Radical Feminism
According to O’Donovan liberalism conceals the concept of power in society. It is this aspect which radical feminists focus on with its main proponent Catharine Mackinnon. For without any understanding on the gendered nature of state power she argues that “women can only accept and use state power (in the form of law) in order to improve women’s formal position.”
Radical feminism is an extreme theory which like liberals acknowledges that there is oppression in society and law plays a part. However they advocate that instead of applying pre-existing male standards we need to go the root of the problem, asking what does it mean to be reasonable and rational? It challenges the reasons for our perceptions rather than simply accepting them and asks how we come to think the way we do. This idea explores the issues facing feminism, highlighting it is not just the fact that women have been denied opportunities to determine their own lives, instead the fundamental factor is that there is a leading patriarchal system based on power within which all social relations are positioned “we should be especially wary when we hear lawyers, addicted to cognitive objectivity as they are, assert that women’s voices have a place in the existing system...The injustice of sexism is not irrationality; it is domination. Law must focus on the latter and that focus cannot be achieved through a formal lens”. If women are expected to be like men in order to be treated equally, equality itself can be seen to be a repressive ideal.
Mackinnon agrees with liberals in respect that “the sexes are not socially equal” In her work ‘Feminism Unmodified’ she accentuates that since men dominate women, the problem is the possession of power. She challenges the interior structure of society and law by focusing on its patriarchal norms and its representation of a patriarchal way of life. For Mackinnon the challenge is to reconstruct ‘women’, giving an account of the world from her perspective. Although radical feminists agree with liberals to a degree in arguing that the law is a useful mechanism in overcoming this male domination, they are careful not to place too much emphasis on its use and they do not accept that equality will be achieved for women if the discriminative legal inequalities are removed from law. They aspire for changes in the laws that will ultimately end the inequality in power. For example Mackinnon support laws that will remove pornography which in her view is male created and consequently results in women being portrayed as a sexual object. Liberals agree that most pornography is male-created and that male created pornography defines “women” as a sexual object, but they differ in that they believe, to allow the state to ban pornography would effectively give the state the power to define what is acceptable sex, thus defeating the whole concept of the radicals aim of removing male norms, it merely creates another kind of inequality; “the current state is a creature of male power, there is no reason to believe the state will define acceptable sex in a way that is consistent with an individual women’s own definition of her sexual self.” So on the face of it, it may seem that the conflicts between the broad approaches of radicals and liberals are very different; however it has been argued that this is not the case and in fact it isn’t as significant as it can be portrayed. “Liberal feminism and radical feminism are not directly opposed; rather they are looking at different elements of their oppression.”
When questioning how useful is this theory to feminist cause Mackinnon is criticised for assuming that women’s experience is a shared one, without any reference to the differences between cultures, ethnic minorities, etc. It is rejected on the basis that radicals fail to take account of the many variances among women, focusing only on how all women are different from men. To centre a theory with the contention that “women” are somehow connected in an identical way suggests that women are alike in the same crucial manner. “The universalising nature of radical feminism and its close alignment with sexuality to the exclusion of women with differing sexual orientation and to women of colour…has led to friction within feminism”.
Difference feminism/cultural feminism
This approach in differing from liberals and counteracting the essentialist criticism within radicalism holds the view that in order for women to achieve true equality, eliminating oppression we should seek to recognise women’s differences as basis for reform. Thus, arguing against the view that women should seek equality, using a male standard. They predicate that the law needs to change in a way which includes women using their different characteristics as a foundation. Irigaray holds the belief that to insist that women need to achieve equality with men in all fields of public life is the equivalent to women becoming men, and thus the differences between men and women remain hidden. Thus the concept is similar to radical feminists in regards to the fact the ‘achievement of equal political, social and economic rights with men cannot represent the end point of women’s achievement’ They are in agreement, insofar as the task that women need to undertake is to challenge the foundation of our social and cultural order. This could be regarded as a very important similarity in its impact in reform, as it goes to the heart of the problem within society, rather than just looking at the inaccuracies within the legal system. However where they differ is in terms of taking into account the female voice, Catharine Mackinnon’s dominance theory rejects any theory which places emphasis on either sameness or difference of men and women. She argues that theorists who emphasis ‘sameness’ are opposed by those who seek to highlight gender differences, and that this debate is pointless by the fact that both of these approaches are unreflective, using a male standard by which to assess whether women are the same or different from men. Robin West states that ‘radical feminists appear to be more attuned to power disparities between men and women than are cultural feminists”. The difference strategy reinforces economic, political and social subordination. The idea that women have a ‘different voice’ has been criticised for reinforcing the traditional perception of women in her feminine role. Cornell argues that gender differences theories weaken the feminist efforts in eradicating patriarchy “gender differentiation is in and of itself an evil, because it circumscribes difference and denies access to “other” in each one of us”. This type of feminism is also less concerned with the use of the law as a medium for reform, being more focused within a psychological/social setting. This could be criticised for not really offering much in drawing attention to the feminist project, rather, it is merely creating more obstacles in promoting reform by injecting more confusion and conflict into debate within feminism; a distraction from the ‘real’ feminist agenda.’
Postmodernism
A recent approach which has entered into feminist jurisprudence, with its origins from the critical legal studies movement is postmodernism. Again as similar to all the approaches outlined above it seeks to uncover the gender bias within the laws and society. This methodology seems to reject the importance of law in achieving success; instead they believe it cannot be relied upon due to its indeterminacy. They take the view that the concept of equality is a social construct, not a legal one, although like all feminists they believe it is one created according to male thought and is in need of reconstruction.
Postmodernism rejects the view that there needs to be a single theory that will benefit all women, denying that the interests of women are all the same. Fragmentation, individualism and uncertainty all portray postmodern thought, although whether uncertainty is a good thing remains to be seen. “Diversity should not be regarded as a disadvantage...but rather represents the wide and healthy diversity of ongoing debates”. Dahl celebrates the plurality within feminism in that it gives a number of methods in which legal subordination can be restructured.This leads onto the main discussion how significant are these differences?
Are these differences significant?
From an initial outlook it would seem that the differences are crucial and it would be difficult to imagine how we could identify connections between them. By not presenting a united front, it could cause problems in achieving any kind of success in reaching their common goal. If all feminists campaigned for the same objective it could mean their voices may be heard and considered more appreciably. A fragmented front could arguably be detrimental to their cause as society could merely dismiss their views as ideals, which cannot in reality ever have been achieved and in effect not taken seriously. With no common view as to how best to combat this patriarchal system there is a danger of ultimately nothing being done to achieve reform. For example do we need to deconstruct the image of women to achieve equality or demand equality on the same basis as men? With no agreement among feminists, how are we to judge what the correct standard is? Conflict between approaches means there is no focus on individual aspects that are problematic within society, so instead of achieving reforms through a process of individual stages determined by identifying the individual problems, feminists are left with the massive task of looking at problems of the legal system as a whole. “It can be both intellectually and politically valuable to have a schematic framework that enable us to map at least some of our points of agreement and disagreement.”
However is this difference necessarily detrimental to the feminists aim? For Margaret Davies a general statement of feminism ignores the fact that women are not a unified race and explains that feminism is a process. She argues that by attempting to diminish feminism to a static theory it results in the disregard of its dynamic nature, “Practical change occurs within a climate of serious reflection and diversity of opinions is in my view absolutely essential as a stimulus theory’. In creating a general identity by a dominant ideology, Davies puts forward the view that it is this is how power differences are institutionalised. Focusing on different themes could actually be beneficial to the feminist cause in their ability to cover a wide range of factors in the study of the oppression of women, something which would be far more difficult under one singular theory. For instance by incorporating both liberal and radical views we are able to gain an insight into the formal legal system with its inherent gender bias and from radical outlook it allows an insight into the social structures of society, considered together allows for a wider coverage. “Thus the feminist legal project encompasses both major theoretical questions and practical issues about the efficacy of using law as a tool for change in particular social and institutional contexts.”
The existence of various theories allows them to continuously challenge each other, looking at the faults inherent in their theory from different perspectives, which is positive in terms of their development. A diverse range of views allows there to be flexibility within feminist theory, which I believe is a key factor in achieving any real change. By refusing to allow differences in views it could lead to an abandonment of a theory completely, as society is ever changing, thus not just feminism but any theory needs to allow room within its approach to adapt to the developments. The fact that there are so many different cultures and ethnic minorities alone would mean it would be impossible to incorporate one view which would apply to all women and present a logical argument to society which would allow an opportunity to achieve change. By pushing for reform in a diverse way, feminists are providing themselves with more possibilities to accomplish their final goal.
To conclude I have presented several broad approaches to the complex issue of feminist thought, showing the variations and similarities within them. In answering the question are these differences significant and does it create barriers, undermining the feminist legal project, it could be argued that it does harm their cause for the reasons I have outlined. On the other hand it could be seen that “as long as feminist scholarship can be united at a general level by commitment to analysing the cause and nature of women’s oppression and disadvantages, differences are irrelevant” In other words if feminists remain faithful to their ultimate aim in the removal of oppression of the patriarchal hierarchy, their differences are immaterial in keeping the feminist project alive.
Biblography
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See Cain, P. (1990), “feminism and the limits of equality”, 24 Georgia Law Revenue at p804
Davies, M. (2008) Asking the law question, Sydney: Lawbook Co. at p 244
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West, R. (1988) ‘Jurisprudence and gender” 55 University of Chicago Law review at p13
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Davies, M. (2007) ‘Unity and diversity in feminist legal theory’ Philosophy Compass 2/4 at p662
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