Similarly, once the matter was deliberated on by the Operations Division of the War Department, a series of similar replies came forth in which they claimed that such an operation is “impracticable” and that it could be executed only by “diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations elsewhere”. (Wyman, pp.298) When one is given the historical context of the current period, however, it becomes clear that the statement made by the Operations Division was entirely wrong. While this claim was made in June of 1944 as a negative response to the request of bombardments, it was already clear in early April of 1944 that the German air force was defeated and that allied air force powers were in control of the European skies. Despite the “concerns” of the War Department in their beliefs that the air force could not be involved in any other action outside of its current plans, other missions were carried out which required similar if not more aerial involvement than would be necessary to bomb the death camps and railways. For instance, during the same time period in which the War Department rejected the initial request to bomb the railways, a fleet of Fifteenth Air Force bombers were preparing to attack oil refineries which were located right near Auschwitz. On August 20th, 127 Flying Fortresses dropped 1,335 bombs on factory-specific locations in Auschwitz which laid five miles east of the gas chambers on a day which was categorized to have maintained nearly ideal conditions for accurate visual bombings. In other words, it wouldn’t have taken much effort or resources to direct a minority of the 500-pound explosives toward the targets which have been the objects of requests to be bombed on numerous occasions.
By making the claim on August 14th that bombing Auschwitz would be possible only by diversion of airpower from “decisive operations elsewhere”, the War Department is denying the notion of Auschwitz being a central target of American bombing activity which in reality it was between the dates of August 7th to August 29th. During this time, an “oil war” took place in which US air forces bombed industrial locations such as Blechhammer because oil was a resource which tremendously aided the German war effort. At any point in time, these missions could have sent a bomb or two in the direction of the camps and fulfilled the requests made but this action was never carried forth in exception of a few occasions in which a bomb accidentally landed in the region. An example of such an incident occurred on September 13th when 96 Liberators bombed factory areas of Auschwitz with no intention of targeting the gas chambers but accidentally dropped two stray bombs and one of which damaged the rail spur which lead to the gas chambers.
In “The Allies and the Holocaust”, Weinberg points out that when the Western Allies executed an airdrop in Warsaw by diverting a considerable degree of airpower to this region, the Western forces not only demonstrated a determination to act despite the tremendous opposition they faced but also executed a mission which was comparable to that of bombing Auschwitz-Birkenau in both its demand for supposedly scarce aerial resources and “impracticable” nature. When the Operations Division of the War Department made the claims that such a mission would be impossible due to the fact that the “target [Auschwitz] is beyond the maximum range of medium bombardment, dive bombers and fighter bombers located in United Kingdom, France or Italy” (Wyman, pp.297), the department essentially lied to all parties concerned. In reality, the Mitchell medium bombers and Lightning dive-bombers were very much capable of reaching Auschwitz from Italy. Also, by discussing the ability to bomb from exclusively British bases, the Operations Division was purposely omitting the concept of attacking from Italy because such a mission could be executed without any unusual difficulties. The bases in the United Kingdom were much farther from Auschwitz and irrelevant to the matter since Italy was a strategically feasible base.
In the field of psychology, there is a phenomenon called the “bystander effect” which states that with an increase in the number of bystanders present during a crisis there is a corresponding decrease in the probability that the victim will be helped. During the deliberations over whether or not to proceed with bombing the death camps and the railways used for deportations, the bystander effect (whether it was demonstrated in the behavior of Poles who lived with the Jews during the invasion of Poland and proceeded to carry out either turn a blind eye to the violent acts thrust upon their neighbors or commit numerous murders on their own behalf or the Western allies who had the means to perform rescue attempts but decided against them) is rampant and could be found to have occurred as a result of ignorance, apathy or a monumental diffusion of responsibility. A perfect example in which the responsibility of rescue was simply passed on from one power to the next is found in British secretary of the state, Sir Archibald Sinclair’s, response to the bombing request in which he stated that despite their success in breaching the walls of a French prison camp, which required an even greater effort to be carried out, he is “proposing to have the proposition put to the Americans, with all the facts, to see if they are prepared to try it.” (Gilbert, pp. 71)
On August 2nd, US general Spaatz and deputy chief of the air staff, N.H. Bottomley, stated that they would explore the operational possibilities of executive these actions but would need photographic materials that could give them a better outlook on the location and nature of the camps. The request for photographic evidence was passed on to the Foreign Office which in turn went to the Jewish Agency for assistance. On August 18th, the Jewish Agency provided the Foreign Office with a topographical map but it never left their hands. Several weeks later the matter of bombing was no longer discussed which is partly due to the lack of photographic evidence which never made its way to its appropriate sources. Gilbert goes on to say that “it is clear that there were enough officials in both London and Washington who failed, at a practical level, to put the request with necessary vigor and sense of urgency to those who had the ability to examine it for feasibility, or to carry it out.” (Gilbert, pp. 73) The fact that officials like Professor Zuckerman, Air Marshal Tedder’s advisor on air strategy whose expertise was bombing railway lines, or Leonard Cheshire, who was the leader of the squadron that carried out many special missions beyond the regular bombing activities, were not approached about these matters demonstrates the lack of research and consultations that the War Department claimed to have made and supposedly found evidence claiming that such a mission is impracticable and strategically impossible at that time.
After examining all the evidence against the faulty claims of the War Department and the lack of concern toward the Jewish victims in Europe, one must question why no one was willing to intervene and aid those who needed military resources the most. Weinberg bring to light the circumstances of the time in his statement that, “the absence of such essentially symbolic action…gives the lie to the endless stories about the alleged power of the Jews in the world: in the hour of supreme agony, all the Jewish organizations on earth could not get one country to send one place to drop one bomb.” (Weinberg, pp.26) How is it possible for human beings to demonstrate such a disregard for other human lives? This question has been asked too many times to count and has been explained in different ways from the perspectives of social scientists, psychologists and historians alike.
In A History of the Holocaust, Yehuda Bauer explains that even though the United States was neutral overall, anti-Semitic feelings were ubiquitous. “In five polls between March 1938 and April 1940 some 60 percent of those responding thought that Jews had objectionable qualities…in 1940-1941, 17 to 20 percent of the population saw the Jews as a menace to the United States…they were believed to be more of a threat than the Germans and far more dangerous than Catholics or Blacks.” (Bauer, pp.326) Not only was anti-Semitism becoming more prevalent as the War progressed but due to the hardships of the Great Depression, many people began to host xenophobic feelings which placed them in opposition to the notion of allowing refugees to enter the country and potentially whatever jobs were left. Even though Roosevelt displayed a more sympathetic stance on the issue, there was only so much more that he could do when a majority of the country preferred to remain uninvolved and was already heavily criticizing him and his administration for allowing a greater number of visas to be issued thus allowing 200,000 Jews to seek refuge in the country.
After being presented with all the facts, it is clear that the opportunity and ability to bomb the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camps and the railways, which led the deportations to them, was very much a possibility but was severely neglected by the only powers who could prevail against the Nazis. By the time that the requests were put forth to take action, the Allies were in a victorious position, particularly in the European skies, and had the means necessary to divert airpower to these missions. However, the Operations Division which claimed to have researched and deliberated on the matter stated that it was not possible and impracticable.
The bigger question here was not whether they were capable of carrying out these missions (since it is clear that they were) but rather whether the concern of preserving Jewish lives was central enough to their plans. As Gilbert ended his article with the words of Hugo Gryn, a Hungarian deportee who survived the war, it seems appropriate to do the same in this paper. In response to the inactivity of the Allies Gryn explained the situation by saying that, “it was not that the Jews didn’t matter; they didn’t matter enough.” (Gilbert, pp.75) Similarly, it was not that nothing was ever done to provide aid but rather not enough was done to save the lives of those who needed the world’s mercy and understanding the most.
References
Bauer, Y. A History of the Holocaust, 2nd edition, New York: Franklin Watts, 2001.
Wyman, D. “The Bombing of Auschwitz” in idem, The Abandonment of the Jews:
America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945, New York: Pantheon, 1984, pp. 288-307
Weinberg, G. “The Allies and the Holocaust” in idem, The Bombing of Auschwitz—
Should the Allies Have Attempted It?, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003, pp. 15-26
Gilbert, M. “The Contemporary Case for the Feasibility of Bombing Auschwitz” in idem,
The Bombing of Auschwitz—Should the Allies Have Attempted It?, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003, pp. 65-75.
