The military expertise of the Franks was evident throughout the First Crusade. The Muslim world was accustomed to light cavalry which employed the use of ballistics, whereas the Franks relied on armoured, heavy cavalry which would slam the ranks of enemies through charges. This difference was epitomised through the Battle of Dorylaeum in 1097, when Kilij Arslan saw the effectiveness of heavy cavalry on his own men. The fact that the Frankish armies were split into two armies, one to act as a vanguard, also proved hugely successful in securing victory, indicating that the Franks were militarily adept to their Muslim counterparts. This is also displayed with the Frankish victories which attained Antioch, despite being pitted against three consecutive Muslim armies and Nicaea. In addition, the Frankish forces numbered 60,000 at the beginning of the First Crusade and although they numbered 15,000 at the end of it, they outnumbered many of their opponents, giving them a clear advantage over the Muslims to secure victory. This is what can be deduced in the Siege Nicaea, where Kilij Arslan and his relieving force were beaten back by the larger crusader army. Indeed, in this instance their numbers were bolstered by the presence of Byzantine troops, who had also taken control of the lake, which was vital for the survival of the besieged city. The fact that they were aided by the Byzantines suggests that part of their success in the crusade was due to the aid of their Greek counterparts. When they crossed over to Muslim lands Emperor Alexius II even provided them with the Byzantine generals, Manuel Boutoumites and Tatikios, whose knowledge of the lands were important in the eventual capture of the city in 1097. Therefore, one can see how the Frankish battlefield tactics and the fact they had consistently outnumbered their enemies had helped them to overcome Muslim armies and to accomplish the success of the First Crusade.
Religious fervour was also important in Frankish military successes. One can see that with the siege of Antioch the winter saw starvation on a massive scale, yet despite this, the Franks had captured and held the city. This resilience, which religious fervour had created, was emphasised with the discovery of Holy Lance, through the holy visions of Peter Bartholomew. Regardless of whether or not the lance and visions were real, It gave the Franks the religious fervour to sally forth and fight Kerbogha, resulting in a Frankish triumph. Moreover, with the death of the Papal legate, Adhemar of Le Puy in 1098, the binding force, between the crusading leaders, whose concerns involved the acquisition of land, had been broken resulting in faction between Bohemond and Raymond of Toulouse as to who was to rule over Antioch. This disunity only ended when the troops of the army issued an ultimatum that the dispute must be solved or they leave for Jerusalem regardless of their leaders’ wishes, indicating that the wellbeing of lords was not a priority above religion. However, once Jerusalem had been taken and the Kingdom established in 1099, there was a decline in the religious fervour which had originally driven the Franks on. Those who remained now owed their allegiance to the King of Jerusalem and with Jerusalem captured, many believed that their religious aims had been met. Therefore, religious fervour was manipulated by the Franks to succeed in achieving great martial and political feats against adversity to succeed in the First Crusade and that with the breakdown of religious fervour and the rise in Muslim unity, such feats were never repeated.
Overall, Muslim disunity was not the only factor in the success of the First Crusade, but it was, however, the primary factor as much of the successes of the Franks were due to a fragmented Muslim world. One can see that under the leadership of Nur ed-Din and Zengi a united Muslim world could experience successes against the Franks and place considerable strain on Outremer. In addition to this Muslim disunity, the Franks could manipulate religious fervour, military expertise and a united cause to take advantage of the Muslim disunity and secure the creation of the Frankish states. Therefore Muslim disunity was vital for the Franks so that they could manipulate other factors of success.
The increase of Muslim unity placed considerable pressure on Frankish survival after the First Crusade. Before Nur ed-Din’s death in 1174, his successful revitalisation of the idea of Jihad had earned him much support among the Muslim world, which perpetuated itself into Saladin’s reign. Saladin had an army of 12,000 cavalry in 1187. His ability to maintain an army of that size, until his death in 1192, indicates the extent of the unification of the Muslim world and the successes it accomplished. After winning the Battle of Hattin in 1187, Saladin had killed nearly all the fighting men of the Frankish states and he had been able to capture 52 towns and castles, in Syria, soon after. The fact that he was able to make such advances shows that he had no rivals to contend with in the Muslim world indicating the unity he had achieved. In addition, the Franks had stimulated much of the Muslim unification that had taken place. One can see that with the war between the Franks and Egypt, the failure of Amalric’s campaign against a united Muslim force had led to the conquest of Egypt by Shirkuh, a general of Nur ed-Din and who was to be succeeded by Saladin, his nephew, moreover, uniting the Muslim world. The Frankish states were now surrounded and isolated. Therefore, Muslim disunity was essential for the success of the First Crusade, but now, under a united front the established Frankish states would struggle in the face of a united Muslim world.
Although it can be argued that many of the Muslim victories were due to unification of the Muslim world it was the adaptation of the Muslim tactics to deal with the Frankish cavalry charges which allowed them to achieve effective victories over the Franks. This becomes evident with how Raymond of Tripoli and a handful of knights escaped from the Battle of Hattin when the Muslim line opened up to avoid their cavalry charge. Moreover, in the period after the First Crusade, there was no indication of the religious fervour encountered in the First Crusade. In fact, there was more of an indication that the Muslim world was experiencing religious fervour with the revival of Jihad and the support it had gained. One can see this in the Second Crusade with the inability of the crusading kings, Conrad III and Louis VII, to succeed in capturing Damascus. Their departure, in 1148 and 1149, indicated that the allure of the crusades was lost. Therefore, due to the lack of religious fervour among the Frankish states, they were unable to achieve the support from the West which Outremer had originally received. Coupled with the ineffectiveness of the Franks’ battlefield tactics, survival of the Franks was placed under tremendous pressure, indicating that these factors were needed in the survival of the Frankish states.
Overall, one can see how it was Muslim disunity which the Franks exploited in order to gain success in the First Crusade. With Muslim politics in disarray, The Franks were able to take advantage of secondary factors in the form of religious fervour, a united front of initially 60,000 and unorthodox and successful battle tactics to overcome hunger, disease and Muslim warlords of the area. However, when faced with a united Muslim world characterised by the reigns of Nur ed-Din and Saladin, one can see that the Franks suffered greatly. Indeed, there is a breakdown of the secondary causes of the success of the First Crusade demonstrated with the loss of religious fervour and unity and the adaption of the Muslim world to the Frankish battle tactics. This theory is emphasised when the fragmentation of the Muslim world caused by Saladin’s death in 1193, allowed the German Crusade to successfully take Beirut and Sidon in 1197. Hence, Frankish success was epitomised through Muslim disunity in the First Crusade, but not only that, it became a theme throughout the crusading period in Outremer.
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King, P.D. Original Sources: Crusading and the Crusader States (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 59
Mayer, H. E. The Crusades (Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 125
Tyerman, C. God’s War (Harvard University Press, 2006) p. 369