The appellant’s contention was that the prosecution in order to succeed must show recklessness on the part of the defendant; that recklessness in this context means foresight of the likelihood or possibility of death or serious injury and a determination nevertheless to persist in the omission to provide care. Mr. Coles for the appellants relied on the decision of the court in one case, R v Lowe (Robert). Mr. Coles relied on the judgement in that case delivered by Phillimore L.J as support for his argument that there must be an appreciation by the defendant of the risk of death or serious injury before a conviction for manslaughter in these circumstances can result.
The court disagreed, saying what was really meant was that there must be proved the necessary high degree of negligence, and a direction which fails to emphasize that requirement will be defective. The court then turned their attention to the case of Andrews v DPP for a definition of the requisite degree of negligence given by Lord Atkin.
Lane L.J continued “It is clear from that passage that indifference to an obvious risk and appreciation of such risk, coupled with a determination nevertheless to run it, are both examples of recklessness.
The prosecution were told the defendant must be proved to have been indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health, or actually to have foreseen the risk but to have determined nevertheless to run. Mere inadvertence would not be enough.
Lord Justice Lane finally said, “If any criticism is to be made it would be that the decision was unduly favourable to the defence and that the direction given by the judge was wholly in accord with this principles, therefore, the appeals against conviction fail.”
With regards to Stone’s sentence it was said that an immediate custodial sentence was unavoidable, if for nothing else at least to mark the public disapproval of such behavior. However, the court showed mercy to Stone by reducing his sentence to 12 months instead of the original sentence of three years. This was partly done due to Stone being greatly handicapped.
Commentary
The details contained in this case are very emotive and raise some important issues surrounding the issue of care and the duty owed to a person who is unable to care for themselves. This is an issue that often gets media coverage, particularly where elderly people are concerned.
On one side of this argument we have an elderly couple who felt that they were under no obligation to provide a duty of care to a lodger who was also a relative to one of the appellants, their argument being that the deceased never kicked up a fuss and that they were not to know they had a duty to provide care. On the other side we have the state telling them that they did and that they should of been aware of this, especially when over a period of time the deceased’s condition started to deteriorate rapidly. The judgement is a tricky one for Lord Justice Geoffrey Lane who relied solely on case law when making his decision, arguably very little case law.
Lane LJ relied on just one case for precedent, Andrews v DPP, to discover the definition of the requisite degree of negligence which was used to show an example of recklessness which ultimately led to the appeals against conviction being dismissed. I believe that to rely on this case alone was not enough to refuse the appellants appeals.
In a case as delicate as this, especially considering the unique circumstances, a much more in depth analysis was required in order to successfully reveal whether or not both appellants took on the duty of care of the now deceased. If this was the case, were they really reckless?
The fact neither of them were able to use a telephone is a sign to me that they lacked the ability of some very basic skills in life.
Mr. Stone was described as having low average intelligence and Mrs. Dobinson was described as ineffectual and inadequate. If this is the case, how can the court then apply the definition of the requisite degree of negligence in Andrews v DPP to this case? Wilfred Andrews didn’t share any characteristics with either of the appellants. Perhaps this should have been taken into consideration?
If we look at the case closely we can see that one of the main issues here is that of the development of authority. By attempting to wash Fanny and provide her with food did the appellants assume responsibility for her? This is a difficult question to answer which is one of the reasons why this particular case is much criticized. By allowing Fanny to stay, it could be said that they allowed a relationship of reliance to develop. Did the appellants voluntarily assume responsibility though? Perhaps Dobinson did due to the fact it was found that she attempted to wash Fanny. I’m not so sure the same can be said for Mr. Stone who in fact did very little in terms of voluntarily assuming responsibility. He did not attempt to wash Fanny like Dobinson did, occasionally he would shout out and ask if Fanny was ok but that is all. Taking this into consideration, why then did Stone receive a harsher sentence than Dobinson? On what basis was this? Understandably there was a public outcry. I believe this played a large part in the appeals for conviction being refused, much more than it was stated anyway. The disapproval of the public and the media coverage this case got, in my opinion, went a long way into deciding the outcome of this case and the dismissal of the appeals. This is a very difficult case and I can see both sides to the argument. I personally would have allowed the appeals on the basis that Stone and Dobinson had capacity issues and this should of been taken into consideration. This was a very difficult case with no clear ratio decidendi.
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 4, Para 7
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 5, Para 1
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 5, Para 3
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 5, Para 6
Lowe (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 365
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 6, Para 2
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 6, Para 2
[1937] A.C. 576 – Page 5, Para 7
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 6, Para 3
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 6, Para 4
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 6, Para 5
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 6, Para 6
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 2, Para 6
(1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 186 – Page 1, Para 1