WWII Analysis

        It is true that PVT Franciavella’s ability to mass tactical fires on the enemy allowed I Company to achieve success.  However, something is to be said about the use of maneuver in the engagement.  Franciavella coordinated ‘tactical maneuver.’  Defined as the positioning of forces to close with and destroy the enemy, I Company’s bounding movements to the enemy’s position are what allowed them to pour direct fire on the Japanese.  Prior to Frianciavella’s taking over the radio, tanks were moving about the area with no fire direction.  As an element of combat power, maneuver plays a vital role in allowing for the effective massing of firepower on an objective, a role that was exemplified in the Battle of Saipan.

        Besides firepower and maneuver, another element of combat power that was epitomized during the Battle of Saipan was leadership.  The duty of every leader is to be competent in the profession of arms.  If a leader is incompetent, he or she puts the lives of his or her soldiers at risk.  In one of the more controversial decisions in WWII, the Marine Corps general in command of the ground forces stood strong in the face of adversity in order to ensure successful completion of the mission.  His decision: relieve an Army division commander.

In command of the ground troops on Saipan, known as the V Amphibious Corps, USMC General Holland Smith made the command decision on 23 June 1944 to relieve 27th Infantry Division commander, Army General Ralph Smith, on the premise that Smith “won’t make [his division] fight.”  Although Holland Smith’s decision caused heated arguments between the Army and the Marines that still continue today, he was not overstepping his boundaries.  Joint Warfare doctrine states that “joint force commanders [have] increased authority over assigned and attached forces…and have full range of authority needed to meet their responsibilities.”  Although he was within his limits, Holland Smith knew that he would be making an unpopular decision.  He realized that “dealing with the diverse elements of [his] command [would be] no easy matter, but [he felt he] dealt with them all fairly.”  However, he did what he had to do to achieve success.  This significant instance of exceptional leadership more than proves the presence of the leadership element of combat power in the Battle of Saipan and how it helped to eventually lead the US to success in battle.  

  Although firepower, leadership, and maneuver proved to be key components of the Battle of Saipan that help to make it a success, protection and information were not as evident in the campaign.  Protection is defined as the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place.  Quantitatively, the United States lost 3,000 men and suffered 13,000 casualties, making the battle the most costly Pacific operation for the United States in WWII.  It did not necessarily have to be that way, however.  Many of the casualties in the Battle of Saipan could have been avoided.  The 106th of the 27th ID, for example, was forewarned on 2 July by General Holland Smith’s G2, Colonel Yancey, that a banzai attack was likely.  However, nothing was done in preparation for the attack.  There was a 300-yard gap in between 1st and 3rd Battalions that was not covered by coordinated or planned fields of fire, a clearly elementary mistake.  The lack of proper protection cost the US 406 lives; nearly 15% of the total number of deaths in the entire battle!  While “protection is neither timidity, nor risk avoidance,” soldiers are the most important resource in the Army, and excessive casualties cripple the ability to accomplish both current and future missions.  Although the battle was a success for the United States, it was achieved at a high price.  Thus, protection was not an element of combat power that flourished in the Battle of Saipan.  

Along with protection, the ability to maintain proper communication of information to friendly units was also weak  in the Battle of Saipan.  As an element of combat power, information is defined as the material that enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and protection.  Throughout the battle, a number of communication problems constrained the United States from maximizing their combat potential.  Along with the radio failure that was mentioned earlier in the attack on Ridge 300, Marine Corps aviators experienced difficulties in communicating information amongst themselves, as well.  This was due to the fact that there existed only one radio frequency for forty-one air liaison teams.  This put a significant strain on the aviators’ ability to control Marine close air support, thus causing considerable delays in operations.                                                            

Besides creating difficulty in the air, lack of communication significantly hindered the relaying of information on the ground, as well.  On 23 June, one battalion of the 105th Infantry was assigned to “clean out Nafutan Point.”  However, difficulties in communications between Holland and Ralph Smith occurred that caused a confusion with orders of who was to do what and when.  The consequence was the entanglement of the 106th and the 165th Infantry that caused the 27th ID to stall.  While the Battle of Saipan was a success for the United States, it was not an example of how information was, or is, used in battle.  

In terms of the elements of combat power as a whole, the Battle of Saipan was an overall success.  The integrated use of maneuver, firepower, and leadership in the battle are what propelled the United States to victory over Japan.  In terms of protection and information, “the Americans displayed [the] ability to overcome such adversity by the combination of strong command, good staff work, quick thinking, aggressive tactics, determination, and hard fighting, all based on a sound plan.”  Therefore, although the elements of protection and information were lacking from the battle, the ability to effectively combine the other three elements helped the US rise above their failures and bring a triumphant end to the Battle of Saipan.

WORKS CITED

1.) Chapin, John C. Breaching the Marianas: The Battle for Saipan. Washington, D.C.:

WWII Commemorative Series Press, 1994.

        

        A secondary source.  Chapin discussed the Battle of Saipan from the early planning stages to its successful capture.  I used this source mainly to get a more detailed account of how communications were used during the ground war. Chapin did not use footnotes, so it is difficult to tell where he got his information from.

2.) Costello, John. The Pacific War. New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1982.

        

        A secondary source.  Costello wrote a history on the majority of the Pacific War. I used his account of the initial beach bombardment and also to get specific casualty numbers.  Costello lacks footnotes, as well, so it is difficult to tell how precise his information is.

 

3.) Evans, Michael. Amphibious Operations: The Projection of Sea Power Ashore.

United Kingdom: Brassey’s, 1990.

        A secondary source.  Evans’ book discusses the development of the amphibious operation and follows its maturation.  I used his analysis of the United States’ ability to overcome adversity in the early stages of the amphibious operation and what lessons we learned from it.  Although Evans used endnotes, he did separate them into chapters, thus making it easier to find where he obtained his information from.

4.) House, Jonathan M. Combined Arms Warfare. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press,

2001.

        

        A secondary source.  House discusses combined arms warfare in the 20th Century.  I used his account of the Marine Corps pilots’ inability to communicate with each other due to the lack of sufficient radio frequencies.  His work is well footnoted.

5.) Love, Edmund G. The 27th Infantry Division in World War II. Washington, D.C.:

Infantry Journal Press, 1949.

        A primary source.  Love was a Captain in the 27th ID during the Marianas Island Campaign.  He wrote a detailed description of the 27th ID’s operations in WWII.  I used his work to gain a first hand insight on how the 27th ID managed on the tactical level of war.  

6.) Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of the United States Naval Operations in World War

II: New Guinea and The Marianas—March 1944 – August 1944. Boston: Little,

Brown and Co., 1960.

        A secondary source.  Morison discussed the Navy’s involvement in New Guinea and The Marianas.  I used his book to gain a better understanding of how Naval gunfire positively affected operations in the Battle of Saipan. Morison uses footnotes throughout his book, as well.  

7.) Smith, Holland M., Percy Finch. Coral and Brass. Washington, D.C.: Zenger

Publishing Co., Inc., 1979.

        A primary source.  Smith was the commander of the Battle of Saipan.  This book is a first hand account of the Battle of Saipan from the man in charge of it.  I used this book to gain a better understanding of the battle on the operational level, as well as to gather quotes about the Smith vs. Smith conflict.  

8.) Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun. New York: Vintage Books, 1985.

        A secondary source.  Spector’s book discusses the United States war with Japan from start to finish.  I used his accounts on the Marianas Island campaign in various parts of my paper.  Overall, his book gave me an initial understanding of the battle so that I could focus my research.  Eagle Against the Sun is well footnoted.

9.) United States Army. Field Manual 3-0: Operations. Headquarters: Department of the

Army, 2001.

        A primary source.  FM 3-0 is the backbone of Army operations.  I used it to gather current Army doctrine in order to have a lens through which I could view and analyze the Battle of Saipan.  

10.) United States Air Force. The Army Air Forces in World War II: The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 – July 1944. Edited by Wesley Frank

Craven and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.

        A secondary source.  This book discusses the Air Force’s involvement in the Pacific War.  I used this book to gain a better understanding of the amount of firepower the US used in clearing the beaches of Saipan in order to allow for an amphibious assault.

11.) United States Armed Forces. Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. Norfolk:

National Defense University Press, 1991.

        A primary source.  This book is the Joint Warfare doctrine of the US Armed Forces.  I used it to gain a better understanding of what the actual joint warfare doctrine is so that I could apply it to the Battle of Saipan.

12.) Van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

        A secondary source.  This book discusses the Pacific Campaign in WWII.  Specifically, Van der Vat discusses in great detail the Battle of Saipan and the difficulties the US faced in capturing it.  I used his book to gain an insight on the strategic importance of capturing Saipan.  His book lacked good documentation.  

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