The treaty signed at Versailles with Germany on June 28 1919 resulted in a great limitation of Germanys military capabilities. The denial to Germany of the right to national self-determination and the acknowledgment of Germanys need to pay the damage caused by the war to the allies through reparations. All of the defeated powers; Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary had to pay this price, some having to pay a substantially higher one.
There was a surrender of areas with populations which were predominantly Polish, creating what was later to be called the Polish Corridor, this separated East Prussia from the main body of Germany. The League of Nations oversaw the setting up of the city of Danzig as a liberated state. Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France. The coal mine rich Upper Silesia was lost, and all of its colonies were given up. All of this brought about a loss of approximately 13% of Germanys pre-war land (Gilbert,2002b:167).
The allies were split in two on the problem of dealing with Germany through treaties. The view of the mainly English speaking section of the allies was that the treaty was too severe on Germany. This was intensely opposed by France and Clemenceau, who believed that the treaty did not hurt the Germans enough, they called attention to the fact that the enforcement of the penalties already imposed were not coming to pass. But the full enforcement of the sanctions would mean that Germany would have to be occupied which would only resume the war and this would be contrary to the primary objectives of the League of Nations. All in all the treaties only insulted the Germans and didn’t actually cause Germany much pain.
It was unusual that these treaties, which contained so many inconsistencies, were accepted. The reason for this may lie in the expectation that the treaties were bound to be bad. But, as put forward in the 14 points, if the League of Nations could be established, then it would act as a medium for the future renegotiations of the flaws in the treaties. The League of Nations was a completely different balance of power system in comparison to any previous strategies of keeping the world order stable. It was a scheme which had the ultimate aim of bringing security to the world through collective power. Woodrow Wilson, who headed the project, had given the allies a moral justification for the war by stating that the war was a fight for the establishment of a New World Order. The fact that Wilson was greatly restricted by domestic politics, especially the senate, meant that the concept of the League of Nations was fatally flawed from the outset. The League of Nations was limited to only a loose framework. In March 1918 Wilson wrote, “the administrative constitution of the league must grow and not be made. We must begin with solemn covenants, covering mutual guaranties of political interdependence and territorial integrity. Any attempt to begin putting executive authority into the hands of a group of powers would be to sow a harvest of jealousy and mistrust, which would spring up and choke the whole thing. The United States Senate would never ratify such a treaty.” The idea of the league did in no way appeal to the people of the US and more decisively the Senate. When the League of Nations was formed the United States of America was not one of its members (Lowe,1997b:50). This was a big setback for the League as the United States was the most powerful state in the world, and according to Europe the most neutral. Old enemy states, including Germany, and Russia with its new Bolshevik government were also not included in the League of Nations.
The failure of the League of Nations is not wholly due to the fact that the many of the most important states of the time were not in participation. Its lack of success is also due to the design of the treaty. The flawed design made it impossible to take any action without unanimous agreement by all members. Unanimity of that degree was very rarely achieved. This may be due to political views of the era; with every state strongly dedicated to their own interests, not prepared to give up any amount of power(Lowe,1997c:51).
Germany was extremely unhappy with the new settlements; the Germans continued their stance of upholding the sanctions imposed as they believed the treaties to be illegitimate and unreasonable. The right wing of Germany’s political system came into power for the rest of the 1920’s after the Social Democratic Party, which took responsibility for the treaties then tried to fulfil the requirements of them, lost support from the populace. This new right-wing government did not try to hide the fact that they intended to throw out the Treaty of Versailles. The German army was engaged in deal making with the Bolsheviks their aim to keep as much of their military hardware as possible. The industrialists of Ruhr refused to give over to France the necessary allocations of coal. Although Gustav Streseman did comply with some sections of the treaty, this was a premeditated effort to try to obtain a quicker turnaround of the treaty requisites. The nationalistic inclinations of the German people were growing stronger during this period and the government had to accommodate the public views to keep electoral support.
France was becoming increasingly uneasy about the German problem at hand and was searching for ways to keep Germany under control using the Treaty of Versailles. The United States, which was becoming progressively more isolationist, offered France no help in this matter. Italy, which was unhappy with the minor rewards it received at Versailles, was experiencing major social and industrial changes and Mussolini was heading a new fascist revolution.
Japan’s position was far too remote in relation to the issues concerning Europe; it was also engrossed with its own expansion into China. Following the revolution Russia was politically unstable and economically weak. It was also largely different to Europe ideologically and did not border Germany. Russia and Germany also shared a common interest in Eastern Europe and strengthened their association with the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, and then again with the Treaty of Berlin in 1926. The fact that the newly formed Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia were extremely different both politically and territorially meant that it was impossible for them to form any kind of strong, consistent political entity. This in turn meant that they would be unable to resist effectively against any form of German or Russian resurgence.
The stability achieved in 1925 was destroyed by the world economic crisis. However to fully understand the effects of the 1930’s you have to look deeper than the economic crisis. Before 1914 the growth of civilisation had been guaranteed. War brought about a period of complete death and destruction which was alien to conventions and morality. The idea that morals could be thrown out of the window if they stood in the way of national victory could not be easily changed with the principles of old. Furthermore the young men who had been thrown straight into the conflict had learned that they had instincts and powers which the world of their parents seemed to have suppressed and which found no fulfilment or expression in the pattern of life to which their parents wished them to conform to.
The rise of Nazism in Germany was the event which gave the system established in Paris and political stabilization its final blow. In September 1929 Germany had 1,320,000 unemployed; three years later in 1932 a peak of over 6,000,000(Gilbert,2002c:252) was reached. On January 30 1933, Adolf Hitler, leader of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi Party became chancellor (Gilbert,2002d:254). Hitler’s first year of conduct of foreign policy ended with a great plus for the Reich. Germany indicated that it no longer felt constrained by the Treaty of Versailles, but at the same time was still seen as a partaker in international negotiations.
The Second World War would have probably been triggered by some other factor if it had not broken out over Poland in the summer of 1939. Hitler was straining for control of the Europe. The world had been disturbed by crisis after crisis, each more serious than its predecessor. With everyone living under constant threat, it was only a matter of time before war was declared.
Bibliography
Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large (2002) The end of the European era 1890 to the present (London: Norton)
Norman Lowe (1997) Mastering modern world history (Ebbw Vale: Palgrave)
