Why did the France of Napoleon III become isolated in Europe by 1870 ?
Why did the France of Napoleon III become isolated in Europe by 1870 ?
It was Napoleon III's intention - as it had been that of his predecessors - to secure revision of the 1815 settlement to France's advantage. Yet his claim in 1852 that ''L'Empire, c'est la paix'' was an attempt to reassure a nervous Europe that there would be no resurgence of France's feared military capacity. Rather, he sought to dismantle the 1815 settlement by peaceful means not by conflict. A prerequisite for achieving this was rapprochement with Britain whose influence, he believed, was indispensable if congresses of the Powers were to be established for solving disputes and reconciling differences. By the 1860's such sentiments were incompatible with Bismarck's resolve to settle the problems of the day by ''iron and blood''. Soon, Napoleon's hesitant and maladroit diplomacy was not only to prove to be no match for Bismarck's ruthless diplomatic manoeuvrings, but was to antagonise other powers intent upon ensuring the continuing containment of France.
In the context of what he professed, it is unlikely that Napoleon III raised the issue of the Holy Places to provoke a war with Russia. Rather, it was a means of promoting Anglo-French accord by generating a diplomatic crisis in a region where Britain had long feared Russian intentions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. A demonstration of Anglo-French naval solidarity as a warning to Russia, even with the latter occupying the Danubian principalities, did not necessarily mean war. Indeed, the Vienna Note (July 1853) seemed to offer a peaceful resolution to the conflict. However, Turkey's declaration of war on Russia (October 1853) and Russia's sinking of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, a legitimate act of war, hardened public opinion in the west so that war against Russia was precipitated. At least Britain was her ally in the conflict. If the war was a squalid affair, it did culminate in a Congress at Paris (1856) which seemed to give France a crucial role in Europe with Britain at her side.
It was Napoleon III's intention - as it had been that of his predecessors - to secure revision of the 1815 settlement to France's advantage. Yet his claim in 1852 that ''L'Empire, c'est la paix'' was an attempt to reassure a nervous Europe that there would be no resurgence of France's feared military capacity. Rather, he sought to dismantle the 1815 settlement by peaceful means not by conflict. A prerequisite for achieving this was rapprochement with Britain whose influence, he believed, was indispensable if congresses of the Powers were to be established for solving disputes and reconciling differences. By the 1860's such sentiments were incompatible with Bismarck's resolve to settle the problems of the day by ''iron and blood''. Soon, Napoleon's hesitant and maladroit diplomacy was not only to prove to be no match for Bismarck's ruthless diplomatic manoeuvrings, but was to antagonise other powers intent upon ensuring the continuing containment of France.
In the context of what he professed, it is unlikely that Napoleon III raised the issue of the Holy Places to provoke a war with Russia. Rather, it was a means of promoting Anglo-French accord by generating a diplomatic crisis in a region where Britain had long feared Russian intentions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. A demonstration of Anglo-French naval solidarity as a warning to Russia, even with the latter occupying the Danubian principalities, did not necessarily mean war. Indeed, the Vienna Note (July 1853) seemed to offer a peaceful resolution to the conflict. However, Turkey's declaration of war on Russia (October 1853) and Russia's sinking of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, a legitimate act of war, hardened public opinion in the west so that war against Russia was precipitated. At least Britain was her ally in the conflict. If the war was a squalid affair, it did culminate in a Congress at Paris (1856) which seemed to give France a crucial role in Europe with Britain at her side.
