‘even de Valera’s enemies saw neutrality... as the litmus test of sovereignty’
De Valera wanted to use neutrality to demonstrate Irish sovereignty from Britain as 26 counties of Ireland had recently achieved dominion status from England.
Across the continent, neutrality was the popular choice - the majority of smaller states (and some large ones) signalled their intent to remain out of the war. However amongst the Commonwealth, it didn't take long for the other Dominion states to join the war effort behind Britain. Ireland's history and long connection with Britain, as well as Her new Dominion status made the policy of neutrality very noticeable when compared to the other smaller neutral states.
Neutrality was an declaration of self-rule - it was Ireland's first decision as a sovereign power. Ireland's refusal to be caught up in a war that was not of Her own making was a way of expressing Her long awaited independence.
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‘There were no striking forces available of offering prolonged and organised resistance’
Militarily, Ireland was quite a weak and inefficient country. By September 1939 when full mobilisation was ordered, Ireland was in a fairly severe situation militarily – She had about 6000 soldiers in its army and air force, plus reserves of 13,000 made up of the predominantly untrained and underequipped Volunteer Force.
However Ireland recognised this weakness, and attempted to come up with policies that would come into place in the event of Ireland's neutrality being broken by an aggressor - they were to defend themselves as best they could with an army of 30,000 men and £10,000,000. There was much debate in the Dáil about what to do in this situation, de Valera described this plan as 'folly', yet he also relied on the belief that if an Axis belligerent attacked Ireland, Britain would immediately jump to Her defence.
Ireland's weak position was not solely due to her lack of men, but also her lack of equipment – there were extreme shortages of mortars, artillery, radios, armoured vehicles and ammunitions of all types. What little equipment that Ireland’s defence force did have came entirely from Britain.
In 1923, Ireland (as the Irish Free State) joined the League of Nations, which at the time had an emphasis on collective security – an arrangement whereby all states cooperate fully and collectively to provide security for all. It can safely be assumed that, like the new European weaker states that had emerged in the aftermath of the Versailles Peace Conference, Ireland joined with an enthusiasm for this ‘collective security’ policy, as it allowed weaker states to rely on those with stronger defence forces. De Valera believed it was the right of small nations to protect themselves from becoming entangled in the conflicts of larger powers, and this was supported especially by his Secretary of External Affairs, Joe Walsh.
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Even with the recent separation from Britain, Ireland was still unable to make a clean break from Her former ruler in terms of economy, trade and communications.
Economically, Ireland was very much reliant on the success on Britain - Most of her securities were in British banks, and the Irish pound was tied to the performance of the sterling, with the Central Bank operating simply as an offshore branch of the Bank of England.
In 1939, Ireland was largely dependent on Britain as far as external trade and communications. In particular, Ireland only controlled five percent of her own shipping, and relied on Britain for ninety percent of her exports. Ireland was largely dependent on British markets and trade for Her economic survival - the effects of another disagreement like the recently solved Anglo-Irish Trade War would put her in a very bad position indeed.
On the outbreak of war, it was agreed that all cable communications to and from Ireland were routed through London, and were as such subject to the censorship division of Britain's Government Communications Headquarters.
There was no way for Ireland to make a truly clean break from Britain considering Her ties to the former ruling nation. If Ireland were to have taken a position of belligerence
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‘From the moment this war began, there was...only one policy possible, neutrality. Any other policy would have divided our people and for a divided nation to fling itself into this war would have been to commit suicide’
Domestically, neutrality was highly popular and seen as a policy that was both sensible and cautious. A phrase used many times over in interviews and press was that neutrality was 'natural given our history', and there seemed to be an almost complete consensus within Ireland that given the recent troubles of the War of Independence and the Civil War, neutrality was the most obvious choice for Ireland.
De Valera believed in Ireland's right to remain neutral as a small nation. Other nations had no right to call her to war. The Allies claimed to be in a war fighting for democracy - Ireland's neutrality was a democratic policy - a genuine expression of the popular will.
Resentment of Britain, pride in Irish individuality, recent memories of the First World War, the Anglo-Irish War and the Civil War, as well as the fear of aerial bombardment all combined to create a general agreement against becoming involved in yet another conflict.
Neutrality was a policy supported by all parties and significant political figures, with the exception of John Dillon. In both the general elections of 1943 and 1944, de Valera won with ease. From this, it can be assumed, even considering the effects of press censorship at the time, the neutrality was a popular policy amongst the general public of Ireland.
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‘(Eire's) Territory and waters were strategically inseparable from those of the United Kingdom itself’
The island of Ireland lies to the extreme west of Europe, shielded from the main bulk of it by Great Britain and surrounded on its remaining three sides by the Atlantic. In contrast to other neutral states, Ireland had an advantage in Her geographical position, being on the very periphery of any conflict. Other neutral states were on the main continent and as such could not avoid being in the middle of any warring states. The geographical accident of being an island behind the offshore island of Britain meant She was sheltered by Britain’s defence strategy from any perceived air or naval attack, making Her the least vulnerable of all the European neutrals.
The main difference between Ireland and the other emergent states was that She was not located on the opposite side of the world to Her former ruling nation. She was located on the same continent and was tied by the closest geographical proximity.
However, due to this reliance on Britain for shelter from air and sea attacks, Ireland had to maintain a diplomatic and friendly relationship with her offshore neighbour. This separation from the rest of Europe also laid open the threat of British occupation – Ireland could not rely on any other forces to save Her if Britain decided to take by force landlocked facilities such as Shannon or the military bases it left behind after the 1921 treaty.
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Even if Ireland were in a suitable position to settle on a policy of belligerence, the question would have to be raised as to which side She would have entered.
Entering the war effort on the side of the Allies would perhaps seem like the most logical choice in terms of geography and defence - Ireland shared a land border with Britain and was already contributing to the British war effort, as well as being shielded by Britain from direct German intervention. However, there was a general feeling of malaise towards the British, ranging from suspicion over Britain's motives in entering the war to deep resentment and a frank desire to see Britain defeated by Germany. If Ireland had fought alongside Britain, there would have been an increased risk of terrorism from the IRA. The image of British soldiers in Ireland was unacceptable to the majority of Irish people. Considering that de Valera's main defence for neutrality was that it protected Ireland's citizens, it would be unwise to risk such national conflict by asking the Irish population to make common cause with Britain.
In the early years of the Free State, Ireland had formed and maintained a friendly relationship with Germany, including the funding and construction of the Shannon hydroelectric station by Siemens and allowing a German ambassador to remain in Dublin. Yet, due to Ireland's geographical position, it would put Her in a very difficult and somewhat dangerous situation if She were to side with the Axis Allies- it would be unlikely that Germany would be able to protect them from an attack by Britain and the USA, and Ireland was certainly in such position to defend herself against such an attack. With Allied forces camped just north of the border, it would have been suicide for Ireland to join the Axis Allies, as it would be an open invitation for Britain to invade and recapture the Treaty ports She wanted so badly.
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'The neutrality which these governments practised throughout the course of the war was governed by expediency...However, in sober truth, there could be no real neutrality in this war'
Neutrality was not an end in itself, but a means to an end – independence and sovereignty from Britain.
Irish neutrality during the Second World War was a policy based firstly on principle, secondly on political practicality, and thirdly on the fear of the consequences of a war upon a virtually defenceless and dependent state.
Resentment of Britain, pride in Irish individuality, recent memories of the First World War, the Anglo-Irish War and the Civil War, as well as the fear of aerial bombardment all combined to create a general agreement against becoming involved in yet another conflict.
Above all, it was a practical stance decided by military and political necessities, not an ideological declaration or the expression of a moral choice. Neutrality expressed the Irish government's responsibility for the survival of the state and the welfare of its citizens.
Eamon de Valera, February 1920
Fanning, Ronan, 'The British Dimension' in, - Ireland: Dependence & Independence, Vol. 8, No. 1(1984), pp. 41-52
Collins, M.E., 1993, Ireland 1968-1966, Dublin: the Educational Company of Ireland. p. 371
Eamon de Valera, Speech on Eire Neutrality, Cork, Ireland, December 12 1941.
Washington Post. ‘Moral Myopia’. In Editorials, p6. (Washington, DC: The Washington Post) May 5 1945