`The drawbacks associated with the battlefield, though, were to prove costly. Because this part of the front had been a 'quiet sector' since 1914, the Germans had had almost two years to prepare their defences, and had done so extremely well. The soft subsoil allowed trenches to be dug to a depth of ten feet, and the dugouts within them in which the Germans were to shelter, to one of thirty feet. Furthermore, although it is true that there were no great impenetrable forests or formidable towns on the battlefield, there was a profusion of small scattered woods, villages and hamlets which were to become like fortresses which the British were unable to take without heavy losses. It was also true that despite the generally flat nature of the land, what rising ground there was was in German hands, giving them a clear view and more importantly a clear shot at any advance which might be made across no-man's-land.
`According to the plan which the British generals had devised, the main part of the attack was to have been the five-day bombardment of the German trenches. Through weight of shell, the British hoped to remove the enemy infantry, including the machine guns, allowing the infantry to walk across no-man's-land and occupy the vacant German positions. While this was fine in theory, the reality of what actually happened was rather different. The first problem was that although every spare artillery piece had been brought to the Somme, the vast majority of these guns were simply not powerful enough for the job of destroying the German positions. The shells which they fired produced impressive craters and showers of mud, but did not have the power to collapse the German dugouts. The best which they could hope for was to block the entrances to them by causing the trench walls to fall in. Although there were some guns capable of delivering sufficiently powerful shells, these were far too few in number to really matter.
`A further problem with the bombardment was that the shells were generally of the wrong type, and often badly made. Most of them were shrapnel shells of little use for destroying the entrenched German infantry. High explosives were really needed to produce a sufficiently concussive effect to cause real damage to the dugouts, but these were in short supply as a result of the incapacity of British industry to produce them in great numbers. Only about 1/3 of the shells fired were high explosive. Given the excess of shrapnel shells, a use was found for them in the cutting of the barbed wire entanglements which had been placed between the opposing trenches. This was achieved to nothing like the desired extent, and when the infantry advanced on 1st July they found far too few gaps in the wire through which to pass. In fact, it is probable that again high explosive would have been the better ammunition to use, for although shrapnel might create more cuts through the wire, high explosive could disorder it, throwing it around and creating larger gaps for the infantry.
`Two problems of quality also affected the initial bombardment. Firstly, the shells were often badly made, exploding too early so the force of the explosion was directed harmlessly into the air rather than into the ground where it could damage the German dugouts, or not at all - a noticeable proportion of them were useless 'duds'. Secondly, the gunners were often the 'green' troops of Kitchener's Army, and consequently lacked the accuracy of the more experienced regulars. The result of all this was that despite seven days of the heaviest bombardment yet seen in the war, the artillery had achieved nothing like total success.
`The inflexibility of the British plan was perhaps its greatest weakness. It was assumed that the great bombardment would work, since, according to the generals, nothing could have survived the week of continuous attack by the artillery. Consequently, there was no contingency plan to fall back on should (as indeed happened) the bombardment be unsuccessful. The official instruction issued by Haig to Rawlinson was to continue the bombardment if necessary until it had achieved its objectives. Rawlinson, however, whether reluctant to believe that the bombardment could fail or eager to get on with the battle, pressed on regardless of the worrying information which he was receiving concerning the extent of the German defences or the intactness of the barbed wire.
`Inflexibility was again shown in the use of the infantry, with Rawlinson unwilling to believe in the ability of the new soldiers, and unwilling as a result to allow them to either show any great initiative or to burden them with any complicated orders. He had taken the unusual step of believing that there would be almost no enemy resistance to his advance, and believed totally in the effectiveness of his artillery. According to his rigid plans, the task of the infantry would be nothing more than to walk into the German trenches and await the counter-attacks which would probably follow. His infantry would not need to move fast to capture the trenches, and would need to carry sufficient food and ammunition to hold on against German resistance. For this reason, the infantry was compelled to carry packs that were so heavy as to make quick movement impossible. There were to be no light 'skirmishers' to rush the German trench and hold it until their comrades could catch up, since according to Rawlinson's assumptions, they would not be needed. As a result, the Germans easily won the 'race' to the trenches after the bombardment stopped, and were ready and waiting for the British.
`Inflexibility also showed itself once the slaughter of 1st July had begun. Rawlinson assumed that his timetabled plan was being followed to the letter more or less throughout his army. Units had their objectives to fulfil, and while he never expected all of these targets to be met successfully, his expectation was that his soldiers would be at the places he had ordered at the times he had specified. In fact, this rigid devotion to a timetable was damaging both when a unit was running into difficulties and when one saw the possibility for success beyond that previously considered. For a large part of the army, this meant that the stern resistance which they encountered from the Germans was not taken into account. The result was either that wave after wave of soldiers met their deaths from the same German machine guns, there not being provision for the halting of advances should there be unexpected resistance, or that the strictly timetabled barrages advanced far in front of the advancing units, falling on the second or third line of trenches while the infantry was still engaged in securing the first.
`In contrast, in the attack on Montauban on the British right could have brought more success had the plans been flexible enough to allow for divisions exceeding expectations. Here, the British had taken the first trench and for some hours were opposed only by "clerks, cooks, batmen and 200 recruits." Here, for some time, lay the opportunity to realise Haig's dream of breaking through with cavalry, a force of which was well up with the successful infantry. A breakthrough here by cavalry would have enabled the attacking of German artillery and communications, thereby dealing a serious blow to the resistance which the British faced. A cavalry attack, however, had not been envisaged by Rawlinson who saw the advancing of infantry alone as the key to winning battles. The cavalry was pulled back, and the opportunity for a breakthrough was lost.
`The main problem for the British attack on 1st June lay in the almost total inflexibility of the plan under which they were operating. In spite of the failings of the bombardment which to some extent were reported, and which should have been more thoroughly investigated, the attack was made because the plan said it should be carried out. It was not considered that there would be any serious German resistance from their front trenches because the plan said that there would not. It was not thought that there need be any changes to the timetable of the attack because the plan said that there would be no need. Despite the occasional report of difficulties which came back from the front line, belief in the plan was so total that there was no thought of changing things. Although factors like the ground chosen to fight on, the artillery's failings, and the level of training of the army (the experienced French did noticeably better) should not be ignored, it was the inability to adapt to circumstances which caused the disaster of the Somme. Although the offensive was fruitlessly continued for some weeks against the villages and woods of the battlefield, the failure of 1st June meant that any gain would have been at too high a price for the battle to be described as a success.
`
`
`Bibliography
`A. Horne, Death of a Generation, London 1970
`J. Keegan, The Face of Battle, London 1976
`B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, London 1992
`M. Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, London 1971
`T. Travers, The Killing Ground, London 1990
`T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, Cambridge 1986
` T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, p.313
` J. Keegan, The Face of Battle, p.230
` Ibid. p.234
` M. Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, p.280
` Ibid. p.286