Why was war so fundamental to social and political organisation in ancient Rome? Was it ideology or necessity that drove the ancient worlds to war?

Assessment 1: Short Essay                                                                

Question (B) Why was war so fundamental to social and political organisation in ancient Rome? Was it ideology or necessity that drove the ancient worlds to war?

Though war was a common part of life in the ancient world, the Roman Republic distinguished itself as a culture represented and identified through its deliberate utilisation. For ancient Rome, war was a machination intrinsic to the structure and legitimacy of its social and political organisation. In an effort to support this argument, the attitude and impact of war upon the three coherently bonded elements of republican society will be examined. This tripartite construct involving the communion of Roman political, military and social stratum can be seen as not just influenced, or even energised by war, but in fact reliant upon it for its operation. The ideology that drove the Republic to war and subsequent greatness will be shown as a major factor in its eventual decline as the necessary defence of its conquered frontiers finally exhausted its hegemonic predominance, long after a more peaceful idealism began to surface. Thus, the fundamental relationship between war and the Republic’s social and political structure; a manifest ideology that enthusiastically pursued, then ultimately necessitated war’s continuance must be further analysed.

At the heart of the Roman Republic was a vigorous aristocracy powered by a social ethos that valued concepts of laus and gloria – fame and glory, above all others. Such was the power of these two concepts that without them, success in either of the inexorably entwined facets of Roman life was unlikely. Ten years military service was a requirement of political office and individual prowess that furthered Rome’s glorification provided a fast track to a consulship. Affirming this through ancient source evidence is Plutarch’s recording of seven-times consul Gaius Marius’ boast that he had ‘carried off the consulship/as spoils of war’. War had established itself as the vehicle by which the aristocracy could further their political career, whilst furthering Rome’s frontiers. The nexus is obvious; Rome’s almost permanent war-footing during this period was the consequence of an ideology that required the benefits of battlefield glory to be in perpetual availability. This assertion does not detract from, or negate Rome’s empire building and wealth seeking motivations towards war, as the two were firmly linked and mutually beneficial. The latter however was evident in many ancient societies, but the symbiotic relationship between war and sociopolitical organisation was almost exclusively a Roman phenomenon.

It is important when positing war’s influential primacy on social custom and political policy in Republican Rome that a picture of mindless barbaric aggression is not presented. The notion of Romanitas that conceptualised what it was to be Roman, involving civil order, religious devotion and education as demarcation between Roman citizen and barbarian, allowed a certain justification to be used in wars of conquest. This creation of identity, that of their own superior self, and that of the other – the barbarian, served a purpose of investing expansionist policies with a sense of right; a growing requirement for a republic wishing to enjoy hegemony culturally and intellectually as well as militarily. This concept of a just war and the not so subtle justifications for war, extend deep into the Roman ethos. Within the acquisition of land and wealth for the strengthening of Rome was the chase for individual prestige and within the defence of Rome and Romanitas lay exceedingly far reaching visions of expansionism. The result was a Roman war-machine honed and confident through battle, resolute in the justness of its cause, and energised by the zeal of its aristocratic commanders eager to excel at all costs. The soldiers being land-owning citizens believed it their civic duty and a privilege to be fighting for Rome, and it was this combination of elements that proved an almost irresistible force for four centuries. 

The manipulation of offence into defence can be regarded as something of a signature tactic in Roman diplomacy at this time. It was not until the fully extended Roman Empire of the post-Augustan period that defence became the primary requirement and analysis of that situation will be continued later in this section. P.S. Derow, commenting on the writings of Greek born Roman historian, Polybius, acknowledges that in this manipulative tactic the Romans ‘succeeded admirably’. When the actual defence of its borders was not required, a diplomatic strategy of manipulation could be achieved through the upholding of fides, which is the extension of Roman good will through trust, to its allies. Under the pretension of upholding its values, Roman borders were often further extended, and history offers the absurdity of Rome’s war with Antiochus, whereby both parties cited liberation of the Greeks as its motivation. As mentioned earlier, though Rome often relied upon manipulation of a defensive imperative to justify its aggression, in later post-Republican years its over extension of frontiers resulted in a fragility that saw it consumed entirely with their defence. Consolidating and protecting frontiers and the pacification of conquered inhabitants tested the thinly stretched Roman military capabilities, and wars initiated years earlier through ideology became now, wars of necessity.

Any historical analysis of ancient Rome reveals a fascinating and unique utilitarian preoccupation and relationship with war. Though other ancient societies utilised its methods in gaining power and wealth, it was Rome that integrated it into its sociopolitical structure. The zealous ideology of the Romans embraced war, breathed life into it, fanned its flames, and then basked in its light and warmth. The preceding analysis examined how war carried Rome to an unprecedented hegemonic predominance and the Roman people dutifully wore its essence as confirmation of their identity. Weaving it into the very fabric of their society, war facilitated the Roman machine to a degree unknown in other ancient societies. When assessing the question of whether ideology or necessity drove the ancient worlds to war, the answer is subjective to a particular society for all except Rome. Different societies were motivated for different reasons, but Republican Rome’s predilection for war was a direct result of an ideological determination. This scenario, as mentioned earlier, eventuated ultimately and somewhat ironically, into necessity as its expansion finally peaked and the inevitable contraction began; Rome was in decline.

                                            Bibliography:

Primary:
Plutarch, “Gaius Marius” in Fall of the Roman Republic, Translated by Rex Warner, Penguin Classics. UK, 2005 edition.

Secondary:
Badian, E, “Rome and Antiochus the Great: A Study in Cold War”, Classical Philology, Vol. 54, No. 2, University of Chicago Press (1959) pp. 81-99.

Campbell, J.B, “The Origins of War” in War and Society in Imperial Rome, 31BC-AD284, Routledge Press. London, 2002, pp. 1-21.

Derow, P.S, “Polybius, Rome, and the East”, The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 69, Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies (1979), pp. 1-15.

Harris, William. V, “Roman Attitudes Towards War”, in War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70BC, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 9-53.

Heather, Peter, “The Barbarian in Late Antiquity : Image, Reality, and Transformation”, in Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, edited by Richard Miles, Routledge Press. London, 1999, pp. 236-241.

Kagan, Kimberly, “Redefining Roman Grand Strategy”, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 2, Society for Military History (2006) pp. 333-362.

---