In contrast to Germany’s one party and uniform ideology, Britain and France had internal problems and political opposition that comes with democracy. “Diversity was founded, not on ideology, but on a theory and a system of political life…”7 The British government knew that the people were very war-weary and would not support another conflict. As a result, the British government placed the League of Nations at the utmost importance and its ability to solve conflicts. Consequently, the League of Nations was the nearest thing to ideology that the British had between the wars. This support endured until British realized the failure of the League and the true Nazi goals of total conquest became clear, which threatened the national security of Britain.8 On the other hand, France‘s biggest influence during the interwar period was the complete and total rejection of war or use of force. The French government and society suffered from the strong divisions between extreme left and extreme right in French politics, creating an unstable government which paralyzed foreign policy. This ideological conflict, and the rejection against war, weakened French reaction to German expansion in the nineteen thirties thus promoting conditions in which war was very likely.9 This fixation of Britain and France with peace enabled the Germans to move forward with their expansion and remilitarization until the only method of stopping them was war. An ideological conflict developed between democracy and what Nazism stood for. That conflict was a principal factor in the final decision of France and Britain to go to war.10
Although ideologies were a major factor in origins of the Second World War, Bell also investigates how the economic condition of Europe and the various countries affected the origin of the conflict. Bell believes that the great depression crucially affected the origins of the war. The depression ruined all economic progress, trade with other nations and created in its place a drive for self-sufficiency and competition. There was social and political unrest and fierce competition for trade to secure food and raw materials. This created divisions in countries like Britain and France that looked to internal self-sufficiency to cope with the depression. This internal action, allowed the resurgence of the German state and the rise of Hitler which used force to secure economic areas and resources.12
This end of the depression brought about economic recovery but also new problems. In Britain, it was believed that all economic influences would suffer with another conflict. This led to the policy of appeasement. Bell explains that Britain depended a great deal on imports and exports for economic revenue. However, with a new conflict, the import bill would increase and their economic position will be severely damaged similar as the First World War.13 Due to the sizeable markets and demand for British goods in Germany, an economically favorable situation for Britain, forced Britain to maintain good relations with Germany and avoid a war with her. Thus, the economic state and interests of Britain deeply profited from the trade with Germany and the peace.
During this period, the French and the Soviets were in a similar economic situation as Britain. Regardless that the French depended less on international trade then did Britain, German industry was far superior compared to the French. The French believed that with the increased passage of time, their industry would catch up with the German’s and would give time for an economic recovery.14 Therefore, the economic interests of France also benefited from peace. Although the Soviet’s economy was in rapid growth, Bell explains that the Soviets had the most to benefit from the peace. Their industry and economy still left much to be desired in the late nineteen thirties compared to that of the German and growth in the iron and steel industries were extremely slow. The slow metal industries growth combined with the economic and social dislocation shaped by collectivization and industrialization, made the Soviet state unprepared for a war.15 This can be seen by the willingness of Stalin to make an obviously unfavorable agreement with Germany to prevent a conflict. This enabled the Germans to avoid a two front war, if a war was to occur, which would greatly enhance their chances of victory.
Unlike the French, British and Soviets, the Germans in fact had economic motivation to start a war. Once the rearmament began, the Germans were faced with an economic crisis. The German’s need for resources and the finances to pay for the rearmament would have caused a halt to production and growth. Consequently, the Germans were faced with two options. In order to end this crisis, Germany could have slowed down the pace of rearmament, which was obviously outright rejected by Hitler. The only other option was to acquire more resources by the means of force which occurred in a circular process. 16 To acquire more resources through armaments, Germany needed more armaments, but to get more armaments, Germany needed more resources.17 Hitler decided to use war to pay for the war, thus German economic strategy and policy was forged by a vicious economic circle of aggression. This aggressive way of gaining resources only left one option that would stop the German offensive expansion- the use of heavy force.
Decisions of states are not always solely decided on ideological and economic forces. For that reason, Bell looks at how military strategy influenced the origin of the Second World War. The German state had a policy of expansion and warfare, yet they did not have the resources to validate such a policy. Adolph Hitler understood the strategical importance of resources and looked for a way to fuel his every growing army. Due to the inability for the German economy to fund the rearmament and the lack of resources, Hitler decided to use the goods gained by conquests to fuel his army. Thus, Germany took on an offensive strategy which hoped for quick decisive wars, the ‘blitzkrieg’. This strategy matched with how the Germans were prepared for war, their economy and their society.18 With quick, victorious wars prior to the Polish invasion, Germany was heavily dependant on imports and used the spoils of victory to pay for the cost of those imports. Furthermore, short wars avoided the heavy economic strain and casualties, while keeping the economy balanced. 19 The quick victories of the Nazi regime were able to strike fear into German enemies. This German power and willingness to use it, coupled with the fear of the other nations and the strategy of offensive action, had a great impact into the origins of the Second World War.
Bell argues why the French or the British intervene earlier to ward of the German’s from their offensive action. Bell contends that the British and French had two things in common: the unwillingness to go to war and a strategy that supported peace. In the post-depression years, Britain had overextended their reserves throughout the world and feared that a second war would destroy power of the country and its economy irrevocably. The British had gained many enemies over the world and in an effort to reduce the chances of war, decided on a strategy of appeasement. Since the British economy relied heavily on imports and exports, particularly with the German’s; the British strove towards good relations and an avoidance of war with them.20 Bell explains that it was only when the German interests interfered with British national security, that their strategy and policy turned to resistance 21
The French, on the other hand, were always hindered by the flux of the government from right wing to left wing.22 Their economic weakness also played a part in deciding on a strategy. The French always believed that in another continental war, Germany would be their enemy. Therefore, the French planned for a cautious strategy which called for a long defensive war. In this strategy, France would be supported by her Allies in a defensive stand because French strategy believed that it would achieve success. Therefore the alliance with Britain and Belgium would be their best line of defense for the state. However, in taking a defensive position, the French stood by as Germany rearmed the Rhineland without offensively responding offensively. 23 This inability to stop the German rearmament due to the flux government and the defensive posture allowed the German state grow to the most powerful nation.24
The post World War One era created an inherently unstable Europe. Germany was beaten, but not destroyed and thus maintained its aspirations, identity and Nazism flourished. Britain and France for so long did nothing to stop the expansionist urges of Germany, where it became impossible to stop them without going to war. The ideologies of the respected countries combined with the will of the leaders and the eventual change of strategy of the French and British powers to resist German expansionism, created the conditions in which the war began. Originally in France and Britain, all the ideological, economic and strategic forces were against a war, whereas in Germany, all those forces were in favor of war. Bell convincingly argues that origins of the Second World War arose due to the will of Hitler, the Thirty Year War thesis, the underlying ideological, economic and strategical forces.
Notes
1. P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, 2nd ed. (Essex: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1997), 17.
2. Bell, 28.
3. Ibid, 18.
4. Ibid, 78.
5. Ibid, 84.
6. Ibid, 338.
7. Ibid, 98.
8. Ibid, 107.
9. Ibid, 139.
10. Ibid, 162.
11. Ibid, 167.
12. Ibid, 168.
13. Ibid, 167.
14. Ibid, 165
15. Ibid, 96.
16. Ibid, 109.
17. Ibid, 116.
18. Ibid, 219.
19. Ibid, 217.
20. Ibid, 200.
21. Ibid, 203.
22. Ibid, 183.
23. Ibid, 185.
24. Ibid, 191.
Bibliography
Bell, P. M. H., The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, 2nd ed. (Essex: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1997).
