What determined the policy of Britain towards the Spanish Civil War?

If, then, we agree that British non-interventionist policy was favourable to the rebels, the question remains as to the reasons for Britain adopting and sticking to this policy.  The official reasoning was the desire to contain the conflict within Spain and, once the internationalisation of the war became apparent with the involvement of Italy and Germany, the desire to avoid a general European war and conflict with the Fascist powers.  It can even be argued that Britain’s acquiescence actually encouraged Italy and Germany to continue their aid.  Tom Buchanan argues that British impartiality was therefore a ‘humiliating trap’ that led to the fall of the Spanish Republic.

Is it possible, however, that rather than a ‘humiliating trap’, Britain’s policy of non-intervention was a success, in that it was in fact a deliberate effort to undermine the Spanish Republic’s chances of success?  Buchanan notes that of the 2,500 British volunteers that went to fight in the Civil War, the vast majority came from the working class and saw the war as a class war. There is evidence that the British Government had the same idea, but with a very different outcome.  There is indeed a consensus among many historians that a major factor that determined British policy towards the conflict was the anti-Bolshevik prejudice which characterised much of the British ruling class.   They felt much more sympathy with Franco’s Nationalists than with the left-wing, revolutionary Republic, a feeling that could only have been consolidated when the communist Soviet Union began sending aid.  Indeed, on 26 July 1936, the Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin gave Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden the order: “on no account … must you bring us into the fight on the side of the Russians!”, while a memo from the cabinet secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, read: “With France and Spain menaced by Bolshevism, it is not inconceivable that soon we will have to throw in our lot with Italy and Germany.”  This shows how seriously Britain took the threat of the possibility of a revolution in Spain; particularly in light of the inclusion of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in the Popular Front government; the Popular Front strategy adopted by the Comintern was interpreted as ‘Trojan horse tactics’ to bring about international revolution.   Much has been made of the argument that Britain saw dangerous parallels between Republican Spain and the Kerensky administration in Russia which in 1917 was removed by the Bolsheviks.  Britain feared that, like the Kerensky government, the Spanish Republic was merely a prelude to revolution and the spread of communism further into Europe.

In connection with this argument is the idea that a factor which determined Britain’s non-interventionist policy and desire to indirectly facilitate the success of the Nationalist rebels was the protection of Britain’s significant economic interests in Spain.   Britain had been the biggest recipient of Spanish exports (accounting for 25 per cent thereof) and, of Britain’s investments in Europe, 13.3 per cent had been in Spain.  Therefore, British rulers feared that, were the Republic to be overcome by left-wing revolutionary forces, their economic investments would be endangered.  Much more favourable was the right-wing rebellion of Franco’s Nationalists.

However, out of “nominal political respect for the legal standing of the Spanish government”, Britain could not legitimise the rebellion by intervening directly in the conflict on its side, which, along with the popularity of the Spanish Republic with the majority of the people of Britain, explains the image of neutrality put forward by the British government.   This policy, however, reduced the legally recognised government and the rebels to the same level; it was in fact a biased policy intended to avoid any help to the Republic and any hindrance to the rebels.  The anti-Republican bias of the British government can be seen in the different interpretations in the diplomatic and intelligence reports dealing with the atrocities committed by both sides; those in the Republican zone were presented as the consequence of mob rule, while those in Nationalist areas were portrayed as the restoration of law and order.

In conclusion, in order to appease the home audience the British government put on a show of impartiality towards the Spanish Civil War, ostensibly to prevent the spread of warfare to the rest of Europe and to prevent assistance from prolonging the war.  However, the real reason for this non-interventionist policy was their distrust of the left-wing Republic, which they considered unable to resist the revolutionary threat and could lead to the establishment of communism in Spain. The government was safe in the knowledge that, in refusing to help the recognised government of Spain, they would in fact aid the cause of the insurgents, which would lead to the possibility of a ‘liberal dictatorship’ led by a “good, prudent and conservative officer”, and which would be much more favourable to Britain’s economic and strategic interests.   Britain’s policy was ‘malevolent neutrality’.

Bibliography

• Buchanan, T., Britain and the Spanish Civil War, (Oxford, 1997)        
• Little, D., “Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War”, Journal of Contemporary History, 23 (1988)
• Moradiellos, E., "The Origins of British non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War: Anglo-Spanish Relations in early 1936", European Historical Quarterly, 21 (1991)
• Romero Salvadó, F. J., The Spanish Civil War, (Palgrave, 2005)