At the beginning Darius listened to Amyntas but later moved northwards and into the plane of Issus through the Amanic Gates. Because he was full of confidence which was encouraged by his dream which had been interpreted in a false way by the courtier.
He had dreamed that he saw the Macedonian phalanx encircled with flames and Alexander waiting upon him as a servant and wearing a cloak which resembled one that Darius himself had once worn. (Plutarch. 18)
Here Curtias said that Thymonda, son of Mentor, had this dream, not Darius himself.
Arrian, instead of mentioning on the dream, gave four reasons why Darius moved from the perfect place for his cavalry. First, he believed that Alexander no longer wished to advance further into Asia. Secondly, he was so sure that the Persian cavalry would ride over the Macedonian army and trample it to pieces. Thirdly, the worse counsel who told him what at the moment he liked hear. Lastly, more than any other things, there was surely some supernatural power which led Darius to take up a position where he could get little advantage either from his cavalry or his superiority in numbers of men and weight of missiles.
Darius crossed the Amanian Gates while Alexander crossed to the Syrian gates. According to Plutarch, the two armies missed each other in the night because they were separated by the width of the Amanus Mountains. But Arrian didn’t mention this.
On the following day when Darius moved on to the river Pinarus, Alexander found out that Darius was in his rear. He sent the galley to see whether it was true or not, and found out that Darius was on the narrow coastal plain near Issus.
Here, both Arrian and Plutarch hold the same account that Alexander was rejoicing at his good fortune, and rushed through Issus without any hesitation.
Alexander, delighted at his good fortune, hastened to catch his enemy in the narrow defile which leads into Cilicia, while Darius was no less eager to extricate his forced from the mountain passes and regain his former camping-ground in the plains. (Plutarch.20)
However Curtias stated that Alexander was rather worried about his fortune which had been too good. Also Curtias emphasised another side of Alexander which is careful and thoughtful.
According to Curtias, Alexander had one more discussion after he moved to Issus to decide whether they ought to advance farther or wait where they were. In my opinion Curtias’ account is more reliable than other two, because prudence is the most basic but important skill for a great leader.
Alexander had more advantages than Darius for several geographical reasons. Firstly, the place was too narrow for Darius’ cavalry so Darius had to divide his forces which decreased the strength of the army.
The country was hemmed in by the sea on one side and the mountains on the other, and divided by the river Pinarus which ran between them. Here the ground prevented Darius from using his cavalry, forced to split up his army into small groups, and favoured Alexander’s inferior numbers. (Plutarch.20)
Also Curtias stated at III.ⅶ.9 that Parmenion expressed the opinion that no other place was more suitable for a battle. Because for there the forces of both kings would be equal in number, since the narrow space could not contain a multitude of a men; his men ought to avoid a plain and the open fields, where they might be caught and crushed in a pincer maneuvers.
Secondly, the coast by Issus was deeply indented, so this fact enabled Alexander the more easily to see the Persians. However Alexander moved forward at a too-rapid advance at the battle even though the Persian army was in full view.
Thirdly, the Persian army was terrified even before the war, because they were confused by loud and confident shouts from the Macedonian troops which were actually the echo by the mountain heights and huge forest.
The Battle
Darius’ army
Firstly, Darius sent 30,000 mounted troops and 20,000 light infantry ㅡ Curtias didn’t mention the 30,000 of mounted troops ㅡ to across the river Pinarus which flowed between the two armies in order to surround the hindmost of the cavalry. However according to Curtias it did not work despite the good plan.
But Fortune, more powerful than any calculation, shattered this advantageous plan; for because of fear some did not dare to carry out the order, others vainly tried to do so. (Curtias.III.ⅷ.1)
Darius was at the centre ㅡ Curtias says that Darius was on the right while Arrian says it was the centre. I believe that Arrian’s account is more reliable because it was a tradition for Persian Kings to stay in the centre at the battle ㅡ with his body-guard, 3000 elite horseman, 30,000 Greek mercenaries and 40,000 infantry forces. Arrian gave 60,000 for the number of infantry forces.
Behind the front line on the sea side (right) were 20,000 slingers and archers under Nabarzane’s command.
Hard on the rising ground on the left, facing Alexander’s right, Aristomedes had 20,000 barbarian foot-soldiers. The rest of the troops were in the centre back as there wasn’t enough space for huge number of the army.
Arrian and Plutarch gave 600,000 for the number of whole army while Didorus and Justin gave 400,000 and Curtias 250,000.
Alexander’s army
Nicanor was in charge of the archers and light infantry at the very right wing on the rising ground to counter the Persian cavalry on the mountainside.
The phalanx was in the centre. Alexander’s infantry was consist of three groups which are Phalanx, Royal Hypaspists and Foreign troops. Phanx was the backbone of the infantry and each of the soldier was armed with a sarissa which was a long spear invented my Macedonians.
Royal Hypaspists was the best-trained infantry and the supporters of the phalanx.
Under Alexander’s command, the Macedonian cavalry was on the right with the Companion which was often organised with Alexander’s closet friends.
The whole left wing was under Parmenio’s command. He was ordered not to leave a gap between the line. According to Arrian at Ⅱ.8 the reason was that if he did, they might well be surrounded, as the numerical superiority of the enemy would certainly enable to outflank the Macedonians.
At the last minute, Darius ordered the greater number of them to his right to threaten Parmenio.
Nearly all the Persian cavalry had now been trasferred to a position on the seaward side facing Alexnader’s left. However Alexander managed it by sending the Thessalian horse to Parmenio’s rear.
Phase I
Both Alexander and Darius advanced slowly but each had a different reason.
According to Arrian (II.10) Alexander tried to give the impression that time was on his side. On the other hand Darius made no move at all because in many places the bank was steep, and any sections of it which seemed less easy to defend he had strengthened with a stockade.
As I mentioned before, Alexander moved towards Darius at a too-rapid advance even though the Persian army was in full view. This was really effective as the swift attack shook the enemy.
Also Arrian states at II.10 that another reason for this rapid movement was to minimise the damage by the Persian archers which were facing Alexander’s right wing.
The sooner they came to grips the less damage would be done by the Persian archers.
Phase II
In the meantime Darius’ Greek Mercenaries fought so well in the centre so there was a gap in the line because the right side of the phalanx advanced while left side of Alexander (which was centre in the whole picture) was held back. The geographic also made it worse for them because the steep banks of the stream prevented them from maintaining a regular and unbroken front. This gap resulted in the precise attack of Darius’ Greek mercenaries in the line where the gap was widest and the most vulnerable. They only just managed to prevent the Persians form encircling them. Plutarch put a bit of exaggeration by saying for although he was so heavily outnumbered, he not only gave the enemy no opportunity to encircle him.
Phase III
Alexander’s right wing was able to turn left after dealing with the left wing of the Persian army.
They delivered a flank attack on the mercenaries and were soon cutting tem to pieces. (Arrian. II.11) Also Curtias described this as great bloodshed at III.ⅵ.5.
Alexander found Darius by his golden chariot and fought hard. Alexander was slightly wounded in his right thigh. Plutarch, disbelieves it and tried to disprove it by emphasising how slight the wound was.
Alexander sent a letter to Antipater describing the battle, but made no mention in it of who had given him the wound: he said no more than that he had been stabbed in the thigh with a dagger and that the wound was not a dangerous one. (Plutarch.20)
Darius fled when his guard was destroyed. Alexander didn’t set off straight after him because he
was needed at the battle. The Persian troops on the left, right and centre-front apeeared to be succeeding against the Greeks. However they began to corrupt after Darius fled.
At the battle of Issus, 100,000 of Persians were killed including 10,000 of the cavalry. Plutarch, Curtias and Diodorus agree on the number but it is not reliable as the numbers were given for the Persian army. On the other hand, Macedonian causalities are only given by Curtias (III.ⅵ.27) as 450 killed and 4,500 wounded.
The Significance of the victory at the Battle of Issus
At the battle of Issus, Alexander faced the Great king of Persia for the first time.
He won over the Persian troops despite the outnumbered army of Darius. This encouraged the Macedonian army and Alexander could get further support from his men.
Alexander failed to capture Darius and the 8000 survivors. However Alexander captured his family which had a great bargaining power later on. Also Alexander captured a considerable treasure from Darius’ baggage train and became to know the royalty which consists of wealth.
So this, it seems, is what it is to be a king (Plutarch.21)
The most importantly, the battle of Issus completed the takeover of Asia Minor. Also Alexander could easily advanced south into Phoenicia and Egypt.
The variations found in the primary sources
As I have been discussing through the different account of each writer and the emphases found in primary sources, I will now talk about the general background of the primary sources I have used most of time.
First, Arrian of Nicomedia, his work ‘The Campaigns of Alexander’ was the most reliable primary source for me. Because his work is based on Ptolemy and Aristobulus who had been shared Alexander’s campaign. He stated at the prologue that he had right reason to choose for right sources.
It seems to me that and are the most trustworthy writers on Alexander's conquests, because the latter shared Alexander's campaigns, and the former -Ptolemy- in addition to this advantage, was himself a king, and it is more disgraceful for a king to tell lies than for anybody else.
Also he has military knowledge as he had been a governor of Cappadocia, where he fought a brief war against the Alans.
However he seemed to admire Alexander so much so that he was a little bit uncritical and holds only positive opinion on him.
I cannot but admire Alexander… (Arrian.Ⅱ.13)
Secondly, Plutarch of Chaeronea was a very famous philosopher.
His ‘Life of Aleander’ was rather short but had thorough features. His work is based on all three of Ptolemy, Cleitarchus and Aristobulus so has some stories that others don’t have. So it was entertaining and also gave me a better understanding.
However Plutarch also admired Alexander much so that he view was rather subjective.
For example, when Alexander had injured on the right thigh from the fight with Darius,
Plutarch , disbelieves it and tried to disprove it by emphasising how slight the wound was.
Alexander sent a letter to Antipater describing the battle, but made no mention in it of who had given him the wound: he said no more than that he had been stabbed in the thigh with a dagger and that the wound was not a dangerous one. (Plutarch.20)
Lastly, Quintus Curtius Rufus. Because it has Cleitarchus as its source, it contains many errors. However he offers many interesting stories that we do not find in our best source, . Also it goes to details comparing to the other two primary sources. Indeed Curtias often gives a reason why Alexndaer did that.
The one more good thing is that he tries to look at the events on the side of Alexander as well as Darius’ side which seems more reliable and fair.
Alexander’s leadership and military ability
Alexander the great extended his rule from Greece to Egypt and all the way to India.
This simple fact suggests that he was a military genius and a great leader. He was, indeed, at the battle of Issus.
He was a good leader who knew how to get support from the army.
When the Macedonian troops wintered over after the battle of Granicus in 334 BC, Alexander allowed the Macedonians who had married just before the campaign to go home for winter. It was a clever idea because it was quite important to have enough food for the troops when they wintered over. It was not only beneficial for the rest of the troops but was also a pleasure to those Macedonians to be able to go home. No act of Alexander’s ever made him better loved by his Macedonians. (Arrian.II.2)
Alexander showed his strong will to rule the Persian Empire when he “fulfilled” the prophecy of the Gordium knot by cutting or removing the pin out. This also suggests that he had no intention to failing. Also Alexander knew that if he could not manage to undo the knot, this would be seen as a bad omen and might discourage the army.
It was also at Gordium where the Athenians came to ask for the return of the Greek mercenaries. The mercenaries were not returned from Macedonia until the situation changed in 331 BC when there was a second rebellion in Greece. King Agis hired 4000 mercenaries who had escaped from the battle of Issus. Darius helped by supplying financial support because he believed that it would be hard for Alexander to have two wars in Greece and Persia.. However Alexander already left the half of his army with Antipater when he started the expedition. Also he now returned the Greek mercenaries so that Greek couldn’t join the rebellion.
This emphasises how circumspective and clever king he is.
Again, Alexander was brilliant at appealing to the support from the army.
For instance, Curtias mentioned at Ⅲⅳ.15 that Alexander had a bath in the river of Cyhnus to show his men that he was content with attention to his person.
Also just before the battle of Issus, Alexander ordered first that the army should eat a lot, showing his care for the troops.
He also had a speech to encourage the troops to fight well by several effective ways.
Firstly, he made the army to believe that the good fortune was on their side.
God himself, moreover, by suggesting to Darius to leave the open ground and cram his great army into a confined space, has taken charge of operations in our behalf. (Arrian,ⅱ7)
Secondly, he compared the Persian with the Macedonian by saying our enemies are Medes and Persians, men who for centuries have lived soft and luxurious lives; we of Macedon for generations past have been trained in the hard school of danger and war.
Lastly, Alexander tried to bring ‘patriotism’ by using the words of ‘we’ or ‘Greek’.
There are Greek troops, to be sure, in Persian service- but how different is their cause form ours. They will be fighting for pay- and not much of it. We, on the contrary, shall fight for Greece, and our hearts will be in it.
Alexander was a determined leader as well. When he found out that Darius was in his rear, he rushed without any hesitation which was the most important part for the victory over the Persian troops. Alexander still kept himself prudent even when he was in rush. The good example if this would be the discussion he had with Parmenio just before the actual battle.
Alexander had good and quick military ideas. When Darius changed his line in the very last minutes. He sent 300 (actual number given by Curtias) light infantry to the left side quickly.
Also in the famous ‘Alexander mosaic’ at Pompeii, Alexander was described as a firm, determined commander who directly gazed at the Great King of Persia with full of confidence.
Alexander made a mistake by leaving a big gap between the right and left wing as he was rushing toward Darius, not considering the geographical differences between left and right.
However he recovered it by sending 300 of light infantry to Parmenio’s rear.
Even though he made a mistake, he quickly reacted and improved the situation.
Also his great military skills are clearly shown when only the right wing, which Alexander was leading, had a successful rapid advance towards Darius.
After the battle, even though Alexander failed to capture Darius, Alexander captured his family.
Alexander the Great was more than a warrior king who was full of magnanimity.
His sympathy was extended, moreover, even to Darius’ mother, wife, and children.
So he ordered one of his companion to tell them Darius is alive so that they could feel better.
One day, Queen failed to recognise Alexander and thought Hephaestion was the king. She was really embarrassed but Alexander merely remarked her error by saying, “for this man too, was and Alexander, mother”… (Arrian.Ⅱ.13)
This emphasises not only his generosity but also care for his kinsman.
Also Alexander wished them to retain all the marks, ceremonies, and titles of royalty that they had before. However he didn’t send them back to Darius as propaganda purposes.
For example, when Darius asked the return of the royal by a letter, Alexander refused his offer of friendship and alliance. He furiously demanded to be addressed as ‘king of Asia’ not as an equal. Alexander again rejected Darius’ offer when he returned to Tyre from Egypt.
Justification
Alexander the Great, King of Macedonia was the conqueror of the world!
He overthrew the Persian Empire and extended his rule from Greece to Egypt and all the way to India, and his successful work was based on his leadership and military ability.
However Alexander made two mistakes at the battle of Issus.
First one was at the Syrian gates that he missed out Darius and let Darius to be his rear.
However Alexander improved the situation by reacting quickly and rushed through the narrow coast of Issus which was great advantages for small number of the Macedonian troops.
Second mistake was at the actual battle. He was leading the troops to move forward very rapidly to minimise the damage from archers. It was a good plan but he didn’t account for the geographical differences between the two wings. So left wing couldn’t follow due to the steep mountain resulted in a huge gap between the right and left wing. However he recovered it later by moving left to help the wing after immediate success advance of the right wing.
Strictly speaking, Alexander the Great was quite lucky at this battle even though he had distinctive leadership and military skills in general. However I believe that the good fortune was a present from God to Alexander for being a Great leader and the Great King .
Fortune certainly presented Alexander with the ideal terrain for the battle, but it was his own generalship which did most to win the victory. (Plutarch.20)
Bibliography
Arrian The Campaigns of Alexander Penguin books Ltd
Plutarch Life of Alexander Penguin books Ltd 1973
Quintas Curtias The History of Alexander Harvard college 1946
Paul Artus Alexander the Great Bellona Book 2001
Form 7 Classical Studies Bursary Study Guide ESA publication
Raewyn Gilmour Warrior King to Great King Polygraphia Ltd 2003
J.R.Hamilton Alexander the Great Pittsburgh Press 1974
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