Then little more than a month later on the 21st of January 1793 Louis XVI was executed. Kant saw this as the beginning of the Terror as it is a violation of the constitutional contract because it was the Monarch’s divine right to be on the thrown. There was outrage in Britain, and on February 1st France declared war on Britain and the Dutch Republic. The Spanish also clearly agreed with Kant as there was fury after Louis XVI’s execution, and on March 7th France went to war with Spain. The Spanish then agreed with the British to co-operate in a British blockage of the French Mediterranean coast to attempt to starve them of their commerce. Then on the 25th of March Britain convinced Catherine of Russia to commit to the anti-French coalition. The countries were uniting against the French because they believed that they had committed regicide. This is a crucial argument for the Revisionist thesis. This situation, according to Furet, was a “… tragic situation”. It would have looked to the people that they were up against an impossible task that could never be achieved- defeating Europe. It can be argued that the execution of Louis XVI was always going to happen- strengthening the Traditionalist view, but it was not always planned. The King was executed via a vote which could have gone either way. The circumstances under which Louis XVI was executed were needed for it to happen.
By this time the French had been driven out of the Rhineland leaving 20000 men left in Mainz. Along with military losses, the new French Republic was suffering invasions. The Spanish had invaded Roussillon on the 18th May 1793, and then the Austrians invaded Conde and then Valenciennes in July. In addition, forces of the coalition were in Flanders and up to the Pyrenees. Whilst this was taking place, the British fleet were circling Marseilles hoping to link up with counter-revolutionaries. Doyle accounts the numerous defeats in 1793 to French over-confidence following a successful year in 1792, and even goes so far as to say that the coalition should have done a lot better than they did- perhaps to the extent as to invade further into France. However, this argument is unfounded. The coalition may have been able to advance, but only for a short period of time since-as Ross argues- the formation of the Committee of Public Safety on 6th April 1793 managed to solve the problems posed to the new Republic making military and diplomatic victories possible. However, by this time other factors were now playing a crucial role in making the Terror an instrument of destruction.
Economics played a crucial role in explaining why there was a Terror. France was going through a severe economic crisis. In February 1792 money was worth 50% of its value- declining 15% since January. Rudé- the main perpetrator of this argument- states that between May and June 1793 the assignat (paper money) was worth only 36% of its original value and by August it was only 22%. As a result of this, shopkeepers were only receiving 20-50% of the market value of their goods. Due to the inflation, farmers were beginning to keep their stock, since they would not be making a profit. The already troublesome food crisis worsened. This caused food shortages in major cities and resulted in riots. Houses were pillaged in Orléans, Vérsailles and Rambóuillet to name a few. Whilst in November 1792, grain riots became endemic and from 25-28th June there were soap riots. This can be attributed to a general rise in prices - in 1790 soap cost 12 sous whilst in 1793 it cost 23-28 sous. It was not only soap that had risen in price; refined sugar had risen from 24 sous in 1790 to between 47 and 60 sous in 1793. To put this in perspective- in the countryside, wage earners earned, on average, 20 sous per day, whilst people earned 40 in Paris. Prices of essentials had doubled or even trebled in price, yet wages had not risen accordingly. These pressures would have put considerable stress on the average family to buy essential items. Soboul argues that the sans-culottes blamed the army for the food shortages due their competitive prices. They had enough -inflated- money to buy enough for the army leaving very little for the people causing dismay with the Government. But the army would not be purchasing from every village all over France. They would have been buying for specific areas so the entire population would not have been dismayed with the Republic over food shortages. To attempt to combat inflation set prices were introduced, known as the Maximum, on 29th September 1793. However, this was not effective due to farmers’ withholding their stock; this helped the emergence of a ‘black market’ where they would higher quality goods at higher prices. The maximum only succeeded in emptying markets leaving people hungry again causing anger and dismay. Donald Greer believes the Terror was not caused by economic circumstances, but by socio-political circumstances such as the Civil War.
On the 24th February 1793 the Convention ordered that 300000 men were to be conscripted into the army in an attempt to solve the manpower crisis the army was facing. There was massive resistance in the Vendée, in the central west of the nation and Bien argues that this political problem explain why there was a Terror. Rapport argues that the revolt in the Vendée was a major turning point, indicating the discontent with the Convention. Also, by this time France was undergoing a process of dechristianization, turning against the Roman Catholic Church, which was extremely unpopular in the Vendée, and with the introduction of conscription it catalysed their anger. When the revolt broke out on March 11th there were few troops to control the citizens and as a result the situation escalated. An army of around 50000 was raised to attempt to rid the department of any Revolutionary authorities. They were reasonably successful and the army occupied Saumur and planned to continue through Brittany, Maine, and Normandy in an attempt to join up with the Chouans, anti-revolutionary peasants, but at Nantes the Vendeans were defeated. The Vendean army marched as far north as Granville, an unbelievable effort. But by this time, the Civil War was sapping up a lot of army troops and taking them away from the war.
The counter-revolutionaries in other provinces also showed conisiderbale resistance to the Republic. When the Estates-General was called on 24th January 1789 it was seen as a chance for citizens to finally voice their beliefs, but they were not heard. This caused huge amounts of anger and disbelief as the ‘new’ France was meant to be the home of liberty and democracy. When people realized their ambitions were not going to be fulfilled they found out they had to pay feudal tax, which took away their benefits their anger for the state grew. Conversely, it has to be said that anger was only in some of the provinces. In the end 70% of the executions in the Terror were done in only five departments and six departments had no executions. This argument for resistance, led by Forrest, is discredited slightly as the resistance was not widespread. However, resistance is never truly widespread. When a revolution occurs, it is never the entire nation fighting for revolt. However, Bouloiseau does not account the revolt in the Vendée to conscription; he accounts it to religious reasons
The Church showed huge amounts of opposition to the Republic. The Church was being pushed out of France due to the policy of dechristianization. There was now widespread anti-clericism throughout France and the state began to antagonize the Church over feudal dues and titles. The state then removed the statue of Catholicism making all religions equal. This caused great unrest as many Catholics believed that it was the fault of the Jews that Jesus Christ was executed and now they had the same rights- which was unknown previously. The state also forced the clergy to take an oath of loyalty to the state and if they did not they were either exiled or executed. In areas of high religious belief this was seen as an attack on religious tradition and liberties. But even before this, the state had began to close Churches, ban worship and auction off their land to try and solve the monetary crisis that France was under after participating in the US Wars of Independence. This all caused massive opposition which helped to force the Government to make the Terror the order of the day on September 5th 1793.
Therefore, it can clearly be said that the Revisionist and Traditionalist theory must be intertwined to give a true account in explaining why there was a Terror in 1793. Although the ideology was clearly there in 1789, the circumstances of the war, the economics and the opposition were needed to force the state to enforce such brutal laws. The war was the most crucial factor. The war was going terribly during 1793, a “disastrous year for the Republic”. With the defection of Dumouriez the stage was set for the French public to see the war as a losing battle. With conscription introduced in February 193 it caused revolt in the Vendée resulting in a huge death toll. Without the war, there would not have been a Terror. Yet, without economics there may not have been a Terror. Inflation was terrible; the assignat was worth only 22% of its value in August 1793- only a month before the Terror began. This caused food riots and the introduction of set prices, which only helped in empyting markets and encouraging the emergence of a black market. Prices of essentials more than doubled but wages stayed the same- the public were becoming desperate. Finally, the opposition caused the Civil War in the Vendée, the provinces and the Church did play a significant role. The Civil War drew troops away from the front simply enhancing the argument that the terrible state of the war was an indispensable factor. The unhappiness in the provinces was due to the Government not fulfilling their ambitions which caused riots and huge amounts of anger at the state. Finally, the policy of dechristianization caused huge opposition from the Church and the people. With the removal of the statue of Catholicism causing the equality of all religions caused huge amounts of contempt along with the Republic forcing the clergy to take an oath of loyalty. It has to be said that the new Republic believed that they had began a new era in human history and their aim was to “realise the destiny of humanity”. This era was being threatened by these factors, thus the Terror was needed to halt the ‘problems’ the French were facing.
Bibliography
HIS923 Primary Documents
HIS923 Lecture: ‘Liberty or Death! The Terror: ideology or circumstance?’ 24/09/07
D.D. Bien, ‘Francois Furet, the Terror, and 1789’, French Historical Studies, 16:4 (1990: Fall) p.777
M. Bouloiseau, The Jacobin Republic 1792-1794, (Cambridge, 1983)
R.C Cobb, ‘The Popular Movement in its Prime’, The Police and the People: French Popular Protest, 1789-1820, (Oxford, 1972)
A. Forrest, The French Revolution, (Oxford, 1995)
F. Furet, ‘Terror’ in P. Jones (ed.), The French in Social and Political Perspective, (London, 1996)
J. Godfrey, ‘The Incidence of Terror during the French Revolution: A statistical interpretation by Donald Greer (BOOK REVIEW)’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol.8, No.3 (Sept., 1936) pp.366-368
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G. Lefebvre, ‘The Revolutionary Government (1793-1794)’, The French Revolution From 1793 to 1794, (New York, 1964)
M. Ozouf, ‘War and Terror in French Revolutionary Discourse (1792-1794), The Journal of Modern History, Vol.56, No.4. (Dec., 1984), pp.579-597
S. T. Ross, ‘Quest for Victory: French Military Strategy 1792-1799’, (South Brunswick, 1973) p320
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A. Soboul, The French Revolution 1787-1799, vol. 1 (London 1974)
G. Lefebvre, ‘The French Revolution From 1793-1799’ (New York, 1964) Ch.2
A. Soboul, ‘The French Revolution 1787-1799’ Vol. 1 (London, 1974) Part 2, Ch.2
F. Furet, ‘Terror’ in P. Jones (ed.), ‘The French Revolution in Social and Political Perspective’ (London, 1966) p450-465
HIS923 Lecture: ‘Liberty or Death! The Terror, 1793-1794: ideology or circumstance?’ 24/09/07
M. Ozouf, ‘War and Terror in French Revolutionary Discourse (1792-1794), The Journal of Modern History, Vol.56, No.4. (Dec., 1984), p592
P. McPhee, The French Revolution 1789-1799, (Oxford, 2002) p130
W.Doyle, ‘Oxford History of The French Revolution” (Oxford, 1989) p202
http://library.thinkquest.org/C006257/revolution/committee_pub_safety.shtml
S. T. Ross, ‘Quest for Victory: French Military Strategy 1792-1799’, (South Brunswick, 1973) p320
http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/frenchrev/section5.rhtml
D.D. Bien, ‘Francois Furet, the Terror, and 1789’. French Historical Studies, 16:4 (1990: Fall) p779
Op. Cit HIS923 Lecture 24/09/07
A Forrest, The French Revolution, (Oxford, 1995) p138
J. Godfrey, ‘The Incidence of Terror During the French Revolution: A statistical interpretation by Donald Greer (BOOK REVIEW)’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol.8, No.3 (Sept., 1936) p367
Op. Cit Robespierre Speech in HIS923 Documents p5