Further to the United States policy of negotiation, geared around the perceived lack of threat from the Soviet Union due to their weakness following world war, was the policy built around the American perception of power, attributed to a number of key factors, namely the American ‘nuclear monopoly’ and the US industrial dominance over any possible aggressor. Both factors were seen as vitally important to maintaining US foreign interests and staving off any possible war from their likely aggressor. Firstly, the fact that the United States had possession of the sole nuclear bomb, and were the only nation capable of producing such a weapon at that stage, gave a large degree of power which to exert its influence over potential aggressors. However, whilst ownership of the nuclear monopoly was important in terms of deterring any possible war with the Soviet Union, it was thought that this fact alone was not enough to win such a war (Jervis 1980, pp. 566). United States reserves of nuclear weaponry grew at a very slow rate, which in itself would limit its effectiveness of directly winning a war on its own. Further, the stigma attached to detonating a bomb on even the most unruly aggressor would be seen as highly unpopular amongst the American public and such a fact could very well prohibit the likelihood of the President to authorise its use (Jervis 1980, pp. 567).
Perhaps more importantly than the nuclear bomb as a deterrent to war, was the industrial strength that the United States had created during the Second World War. Given the United States’ relatively small military capacity at the time following war, the huge industrial structures that allowed the United States to “out produce the world” (Millis 1951, pp. 350) put the Americans into a very strong position should a drawn out war ever eventuate. Whilst a ‘short war’ may inflict casualties in the short run, in the long run any drawn out war would be futile as the United States could draw on their industrial mechanisms to continue the war effort as long as it would take to win. Therefore, there was an assumption by United States policymakers that a dramatic increase was not required, nor was it ideal, in order to stave off war with the Soviet Union in the near future.
However, the threat of Soviet expansion was in fact quite real, as had become apparently so after the Yalta and Moscow meetings, where Soviet interests in Rumania and Bulgaria had become of concern to the United States. Whilst the United States had little interest in either of these states, it had become very clear that the Soviet Union were acting to secure surrounding states in the interest of forming and expanding a sphere of influence in the region. This was of great concern to the Americans for the issues that these influence spheres presented for world stability. The Soviets, maintained that their interest in areas in Eastern Europe derived solely from the interests of insecurity, in which they proclaimed that it was vital for Soviet Union security interests to protect themselves from further conflict with surrounding nations, as had been the case for them in both World War I and II. In reality, the Soviet Union took the American ‘lack of action’ as a sign of weakness, which only further strengthened their resolve to continue their expansion (Harriman, in Gaddis 1987, pp. 30). In response to further Soviet actions, the Americans embarked on a defensive strategic policy of “containment”, of which the Americans would employ until throughout the majority of the Cold War, and continue to adopt in further conflicts such as Iraq and China.
Containment policy, first introduced by George F. Keenan in an anonymously signed letter in Foreign Affairs, was the major foreign policy strategy towards the Soviet Union throughout the majority of the Cold War. The policy, in short, was aimed at countering and containing Soviet influences by the;
“Adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy.” (Keenan 1947, pp. 576)
The policy of containment, which essentially wanted to limit the Soviet influence to a set of regions of little political interest to the United States, was built around the notion that in order to defeat the Soviet threat, or at least minimize the threat, it would be necessary to contain the Russians to their own sphere of influence. By containing the Soviets to this sphere, through strategic warnings such as the placement of warships in key foreign areas, the United States could limit the growth and subsequent power of the Soviet Union, which would then [it was thought] force the Soviet Union into drawing back and ending their push forward.
Containment found few objections throughout the years preceding the Korean War. The main focus of the idea was to set up a ‘defensive perimeter’ in the Pacific Rim, including the areas of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Aleutians, Midway, and the Philippines, which would act as an area of containment, eliminating the threat of further soviet expansion into the area. The perimeter also allowed the United States, through military bases in places such as Okinawa, to launch an attack on the Soviets should any further ‘push forward’ be attempted. Of course, the defensive perimeter strategy was built around the perception, as already mentioned, that through decimation, the Russians were not willing to take on the United States in the area, at risk of starting another war. Further, there was the maintained misconception that the Soviet Union was merely expanding to the point to which they could maintain a level of regional security. However, as the Russians continued their push for the spread of power into the Asian sphere, it would become apparent that a change in strategy would be needed in order to combat the strengthening Soviet threat.
The outbreak of the Korean War forced a direct change in United States foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and the threat they posed to the balance of power. Before the outbreak of war in Korea, the Soviet’s were seen as a high threat, but they had proved to lack the strength to conflict to realise their aims (Jervis 1980, pp. 579). The Russians had obvious expansionist motives, but were mindful to do it at a pace that would not spark conflict with their foes. Korea changed this mood, from tentative and cautious to direct and aggressive. As the United States saw it, the Russians were resigned to taking steps, which unlike any other action preceding Korea, risked war with the United States and her allies (Acheson, in Jervis 1980, pp. 579). As a result of the Soviet actions in Korea, the United States was forced to review its defensive policies towards the Soviet Union and the threat of war. The resultant changes in United States Cold War strategy and perception came threefold. Firstly, changes to strategy first and foremost came in the form of increased defence spending and budget, which as mentioned previously was severely undervalued relative to the perceived threat of the Russians. Secondly, the United States was forced to re-evaluate their perceptions of the Sino-Soviet bloc and its implications for world stability. And finally, the Korean War helped the United States realise that limited wars were possible, and were indeed important in helping maintain general security against Soviet [and other] threats.
US defensive spending, as previously discussed, had been grossly inadequate relative to the high perception of threat that emanated from the Soviet Union. The outbreak of war in Korea allowed the US to make a major increase in defence budgets, as public support in the face of the Communist threat allowed for it. The tensions in Korea, where United States had already maintained troops previous to the outbreak of the Korean War, only increased the public’s perception that there was a great threat of Communist expansion, and in order to stop it, it was vital to increase spending in order to support the troops in their fight (Jervis, pp. 580). In 1948, United States Defence Budget was levelled at $98.5 billion. By 1951, this amount had increased 176% to $439.9 billion (http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2000/0300coldwar.asp). Further, the outbreak of war changed the perception of policymakers in regards to the militarization of NATO, which had previously been only a “symbolic agreement” (Jervis, pp. 580) but was now seen as vital in defending western ideals and maintaining world stability by fighting the Soviet Union. The NATO forces, therefore, allowed for a greater presence in Korea in order to effectively fight off the Soviet Union and attempt to push her back. Changing perceptions had played an integral role in the adjustment of United States strategy towards the Soviet Union.
The emergence of China as a destabilising threat in the region also forced a change in the foreign strategy of the United States towards the Cold War. Chinese entry into the Korean War was built mainly on the back of a perception that the United States, who had positioned a naval fleet between the island of Taiwan [known as Formosa at that time] and the Chinese mainland, had become a threat to the Chinese nation. The placing of this fleet, which was purely for strategic reasons, forced a reaction from the Chinese that was unexpected. The United States, through perhaps sheer arrogance or extreme ignorance, ‘assumed’ that such a move could only be seen as non-threatening. However, the Chinese understandably saw this move as a direct threat to their power and acted in self-defence when entering the Korean War. The ‘self-defence’ argument of the Chinese did not hold power with the United States, who further assumed that as their act of situating a fleet of the mainland of China was in strategic interests not to do with China, that the commencement of war by the Chinese in response was in fact due to their deep-seated hostility towards American values and as a result of their common ideologies and interests with the Soviet Union. This misconception of opposition strategy by both parties further swayed US public opinion in favour of increased defence budgets and the war effort in general as the intensity of conflict was set to deepen.
The Korean War also helped the United States public understand that limited wars, which had previously been deemed absolutely unnecessary, were in fact quite necessary in defending domestic and foreign interests and values. The fight against Communism had now extended its barriers past those that had been contained in the Soviet sphere of influence, and it was no plausible to understand that unless the United States stood up to the challenge of defending smaller nations from the Soviet threat, that defeat would be a distinct possibility. Korea presented the United States with the opportunity to prevent the Soviet machine from rolling any further, and once won, would further give the US the opportunity to roll back and enemy and attempt to restore the balance of power. As Jervis (1980, pp. 581) argues, the United States had in fact ‘invited’ the attack on Korea by distinctly vowing not to defend her should the Soviet Union attack. This statement, whilst made in the thought that an attack on Korea would only be made as part of a concerted, large-scale push from the Russians, effectively opened the door to the Soviet Union to attack. The result of this statement would be a harsh lesson in any future proclamation of defence strategy by the United States administration.
The greatest change the Korean War had on the formulation of United States Cold War strategy was through the perceptions of the Soviet Threat and the extent to which the Russians wished to impose their values on the rest of the world. As I have previously discussed, pre-Korean War strategy was built around a level of containment, under the perception that the Soviet Union would only act to the extent to which they gained regional security. However, the continued push into gaining satellite states in Europe and Asia quickly extinguished this perception. It had now become apparent that the Soviet Union would not back away until it had completed world dominion, and as such, the American hardline policymakers now had the political ‘ammo’ to support their policy of confrontation. The United States had also perceived the Soviet Union, whilst determined, to be weak and not willing to confront the US to the point that it would lead to a war. However, as Korea had proved, this was entirely not the case. Rather, the Soviet Union would only hold back until sufficient rearmament had strengthened their military might.
The misconception of Soviet desire, most importantly, forced a heightened urgency in restoring the balance of power that was being continually threatened by Soviet interest in third world countries such as Korea. Korea, therefore, gave the United States an opportunity to use the “balance of power” argument in justifying their future involvement in limited wars (Yoon 1997, pp. 582). Once again, Korea had swayed public perception of the Soviet threat, and policymakers now justified their intervention methods via this rhetoric. Wars such as Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet-Afghan war, of which the United States had either a direct, or an important indirect role, could possibly not had seen American involvement without the Soviet Union’s interest in Korea. (Dobbs 1981). Of course, there was indeed a large sway of anti-interventionist public opinion towards the latter stages of the Korean War and for much of the Vietnam War, however this ant sentiment had only surfaced after the fact, and public opinion was in fact much more understanding when confronted with the possibility of the worldwide spread of communism should the United States not step in.
Cold War strategy, in the years preceding the Korean conflict, had been built around a number of different perceptions that United States policymakers and administration had made when evaluating the level of Soviet Threat. The US had failed to realise the full extent of Soviet interests in extending their sphere of influence far and beyond that which had been ‘granted’ to them after the Yalta meetings by the United States. The Americans had also misconceived the willingness and determination of the Soviet Union to gain their world dominion, and the likelihood of going to war. Further, the United States administration was bound by public opinion, where the public did not see a need to get involved in offshore confrontations, especially given the proximity to the culmination of World War II. As such, the Americans took a wary stance of containment and negotiation to deal with the Soviet threat. However, as the Soviet Union interests became increasingly apparent with their support of North Korea, there was a forced change in strategy. Public opinion had turned, and the perception of the Soviet Union had changed. It was now feasible to be involved in limited warfare as part of an overall Cold War strategy. It was also now seen as vital that the Soviet Union be met head on through intervention rather than negotiation. It is this strategy that the United States would now adopt for the majority of the Cold War.
List of References
Dobbs, C M 1981, The Unwanted Symbol: American foreign policy , the Cold War, and Korea 1945-1950, Kent State University Press, Ohio.
Gaddis, J L 1987, The Long Peace, Oxford University Press, New York.
Gaddis, J L 1972, The U.S. and the Origins of the Cold War, Columbia University Press, New York.
Jervis R, ‘The impact of the Korean War on the Cold War’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 24, No. 4, 1980, pp. 563-592.
Kennan, G F 1987, 'Reflections on Containment', in T L Deibel & J L Gaddis (eds), Containing the Soviet Union: A critique of US policy, Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defence Publishers, Virginia, pp. 15-20.
Millis, J L 1951, The Forrestal Diaries, Viking Press, New York.
NSC-68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, Federation of American Scientists, accessed 7 May 2008, < http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-1.htm>.
The Blueprint for Cold War Defence, Air Force Magazine Online, accessed 7 May 2008, < http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2000/0300coldwar.asp >.
“X” [G F Keenan], ‘The sources of Soviet conduct. Foreign Affairs vol. 25, 1947, pp. 566-582.
Yoon M Y, ‘Explaining U.S. intervention in third world internal wars’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, No. 4, 1997, pp. 580-602.