that the region was poised for war and that the major nations of the world had to help protect the safety of Kuwait and its citizens.

Seeing as the Iraq army was the fourth largest in the world, which was invading a country the size of Connecticut, it is clear that the United State’s role in the war was to restore justice in a country that was clearly too small to protect itself, which further abided by the just war requirements. It seemed as though Hussein’s motivation for invading Kuwait was based mainly on jealousy and hatred. Kuwait had a reputation of being arrogant, due to their record breaking wealth. Many Arab nations opposed the Kuwaiti practice of hiring other Arabs in order to do jobs they were not willing to do themselves. There was also the belief that Kuwaitis were siphoning oil from the Iraqis in the Rumaila oil field. Though it is understandable why a country may grow frustrated with such acts, there is clearly not enough basis to attack a nation. This is not a situation in which Kuwait launched Scud missiles into Iraq. There was no imminent threat that Kuwait imposed on Iraq, therefore there was no reason for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. If we have created guidelines which exemplify when a war is “just”, then let us briefly look at the Kuwaiti threat on Iraq.

“Just War” exists in cases where the war is declared by a legitimate authority, is a last resort, waged in self defense or to establish/restore justice, and fought to bring about peace (Rourke-Boyer, p.212). It is clear that there was no authority other than Iraq that publicly declared war on Kuwait. This declaration was not supported by any other major nation, nor was it supported by any international organizations. The reasoning for there being no support for this war was because Iraq did not have a valid reasoning behind their actions. Kuwait may have been a slight economic threat to Iraq, but there was clearly not enough of a threat in order to declare war. If the US begins to feel threatened by a vastly growing economy in China, it does not look to invade it due to the economic threats it may pose. Therefore, Iraq is not invading Kuwait in self defense. An invasion of Kuwait would create mass chaos and would clearly not bring about peace within an already unstable Middle East.

This is where the United States knew that it had to step in and abide by another guideline of the just war theory. Clearly the actions of the United States during the Persian Gulf War were implemented based on the goal of restoring peace and security within the Middle East region. In looking back at Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons attack on Iraqi Kurds in the 1980’s, it was clear that the end result of taking control of Kuwait may have been to enact genocide among that region too. With Hussein’s track record, most nations feared the worst for Kuwait, if the Iraqi army was able to effectively take control of that region (Fabbrini, p.298).

At the time of the Persian Gulf War, the Soviet Union was still intact. It is hard to even imagine the further instability of the Middle East, had no one stopped the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait along with the elimination of the Soviet Union. Iraq could have possibly sought even more opportunities by invading other newly established and unstable nations, seeing as they would have assumed the United States and other powers would just turn away as they did during the invasion of Kuwait. The United States viewed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a warning sign of what Iraq may possess as an overall goal. If Saddam Hussein was able to invade Kuwait without much resistance, then he would surely look to claim even more oil fields throughout the Middle East. The United States knew that one country led by Hussein was threatening enough. By allowing Hussein to invade and gain more land would only further the Middle East region into chaos. How the United States handled the citizens of Iraq may lead to a little more resistance though.

The main justification that must be made when determining if a war was just has to do with whether the amount of force used by a nation is proportionate to the threat and whether the force is harmful to innocent civilians. The United States created an army that perfectly matched the threat and would be able to protect the citizens that lived in both Kuwait and Iraq. The Iraqi army which had numbered almost a million strong consisted of the fourth largest army in the world. It was based on this threat that the United States deployed roughly 500,000 troops into the gulf region. With more advanced technology, accompanied by almost 250,000 troops from other nations, the United States and the coalition were in relatively good shape based on military size match-ups (Katel, p.5). The size of the coalition was smaller in comparison to the Iraqi military, but the strength of the military must also be measured based on its resources. The United States alone could provide for the naval security needed to “own” the sea, while their air force was just as powerful. Solely based on troop size alone, Iraq may have been larger, but in adding technology and military vehicles to the mix, the US led coalition was clearly overpowering. With this advanced technology, the US-led coalition aimed to eliminate innocent civilian casualties.

It was clear that the goal of the United States was to avoid innocent civilian deaths at all costs. It is unrealistic to assume that no innocent lives will be lost in war and the Persian Gulf War was to be no exception. By the end of the war, an estimated 3,664 Iraqi civilians were killed (Woods, p.23). These civilians were not in any way intentionally attacked, and a majority of these civilians were killed during an attack on what was believed to be an Iraqi military communications center in Baghdad. The US later found out that it was also serving as an air raid shelter. It has never been the goal of the United States to kill innocent civilians and the US has spent billions of dollars on creating technology that works to improve the accuracy of its missiles. Therefore, the United States was effective in making sure that noncombatants did not become intentional targets during the invasion of Iraq.

Just war theory is broken into two main categories in which it tries to dictate the justification for going to war and, once it is engaged, the conduct of the combatants involved (Walzer, p.9). A questionable cause does not, in any way, qualify questionable conduct. When applied to the Gulf War, both considerations were fully ignored by the Iraqi government along with its soldiers. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was an exact example of aggression, according to the very definition given in the just-war theory. Once Iraq had invaded, the coalition had made enough attempts to settle the matter without having to resort to war, thus satisfying the "last resort" requirement. Once diplomatic efforts had failed, the coalition had received permission from the expert authority of the United Nations allowing the US to use force against the Iraqi army. Humanitarian intervention was also necessary as a result of the atrocities performed against the Kuwaiti civilians, which further solidifies the US case on a just war. Following the start of the war, the concentration had shifted from the justification for war over to the justice during the war. Iraq had once again failed to adhere to the just war principles. The Iraqi treatment of prisoners of war was far different from that of the coalition troops. The coalition continued following the requirements of just war behavior which allowed the killing of combatants regardless of the circumstances which brought them to bear (Woods, p.23). Lastly, the coalition did not participate in any individual assassination or nuclear war. This would have violated the exclusion of non-combatants from hostilities. During the entire Persian Gulf War, the coalition had followed the requirements for a just war long before and during the Persian Gulf War.

After reviewing the steps necessary in determining whether a war is justified, it is clear that the United States abided by all these guidelines, and had been given no choice but to intervene on the matter. The actions of the United States during the Persian Gulf War were implemented perfectly (this is without looking beyond March 1991). It was the main responsibility of the hegemonic power to ensure that all human beings were being treated ethically. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United Nations sought the support of the United States in ensuring the safety of the Kuwaitis. With the recent war in Iraq, we have seen the importance of support from, not only a nation’s citizens, but also the United Nations and other super-powers. President Bush ensured that the United States was acting based on the best interest of the United Nations during the Persian Gulf War, and it is hard to picture what he would have done if the invasion of Kuwait was ignored by the United Nations.

Works Cited

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(Fabbrini, p.298) (Katel, p.5) (Woods, p.23) (Rourke-Boyer, p.212)