The Bolsheviks did not seize power in October 1917, it fell into their hands
The Bolsheviks did not seize power in October 1917, it fell into their hands
The very nature of revolution is to seize power and this the Bolsheviks did, but they were greatly assisted by circumstance and the incompetence of those around them. Their ascent to supremacy began not in October but years before. To rigidly frame the Russian Revolution as one of the above statements is thus simply a matter of semantics. Lenin himself admitted that power had not so much been seized as had fallen to him like a ripe fruit from a tree. Yet the events of October were the culmination of decades of turbulent high politics, universal social revolution and Bolshevik spadework.
There was no great, symbolic battle to announce a traditional seizure of power - it was the inadequacies of every Bolshevik rival that meant the opportunity to take power was presented and duly taken. From February through to October, there were abundant openings for various political parties and individuals to take control but none took full advantage. With the increasing socialist nature of society, the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries had as equal an opportunity as the Bolsheviks, but they either failed to recognize power was in their grasp, or they couldn't bring themselves to brake with the liberal coalition. Lenin showed prudence to ensure that events would unfold to his benefit, but that the Bolsheviks held just mediocre support across the country showed how badly the other proponents to Tsarism had handled events since the Tsar's overthrow.
The three main traditional interpretations of the revolution all set the events of October in a specific context, often directly against each other. The orthodox Soviet view, especially during the Stalinist era were distorted and heavily biased but Trotsky's 'History of the Russian Revolution' and Medevevdev's 'The October Revolution', are examples of accounts which offer an accurate version of events, if not with some ideological bias inherent. Liberal interpretations are scornful of the Marxist view, and see the revolution, as Daniels puts it, as 'a series of lucky developments.'1 Rather than the Revolution being an expression of popular will, Lenin was said to have manipulated the workers and other socialists. Yet this view is so set against the soviet view that it fails to concede to any Marxist point, often degenerating into something even more biased than a soviet interpretation. The libertarian view, although leftist, views the Bolsheviks as counter revolutionary, giving sympathy to the Mensheviks and SRs claiming Lenin hijacked the revolutionary promise of 1917.
A revisionist view was inevitable because each field (of course there are exceptions) held such rigid principles they failed to offer a balanced perspective. Rather than making grandiose claims and concentrating exclusively on the main actors, revisionists began to examine the revolution 'from below'. An example of a recent revisionist view is Orlando Figes' 'A People's Tragedy'. It recognises the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches and was the first major work to make use of the extensive archives released after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Many a date has been given as to when revolutionary phases in Russia began, but power began to slide from Nicholas after the events of Bloody Sunday. The political awakening of the public, the material suffering of famine, and the first of Nicholas' military defeats culminated in the 1905 Revolution. 150,000 workers, lead by the priest, Father Gapon (ironically he had believed more than anyone in the bond between Tsar and people, yet he organized the demonstration in which this bond was destroyed) marched on the Winter Palace. The ensuing massacre marked the beginning of the end for Nicholas because Bloody Sunday was a tragedy instigated by his self rather than one he had simply failed to deal with. Sablinsky gives a perfect example of the vehement feelings when he recounts that after the shooting had stopped an old man turned to a 14 year-old and fumed, 'Remember, son, remember and swear to repay the Tsar. You saw how much blood he spilled.'2 Nicholas, through his perceived actions on that day had destroyed the myth of the Tsarism and paved the way for revolution. But as of this point 'a clear distinction between strategies of reform and strategies of revolution was not yet a significant factor in their thinking.'3 Unfortunately for Nicholas this would not last long as strike organisers like Father Gapon would soon be superseded by organisers of revolution like Lenin.
Although Krivoshein and particularly Stolypinn had instigated much needed reform since the disasters of 1905, these had not succeeded in fully returning Nicholas to favour as the Lena Goldfield massacre and the Petersburg general strike had shown. Only war could do that, and like Tsar Alexander a century before him, Nicholas stumbled into a huge conflict. In going to war against the Central Powers, Nicholas had not so much as crossed the Rubicon - he left it out of sight. There was no way back now, as his own fate hung inexorably with his army's.
Lenin was delighted that Russia was at war. As with Peter Durnovo, he foresaw the long intolerable strain that would be too much for Russia's financial resources to deal with. Durnovo's assessment of the war was truly prophetic, the essence of which was: 'there must inevitably break out in the defeated country a social revolution.'4 Yet Lenin still had not created a popular enough party so that when Tsarism eventually collapsed in February 1917, it was not the Bolshevik party who were waiting in the wings (Lenin and other leading Bolsheviks were still abroad either in emigration or ...
This is a preview of the whole essay
Lenin was delighted that Russia was at war. As with Peter Durnovo, he foresaw the long intolerable strain that would be too much for Russia's financial resources to deal with. Durnovo's assessment of the war was truly prophetic, the essence of which was: 'there must inevitably break out in the defeated country a social revolution.'4 Yet Lenin still had not created a popular enough party so that when Tsarism eventually collapsed in February 1917, it was not the Bolshevik party who were waiting in the wings (Lenin and other leading Bolsheviks were still abroad either in emigration or exile). With almost universal unrest and the cities descended into anarchy, Russia's military leaders recommended Nicholas abdicate so that the unavoidable transfer of power be at least bloodless. As Hobsbawn put it, 'four spontaneous and leaderless days on the street put an end to an Empire.'5 The Romanov dynasty had finally collapsed.
The dual power that followed fared no better than Nicholas had. Early on it emerged that the Provisional Government's power was not set in stone and that it lacked the capability to be decisive at the crucial time. Critically, they failed to halt the increasing Bolshevik influence among the workers. Even arresting Bolshevik leaders and forcing the party underground couldn't stop the party gaining momentum. By July, Lenin was looking to organize armed insurrection. Importantly, they were the only major party who championed Soviet power. The months leading up to October were the culmination of decades of social revolution as Russia's working classes sought autonomy from the old order. 'All Power to the Soviets!' convinced many workers, peasants and soldiers that Bolshevism was the only way to achieve the direct self-rule of the people they so wanted.
Lenin thus declared class war, exacerbating the political polarization of the country between the common people and the privileged elite. He gave workers direction to vent years of anger and frustration because he knew what a powerful source it would enact. And ultimately, 'Few aspects of the Russian revolution were more central to its development than the mobilisation of the workers.'6 In huge numbers, members of all working classes practically begged the socialist parties to take control. Workers wanted to regulate their own factories (the same concept of national self-determination or volia that the peasants wanted), soldiers wanted peace and villagers wanted food and autonomy from the old agrarian order as they took matters, often violently, into their own hands (even Tolstoy's estate couldn't escape their wrath and in July alone, 481 'disturbances' were reported7). So fervent were these feelings that once again the country descended into strike ridden anarchy. Lenin saw to his delight that masses of workers and peasants were forming their own types of Soviet rule and even soldiers were forcibly changing century old traditions. The working class had decided for itself the way in which it wished to be ruled and unfortunately for the Provisional Government it was on soviet principles. These episodes highlighted how weak and ineffectual dual power was. Huge areas of the country simply governed how they saw fit, with the Provisional Government helpless to stop them.
With public opinion such, any party with a semblance of soviet ideals should have found power within their grasp. Yet extraordinarily, Lenin's socialist rivals all clung to their Communist Manifestos and its rigid dogma. Marx's timeline of course included a bourgeois stage of revolution so the Menshevik and the Socialist Revolutionary parties kept faith in the current coalition and dual power. Men like Martov suffered from not adapting or even recognising the changes in social atmosphere. Figes makes an important point that is appropriate to any such era: 'noble principles are a fatal burden for the revolutionary leader.'8 Thus they clung to the liberal alliance and the need to continue the war. Lenin on the other hand was ruthless in his pursuit of power and put his faith in himself rather than fate and philosophical principles, knowing this was now the time for action (he often cited Napoleon's maxim that revolutions did not make themselves, they had to be made by their leaders). If there was to be revolution then Lenin was the only one in the higher political circles who sought it. The Bolsheviks were the only real dangerous rivals to the Provisional Government and that would soon shoot itself in the foot many times over.
However, matters were so delicate and the situation so grandiose, that caution still took precedent over decisive action. Dangerously, Lenin still preached on the need for a repressive party state (articulated most recently in The State and Revolution) but popular opinion was of a very much liberal nature - hence Kamenev's desires for the party to keep some democratic values. He knew that a Bolshevik rising now would cause civil war. Lenin submitted and although he always wished a Bolshevik dictatorship, he supported Kamenev's proposal to join the Mensheviks and the SRs in a socialist government, but the conference that ensued was a failure and the notion dropped.
The Bolsheviks didn't ultimately need assistance due in part to unfolding events concerning their main support base. That the Russian population 'constituted a disproportionately large segment of factory workers,'9 worked to the Bolshevik's advantage as the cost of living in the cities almost doubled between March and October. The collapsing economy produced an almost united front of workers against their employers. But for Lenin they would not have made use of this and on his arrival in early April he set about unifying a splintered party. The April Theses included the declaration that would bring the Bolsheviks to power: the transfer to socialism could come before a capitalist epoch in the Revolution and the Bolshevik party would now actively pursue this transfer of power using powerful propaganda to engender greater support. The essential difference between the Bolsheviks and their socialist rivals was that they believed the road to Communism could be shortened and Lenin was prepared to forsake anything in his pursuit. With the masses moving relentlessly toward soviet principles, only a socialist party could realistically come to govern - this left Lenin in a great position as the Mensheviks and SRs were not willing to take this opportunity, fearing an inevitable civil war. Proof of this comes from the famous scene where the Menshevik, Tsereteli confidently declared in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, that no party wished to take power alone, to which Lenin cried from the floor, 'There is such a party!'10
Yet the Bolsheviks were still in no shape to even think of seizing power. The great minds that were needed to orchestrate an insurgency were either in prison or as in Lenin's case, once more forced into in exile. Once again the Bolsheviks were aided by their enemies as the aftermath of the debacle that was the Kornilov Affair served only to assist Lenin. Premier Kerensky lost the support of much of the army after he pushed commander in chief Kornilov into a mutinous corner from which the General attempted a coup. Although Kerensky won the battle against Kornilov, he would as a result lose the war to Lenin. Many in the armed forces and on the political right were astounded that the commander in chief was now in custody and so Kerensky lost the support of those ideologically opposed to the Bolsheviks. Come October Kerensky's calls for aid would go unanswered. The more immediate effects saw the release from prison of Trotsky, Antonov-Ovseeeko and Dybenko, who alongside Lenin would be the brains behind the revolutionary brawn. The release of Trotsky in particular was to have two major consequences. As a public speaker he was truly brilliant and his relentless, powerful speeches persuaded countless before the Cirque Moderne that the Provisional Government needed to be replaced. Also, Trotsky brought with him to the party a group of army-less generals who would provide valuable assistance and organisation in the coming weeks.
The whole affair was another huge mistake on the Provisional Government's part, bringing a Bolshevik insurgency much nearer - it was just another incident that, without its appearance, the Bolsheviks might never have come to power at all. To add to the list of disastrous consequences, some 40,000 were armed against Kornilov and as Trotsky put it, 'the army that rose against Kornilov was the army-to-be of the October revolution.'11 Those men had fought against Kornilov, a 'counter revolutionary general,' rather than for Kerensky.
Material power came to the Bolsheviks as early as August as they won control of Soviets in many major cities, including Moscow and Petrograd. The inability to hinder their momentum was proven when on the 25th September, Trotsky bullied his way to stand as Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. By late September Lenin had lost his patience with those such as Trotsky who still called for restrain, but being still not daring to return to Petrograd, his calls fell on deaf ears. The country was though ripe for revolution. Amongst the peasantry the situation had degenerated such that the Provisional Government gave in to their demands and temporarily gave the peasants the legal rights to their land. Lenin had declared that what was needed was 'a mood of despair among the broad masses who feel that nothing now can be saved by half measures.'12 By October the working classes had certainly succumbed to such mood and on the 10th Lenin returned disguised in to the capital. In the house of a Menshevik and with his wig repeatedly falling off, Lenin first staged a revolution in his party (half the Central Committee were absent) and then organised one for his country as his clout within his party forced his ideas through.
On October 20th minister of war, Verkhovsky described how the Provisional Government stood on the brink: 'In Petrograd itself not one hand will be raised to protect the Provisional Government.'13 The Bolsheviks, had gained the vital support that was to be the Military-Revolutionary Committee and the Red Guard. On the decision to send the Petrograd garrison to the northern front, the Provisional Government and Kerensky had by now been proven to be traitors to the revolution. Thus the MRC was able to exert greater influence inside the Petrograd garrison who mutinied their call to the front and with it the Provisional Government had lost the support of the very armed forces that were the only obstacle to insurgency. This was of fundamental importance as no revolt can ever be successful until the ruling institution has lost the monopoly of the armed forces.
After years of struggle just to remain a party, taking control of the country came relatively easily. The Military-Revolutionary Committee meticulously organized what was to be done in the coming days, to which this was executed successfully. After the anarchy that had been the hallmark of the entire revolutionary epoch before, the actual seizure of power was decisive and organized considering what was at stake.
The first signs of an insurgency in Petrograd arose spontaneously of Lenin as crowds of armed Bolshevik workers and soldiers spilled into the centre of the city. Lenin persuaded the other leaders to not repeat their hesitant actions of July, but to take decisive action. Bolshevik soldiers stormed the defenceless Marinsky Palace while Kerensky fled the Winter Palace in search of loyal troops, leaving no-one prepared to rally to the defence of the Provisional Government. Later that night the Soviet Congress finally opened. Lenin had desperately tried to organize the insurrection before the Congress fearing what was about to happen. Martov proposed the formation of a united democratic government based upon the soviet parties. This notion would have gone through and a Bolshevik dictatorship averted, but for a series of Mensheviks and SRs who denounced the whole 'criminal venture.' With these two parties now looking counter revolutionary, Martov's calls for a coalition fell apart as the Bolsheviks seized the initiative. In what was Trotsky's finest hour, he launched a tirade against them crying aloud the immortal words 'your role is played out; go where you ought to go - into the dustbin of history.'14 Caught up in the emotional scenes, Martov used his heart rather than his head and symbolically walked out leaving a Bolshevik dictatorship behind him. Trotsky passed a resolution condemning the two parties while at the same time Antonov-Ovseenko led the final assault on the Winter Palace, placing the remaining ministers under arrest. The Bolshevik seizure of power was complete.
The failing of the Provisional Government was its very structure according to Berdyaev, citing that 'the principles of democracy are suitable... never to a revolutionary epoch.' His conclusion that 'only dictatorship could put an end to the process of final dissolution and the triumph of chaos and anarchy'15 seems to suggest that Lenin was always going to ascend to power because he was the only would-be dictator and it was just a matter of time. Yet didn't the Provisional Government have the perfect opportunity to create a strong power base? Their accession was greeted with almost universal rapture (far more than Lenin's was any way) and anything is possible with the support of the vast majority. The system may have been weak, but it was because it was in the hands of the inept and that it faced great hurdles that it failed, not the nature of the system itself. Thus the Bolshevik seizure of power was never inevitable. It fell into their hands as much as it was seized because that was the only way they could ever get into power. The party could only ever have been successful in a second revolution because Tsarism would never have allowed the political freedom the Bolsheviks took advantage of post February.
From the Provisional Government's standpoint the Bolsheviks should never have been allowed to gain the military support of Military-Revolutionary Committee. If Prince Lvov and Kerensky should have done anything, it was to stop the armed forces in the main cities from siding with Lenin, or any revolutionary, at any cost because that was the only way an insurgency could be successful. That they didn't was the final nail in the Provisional Government's coffin and so one can say power indeed was allowed to fall into Lenin's hands. After the Bolsheviks infiltrated and won the support of garrisons in the capital and at the fronts, and the Petrograd and Moscow soviets, the revolution really was inevitable. The only contentious issue then was what nature of rule they would impose, this being decided by the Menshevik and SR exit from the Soviet Congress.
In truth the Provisional Government under Kerensky held few options as the situation leading up to October grew out of control. What was needed to keep the Provisional Government in power was a new attitude to the war. The soldiers didn't want to fight but they didn't want to lose land either. It was the reckless and suicidal offensives that brought such unpopularity to the war effort. The Provisional Government should have used the same powerful propaganda that was seen in 1812 (and later in 1941) and turned the war into a patriotic one. A new declaration that armed operations were to be of a purely defensive nature would likely have gained the backing of the army in general, leaving Kerensky to deal with domestic problems (which also would have been eased with an appeal to the masses to side against the invading foes).
Robert Daniels claims chance put Lenin in power, 'a series of lucky developments that no one could have counted on.'16 Yet Lenin counted on them and he used them to his advantage. Of course many events conspired indirectly to Lenin's gain such as the Menshevik collaboration with the pro-war Kadets and the disastrous military offensives, but Lenin learnt from his mistakes and ensured that they were not fatal (although the premature armed demonstration against the Provisional Government came close). Richard Pipes' conclusion is more accurate - that Lenin deceived the masses and seized power amidst the anarchy that was Russia in 1917, uprooting the existing institutions and install a totalitarian regime.
The failures of Tsarism, the Provincial Government, the SRs and the Mensheviks were all failures of leadership. Russia's revolution was as much a social, universal revolution as it was one shaped by individuals. Lenin stood out against all other leaders of varying guises because he was able to control events and shape them to his advantage. He held an astute and ambitious mind in an age completely devoid of them. Some were astute (Durnovo) and some were ambitious (Kerensky) but no-one during this time had these qualities in unison. 'Seizing power' gives connotations of brash, military insurgence, but this was only the last act in an episode spanning decades and they could have been thwarted at many points anyway. The Bolshevik coup d'étât only occurred once they had gained enough support to be confident of long term success. They gained this critical support through Lenin's inspired propaganda, Trotsky's great oratory powers, and the failures of each and every rival to either stop their rise or steer Russia away from revolution. Power was presented to them and they seized it.
Bibliography
R. Medvedev, 'The October Revolution' (Constable, London, 1979)
R. Daniels, 'The Bolshevik Gamble' in Russian Review
R, Service, 'A History of 20th Century Russia' (Penguin, London, 1997)
R. Service, 'The Russian Revolution 1900 - 1927' (Palgrave, New York, 1999)
G. D. Surh, '1905 in St. Petersburg'(Stanford University Press, California, 1989)
P. Waldron, 'The End of Imperial Russia'(London, Macmillan, 1997)
C. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the Word since 1917 (London, Arnold, 1998)
Sablinsky, Bloody Sunday (Princeton university press, New Jersey, 1976)
O. Figes, 'A People's Tragedy' (London, PIMLICO, 1997)
E. Acton, 'Rethinking the Russian Revolution' ninth impression (Arnold, London, 2001)
R. Pipes, 'The Russian revolution 1899-1919'(Fontana, London, 1990)
G. Swain, 'Before the fighting Started' in Revolutionary Russia vol.4 1991
R. Daniels, 'The Bolshevik Gamble' in Russian Review, October 1967, p. 337
2 in Sablinsky, Bloody Sunday (Princeton uni press, New Jersey, 1976), p. 273
3 G. D. Surh, '1905 in St. Petersburg' (California, Stanford University Press, 1989) p. 408
4 In P. Waldron, 'The End of Imperial Russia' (London, Macmillan, 1997) p. 140
5 C. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the Word since 1917 (London, Arnold, 1998), p. 16
6 W. Rosenberg, 'Workers and Workers' Control in the Russian Revolution' in History Workshop Journal, 1978.
7 R. Service, 'The Russian Revolution 1900 - 1927' (Palgrave, New York, 1999) p. 42
8 O. Figes, 'A People's Traged'y (London, PIMLICO, 1997), p. 468-9
9 R, Service, 'A History of 20th Century Russia', (Penguin, London, 1997) p. 46
0 R. Medvedev, 'The October Revolution' (Constable, London, 1979) p. 28
1 O. Figes, A People's Tragedy (London, PIMLICO, 1997), p. 4
2 In R. Medvedev, 'The October Revolution' (Constable, London, 1979) , p. 45
3 In ibid, p. 33
4 In O. Figes, A People's Tragedy (London, PIMLICO, 1997), p. 491
5 N. Berdyaev, in R. Medvedev, 'The October Revolution' (Constable, London, 1979) , p. 5
6 R. Daniels, 'The Bolshevik Gamble' in Russian Review, October 1967, p. 337
