In the 1920s, Britain solidified its southern policy. The region would be administered as a separate area of three provinces: Equatoria, Bah al Ghazal, and Upper Nile, and southern deputies were not required to attend meetings in Khartoum (Metz 41). The core of the policy revolved around the Closed District Ordinances; created in the British’s minds to protect the South (Poggo 22). This included the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922 which restricted travel between the two regions, and the Permits to Trade Order of 1925 which restricted Arab trading in the South (Verney). Additionally in 1928, English was established as the official southern language (Verney). Next In 1930, Civil Secretary MacMichael issued a memorandum which further stated “The Negroid Africans of the south are culturally and racially distinct from the Northern Arab Sudanese” (Wai 35), and “The future of the southern Sudan [] lie[s] with the countries of British East Africa” (Johnson 11).
After World War II, foreign pressure saw a sudden reversal of southern policy. In 1946, policy changes discussed at the Sudan Administrative Conference (Daly 262) included administering Sudan as one country, revoking the ordinances, and changing the principal language to Arabic (Metz 44).The conference’s suggestions were then deliberated at the Juba Conference of 1947 (“Proc. of the Juba” 2) and subsequently enacted (Metz 44). Furthermore in a 1946 memorandum, Civil Secretary Robertson stated “[We should have the] one aim of developing trade in the south, and between the North and South” and “[the south is] inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and Arabicized Northern Sudan” (“Proc. of the Juba” 2). All these policies were enacted to plan for future Sudanese independence, and finally in 1952 a self-determination agreement was signed by Sudan and Britain (Metz 15). These policy changes were heavily supported by the north who desired a unified Sudan both before and after independence (Metz 42, 44).
The Juba Conference specifically had been called “to gauge Southern reactions to and feelings” (“Proc. of the Juba” 1). The following statements made highlighted the reactions towards the policy changes and officials biases. James Tembura stated “education had not advanced far enough in the South to allow for full representations” (“Proc. of the Juba” 6). Chief Cir Rehan stated “The South was distinct from the North,” “at the present time, Northerners could [not] understand the needs of Southerners” and “their people… had no objection to live …with the Northerners but they wanted to wait and learn” (“Proc. of the Juba” 6-7). Thomas Owen stated “[Southerners] were still suffering from the sins of Zubeir Pasha and the slavers…The south had not forgotten the days of oppression” (“Proc. of the Juba” 8). And finally, Sgt. Major Philemon and Deputy-Governor Marwood stated respectively “the southerners were like children in their relations with the grown up Northerners.” and “[the Northerners] do not seek opportunities of exploiting backward tribes in the South” (“Proc. of the Juba” 1).
Section C. Evaluation of Sources
The most important source for this investigation was the work Sudan: A Country Study written by Helen Chaplin Metz for the Library of Congress’s Country Study series. The series is prepared by the Federal Research Division and sponsored by the Department of the Army. Its purpose is to provide a detail account of all aspects of the given country, including geography, demographics, and history, while giving specific attention to the views and beliefs of the country’s people. Its value lies in that it is written by a non-Sudanese author and not published under the auspices of either Sudan or South Sudan, both fractions which would prevent a skewed account. Limitation-wise, bias and dramatization are possible as it states in the forward, “the authors strive for a dynamic rather than static portrayal” (Metz 6) and, because the work was published in 1991, the study would have occurred amidst the controversial Second Sudanese Civil War. There is also the possibility that because it was for a United States of America organization, it would be slanted towards the Christian South.
Another useful work was the proceedings of the Juba Conference from 1974. It is a government document from Great Britain’s administration of Sudan. Its purpose is to inform the administration of the proceedings and views expressed by southern officials and chieftains regarding the administration’s change of policy. Its value is that it shows primary source reactions to the topics under discussion, demonstrates the opinions of often over looked tribal leaders, and shows the British government’s views towards the inhabitants of the two regions. Further value comes from the fact that it was a highly confidential document and thus it is less likely that the participants hid their opinions. The limitations of the source are that we do not know how faithfully the proceedings were recorded, if any particularly dissenting voices were excluded from the conference, and whether the representatives sent to the conference accurately spoke for the people.
Section D. Analysis
The British were biased against the South. At the Juba Conference, references to the southern populace as “backward” and “children” compared to the “grown up” north unarguably demonstrates discrimination. While these technically were the personal views of “Proc. of the Juba” and Philemon, as prominent officials they represented the government. Furthermore the maintenance of indirect rule in the south while trusting the northerners enough to change this policy in their region, demonstrates further favoritism towards the north. This mindset of the British would have created rifts in the population. The north constantly reaffirmed that they were superior, would have felt secure in their desire to control the south after independence. In the south where the British’s viewpoint likely was met with disagreement, the people would have found greater reason for fault with the British and Northerners. Even amongst the southerners who recognized they had less education; they felt unable to work with the north due to their bias-reinforced lack of knowledge, demonstrated through the statement of James Tembura. The establishment of the capital at Khartoum might be considered a further example of northern favoritism, and the north indeed would have profited from proximity to the seat of government; however, as Metz discusses, Khartoum was the capital under a variety of governments. This instance then presents an example of practicality and pre-Anglo influence not discrimination.
The administration was not vindictive towards the South; rather because they viewed the region as weaker they felt it needed to be protected. This led to the isolation of the region caused by the ordinances and the decision to administer the South separately, which had the unfortunate occurrence of developing the two fractions of the civil war. By separating the North and South, the Southerners had no way of learning about the north or of gaining experience cooperating with them and vice versa. Additionally, the British made it feasibly implausible for the two sides to communicate by supporting the English not Arabic language in the south. Most importantly, is the effect on religion. As Sudan: A Country Study describes, Sudan was beginning to incorporate Islam under the pre-Anglo governments; however because the British closed off the south from northern influence, Islam was not able to spread southerly. This prevented the country from having a unifying religion, and gave the South another characteristic different from the North.
The complete reversal of southern policy in the late 1940s might suggest that the government became aware of the repercussions of their laws. It seems more likely however that it was a last effort to make both regions self-sufficient before British withdrawal. Whatever the case, the change in policy was too late to mend the rifts between the North and South. Sudan had lived for almost 30 years with the previous southern policy and the six years between the implementation of the new policy and the self-determination agreement would not have been enough to dispel it. As expressed at Juba by Chief Rehan, southern Sudanese were not against the idea of living with the North; they just need more time to adjust. Furthermore, if the British had continued with the plan of merging the South with East Africa, as mentioned in the 1930 memorandum, the north would not have had as much impetus to demand unification with the South after independence. Instead after creating sharp divisions between the regions, the British then tried to hastily force the two together; an action more violate than the conception of the divisions themselves. The language policy is a prime example. The few Southern representatives knew English as lawfully required. By suddenly instituting Arabic as the language of government and not giving time for Arabic to be taught, these people were unable to participation and the south was left virtually unrepresented.
Conversely to the above arguments, divisions between the North and South do predate the British. As the statement by Thomas Owen shows, even in 1947 the south still remembered the practice of slave raiding conducted by the North and its “oppression.” It is also arguable that the British did not instigate the new southern policy rather international and northern Sudanese pressure, and noting the time period, the effects of World War II; however while these might have influenced British decision, the final actions and implementations were of Anglo-origin.
Section E. Conclusion
Civil wars are caused by two internal fractions fighting over ethnic, political, religious, and even ideological issues. The British, regarding the first Sudanese civil war, are responsible for augmenting these two fractions and, moreover, for placing them in a position where they would conflict by later supporting the North and South unification. This is demonstrable by looking at the British's bias towards the south, their original separation of the South, and the sudden 1940’s policy change. In conclusion then, while the British did not directly spark the fighting, they exacerbated is not created the root causes.
Section F. Bibliography
Daly, M.W. Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1934-1956. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.1991. Online Book.
Jalata, Asafa. State Crises, Globalization, and Notional Movements in North-East Africa. New York; Routledge. 2004. Online Book.
Johnson, Douglas Hamilton. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Indiana University Press. 2003. Online Book.
Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. Sudan: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, June 1991. PDF file.
Poggo, Scopas Sekwat. The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan. New York; Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. Online Book.
Proc. of the Juba Conference of 1947 on the Political Development of the Southern Sudan, 21st June 1947, Juba, Sudan. PDF file. <http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecenter/ Documents/Articles/juba_conference_1947.pdf>.
Verney, Peter, ed. “History of Sudan: Chronology.” Sudanupdate.org. November, 2011. Web. < http://www.sudanupdate.org/HISTORY/chron.htm>.
Wai, Dunstan M. The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan. Africana Publishing Company. 1981. Online Book.