The second rule, the Golden Rule, builds on the Literal rule and it suggests that if there is an absurdity with the result of the Literal rule, then the judge should seek an alternative meaning that the words of the statute carry so that there can be a conclusion that is more appropriate. R v Allen shows how the Golden rule can be used, in this case, the D was accused of bigamy, however, his defence was to take the meaning of ‘marry’ as the ‘acquiring the status of being married’ which meant that he could not ‘marry’ twice. However, judges said that the meaning of ‘marry’ was to go through the ceremony of being married, which he had already done, and therefore he was convicted. Also, Adler v George was a case where the D had broken into and demonstrated in a military base, therefore he should have been guilty of breaking and entering as well as the offence of ‘demonstrating in the vicinity of a military base’. He, however, rightly took ‘in the vicinity’ of to mean ‘near’, but, the judges felt that it would be an absurdity if he was not convicted as he had committed two offences. The judges used the Golden rule to take ‘vicinity of’ to include ‘inside’ as well and convicted him of the charges. The Golden rule has been described as an ‘unpredictable safety valve’ so that judges can escape embarrassment from situations arising from the Literal rule. It has also been criticised because there is no way of predicting what will strike a court as an absurdity sufficiently clear to justify using the Golden rule and also, in order to apply the rule, the words have to have one or more alternative meanings.
The third rule is the Mischief Rule, which came about in the 16th century in the case of Heydon. It requires a judge to consider 3 factors; firstly, what the problem was before the statute was passed, what problem or ‘mischief’ the statute was attempting to remedy and what remedy Parliament was trying to provide. Bearing in mind these factors, the judge should then interpret the statute in a way that means there will be an end to the problem Parliament was addressing. An example of the Mischief rule being put into practice comes in the case of Smith v Hughes, the offence was that it was illegal ‘to loiter or solicit on the streets or in a public place for prostitution’. The defence was that the prostitutes were behind windows in a building and therefore, not in a public place, however, LCJ Parker said in order for them to be guilty, one of three situations had to have taken place. He said that if the prostitutes were on the street, if the customers were on the street, or if both the prostitutes and the customers were on the street, then they were guilty. The prostitutes were found guilty as he claimed that ‘innocent passers-by on the street were being molested’. This shows how it can be argued that the Mischief rule allows judges to overreach themselves, as LCJ Parker was making the law when it was not in his power to. This approach has been supported because it encourages courts to look at the context in which the doubtful words appear rather than directing purely towards single words. Also, in it helps to avoid injustice and absurdity and has been described as a ‘rather more satisfactory approach’ that the first two rules. It has been argued that this approach is not satisfactory; this is because when the rule was made judges were usually the ones that drafted bills on ‘behalf of the king’ and so they were better qualified to decide what the previous law was and what the statute intended to remedy. It has been said to make judges into ‘law-makers’ rather than ‘law-finders’.
The final rule is the Purposive Rule, which establishes that the judges should only be allowed to interpret the statute ‘as far as it will allow’. In the case of Black v Papier, it was argued that ‘we often are looking for the intention of Parliament, that is not quite accurate, we are seeking not what Parliament meant, but the true meaning of what they said’. The Purposive approach also existed in the case of Jones v Tower Boot Co. Ltd where the issue of the liability of an employer over their employee’s actions (in this case racist behaviour) was concerned.
As aforementioned, judges can also use Presumption to help them interpret statutes. There are certain techniques of Presumption, the first of which is Eiusdem Generis, this is when general words that follow specific words are taken to include only things of the same kind. Also, there is the guidance of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius which suggests that express mention of one things, implies the exclusion of another. For example, the term ‘Persian cats’ would imply that it would not include any other breed of cat. Another conclusion is that a word draws meaning from other words around it whereby mentioning the term ‘cat baskets, toy mice and food’ would imply the ‘food’ was cat food. It has also been argued that laws which create crimes should be interpreted in favour of the citizen when there is an ambiguity.
