The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world has every come to nuclear war.

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world has every come to nuclear war. President John F. Kennedy and his committee of advisers had ten days to create a plan of action for the United States that would prevent nuclear war with the Soviet Union and ensure that the missiles in Cuba were no longer a threat to the United States security. President Kennedy was faced with a difficult decision on what kind of approach to take. President Kennedy choose to diffuse the crisis with a blockade war diversion, but what factors lead to this conclusion, and why was the blockade the best option?

The Soviet Union had never before installed their missiles outside Soviet territory, and accounts vary as to the principal motivation for their risky deployment of ballistic missiles in Cuba. The domestic situation in Russia was good. The twenty-year plan for increasing domestic production was ahead of schedule, the unemployment rate was down, and the economy was on the rise. The Soviet Union was also basking in the success of the Sputnik operation. The world generally assumed that the military and strategic balance had significantly shifted in the Soviet’s favor. In the 1961 meeting of Vienna, Kennedy naively stated "we regard...Sino-Soviet forces and the forces of the United States and Western Europe as being more or less in balance." Soviet’s Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s personal assessment of US president, John F. Kennedy, acted as another motivation to move nuclear missiles into Cuba. Khrushchev saw Kennedy as a new, young, and inexperienced president, and had little faith in his ability to lead the great country of the United States. The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 had reinforced Khrushchev’s opinion that Kennedy was not ready to make crucial decisions and revealed a president who was unsure of himself. Khrushchev capitalized on his perceived military and political power over the United States to extend Communist influence throughout the world.

In the spring of 1962, the Soviet Union’s political, domestic, and military positions changed dramatically. Difficulties arose when dealing with underdeveloped countries. The Soviet Union did not have the financial means necessary to provide foreign aid, the patience to deal with extreme nationalism, or the time to train inexperienced political leaders: in short the Soviet Union overstretched themselves and could not support the unstable nations that they took under their Communist wing. Domestically, the government could not meet the demands it had established with the twenty-year plan. There were not enough resources to provide the consumers with a better life and account for the needs and space of the program (Hilsman 8). The Soviets were put in a uncomfortable position militarily when the reversal of the missile gap was publicly announced; now both the military and political power were in favor of the United States. The tension in the Soviet Union became more burdensome, with the insistent clamoring of Fidel Castro for military protection of Cuba.

An urgent solution had to be found to regain the USSR’s military position. The missile gap prompted the Soviets to redress the balance of world power. They decided the best way to offset the overpowering position of the US was to militarily support Cuba. After the fact, Khrushchev claimed that putting missiles in Cuba was purely to defend Cuba from another attack by the United States, not a retaliation of the reversal of the missile gap. Khrushchev had better intelligence available to him than that of the United States. Khrushchev was aware that the United States had no intentions of invading Cuba (Hilsman 13). The main objective of the introduction of ballistic missiles into Cuba was strictly strategic. A successful deployment of missiles into Cuba would be a prompt and inexpensive move to counter the United States. Khrushchev himself acknowledged that the deterrence of a US invasion was not the sole objective of his act: "In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance of power’" (Talbott 494).

Upon Fidel Castro’s consent, the Soviets devised a plan to secretly supply Cuba with offensive and defensive nuclear ballistic missiles. The first phase was dedicated to providing a defensive for Cuba. Cuba was equipped with surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, short-range harbor defense missiles, coastal patrol boats armed with ship-to-ship missiles, IL-28 bombers, and over one hundred MIG fighter planes. The second phase of the plan was to make Cuba an offensive nuclear threat. Cuba was given six battalions of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and four battalions of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). The weapons would be accompanied by special ground troops totaling roughly 42,000 men. The ground troops had an alarming force of infantry, artillery, and battlefield nuclear weapons (Hilsman 15)

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Before October 1, 1962, U.S. intelligence suspected a Soviet military buildup in Cuba, but could not verify if the weapons were capable of threatening the United States. On October 5, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone predicted that there was a possibility that the Soviet military buildup "would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs" (US Government website). Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy disagreed, stating that the Soviet Union wouldn’t make such an audacious challenge. President Kennedy approved a U2 reconnaissance flight over Cuba to obtain evidence about the development of MRBM sites ...

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The deployment of ballistic missiles in Cuba was a devious act by the Soviet Union. On September 4, 1962, Kennedy warned the Soviets that if any missiles were put in Cuba then “the gravest issue would arise,” (Brune 45) meaning the potential of nuclear war. Kennedy delivered another very similar warning on September 13, committing the United States to protecting its own security, and that of its allies. In an official statement on September 11, Khrushchev said that there was "no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba” (Boukhars). The Soviet reactions to his warnings led Kennedy to believe that they had no intention of installing any offensive armaments in Cuba. The Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, reassured Kennedy that the missiles being shipped to Cuba were “defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to the security of the United States” ( Boukhars 2). Kennedy even defended Soviet integrity to the American people in a public address, by denying all claims that they were sneaking offensive weapons onto the island. The covert introduction of Soviet ballistic missiles into Cuba was to create a serious crisis between the two superpowers.

President Kennedy was informed of the missile sites at 8:45 a.m. on October 16, and immediately called a meeting of his advisers to discuss the plan of action. The meeting began at 11:45 that morning and went on with brief intermissions for the rest of the week. The deliberations were carried out with extreme secrecy; it was critical that the Russians remained ignorant of the United States knowledge, until the US had a plan of action (US Government website). The group advisers became known as the executive committee (ExCom). The members of the ExCom- the president, the Vice-president, Rusk McNamara, Robert Kennedy, General Taylor, McCone, Dillion, Adlai Stevenson, Bundy, Sorensen, Ball, Gilpatric, Llewellyn Thompson, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin, and others brought in on occasion, Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, and Conrad Meeker- had to attend regular meetings and maintain their normal schedule to prevent any suspicion. The ideas that emerged during the Committee’s discussion were innovative and ranged widely. The difficult situation had to be handled with a degree of urgency, hence considerations were free, focused and continuous. The members walked around the problem, and analyzed it like a piece of art, from every angle and perspective. They had ten days before the missiles would be on pads ready for firing, and they wanted to explore every alternative before deciding on a course of action. (Schelsinger 803).

Edwin Martin, Llewellyn Thompson, and Conrad Meeker wanted the United States to act within the parameters of international law. Meeker was the Acting Legal Adviser at that time and Martin was the Assistant Secretary for Latin America. Thompson stressed the importance of law in Russia, and the significance of being able to present a strong legal case in defense of the US’s actions. From a legal standpoint the missile emplacement in Cuba could not be regarded as an armed attack by the Soviet Union, therefore the president could not order unilateral action without publicly characterizing the threat in these terms (Chayes 31). They suggested that the United States should use their allies, Organization of American States (OAS) to solve the problem. The OAS could legitimize blockade, and the choice to take harsher military steps could be left open. They tried to assure the ExCom that using the OAS was feasible and that the United States could obtain the needed 14 votes to instate the blockade. This approach would justify the use of force against Cuba under the terms of the United Nations Charter, which permits regional arrangements in handling threats to international peace and security (Chayes 32). The committee quickly agreed to abandon this idea. Although this option would have allowed the United States to operate within international law, there was too much risk involved. If the US didn’t get the necessary votes or the voting was delayed in OAS, the Russians would be able to install all the missiles in Cuba without any intervention. The only option left for the United States would be to declare war, and conventional war runs the risk of escalating into nuclear war. Robert Kennedy also expressed his concern over the possible embarrassment of his brother should the United States lose the vote.

Dean Acheson joined the committee during the second day of deliberation. Acheson thought an immediate air strike would be the best way to remedy the crisis. Acheson had had many years of experience in international relations, and was steadfast in his foreign policy. Acheson proposed an surgical air strike -a strike confined to the nuclear missile bases- stressing the importance of time in dealing with this crisis situation: “we were involved in a test of wills, and the sooner we get to a showdown the better” (White 138). He and the other proponents of the air strike argued it was imperative to United States security, that the missiles in Cuba be destroyed before they become installed and operative. Acheson proceeded to discuss the position of America’s allies in resolving the missile crisis. He thought it best if the Kennedy administration notify the allies of the United States plan of action instead of consulting with them. Acheson suggested that the November congressional elections should not be a consideration in the administrations decision-making process. He thought Kennedy should cancel all of his campaign speeches and refocus his effort toward uniting the country, once the committee had come to a conclusion on how to respond to the crisis.

The Pentagon undertook the technical analysis of the requirements for a successful strike. They concluded that a surgical strike would leave the airports and the IL-28’s untouched; additionally the results would be inconclusive because they had no way of knowing if all the missile bases were identified and destroyed. A limited strike would have left the United States vulnerable to nuclear retaliation. A successful air strike would need to be much larger to eliminate all sources of danger. The only way to effectively use the air strike would have been to destroy the majority of Cuba. The Pentagon asserted that this was an opportunity they should capitalize on; they could justifiably overthrow the Castro regime and re-establish the security of the western hemisphere.

Robert Kenney and other members of ExCom rebutted, claiming it had a grave potential to escalate the situation rather then diffuse it. They resolved that the world would regard a surprise attack, by such a powerful country on such a meek island as an excessive response, and may consider it pure vengeance from the Bay of Pigs loss. The Latin American experts pointed out that the strike would kill thousand of innocent Cubans (White 139). In fact the air strike was based around the idea that the majority of casualties would be Cubans, and the Russian casualties would be kept to a minimum. The United States assumed that the Russians wouldn’t retaliate with nuclear weapons over such minimal losses. Actually, there were over 42,000 Soviet men in Cuba, and losses of this magnitude would have created much more risk then the United States was willing to take. The Soviet experts added that an air strike with even as many as 2,000 casualties might provoke the Soviet Union into a drastic or unpredictable response.

Acheson’s argument was flawed, because the concept of brinkmanship from which he derived his proposal was flawed. Brinkmanship is based on the assumption that in any confrontation the United States could always up the ante, because its opposition would back down. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union would have backed down to America instead of starting a nuclear war. This approach depended upon being able to determine the fine line at which the brink would be reached; if calculation were not precise then it could very easily cause a nuclear war. Acheson assumed that the air strike, blowing up missiles and killing Russian and Cuban men, would not cause Khrushchev to retaliate. The location of the brink could not be established; Khrushchev hadn’t distinguished the point where Soviet Union retaliation would be necessary. Even if the air strike didn’t produce a nuclear retaliation, it would invite Russia to move against Berlin. This would give Soviet Union the opportunity to shift the venue to a place where the stakes were much higher, and the United States position much weaker.

The air strike could not be justified legally, because it posed legal double standards. Acheson maintained that the Soviet Union was obligated to abide by the Monroe Doctrine, which was considered a quasi-legal concept. At the same time, he claimed that the Kennedy administration did not have to consider international law when deciphering its response to the missile deployment in Cuba. It would be quite hypocritical of the United States to unlawfully attack the Soviets for breaching international law (White 161).

Robert Kennedy and Rusk McNamara advocated the use of a blockade rather than an air strike. They refuted an air strike, claiming it would oppose America’s traditions and undermine its moral authority over the world. An American strike on Cuba would represent an attack by a great power against a small nation, and this would be against American values and history. Robert Kennedy compared an attack on Cuba to Pearl Harbor in reverse, and he refused to let his brother to become the Tojo 1960’s (Hilsman 139). They suggested a blockade would be a better option because it would apply steady, slow, and intensifying pressure on the Soviet Union, while avoiding war. Khrushchev would have ample time to decide his next move. If he chose to remove the missiles, the blockade allowed him and the Soviet Union to save face and retreat with dignity. If Khrushchev refused to disarm Cuba, in spite of the US’s attempt at a peaceful solution, then they could resort to military force to diffuse the crisis.

Aside from the possibility that a strike would lead to a costly war, the principal factor behind Robert Kennedy’s opposition to an attack was his instinct to protect the interests of his brother. Contrary to Acheson, RFK’s position was formed from his devotion to his brother rather than an attachment to a particular foreign policy ideology. The Kennedy family was raised in an environment that stressed the importance of family loyalty; hence throughout John Kennedy’s political career Robert Kennedy assumed the role of his protector. Robert Kennedy evaluated the situation from the perspective of his brother’s reputation. He wanted to avoid at all costs his brother being labeled the president who led the United States into a third and potentially nuclear world war. Military action against Cuba was the least agreeable option, because it was the most likely to provoke a military response from the Soviet Union (White 152).

Discussions on October 19 centered on the blockade, which the majority of participants now agreed was the most promising option. The argument for the blockade was strengthened when the military representatives conceded that a blockade now, would not exclude an air strike later. Discussion of a military strike continued, however, with Acheson pointing out that a blockade would not actively remove the missiles that were already in Cuba, and would only postpone the necessary military action. The participants formed two groups to present the alternatives to President Kennedy: the blockade scenario and a paper on the military option. The two options were presented to the President at the meeting of the National Security Council on October 20. The president opted for the blockade, and decided to reveal the situation to the American public during a televised address on October 22:

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are - but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high - but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right-not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

International law acted indirectly as a constraint on the choice to use a blockade to deal with the Cuban Missile Crisis. If United States actions followed the norms of their previous actions, coincided with their foreign policy, and were morally justifiable, then their conduct falls with in the law, and the law constrained their choice to follow that course of action (Chayes 36). International law helped define the US’s choice to use a blockade because it followed more along the lines of US’s previous actions in crisis situations. The blockade did not completely agree with international law. It deprived the Soviet Union of its right to freedom of the seas, and violated the law that a Pacific blockade may not be applied against vessels of a third party. The United States skirted around this issue by calling the blockade a quarantine, which does not constitute a war threat under international law.

Robert Kennedy played a large role in the transference of the president’s support from an air strike to the blockade. John F Kennedy respected and heavily relied on his brother throughout his presidency. Robert was the first person John contacted after the discovery of the missiles, and the first person consulted upon the president’s return from Chicago on October 20. On several occasions during ExCom meetings the president would step out onto the porch accompanied by his brother, they would briefly converse, and upon the presidents return to he would make a decision (White 159). JFK used some of the same arguments that his brother proposed against the air strike, for example the president used the Pearl Harbor analogy in discussing the air strike with Acheson.

The imposition of a quarantine exerted maximum pressure on the Soviets while incurring the minimum risk of war. It was the most flexible of any of the responses that the US examined. Unlike an air strike or an invasion, the quarantine both demonstrated the seriousness of the US’s determination to get the missiles out of Cuba, and allowed the Soviets time and room to pull back from its dangerous position. The imposition of the quarantine was an astute way to solve the problem. President Kennedy agreed it was better to start with limited action before moving to severe measures. He also opposed a massive surprise attack by a large country on a small one because he believed such an attack to be inhumane, contrary to America’s traditions and ideals, and an act of brutality for which the world would never forgive the United States (Chayes 39). The quarantine allowed both sides time to weigh out the repercussions of their decisions before they acted, therefore stopping, as President Kennedy puts it, "spasm reactions" (Hilsman 102). The quarantine started at the very lowest level of forceful coercion, and allowed for a step-by-step escalation towards the use of force, leaving room for both governments to maneuver, and hopefully end with a peaceful solution.

The quarantine was genius because it put the pressure on the Soviet Union to initiate military action. Its imposition, as McNamara said, left the options open (Medland 51). If the Soviet premier displayed some rationality and caution, he would not try to break up the quarantine, because that would escalate the crisis to a confrontation between the two powers. Khrushchev realized that his only reasonable option was to succumb to American demands, and remove the missiles.

The Cuban missile crisis was a dangerous episode, bringing the world's major military powers to the brink of nuclear war. Kennedy choice to use the quarantine because it was an assertive way to diffuse the crisis, using international institutions would have been to passive, an air strike would have been to aggressive. Kennedy trusted his brother’s judgment that the quarantine would remove the missiles out of Cuba without the threat of nuclear war. The quarantine both fell in the bounds of international law and coincided with America’s values and traditions. Kennedy, above all, choice the quarantine, because he was not willing to react in a way that would have provoked Khrushchev into nuclear war. Most historians agree that it was Kennedy's good judgment with sustained involvement by his advisers, and the good sense Khrushchev displayed once the crisis intensified, that helped avert catastrophe. The management of the Cuban Missile Crisis required an exceptional sensitivity to, and cooperation with, the adversary, in order to avert a situation in which both sides had more to lose than either had to gain.

Bibliography

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