Sophia Marinho de Lemos

The Soviet Union had been struggling to industrially renovate itself, yet this required major amendments to be made to the system particularly, as noted by Bunce, a transformation from ‘planning to markets, from public to private ownership, from shadow to real prices and to participation in the global economy.’ This criterion implies a movement away from the ideology of socialism that the CPSU had based itself around and in fact gave it its legitimacy as rightful power holders throughout the USSR. Perhaps confessing to the downfall of the tradition of socialism and veering away from the long-established system of central planning Gorbachev in fact weakened the CPSU as ‘a legitimate political entity.’

Perhaps it is debatable though that it was not merely the abandonment of Soviet tradition that obstructed the CPSU as a united body, but more crucially what replaced the traditional system. The introduction of glasnost and perestroika into the way of government resulted in significant disorder. It is possible to say that Gorbachev’s most daunting task he had to face when assuming office in 1985 was how to stabilize the Soviet economy which had been in a period of stagnation for over two decades and was in need of reform. Gorbachev thus chose to enforce the policy of perestroika in order to reconstruct the previous scheme into a more efficient economic and social system. The Soviet states were accustomed to unrealistic statistics fuelled by propaganda and thus judged the state of economic affairs on a more local level such as the length of queues outside stores and the availability of goods in shops, which in a time where basic commodities such as bread and soap were virtually unavailable meant that people were disillusioned to say the least. In 1988 and 1989 there was no change in the rate of economic growth from the previous years and in 1990 national income fell and continued to fall by about 15 per cent until 1991 when the economy appeared to have collapsed entirely. This economic disaster was inextricably linked to the disastrous results of the Law on State Enterprises. Wages had become dependent on output, but because output was measured by its value in roubles, factories steered away from increasing overall output and instead concentrated on the manufacturing of more expensive goods and the reduced output of cheaper ones. This system led to widespread inflation and a lack of basic domestic goods. The Soviet population felt disillusioned at Gorbachev’s shortcomings and soon strikes broke out demanding better living and working conditions. By failing to bring any significant change to the Soviet economy, Gorbachev lost the support of the people, furthermore within the party he had created conflict between the conservatives and the reformers thus alienating himself and leaving him with few allies.

As pressure mounted on Gorbachev to pull the CPSU out of its disastrous economic state of affairs tension was ever increasing within the party particularly between him and Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin believed that the union should be voluntary, that is to say that each republic should be independent but still be committed to responsibilities with the Soviet Union and if a republic wanted to leave the union as did Lithuania they should be permitted to do so. Gorbachev, perhaps rightly so, predicted that this form of governing would inevitably lead to a disintegration of the union and was thus opposed to this suggestion. The republics though supported Yeltsin in his notion for a voluntary federation thus increasing resentment towards Gorbachev’s policy of a compulsory united republic. Yeltsin believed that the only way to save the economy was by rapidly converting to a market economy which he new would be a difficult transition for the population but believed that the long term effects would be far more beneficial. Gorbachev instead wanted to avoid this transformation in order to steer clear of the massive unemployment and even higher prices that would inevitably occur and instead looked towards his more moderate policies.

It must be noted that nationalist pressures beyond Gorbachev’s control also contributed towards his failure and consequently the downfall of the USSR. The federal state of the Soviet Union consisted of fifteen separate republics, each with its own parliament that had been kept under close control since the Stalinist era. With the introduction of Gorbachev’s policies more power was sought for within the republics’ legislative bodies and states began to pursue independence from the central power of Moscow. Gorbachev’s initial reaction of sympathy to the various states pleas for more power encouraged an increase in nationalist formations within the numerous republics and it was not until the power of the communist party itself was threatened that his ability to withhold overall control appeared dubious.

Similarly it is essential to appreciate that within the boarders of this huge nation lived 120 different ethnic groups divided into fifteen republics and various autonomous regions. Lenin believed that nationalism would disappear under communism and a Soviet people would emerge yet this proved to be fundamentally false as with such a diversity in population Russian nationalism and beliefs of superiority resulted in ethnic conflict within the USSR and thus contributed to its breakdown. With such a multicultural society perhaps demands for independence by individual republics was inevitable thus leaving Gorbachev in a complicated situation. He was unable to make one territorial adjustment as this would predictably lead to many others as there were approximately 120 changes wanted by the various ethnic groups. Often groups were permitted the freedom to dispute between themselves until demands were made for independence and then the Soviet militia would retaliate accordingly. A single example of the anti-Soviet demonstrations is that of Baku that led to military force retaliating against protestors and leaving over 100 dead, this form of violence resulted in loss of support for military authority and enthused the republics to break away from the control of Moscow. It has been suggested that the Soviet independence demands followed a pattern commencing with problems of language and culture, followed by the truth about the past, environmental issues, then the economy, then political autonomy, then the goal of sovereignty and finally independence. In this way the republics were able to gradually gain support in order to obtain the strength to defend themselves against Moscow. Perhaps there was always a potential for a nationalistic backlash as there was such a large proportion of the population including entire races living outside of their places of origin and thus Gorbachev cannot truly be held accountable for this cause, yet it was the collapse of the Soviet economy and the inability to restore it that fuelled the surges for independence and Gorbachev is categorically seen in relation to this factor. People of the various ethnic groups quickly grew envious of what other more successful republics enjoyed and as exposure to the capitalist West increased the wealthier Baltic states began to crave escape from the poverty inflicted upon them by the Soviet Union.

In conclusion one may deduce that though Gorbachev is seen in close correlation with the collapse of the Soviet Union he perhaps merely served as a catalyst to the disintegration of the USSR rather than the sole cause. Gorbachev, conceivably like all Russian leaders, was faced with the legacy of Stalin, a virtually impossible obstacle to tackle. The Soviet bloc consists of such an assortment of cultures and ethnicity that nationalist movements were inevitable once total control was removed and thus with the loosening of the iron grip over the republics it was somewhat unavoidable that a rebellion was to occur. Gorbachev believed that ‘democracy is the wholesome and pure air without which a socialist public organisation cannot live a full blooded life,’ yet this policy accompanied by that of glasnost was precisely what led to his downfall as the more democracy that was sanctioned the more radical demands arose for  faster and wider reform. This was correspondingly hastened by the televising of the elected Soviet Parliament and the policy of perestroika. Though one may hold Gorbachev responsible for the breakdown of the Soviet Union one must also take into account factors such as the
over-centralized and inefficient communist governments of Eastern Europe and the economic struggle they were all undergoing.

Words 1943

Bibliography

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Lowe, Norman. Mastering Modern World History. (Macmillan Press Ltd., Great Britain. 1997)

Macdonald, Hamish. Russia and the USSR: Empire of Revolution. (Longman Group Ltd., United Kingdom, 1994)

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