Why Did the German Attack On the Soviet Union in 1914 fail in its objectives?

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

WHY DID THE GERMAN ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION

IN 1941 FAIL IN ITS OBJECTIVES?

In the immediate view, it seems that there are a few main arguments attributed to the failure of the German attack in 1941. One suggestion is that the Russians actually forced the German attack into failure as they had deceived other powers as to the size and power of troops that they had at their disposal. Other historians believe that the German’s themselves were to blame due to their underestimation of the power of the Russian army and also that they were preoccupied with war on the Western Front with Britain and France. I aim to give a detailed analysis of these arguments, drawing on views from both the Nazi and Soviet camps.

The following discussion will suggest that the German attack failed due to a mixture of these arguments. Using sources from various known historians, I will argue these points to the conclusion that there was no one single reason for the failure of the German attack in 1941.

The most common reason given, and in most cases the first that one comes across when studying this part of the Second World War is that of Soviet military deception. When analysing the military powers at this time, it was Germany who were the most feared. This was due to the fact that the state of their armed forces was one of the best kept secrets in the pre-war period. In his book ‘The Road to Stalingrad’, John Erickson states that it was indeed German policy that dictated the reaction of the other powers and not allied military policy. Even though the German army was being heavily surveyed at this point it was still unclear as to their exact capabilities, however, it was becoming clear that soon the Germans would once again possess real military power;

Tukhachevskii ……… pointed to Pétain’s argument, that no longer could the French Army rely on time to mobilize before the enemy engaged powerful forces.

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According to Tukhachevskii, the French would prove no worthy opposition to the Germans. Erickson, who continues to outline the potential of the German military forces, confirms the beliefs of the Marshall of the Soviet Union – Tukhachevskii. One can see from the projected figures that, on paper at least, there was a potential problem concerning the size of the German army,

By summer 1935 Germany would have an army of 849,000 – 40 per cent greater than the French and almost equal in size to the Red Army with its 940,000 effectives.

This potential for strength in ...

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By summer 1935 Germany would have an army of 849,000 – 40 per cent greater than the French and almost equal in size to the Red Army with its 940,000 effectives.

This potential for strength in war was confounded by the Soviet knowledge of Hitler’s unpredictability when it came to foreign policy. It was the view that the Soviet government could not take a risk, especially where Poland was concerned. It seemed inconceivable in 1936 that Germany would soon erase Poland as an independent state and therefore force a World War situation. This view was enhanced by the fact that the Poles were ‘a threat which the Red Army itself had never been able to ignore’. It was not that the Soviet Union was scared of Poland, but coupled with Germany she could have formed an insurmountable opposition.

Therefore in 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, the Russians had every right to be worried, as what they had long feared had now become a reality. Hitler immediately used this invasion as a foothold to get into a good position in which he could attack his real target on the Eastern Front – the Soviet Union. It had been well documented that Hitler had much personal contempt for Stalin; most historians thought that this was born from envy and jealousy and they may be right. Hitler’s character was not too different from that of Stalin; they were both very mean and harsh men who would not let anything stand in the way of their goals. The only difference being that whereas Stalin’s goals towards the Soviet Union were relatively insular, Hitler had the most grandiose plans for world domination.

So to the Second World War and the involvement of Stalin’s Soviet Union in a war against a German force strongly rejuvenated by Hitler and his propaganda machine. However, it was not for some time that Germany actually concentrated on trying to break down the Russian Army. Hitler and his army were very busy trying to defeat the French and the British on the Western Front, and as Stalin had made no immediate interventions to stop the German machine, Hitler believed he at least had time on his side, if not Russia herself. However Stalin was merely biding his time. He knew the real power of the German Army and that at the outbreak of war that there was no way that the Soviet Union could match Hitler’s military force at that time.

Therefore, it was Stalin’s view that by fooling Hitler, it would give him much needed time to continue rebuilding the Red Army into a force that could match Hitler’s Germany. However, by the end of 1940 the Red Army would begin to enter the War,

At the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941 there were more war-games, involving assumptions about attacking the USSR. Within weeks of each other, as if in some shadowy showdown, the German and Soviet commands played out their prescriptions for victory

Indeed in July 1940, Hitler dictated that primary studies for a successful campaign against the Soviet Union be set up. It was now the turn of the German’s to study the whole of the Soviet strategy, both militarily and politically. Hitler, however, had different ideas. It was in December of this year that he signed the ‘super-secret directive . . . . . setting out the instruction “to crush Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign”’. This was to become ‘Operation Barbarossa’.

However this was no more than a myth. Operation Barbarossa existed, but only in the minds of those who closely followed Hitler and his every move. It was surprising to many that Hitler had not gone public with his intentions towards the Soviet Union as he had with many of his former conquests. Moreover, even though he had announced a plan for victory in the East, his heart and mind were still firmly set on the primary goal – victory over the Allied forces of Britain and France on the Western Front. Hitler knew that unless threatened, Stalin would never engage in a war that was, for now, on the other side of Europe. However, Hitler also did not perceive that Stalin would be holding secret meetings with Winston Churchill over the next two years to discuss how to deal with Germany, especially on the Eastern Front.

Therefore, it is evident that German policy was starting to slide and that Hitler’s ideal world where no-one would fight back was just a dream. Moreover, Stalin now has a lot more belief in his country’s ability to match and fight Hitler’s army. He was clever in biding his time whereas Hitler, who must have known that the Russians would be the most formidable of opponents, had jumped into war two years earlier with the British and the French. Stalin knew what Hitler was like; he was extremely ‘gun-ho’ and liked to rush things, he didn’t believe in waiting for opportunities, he would rather go out and create them.

We can conclude therefore, with the help of the evidence given by Erickson and Keegan, that indeed the many reasons given for the failure of the German attack in 1941 were all true. Military deception was not that high on the Soviet agenda, but did come into play. As did the Germans being preoccupied with the Western Front, although by this stage of the war, most of their work to the west was done.

However the reason that is undoubtedly the most viable for this ‘Russian victory’ is that of poor German military intelligence and therefore the Russians having the higher level of military knowledge at the time. The Germans were so unaware of Stalin’s war games and the rebuilding of the Red Army that they were taken successfully by surprise.

We can therefore see that in this case, the military politics and intelligence of the Russians was far more effective in the long-term that the sheer force of the German Army. This may be down to Hitler and his naivety when it came to the military but the most likely explanation is that the Russian intelligence units, who surveyed the German army to find their unapparent weaknesses and who also advised Stalin of the right time to come out and prove what the Soviet Union had in terms of military power, were the real heroes of this ‘Soviet victory’.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ERICKSON, J., The Road to Stalingrad (London: Cassell & Co., 1975)

GLANTZ, D., Soviet Military deception in the Second World War (London: Cass & Co., 1989)

KEEGAN, J., The Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1989)

KENNEDY-PIPE, C., Stalin’s Cold War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995)

MAGENHEIMER, H., Hitler’s War (London: Cassell & Co, 1997)

OVERY, R., Russia’s War (London: Penguin, 1998)

PUGH, M., A Companion to Modern European History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)

Word Count – 1,543

Erickson, J., The Road To Stalingrad (London: Cassell & Co., 1975) p 1

Erickson, J., The Road To Stalingrad (London: Cassell & Co., 1975) p 7

Erickson, J., The Road To Stalingrad (London: Cassell & Co., 1975) p 8