- The Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cuban Missile crisis in 1962 was a period of tense relationship between the U.S.S.R and the U.S. The U.S had discovered with a U2 spy plane that the Soviets were deploying medium range and intermediate ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba under the permission from Fidel Castro. These missiles had a potential range hitting targets in nearly entire continental U.S were to be ready in less than one week. Upon hearing the news, President John F. Kennedy ordered a strict quarantine blocking any ship entering Western hemisphere waters and demanded Premier Nikita Khrushchev to remove the missiles. Initially, U.S.S.R denied any deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuban territory but after the U.S presented spy photographs to the U.N, Khrushchev couldn’t deny it. On October 22, Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy agreeing to remove missiles from Cuba if the U.S pledged not to invade Cuba. In a second letter issued by Khrushchev, the U.S.S.R demanded the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. By this time however, a second U2 spy plane had been shot and it was at this point the President decided to reply to the first and ignore the second. The Soviet Union, agreed to remove their missiles immediately, given the conditions that the U.S will remove their missiles six months.
- Evaluation of Sources
Two of the sources used were:
Haley Boon, Premier Khrushchev, Lenad Books, Chicago, 1988
This book is comprised of separate journals that Haley Boon found after the death of Premier Khrushchev. It contains his own personal opinions while he was Premier as well as reflections after he was ousted. In it, admits that Kennedy, ‘regardless of his youth, was a real statesman.’ Whilst this book does offer a consistent biased view towards the U.S, it contains refreshing material that is different from the usual Pro-American sources. In his journals, he also explained why he placed the missiles in Cuba as well as his own version of what happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Mather Jacobson, American Foreign Policy towards its Rivals, Jacobson & Tyler, Washington, 1994
As the title states, this book is mainly about American’s Foreign Policy towards the Soviet Union. The main theme of this book is how statesmanlike John F. Kennedy was, especially when he took the least provocative response and remaining undeterred on the removal of missiles. Since its an American book, it offers some biased views, like giving plenty of reasons why Kennedy was right. Still, it informs the reader of the exact method in which Kennedy came up with is decisions, including listening to his brother, Robert Kennedy on the quarantine.
- Analysis
By deploying missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev actions could be seen as “reckless adventurism.” ‘Reckless Adventurism’ is a foreign policy that is used to improve one’s own domestic support by taking unnecessary risks. By placing the missiles in Cuba in a clandestine manner and later denying the allegation, it seems that Khrushchev secretly wanted the missiles there. Furthermore, the fact that U.S.S.R had never placed or attempted to place any military arms outside its territory before alarmed the U.S. Another reason Khrushchev actions could be seen as ‘reckless’ was that he only pursued the Cuban ‘option’ as a need for success. Seventeen years after World War II, the East Bloc is still suffering from severe food shortages whilst the European Common Market was booming. The Berlin problem was still unsolved and the schism with the People’s Republic of China was growing more apparent and so western experts believed that what Khrushchev needed was a quick fix, thus pursuing the Cuban matter. Likewise, the deployment of missiles in Cuba went against the Monroe Doctrine which states, America would not tolerate European Interference in Central and South America. Lastly, due to the tense period during the 1960’s which include the U2 incident and Berlin Wall, it seems that the Soviet Union was preparing itself for nuclear war.
The Soviets believed that if U.S and NATO had missiles in Turkey, the placement of missiles in Cuba would ‘balance the threat’. Deploying missiles in Cuba would alter the strategic nuclear equation in Russia’s favor at no extra cost. They would receive ICBM capabilities at ICM price. Khrushchev might have perceived Kennedy as weak and inexperienced because he failed to act over the Berlin and Wall and allowed the Bay of Pigs invasion to fail. Nevertheless, the missiles in Cuba would give the Soviet Union recognition and would give more bargaining power to the U.S. Lastly; U.S.S.R saw this as an opportunity to break out of threat of encirclement which plagued Moscow and the Soviet Union. For these reasons, it seems that Khrushchev wasn’t reckless at all.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, many critics claim that Kennedy’s statesmanship won the conflict. Statesmanship is the act of diplomacy and behaving in a conciliatory manner to reach an agreement, or reduce to tensions. During the crisis, Kennedy chose the least provocative response and by immediately informing the United Nations and NATO, he was getting support. In addition, by replying to the first letter sent by Khrushchev and ignoring the second, he made sure that tensions wouldn’t rise. Moreover, the order of a strict quarantine allowed U.S.S.R a chance to retreat from the brink without too much loss of face. He is further seen as a statesman because at that time, the nuclear equation was strongly in America’s favor and so, he could have demanded absolute status quo. Moreover, Kennedy accepted defeat in regards to the Monroe doctrine because it guaranteed continuation of communist regime in Cuba, more importantly, the first in the Western Hemisphere. Lastly, Kennedy was a statesman because of his willingness and determination for peace and he ignored claims from the ‘hawks’ of his cabinet to take military action against Cuba, in addition to remain undeterred on the removal of missiles.
Critics claim however, that Kennedy’s statesmanship was not the reason the crisis was resolved. They claim that although when Kennedy issued the quarantine he was aiming for the least provocative response, he still ignored the fact that such actions were illegal under the “Freedom of Seas Treaty.” Others believe that Kennedy gave in to the Soviets when he agreed to remove the missiles from Turkey. This theory, from extreme revanchist Paul Johnson, claims that Kennedy betrayed America by taking their missiles from Turkey and guaranteeing a no-invasion policy on Cuba. Some historians believe that nearing the end of the crisis, it was Khrushchev statesmanlike behavior rather than Kennedy’s behavior that actually resolved the crisis. Although Khrushchev initiated the crisis, it was when he agreed to publicly remove the Russian missiles that proved that was he more concerned about results than losing face. Also, Khrushchev took a big risk when he agreed to remove the missiles knowing relations with Cuba and China would suffer.
- Conclusion
The Cuban Missile Crisis was arguably the closest the world had come to nuclear war. It could be viewed as a turning point in East-West relations because it was a salutary lesson for both sides, demonstrated renewed tensions of the early 60’s, demonstrated U.S resolve, led to less belligerent attitudes and led to the creation of stabilizing measures which include the Hot Line (1963), the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (1968).
Although it was a propaganda victory for Kennedy, the Soviets still successfully removed missiles from Turkey and gained influence in Cuba. Nevertheless, it was a major for Kennedy because he remained undeterred from the ‘hawks’ of his government and survived during a pressured time. Had Kennedy not tried to act statesmanlike or had Khrushchev not appear reasonable, the Cuban Missile Crisis would have never ended peacefully. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the volatility of the relationship between the two superpowers in a tense period during the Cold War but showed the willingness of both leaders to ensure peace and prosperity.
Words: 1853
- List of Sources
Endnotes
Smith Holler, Détente: Successful or Not?, Middleton Press, London, 1989, p. 22
Mather Jacobson, American Foreign Policy, Jacobson & Tyler, Washington, 1994, p. 184
Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties, Harper & Row, New York, 1983, p. 633
Mather, op cit., pp. 193-194
Bernard A. Weisberger, Cold War Cold Peace, American Heritage, New York, 1985, p. 215
Josh Brooman, The Cold War: Superpower Relations, Addison Wesley Longman United, 1997, p. 343
Haley Boon, Premier Khrushchev, Lenad Books, Chicago, 1988, p. 356
Alex Wovenn, U.S.S.R Relations, Panid Publishing, Los Angeles, 1956, p. 149
Colin Brown and Peter J. Mooney, Cold War to Détente 1945-85, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1981, p. 434
Neil De Marcho, The World This Century. Working With Evidence, Harper Collins Publishers, London, 1987, p. 417
Ulrich Jackson, The Balance of Powers, McKinds Publishers, Houston, 1995, p. 334
Alex, op cit., p. 193
Bibliography:
Works cited:
Holler, Smith. 1989. Détente: Successful or Not?. London. Middleton Press
Jacobson Mather. 1994. American Foreign Policy. Washington. Jacobson & Tyler
Johnson, Paul. 1983. Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties. New York. Harper & Row
Weisberger A., Bernard. 1985. Cold War Cold Peace. New York. American Heritage
Brooman, Josh. 1997. The Cold War: Superpower Relations. Addison Wesley Longman United
Boon, Haley. 1988. Premier Khrushchev. Chicago. Lenad Books
Wovenn, Alex. 1956. U.S.S.R Relations. Los Angeles. Panid Publishing
Colin Brown and Peter J. Mooney. 1981 Cold War to Détente 1945-85, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd
De Marcho, Neil. 1987. The World This Century. Working With Evidence. London. Harper Collins Publishers
Jackson, Ulrich. 1995. The Balance of Powers. Houston. McKinds Publishers