"The military successes of Germany in 1939/40 are explained more by the inadequacies and mistakes of its enemies, than by German military superiority." How far do you agree with this view?

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James Hulme

13PJC

“The military successes of Germany in 1939/40 are explained more by the inadequacies and mistakes of its enemies, than by German military superiority.” How far do you agree with this view?

German superiority was clearly a defining factor in the fall of France and the Low Countries that gave Germany their success during this period. They over powered the minor nations and incorporated skilled strategic and tactical manoeuvres throughout the campaigns; they had excellent leadership on the battlefield, a well-trained and experienced army. But, their opposition was also inadequate in quality, leadership and command, and that certain mistakes were mind due to mentality and lack of experience.

The role of leadership played an invaluable role in the inadequacies of the allied efforts, France’s military leaders were to old and unable to comprehend modern mobile warfare, while all the senior commanders were veterans of the second world war. The Allied chain of command was very complex Gamelin had many roles, he was in charge of all actions, but no control over air force or navy and control over the armies in the North-East was Georges job; there were many command centres scattered over a large area, and this led to slow communications, it took 48 hours for one of Gamelin's orders to arrive and be executed on the field. This command system weakened further by the mutual antipathy between Gamelin and Georges proved a recipe for disaster, for Georges was responsible for fighting a battle according to plans drawn up by Gamelin with an army that Gamelin had moulded to his own concepts. As a result, when the Germans launched their offensive in the west, no one was certain who was actually controlling the battle and this was compounded by the proliferation of headquarters and an inadequate communications system.

The Allied army was another inadequacy, in terms of numbers it was as large if not larger than the Germans: they had 144 divisions, 13974 guns, and 3384 tanks compared to the Germans with 141 divisions, 7378 guns and 2445 tanks. However, the French second army consisted mainly of ageing reservists that were not fully trained in all aspects of defence warfare, many of the French divisions were slow, lacked anti-tank guns, which were needed immensely, they had to use the Hotchkiss 35 tank which was useless, they could not even slow a German Panzer, let alone stop one. When the French Ninth Army was attacked at the main thrust of “sickle-stroke”, it was unable to withstand the attack as it consisted of only two active divisions and seven reserve or fortress divisions, which were elderly, under-trained and ill armed. These reservists were left to hold 40 miles of the front line, with the right flank not even owning a single ant-tank gun and the two left flanks composed of elderly reservists. Throughout the French army there was a shortage of combat skills, mobility, anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns; with the latter of the two being the most important weapons required in the entire campaign. Even though the French possessed a large tank army it devoted most of them to supporting the infantry and had not developed the concept of massing them in the way in which the Germans had already triumphed in the Polish campaign and by the 28th May Charles De Gaulle said: “Our tanks had been sorely tired. Barely a hundred were still in working order.” The Norwegian Army was mainly a militia force that put up a valiant but poor defence, the Dutch army was only made up of 400,000 men but they fell in just five days.

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Support of the Allied troops was one of the biggest disadvantages during the whole campaign; the Germans had clear air superiority, with 1220 fighters and 1559 bombers compared to the Allied 708 with the air forces of Holland and Belgium being negligible. The British contributed a modest air support, but left the Spitfire back home to defend Britain, there was virtually no tactical bombers of any value, so it was in the air that the Allies were at their biggest disadvantage, with the French air force largely equipped with inferior machines, which like their armour was poorly deployed. The French ...

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