The Cold War and the relations of Superpowers with Europe1945-1990

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

Richard Lowe University College

Topic 1: The Cold War and the relations of Superpowers with Europe1945-1990

1a. Was the emergence of a Cold War in Europe unavoidable?

In January 1945, Winston Churchill stated ‘The only hope for our world is the agreement of the three great powers. If they quarrel, our children are undone.’ Evidently, the great three did quarrel and thus, resulted a Cold War conflict in Europe. The question, ‘Was this quarrel avoidable?’ is well worth considering and I believe that by examining key aspects of the initial history of post-war superpower relations, it will allow me to conclude. I believe that the key events to the origins of European Cold War are; the conditions in Europe after the war, the questions over Poland and post-war Germany, politics in Eastern Europe and finally the US commitment to Marshal Aid throughout the whole of Europe.

When examining the picture of post war Europe and particularly the great European powers, a far different picture exists than at the beginning of the war. Britain had become a small island whose resources, economy and population were inadequate to compete with the Superpowers. France had suffered major wartime destruction and her economy was in major recession. Germany was humiliated and economically crippled due t years of warfare. The Red Army with the possible exceptions of Greece, Italy and Turkey generally occupied Eastern Europe and these countries were again, in need of economic assistance to rebuild themselves. There was, therefore, a major vacuum in who would control European affairs and it seemed only natural that the Superpowers would have some input in the direction of post war Europe and obvious that countries would align themselves to either Superpower.

Given the experience of World War Two itself, this division of Europe was perhaps inevitable. Both sides wanted their values and economic and political systems to prevail in areas which their soldiers had helped to liberate. If both sides had accepted these new spheres of influence, a cold war might never have occurred. But I believe that the nations of Western Europe and the United States still had Hitler on their minds and they soon began to see Stalin as a similar threat. Therefore, the relations between the East and the West were already hesitant at the Yalta conference and a conflict of interests was beginning to look unavoidable.

The Yalta conference of 1945 signalled the time that Europe came closest to peace for almost six years. At Yalta, the formation of a United Nations were discussed which was to become known as ‘a universal organisation which all peace loving countries could join’.(2) and if implemented correctly, would have avoided a Cold War in Europe altogether. Although Stalin viewed the formation of the UN with great suspicion, (he believed it would be based along the same lines as the League of Nations which failed because of the lack of US input and also the Soviets were denied membership from the league until the late 1920’s and then were expelled in 1939), the Soviets still signed the ‘UN agreement’.

However, it was the discussion of the question of Germany, at the same conference, and the allied failure to reach a decision over the reparations and boundaries of post-war Germany, which contributed to the Cold War in Europe immensely.

In Quebec 1944, the allied powers discussed what should happen to Germany after the war. The Americans and the British believed in destroying the German war making potential but support her economically so that she ‘can come back industrially to meet her own needs’(2). The Soviets and the French also believed in the destruction of her war making potential but on the other hand, totally dismember her industrial potential.

With such an inevitable clash of views, Stalin demanded reparations totalling $20 billion of which, $10 billion to go to the Soviet Union-in other words ‘complete disarmament, demilitarisation and dismemberment of Germany as they deem fit for future peace’(2). Roosevelt and Churchill, on the other hand, wanted no set agreement until the war had been won: Churchill stated in his memoirs that he would prefer to postpone ‘dismembering Germany until my doubts about Russian intentions have been cleared away’ and this feeling was shared by Roosevelt who was worried that high reparations could make Germany easy prey for the communist ...

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A large percentage of the time at Yalta was spent considering the question of Poland, i.e. her future government and boarders. It was inevitable that Stalin wanted major influence in the Eastern European bloc after the war: I believe that he wanted regain the territory that he lost in the inter-war period in the Baltic states, some of Poland and Finnish territory, and with the almost guaranteed defeat of Germany and the economic exhaustion of Britain and France, a power-vacuum was left in central and Eastern Europe which was filled by the Red Amy. Stalin realised the economic potential of the Eastern states in terms of raw materials, the sale and production of cheap goods which would allow the Soviet economy to grow.

Poland therefore was ‘to become a testing ground between the West and Communist Russia-between two concepts of security’(3). It was agreed that Poland should have a provincial government and would hold free and fair elections based upon universal suffrage.

Roosevelt’s suspicions of Soviet expansionism were further enhanced when Churchill and Stalin agreed that 90% of Romania and 75% of Bulgaria should controlled by the Soviets and although the Russians signed a ‘Declaration of Liberation of Europe’ which gave tri-party responsibility of Hungary and Yugoslavia which counteracted the sphere of influence argument, the West believed that Stalin was certainly taking liberties regarding Eastern Europe.

However, despite potential contradictions, it appeared that at the Yalta conference each superpower was generally appeased with both taking concessions regarding Europe. The West, taking risks over Poland and Eastern Europe, while the Soviets awaited confirmation of reparations essential in rebuilding their economy and they also agreed to tri-party responsibility over Yugoslavia and Hungry. Roosevelt stated in his message to Stalin, ‘the successful development of our program of international collaboration that the Polish question to be settled fairly and speedily. If this is not done, all difficulties and dangers to allied unity…….will face us in even more acute forms’. This was the largest warning to the world that unless both Superpowers kept their agreements, a confrontation of some form would certainly be unavoidable.

At first subtly and then more and more openly the British and American leaders began to challenge the legitimacy of Soviet activities in Eastern Europe. Between the Yalta and Potsdam conferences (February and June 1945) a critical transformation occurred in the expectations between Russia and the West. For during the discussion of ways and means of reforming Europe politically in order to ensure peace in the world and in the wake of unilateral measures in Eastern Europe, the alliance fell apart.
Between Yalta and Potsdam diplomatic disagreements between East and West intensified as each side openly maneuvered to be in a position of maximum advantage at the war's end.

Overshadowing all these initial cold war issues of 1945 was the atomic bomb. Although this did not directly effect the development of a Cold War in Europe, it generally caused a massive Soviet mistrust towards the West and increased Stalin’s paranoia of Western expansionism in Europe. It could, however have been argued, as it was by General Patrick Hurley in his address to the US Senate (June 1951), that ‘one quiet word to Stalin…..would require him to keep his solemn agreements’ i.e. the US could bully the Russian into agreements over conflicting issues, however such a solution would generally be impractical without America declaring full scale war on the Russians.

Although both sides were content to preserve the fiction of cooperation, neither really believed that it could afford to trust the other with events in Europe.

Stalin embarked on a theory of ‘Orthodox Eastern European Revolution’ put forward by Robert Wegs in his book ‘Europe since 1945-A concise history’. Stalin had already, in 1944, formed a coalition government where leftist intellectuals and communist functionaries existed and this was recognised by Churchill at Yalta as long as coalition governments were allowed to form democratically. After Yalta, Stalin stated that ‘any freely elected government would be anti-Soviet and that we can not permit’ and thus, Moscow embarked on a two year programme of intimidation toward other political parties in Poland particularly to the Polish Peasant Party who gained growing support during the period. The West viewed such acts of European aggression with grave concern and Kennen, the US foreign minister, stated, ‘Since Yalta, the Soviet government has taken a firm and uncompromising position on nearly every major question that has arisen in our relations. The most important of these is the question of Poland.’ I believe that the disagreement over Poland is one of the key turning points in European Cold War history and it was one of the first steps in the downward spiral of East/West relations. The West viewed Stalin’s actions in Poland as revolutionary which would result in a communist dominated government and saw him as expanding his sphere of influence thus causing a threat to Western European security. American fears were further enhanced with the arrest of members of the Polish Underground in May 1945 and the summoning of RPPS (the Socialist Workers Party) to Moscow demanding that they were to cooperate with the Soviet Government during 1946/7. It was this level of heavy handed aggression that I believe was the sole cause of Cold War in Europe and while Stalin continued to carry out ‘a policy characterised by a decision to disregard the good will of the non-Communist West…..to expand and consolidate Communist power’ (1), the trust of the West diminished.

This point can be proven when Truman invited Molotov, Soviet foreign minister, to Washington as Truman believed that ‘the most affective method of assuring that the US and the world of the Soviets continue to collaborate’(2) was to discuss the Polish question. The fact that Truman thoroughly believed in mutual observation and his desire for friendship with the East illustrates that a solution could have been found between the two great powers and hence a Cold War in Europe avoided. However, it was policies such as the Russian treaty of ‘Mutual Assistance’ with Poland (April 1945), and hence their government becoming ordered into a Soviet structure caused the Washington Conference to fail.

Hope of cooperation between the two states increased slightly in May 1946 when Stalin withdrew support from the Iranian Separist Movement because he realised the implications would cause a massive rift with the West and hence the Cold War in Europe would have become more intense.

However despite this minor amount of cooperation, the same system of Soviet takeover can be followed in many other Eastern European states. In Romania, Stalin created a government that was, at first, a friendly coalition government to the USSR (this satisfied the West at Yalta and Potsdam), but gradually the communists began to act openly against opposition parties during 1946/7 and culminating in December 1947 when King Michael was forced to abdicate.

Bulgaria was a similar story where a series of non-communist uprisings resulted in America ratifying the Bulgarian Peace Treaty in June 1947 and hence, ending the Control Commission for Bulgaria (ended all US action in Bulgaria).Stalin then ordered the elimination of all other political parties and placed his friend Dimitrov in control of the Bulgaria. Both countries became ‘Satellite States’ of the Soviet Union who imposed collective agriculture and long term economic plans on the new Communist governments.

Both Bulgaria and Romania were countries where slow Stalinist expansion was demonstrated to the West, however, the dramatic events and shift in takeover policy Czechoslovakia were perhaps the final straw in Western cooperative politics regarding Europe. Yalta and Potsdam permitted the Czech’s a coalition government even though the communist party dominated during 1945. Stalin permitted free elections because of the lack of Czech hostility towards Russia and most importantly, Stalin wanted to use Czechoslovakia as a distraction from Poland. The government elected in 1946, the ‘Premier United Front’, was a primarily Communist government which pleased the Soviets. However, during 1947 and the distribution of Marshall Aid (discussed later), there was a communist melt down in Warsaw and hence, Stalin forbade Czech attendance at the American conference. Stalin was paranoid that this was a Western form of aggression which could potentially divide ‘the iron curtain’(4) into two distinct parts leaving Russia vulnerable and also, this alliance to the West could spread to other Eastern Europe countries.

Finally in Feb 1946, Stalin reaffirmed his belief of basic capitalist ill-will and hostility, by declaring that the ‘capitalist system of world economy’ conceals within itself ‘the elements of general crisis and military clashes.’

Western leaders received these words with foreboding. But certainly Anglo-American leaders at the same time viewed Soviet actions as fundamentally hostile to Western interests. Soviet obstructionism and resistance to American demands concerning Eastern Europe prompted a hostile response from President Truman.

There were two other administrative policies that also helped to shape the future of US-Soviet relations during the early stages of the cold war. Most western European Communist parties were at a peak in the years immediately following World War Two. The French Communist Party, for instance, won almost 30% of the vote in November 1946 elections.

In Greece, Communist led guerrillas supplied from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, posed a threat to the Western government of Greece. The Greek communists attempted to seize power in late 1944, when their tactics of mass slaughter turned off a majority of Greeks. But the communists fought back and eventually civil war broke out in Greece in 1946 amid economic crisis. By January 1947, the British informed the United States that they could no longer supply economic aid to Greece or Turkey. Believing that the Soviet Union was responsible for Britain's withdrawal, the United States decided that they had to assume the role of supplying aid. You can conclude that the Americans have such beliefs about the Russians, now meant that a Cold War in Europe was truly unavoidable.

The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 announced aid to Greece and Turkey totalling $400 million, in the context of a war against communism. In many ways, the Truman Doctrine marked the formal declaration of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It also solidified the United States' position regarding containment and her commitment in Europe-at this point the Cold War in Europe was not unavoidable but reality.

As the war ended, Soviet and American power confronted each other and exhausted countries that provided an invitation to rivalry. Had Germany not been reduced to rubble or had France and Britain been able to maintain control of their traditional spheres of influence or had the Eastern European states form coalition governments for themselves, the Soviet-American confrontation might have been avoided completely. Unfortunately, the vast scale and consequences of the war were destined to cast Russia and America in the fatal role of antagonists with no third state powerful enough to balance the need for international security. It was this belief that caused the Polish crisis, the Soviet hunger for East European alliances, the dispute over German reparations and boarders, the question over Greece and finally the American policy of Marshall Aid. True, there were minor attempts of cooperation which could have resulted in a different outcome, the Iranian Oil movement and the agreement over the UN for example, but in all honesty, the Cold War in Europe was unavoidable since each minor dispute resulted in a further element of mistrust and insecurities which catalysed the next dispute.

I believe that Mcneill summarises this argument completely:

‘As between friendship with the West and a (Russian) secure politico-military position on the Western frontier, Stalin chose the latter. He probably never made choice in any deliberate cold-blooded manner. Rather insisting upon security of his frontiers, he little by little sacrificed the sympathy of the West.’(5)

I therefore conclude that the emergence of a Cold War in Europe was unavoidable.

Bibliography:

1.The Tests of Yalta (July 1949)- McGeorge Bundy

2.Europe Since 1945-A concise history (1977)-Robert Wegs

3.Beginnings of the Cold War(1966)-Herz

4. Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech fifty years later (1999)-Muller

5.US,USSR & British-Their cooperation and conflict (1953)-Mcneill

6.Dangerous Relations: the Soviet Union in World politics (1984)-Ulam, Adam

7.Alliance Policy in the Cold War (1959)-Wolfers

Quotes taken from:

1.The Tests of Yalta (July 1949)- McGeorge Bundy

2.Europe Since 1945-A concise history (1977)-Robert Wegs