Support of the Allied troops was one of the biggest disadvantages during the whole campaign; the Germans had clear air superiority, with 1220 fighters and 1559 bombers compared to the Allied 708 with the air forces of Holland and Belgium being negligible. The British contributed a modest air support, but left the Spitfire back home to defend Britain, there was virtually no tactical bombers of any value, so it was in the air that the Allies were at their biggest disadvantage, with the French air force largely equipped with inferior machines, which like their armour was poorly deployed. The French were afraid that the British would begin strategic bombing of German industry before the campaign but they were reassured, but the problem was due to their bases being far from the battlefront. General Gamelin did not believe that air forces would play an important role in any modern war, and no-one had the ability, due to the command structure to call upon the Air Force, and more importantly could not be concentrated to meet the enemy thrust on the Meuse due to them being scattered across the front.
The most fatal mistake made by the Allies was due to their strategy, which was based on the assumption that Germany would attack through the Low Countries, as in World War One. To meet this challenge the bulk of the French army and the B.E.F. planned to move into Belgium and link up with the Belgian army as soon as the neutrality of the Low Countries was compromised. Concerned that the Belgians could not hold the Albert Canal Line, plans called for meeting the Belgians along the Dyle River. This sound strategy, (providing the Germans had attacked there fully) would however shorten the defensive line and play into the plans of the Germans by allowing concentration of force, and protect industrial areas of Northern France. Two main flaws are evident in this strategy though: the Ardennes assumed to be impenetrable, was defended in the main by low quality reserve units of the French army; with the commitment of the best and most mobile forces for the move into Belgium severely limited Allied options in the event that the main German attack did not come as expected. This wrinkle was a late addition to the Allied strategy, added at the insistence of Gamelin, over the strenuous objections of many of his subordinate commanders. General Gamelin had forty or more of his divisions into Belgium to confront the advancing German 4th Army Corps and the Panzer divisions this was backed up by the British B.E.F. This move suited the Germans and general von Manstein was able to complete his operation “Sichelschnitt” on May 13th-18th, as he firmly believed that the British and French were under the impression that he would make his attack well north of the Ardennes. The invasion of the Low Countries had pulled the bulk of the Allied forces North making way for the surprise entry through the Ardennes, just north of the Maginot Line, and defending this area was second-rate troops, who were considered adequate because it was not believed that the Germans would attempt to advance in force through the Ardennes.
France sought to protect her border with Germany by means of the Maginot Line, which ran from the Swiss border to the Ardennes forest, numerous critics have derived the vast expenditures necessary to create the Maginot Line, arguing that France would have been better served in producing tanks and airplanes, the reliance on this allowed France to concentrate its force in the much more vulnerable north, unfortunately the flawed strategy perused by Gamelin failed to correctly position available forces to stem the German attack through the Ardennes. Furthermore the French army, on manoeuvres in 1938, had actually staged a mock attack on Sedan through the area; the exercise involved seven “German” divisions, supported by tanks, which smashed through the Ardennes and routed the defence.
Within the armed forces themselves there were several mistakes made with leadership being a major factor. Undoubtedly the most questionable aspect of French leadership was Gamelin’s distribution of forces and his insistence on moving into Holland- a strategic decision known as Breda Variant. Gamelin placed half the French Army immediately behind the Maginot Line; perhaps Gamelin had no faith in this formidable series of interconnected fortresses. In the event no major attack was launched against this line. From the start of half of France’s military might was in no position to meet the German tanks. Most seriously, Gamelin had stripped the French army of reserves. This vital was to be played by the Seventh Army. Instead, Gamelin placed this reserve force against the Channel and assigned it a liaison role to move to Breda in Holland and link up with the Dutch and Belgian armies. Since the Low Countries refused even informal staff conversations, this was a highly risk gambit. When the onslaught came, the Dutch army withdrew to the North into “Fortress Holland”. This made the Seventh Army’s mission a waste of time, and the lack of reserves would prove fatal for France. Indeed when Churchill spoke to Gamelin on 16th May he recorded: ‘General Gamelin turned to me and, with a shake of his head and a shrug, said “Acunue” [“There is none”]. A careful analysis of French tank doctrines reveals a clear understanding of armoured warfare, given the basic French strategy of defence, the tactical employment of armour as set forth in French field manuals fully utilized forces available. The field officers in the French armoured units were fully versed in current French doctrines, which higher commanders often failed to grasp. A prime example is the withdrawal ordered by General Corap, in command of the French Ninth Army, which guarded the Ardennes. This allowed the Germans to secure their bridgeheads across the River Meuse. A strong counterattack by Coraps armoured units might have allowed time for reinforcements to arrive. Charles De Gaulle felt that the State attributed to mistakes, and that if it had played its part while there was time, and it had directed its military system towards enterprise, not passivity; and if our leaders had in consequence had at their disposal the instruments for shock and manoeuvre which had been often suggested to the politicians and to the High Command; then the French armies would have had their chance.
As well as strategic and command mistakes there was also operational mistakes that had a large effect. When von Rundstedts armour advanced through the Ardennes . Their worst problems were the vehicle jams on the inadequate forest roads. Stretching back 80km east of the Rhine, the advancing columns were protected by a massive and constant umbrella of fighters. A few well-placed bombs on these roads could have seriously impeded the advancing tanks, but Allied eyes were focused on the attack they had expected in the north. By nightfall of Whit Sunday 12th May, seven Panzer divisions stood on the east bank of the Meuse all the way from Dinant where Rommel stood, to Sedan with Guderian. Still French military intelligence failed to recognise the danger, reckoning as usual on First World War experience, which still constituted much of Anglo-French military doctrine, that the Germans would require at least five or six days to concentrate before they could force a river crossing. An attack was ordered for May13th in the hope of catching the French unaware and after its initial success the French failed to mount an armoured counter attack, this was due to the Second DLM’s being taken by the infantry to boost them and they were not available until 21st May, and more importantly were supposed to be in reserve. The First DCR was supposed to counter attack at Dinant, but after refuelling they finally attacked on 15th May and were caught by Rommel due to their slowness. The Second was ordered for the 13th May, but Georges changed its destination to Sedan, and by 15th May it was cut in half; the third was ordered for the 14th May was postponed and finally conducted on 16th May. The outcome of this was that no DCR’s delivered any counter attack. So in effect there were many mistakes made by the Allies, mainly the French and through their High Command, with the most crucial mistake being underestimating an attack through the Ardennes.
It must not be forgotten that the Germans were a superior war machine and that here skill would have placed a severe outcome on the campaign. Even thought that Germans had a smaller army, it was clearly superior, the tanks were of much better quality and more importantly were massed together and used as a single unit; this concept was not grasped by the Allies, and not only shows the superiority of the Germans but also the inadequacy and mistake making of the Allies. The Luftwaffe was larger and stronger in the important bomber and fighter planes, which led to air supremacy in France. The German Luftwaffe was designed and trained for a single clear-cut purpose- to be an integral part of the German offensive machine. Its fleets of medium bombers could destroy infrastructure behind enemy lines, whilst Dive Bombers, the Stukas or Junkas 87s, gave direct support to advancing infantry and tanks.
The German use of Blitzkrieg was the most superior advantage possessed by the Germans this new tactic developed in large by Guderian and Manstein incorporated the use of Army, Panzer and Luftwaffe divisions in a quick attack that penetrated the weakest point in great concentration of forces, this combined with the Sichelschnitt Plan in which the original plan through the Low Countries would be only a feint to draw the Allies into advancing in the wrong direction, and whilst the Allies were plunging north , the Germans in the south would slice right through to the sea and catch the bulk of the Allies in a gigantic trap.
As well as strategic superiority there was also the use of modern technology. During the defeat of the Netherlands, were it took only five days for the inadequate Dutch to be defeated, parachutists landed and took control of important areas, this was again repeated at Fort Eben-Emael, which was essential to the army’s progress. This time newly invented hollow-charges were used to seize valuable points.
The German superiority was shown when three French Divisions of the Ninth Army were defending the Meuse River around Sedan, and they were in no way, in a position to stop, or even slow the elite XIX Panzerkorps, the Grossdeutschland Regiment and the XIV Motorized Corps. Once on French soil, the Blitzkrieg started, 1,500 planes of the Luftwaffe bombarded Sedan and the surrounding areas accompanied by heavy artillery support. The German forces soon overran LaMarfee Heights, one of the best defences that France had at Sedan. Pillboxes were blown by Sturnpioneren, while flak guns attacked others killing the Frenchmen through their unprotected weapon slits. The German attack was textbook style, like a well-drilled precision machine. After the taking of Sedan, their movements were just as swift, with units and divisions attacking one after the other.
In conclusion the Germans were a very good machine, but their superiority came mainly from the mistakes made by the Allies, not their inadequacy, in terms of numbers they were equally matched. Lieutenant-General Khozin, of the Red Army, wrote about the German Army: “The claim that the German Army is “invincible” is a myth invented by the Nazi rulers. The easy victories of 1939 and 1940, on which the German militarists now preen themselves, were not so much by their own forces as by base treachery in the countries against which they fought.”
Bibliography
The Second World War – John Keegan
Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet-German War – Lieutenant-General Khozin