This fist section is a dialectical examination of perception. Here he posits that knowledge of the physical world implies viewing that world as a set of forces which interact with each other by governing laws. But here Spirit is experiencing reality directly without concepts, as this is our most elementary way of thinking about our relation to the world at large. Hegel attempts in this chapter to point out the problematic nature of this level of consciousness by showing that sense-certainty does not allow us to go beyond the level of universals as it originally supposes. The only way for consciousness to become truly “self-conscious” is for it to truly acknowledge the “other”. Sense-certainty only realizes the “other” in its most abstract terms and therefore has an incomplete understanding of it. From this position it must then move into perception, where the individual is viewed as sharing properties with others, “by showing itself to be the thing with many properties” (§112). However, while perception does provide some degree of resolution for the difficulties it faced, it still only has a limited understanding of universals by treating them as instances of sensual data, such as “round” or “blue”. This has led consciousness to regard the other merely as a collection of unrelated properties, which provides no resolution to the problem of conceiving “the Thing” as both unified and as other. Here is the point where consciousness breaks down and the transition can be made into self-consciousness.
In the section on ‘Lordship and Bondage’, Hegel explains another stage in the dialectical development of consciousness. He begins by pointing out that only by acknowledging an "other" is self-consciousness possible. But if there is an other, then the original self-consciousness feels threatened and asserts its freedom by trying to dominate that other and force acknowledgment of its dominance. The ensuing struggle results in a master who dominates and a servant who is dominated. The master then forces the servant to produce material goods for the enjoyment of the master. But at this point the master is now dependent upon the servant he has dominated. In the first place, his self-consciousness as master is subject to his recognition as master by the servant. But more important, while the master has been consuming or destroying what the servant makes, the servant has been learning to create--to bend nature to his will ― and so has established his own self-consciousness in relation to what he has created. Furthermore, the labor of the servant has a permanent quality whereas the master's consumption is again dependent on the servant's production. So by dominating the servant, the master is dominated. The solution to this contradiction is to acknowledge that neither master nor servant is free and that freedom is not possible in relationships of domination. The next stage in the dialectic is for the mind to seek freedom within itself.
But before true freedom can be achieved, the dialectical movement must proceed through other stages, and first into the stage of Stoicism. This philosophy seeks to abolish the slave/master limitations, and Hegel identifies it as being at home “whether on throne or in chains” (§199) for this reason. In making this advance, Spirit aims to move closer to freedom, however Hegel points out that this movement reveals flaws as well, in that it is unable to establish any criterion for truth, and by the vague claims made for an ethics based on living ‘in accordance with reason’ to achieve the good life. These errors result in a type of dogmatism which gives rise to the next stance occupied by the Sceptic. This movement is a reaction to Stoicism in that it is prepared to question everything, even that there is reason to be found in reality at all. The goal of achieving freedom in thought is shared, but this method seeks to eliminate all aspirations of rationality to methodically examine appearances alone. But Hegel here shows that this freedom is an illusion, because the power of thought is negated. Thought cannot take us beyond appearances, and thus the Sceptic must revert to the original position of the senses.
The Phenomenology proceeds to its end along these lines, with Hegel showing that with each progression on the ladder, inescapable errors force consciousness to make corrections in a particular way. Consciousness is described as following a characteristic movement as it passes through history. At each point in which it realizes that the position it holds is flawed, it falls into despair which makes the world seem confusing and frustrating. But for Hegel the dialectical movement is necessary because consciousness cannot remain dissatisfied, because the despair itself forces it into change. So consciousness must move to a new standpoint to try to regain its sense of being at home in the world, and will develop a new method for questioning the assumptions of its prior state. However, until the point of absolute knowledge, it is merely the “necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of the unreal consciousness” (§79) which are being drawn out. Since it is still an ‘unreal consciousness’ its movement is from one erroneous position to another equally flawed, as each of the movements discussed thus far have shown.
Even in the later chapters, Hegel shows the same one-sided movement. The problems of the Greek ethical life force consciousness to evaluate the position of the Greek perspective, which in turn lead to the modern concepts of individuality and freedom. But even these concepts are found to be laden with problems which are described in the sections on ‘Reason’ and ‘Spirit’. Ultimately, he shows that even though modern man has moved past his satisfaction with a view of reality hinged on the dogmatic religion of the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’, it has only moved past it in a one-sided way. Thus, he criticizes the Enlightenment view, along with the Kantian, in that the result is a purely materialistic and utilitarian form of consciousness. What Hegel truly wants us, the reader and observer of consciousness, to see in this system is that the movement described is necessary and inevitable, as it would be for one climbing a ladder if he wished to reach the top. It is therefore only in the final chapter where the ‘natural’ consciousness emerges through the dissatisfaction it feels for itself. It is only at this point that consciousness is ready to proceed with the true Science of philosophical self-examination which is needed to achieve ‘absolute knowledge’.
For Kierkegaard, however, the emphasis rests on the subjective rather than the objective truth. The pseudonym Johannes Climacus represents this subjective approach to knowledge, although this particular Climacus, based on the historical figure of monastic life, is not a believer himself. The ladder which he speaks of in the Philosophical Fragments is not the ascent to the Absolute, or God, but is instead representative of the system that Hegel employs to delineate the stages of consciousness as it proceeds from one premise to the next. This method is rejected as viable for spiritual matters, because the Absolute cannot be reached by any other method than through faith. Here he is concerned with a philosophy of subjective knowledge and the leap of faith because objective knowledge, which is the goal of Hegel, is impossible to reach by subjective agents. Kierkegaard replaces the idea of the ladder metaphor toward absolute knowledge with a theory of truth where the believer, because of paradox and absurdity he faces through his beliefs, can find himself in Christ.
In the ‘Interlude’ of the Fragments we also get a clear criticism of Hegel’s view of history. Here he states that “everything that has come into existence is eo ipso historical” (P.75), or that all things past are past. Though this statement seems obvious, what it implies is that when we ordinarily look back on historical events we seek to understand or examine it in order to deduce some meaning from it. But Kierkegaard claims that history is too “abstract” to enter into a dialectical relationship with it because in light of the first premise, history can have no meaning. This runs counter to the claim of Hegel’s historicism which views the past in relationship to the present as a necessary progression. Since there is no sensory data available to analyze a historical event, and reason is dependant on such immediate information, then reason collapses. Faith, therefore, arising from subjective knowledge is the only valid method of approaching the Absolute.
In the works of Hegel and Kierkegaard we are faced with two philosophies which stand in stark contrast. Though the former seeks to create a system whereby the truth of Spirit can objectively be represented, and the latter proposed the idea that only the subjective individual can appropriate the Absolute, both are concerned with the realm of thought. We can see that the writings of these men reflected their beliefs, as their styles reflected each distinctively. Hegel proposed a monolithic system, and thus his work was equally labyrinthine and systematic; whereas Kierkegaard emphasized the subjective and so his works were unbounded and masked under many layers of meaning. Whether or not either could lay claim on the truth is beyond my abilities to say, however, there is a sense that perhaps their philosophies may be able to be resolved and shown to be complementary. Needless to say, that is an idea which must be taken up elsewhere.
