British involvement in South Africa was part of a long history of imperialism and colonisation and satisfied a desire of the Empire for power and influence. There was a genuine sentiment that Britain had a responsibility to civilise the peoples of its colonies, in Africa, Asia and the West Indies by spreading British culture and ideology. The rationale for British imperialism was varied, ranging from political motivations, to commercial interests and Christian evangelism. The Boer war became a "struggle between two conflicting global ideologies: British imperialism and capitalism versus anti-imperialism and nationalism".
This ideology, of the need for imperial supremacy, dominated the political decisions of Britain and its actions within the expansive Empire. Thus, when between 1836 - 1838 the 'Great Trek' saw the migration of 10,000 Boers to the new lands of the Northern Frontier and the establishment of the Orange Free State and Transvaal republics, the British government initially refused to acknowledge their legitimacy and understood the action as a political rejection of Britain. The attempt to reclaim authority over the Boers was in response to a belief of statutory sovereignty, a prominent ideology in the British Empire at the end of the 19th Century. Culturally, Britain's expansive Empire was a key sign of it's strength, and any weakening of the colonies was seen as a reflection on Britain.
While there is strong evidence to suggest that the British interest in the Northern Frontier was largely economically motivated, following the Boer discoveries in the 1870s of substantial gold and diamonds reserves, it was predominantly focussed on a desire to maintain political control over the area. British migrants established a strong commercial and industrial presence in South Africa, including the politically active De Beers Consolidated Mines company, and ultimately saw that the advancement of South Africa to a modernised capitalist society would expand prospective markets of the British. While this pursuit of foreign expansion and capitalism was a significant motivation to maintain stability and political authority in the region, it was not the driving force of the British campaign.
Rather Britain aggressively sought to affirm its supremacy and the “imposition of its political will over the Transvaal.[The conflict was not] economic determinism but the decisive affirmation of imperial political supremacy.” The issue of Boer Independence had for decades been vague and highly disputed and while an “informal British hegemony” had existed until this time, these new developments saw the British move to establish a more formalised control over the Boer colonies. The British feared a shift in the region's balance of power and that an economically strong Trasvaal, under the Kruger government who had long harboured separatist ambitions, would ultimately threaten British interests in the region. As such, while Britain had genuine economic interests in the Boer region, it was not its primary motivation.
More widely, Britain felt increasingly threatened about its imperialist control in Southern African and invested heavily in securing its naval assets in the region. There was anxiety about interference by rival European powers, namely France and Germany as well as the USA. Adding to the tensions of the new resource boom, in 1894 the completion of the Portuguese Delagoa Bay to Withwatersrand rail link meant the Boer republics no longer relied on the British Cape ports and formed an alliance with Germany as a visible sign of political defiance and imperial rejection. The growing independence of the anti-British Transvaal threatened the political authority of the British. The failure of the Jameson Raid in 1895 helped to strengthen the bonds between the Boer republics and Kruger used the opportunity to generate further anti-British sentiments and spread the idea of supposed imperial complicity in the event. the 'Kruger Telegram' which followed expressing support of the Boers by Germany only deepened the anxiety of the British that they were under threat to maintain control of the colony.
Under Chamberlain, the Uitlander discrimination became the foundation for a popular tide of pro-imperialist action to establish a better state of political freedom in the Boer provinces. Imperial heroes such as Lord Kitchener provided role-models for the British and this notion of 'imperial supremacy' was strongly pushed forward by Chamberlain and Salisbury. Historians have also suggested that the Uitlanders desire for political sovereignty and economic independence in the Boer republics was used by the imperialistic British Consulate-General, Milner, to provoke the context for war.
Britain was not seeking specific goals from the war such as economic monopoly, or unification of the states, but was responding to a threat of it's imperial power. Not only was this conflict a concern for Britain's control and authority within Southern Africa, but also the wider ramifications that capitulation might have on the wider British Empire. As Chamberlain declared “What is now at stake is the position of Great Britain [and] the estimate of our power and influence in our colonies and throughout the world”.
Bibliography
Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Boer War 1899-1902, Osprey Publishing, (2003)
Henshaw, Peter. “The Origins of the Boer War” in The International Impact of the Boer War. Ed Wilson, Keith. Palgrave, (2001)
Hobson, John. Imperialism: A Study, James Pott & Co, (1902)
Lowry, Donal. “'The Boers were the beginning of the end'?: The wider impact of the South African War in The Impact of the South African War, Omissi, David and Thompson, Andrew S, (2002)
Nasson, Bill. The South African War 1899-1902, Arnold, (1999)
Porter, Andrew N. “British imperial policy and South Africa 1895-9” in The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902. Ed Warwick, Peter; Spies. S. B., (1980)
Nasson, Bill. The South African War 1899-1902, Arnold, (1999) p16
Nasson, Bill. The South African War 1899-1902, Arnold, (1999) p17
Nasson, Bill. The South African War 1899-1902, Arnold, (1999) p18
Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Boer War 1899-1902, Osprey Publishing, (2003) p75
Lowry, Donal. “'The Boers were the beginning of the end'?: The wider impact of the South African War in The Impact of the South African War, Omissi, David and Thompson, Andrew S, (2002) p270
Hobson, John. Imperialism: A Study, James Pott & Co, (1902) p56
Nasson, Bill. The South African War 1899-1902, Arnold, (1999) p37
Nasson, Bill. The South African War 1899-1902, Arnold, (1999) p22
Porter, Andrew N. "British imperial policy and South Africa 1895-9" in The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902. Ed Warwick, Peter; Spies. S. B. , (1980) p37
Henshaw, Peter. “The Origins of the Boer War” in The International Impact of the Boer War. Ed Wilson, Keith. Palgrave (2001) p20
Porter, Andrew N. "British imperial policy and South Africa 1895-9" in The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902. Ed Warwick, Peter; Spies. S. B. , (1980) p46
Henshaw, Peter. “The Origins of the Boer War” in The International Impact of the Boer War. Ed Wilson, Keith. Palgrave (2001) p19
Henshaw, Peter. “The Origins of the Boer War” in The International Impact of the Boer War. Ed Wilson, Keith. Palgrave (2001) p21