In case of plant breeding or biotech seeds, besides the fact that European Parliament called the EPO also to exclude from patenting products derived from conventional breeding and all conventional breeding methods, including SMART breeding (precision breeding) and breeding material used for conventional breeding, and the critics’ arguments that seed patents impose an abuse of the patent law by using it as a tool of misappropriation which turns agricultural resources into the intellectual property, the fact that Monsanto already owns 36% of the tomato seed varieties registered with the Plant Variety Office of the EU, as well as 32% of the paprika (sweet pepper) varieties and 49% of the cauliflower varieties, it seems to be not sufficient to argue ordre public or immoral behavior.
In addition, the fact that the second biggest applicant in this field, Syngenta, owns 26% of the tomato varieties, 24% of the paprika (sweet pepper) varieties and 22% of the cauliflower varieties doesn’t bother the EPO to apply Art 53(a) in order to compel an alteration of the present filing strategies, but illustrates that for these subject matter the public policy of the EPO relies on the fact that plants and animals are regulated by EPC Art 53(b).
But where is line draw to invoke such limitation on inventions?
Hereto, the evaluation of Art. 53(a) at the EPO was centered on the Oncomouse case. which was ruled prior to and post the introduction of the EPC Rules in 2000, whereas in terms of animals as shown above, the EPO draws the line of morality by the application of the so-called utilitarian balance test in order to exercise balance between animal suffering, potential risks for the environment and beneficial usefulness to mankind. According to this narrative the necessarily cause of suffering to the animals was sufficient to conclude immorality and render the invention for the process not patentable. However, it has to be highlighted that sharp line is drawn by the black letters of Art. 53(a) and Rule 28, since from an EU and UK perspective neither product claims, nor product-by-process claims will be affected by the non-patentability of biological processes in the above scope.
Albeit the established cost-benefit-test with regard to Art. 53(a), in Plant Genetic Systems the EPO Opposition Division neglected to employ the test in the opposition proceedings, because there was no sufficient prove to quantify the reasons for the objection. Thus, albeit ethnically questionable, the EPO’s Technical Board of Appeal denied the opposition motion and upheld the patent grant because of the EPO’s function to protect the protect the deep rooted norms of the European society but also to service both, public policy and science, respectively. Hence, the EPO took on the issues concerning public security, and physical integrity of individuals as part of society.
With regard to the above seminal cases, and in line with seminal decision in Regina (in ex parte Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health that defined that the term embryo should not be restricted to a live human embryo produced by the fertilization of a female egg, but should be interpreted to include an embryo produced without such fertilization, such as one created by cell nuclear replacement, a further subject matter that was deemed immoral can be illustrated.
Thus, with regard to stem cells to be retrieved with a destruction of a human embryo, the EU view on ethics clearly shows a prudent approach to deny patentability in this particular field of research, whereas the impeccable reasoning of the UK’s position to the future of stem cells research that was conveyed to EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal Judgment in the WARF case, shows an ethnical balance to this issue.
Biotechnology patentability ? the latest from the EPO (Patents in Europe 2013/2014,www.iam-magazine.com) <http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/article.ashx?g=00a9c7b4-cf36-49cf-9ea0-65d8a13465ce> accessed on 13 September 2013
DIRECTIVE 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 1988 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L 213/13, especially Art 6(2) which corresponds to EPC 2000 Rule 28 and sch A2 para 3;
The European Patent Convention of 2000 Art. 53 (a), Rule 28
Patent Act 1997 s 1(3) and sch A2 para 3,
Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Biotechnological Inventions in the Intellectual Property Office (IPO, July 2012 ) <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/biotech.pdf> accessed on 13 September 2013 para 103
EPC 200 Rule 28; PA 1977 sch A2 para 3(a)-(b)
ibid sch A2 para 3(c)
ibid sch A2 para 3(c)
Christoph Then & Ruth Tippe, 'President of the European Patent Office gives green light for patents on plants and animals' (Green light for patents on plants and animals, March 2013,www.no-patents-on-seeds.org) <http://www.swissaid.ch/sites/default/files/Report_New_Wave_of_Patents_2013.pdf> accessed on 13 September 2013 p10
T19/90 Harvard/Onco-Mouse [1990] EPO OJ 12/476
Ella O’Sullivan, 'Article 53(a) EPC and the patentability of animals: The effect of Rule 23d(d) on ordre public and morality evaluations in the European Patent Office' <http://www.atrip.org/Content/Essays/Article%2053a%20EPC%20and%20the%20patentability%20of%20animals.doc> accessed on 13 September 2013
ibid [1990] T19/90 paras 501, 513
Michelangelo Temmerman, 'The Patentability of Plant Genetic Inventions'(2006) 1 NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper p 11
Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace, EPO Technical Board of Appeal T 356/93 [1995] OJ EPO 545 § 26
Lionel Bently, Intellectual property law (3rd edn, OUP 2009) p 457
R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13
Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Biotechnological Inventions in the Intellectual Property Office (IPO, July 2012 ) <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/biotech.pdf> accessed on 13 September 2013 para 105
WARF/ Use of embryos [2009] EPOR 15 (G 0002/06)