After the Second World War, the global dimension of politics had changed drastically. The British Empire was no longer seen as the power house it had once been. Its finances were in turmoil and Hitler’s defeat had cast colonial ideologies into an unfavourable light. Such an opinion is reflected with the establishment of the United Nations Organisation and its strong stance against empire. It would seem natural, that in order to maintain some influence and power, Britain would decolonise. This global requirement for decolonisation is all the more apparent with the rise of the United States of America and the Soviet Union as superpowers and their respective stances against colonialism. The implications this held for Britain are apparent in the USA’s case. Following the war, the Lend-Lease program had put Britain heavily in debt with the US creating a ‘financial Dunkirk’. Britain required a further grant of $5 billion from the US to stimulate peace-time industry. This had made Britain firmly economically dependent on the US and would have to cooperate in their anti-colonialist policies accordingly. No more is this power apparent in the Suez Crisis, when the US threatened to refuse a bail-out of the pound, should Britain refuse to withdraw from the Suez. The fact that the UN was also involved in the condemnation of the crisis indicates the wider global perspective and its bias against colonialism. Therefore, one can see how economic dependency on the US and its strong stance against imperialism did push the case for decolonisation. This influence of the superpower was, in turn, bolstered with the changing of global opinion, so much so, that decolonisation was merely a product of maintaining Britain’s standing in a new world order.
In addition to its compliance to the US superpower’s stance on decolonisation, the threat of the Soviet Union was of prime concern to Britain’s strategic policies. This could explain the new found importance of Europe to British international relations, as expressed with the Dunkirk Treaty with France in 1947, the Brussels Pact in 1948 and the British induction into NATO in 1949, all of which were to strengthen political ties to the continent, of which much was occupied by Russia. Digressing, one must also note that Europe had grown in economic potential as Britain’s trading partners become centred on it, the implication being that further importance was placed on Europe, as opposed to that of empire. The greater importance of Europe centring on a contingency plan against Russia is seen with the fact that the US had pulled out of Europe following the war. Britain was to bear much of the burden of European defence against the possibility of war with Russia, with its only ally being an impoverished France. The occupation of Germany alone cost Britain £100 million following the war, being manned by some of the 1.4 million armed servicemen. Such an expenditure on funds and manpower can be attributed to the abandonment of Greece and Turkey in 1947. It is undeniable that such a military commitment would be incompatible with that of colonial defence and one can see that the decolonisation of India, although not being decolonised for strategic reasons, did reduce the pressure of those commitments. Evidence suggests that pressure on manpower and finances in the face of the Soviet Union was not directly linked to the beginning of decolonisation, but does, however, suggest that defence against Russia was of primary concern and that empire was subsidiary to this.
The rise of Communist Russia as a world power induced communist movements throughout the world, which were, in turn, provided with resources from the superpower. One can see how the British combated communist revolution in 1950, with the Korean War, but more importantly, one can see how its decolonisation was swayed by growing communist influence and how Britain tried to prevent it. When regarding the communist insurgency in Malaya Britain’s decolonisation of the area was utilised in a way which would win favour with the local elites and isolate support for such insurgents. Its ANZAM arrangements, from 1949, Colombo Plan, from 1950, and Manila Pact, following 1950, fostered good relations and helped the transition to independence, as it provided security and economic stability and in so doing, prevented a large scale communist insurgency. The impression given is that, with the rise of the Soviet Union and Britain’s lack on manpower and funds, there was an incentive to decolonise, because to not do so would push communist sympathies amongst the territories in question. In turn this could bring about a revolution which would alienate economic and political interests which could be obtained through the decolonisation process. Therefore, the threat of the communist superpower can be seen as an added factor in starting decolonisation.
However, when looking at the effects of global politics and the two major superpowers, one can see inconsistencies with how they influenced decolonisation. In regards to the US, the actual process of decolonisation began before it assumed an active role in quelling empire. This indicates that despite the US’s anticolonial policy, it did not actively initiate decolonisation. Likewise, in regards to Russia, one can see how Britain was active in maintaining its occupation of the Middle East as a strategic foothold against Russia, calling into question its decolonisation as a strategic effort against Russia. Indeed, it was argued that if Britain was to ‘lose the air bases [in the Middle East] vital for the action which alone can decrease the weight of attack on the United Kingdom’ it would not be able to bomb Russia from anywhere but home. This would explain the investment of resources in Suez Canal zone, its ten airfields and forty camps. Therefore, one can see that the global perspective towards beginning of decolonisation was not clearly defined with Britain appeasing the anti-colonialist tendencies of the US and its peaceful decolonisation of countries to deny them to communism. Therefore, one can see that although the rise of the two superpowers had affected the beginning of decolonisation, Britain was employing different strategies concerning them, but with the international anti-colonial sentiment ever present in the background, suggesting that although the global perspective did contribute to the beginning of decolonisation, it was to an atmosphere conducive to decolonisation, as opposed to a direct trigger to it.
When regarding the colonial dimension of the beginning of decolonisation, one can see that growing colonial nationalism, following the war, was one the key reasons for pushing Britain to decolonise. However, it must be noted that nationalism cannot be portrayed as a mass, united and sustained pushing against colonialism. Colonies were made up of many different ethnic groups and, therefore, a nationalist movement could not be sustained for a prolonged period of time and could not pose a serious threat in overthrowing the colonial government. This is displayed with the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya from 1952 to 1960. The Mau Mau made up only a fifth of the Kikuyu tribe and the success of Operation Anvil in 1954, it could not pose as a threat of a forced decolonisation. What is more, at no point during decolonisation, was there an uprising which forced the British to leave their colonies. What can be seen with the significance of nationalism in beginning of decolonisation was the fact that, like both the global and metropolitan aspects, it heavily influenced the onset of decolonisation. When harking back to the Mau Mau uprising, one can see that although it failed in overthrowing the colonial government, the brutality of Operation Anvil sent shockwaves which appalled the Metropolitan and it subsequently led to the independence of Kenya in 1961. Evidence suggests that although the British Empire was capable of putting down rebellions, it could not condone the violence which accompanied civil unrest. Indeed, when analysing events surrounding the decolonisation of the Gold Coast, the riots of the colony in 1948, which had led to the deaths of twenty nine people and injured 200, had led to political expectations of colonial reform throughout the colony. A commission stated that ‘in the conditions existing today in the Gold Coast a substantial measure of reform is necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of the indigenous population’. One can see that the security forces of the colonies were able to handle unrest, albeit in a controversial manner, but as one can see, with the independence of the Gold Coast, marked by the creation of Ghana in 1957, it appears that during the period of decolonisation, there was an effort on Britain’s part to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Therefore, one could argue that the colonial perspective pushed for the beginning of decolonisation, not through a nationalistic uprising, but through the threat of bloodshed it would bring. The Empire was able to stamp out unrest, but it appears that decolonisation was done so on a more willing basis, which brings into question how exactly nationalism pushed decolonisation. After all, the entire basis of empire had been built by conquering and occupying lands, by force if necessary, suggesting that nationalism was not a clear defining factor, but like the global and metropolitan perspectives a factor which contributed to an atmosphere conducive to decolonisation.
Overall, one can see that the significance of the metropolitan, global and colonial perspectives in starting the process of decolonisation. However, it is more so evident that each one could not be effective in bringing about decolonisation when isolated as a separate factor. The inconsistencies of each perspective suggest this, due to the fact that each one could be debated in its actual effectiveness in beginning decolonisation. It was the connection between the three perspectives which had led to an atmosphere conducive to decolonisation. For instance, nationalistic overtones in the colonies were supported both by the metropolitan’s growing indifference toward empire and the violence it entailed and the growing global demand for the end of empire. Likewise, the indifference of the metropolitan was swayed by the demand for decolonisation from both the colonies and world. Global opinion could have been ignored by Britain had there been little nationalist sentiment and a more concerted metropolitan effort toward empire. All these interacting perspectives stems from the fact that Britain was no longer the powerful empire it had once been. Its metropolitan was unenthused by the continuation of empire, the world was now anti-colonialist, as was the superpowers which dominated it, and the colonies were now demanding more independence. Britain’s decolonisation began, because the world had changed and Britain would have to follow suit. Resistance, as seen with the Suez Crisis merely, punched home this reality, as the colonial, metropolitan and global perspectives simply pushed Britain through the process of decolonisation and it reacted accordingly and practically from the start.
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