In the light of the Royal Commissions comments critically assess the effectiveness of the ways in which the police are held accountable in the exercise of their legal powers.
Criminal Justice
In the light of the Royal Commission's comments critically assess the effectiveness of the ways in which the police are held accountable in the exercise of their legal powers.
Before any discussion of effectiveness can begin an outline of the organisation of the police force and to whom they are accountable is necessary. Then we shall move on to look at the Police Complaints Authority and its procedures, making note of their effectiveness as they are discussed. From this final conclusions will be drawn.
There are two police forces operating within Great Britain. Firstly there is the standard police force for England and Wales, which comprises of 43 forces in total divided by geographical area, and there is also the Metropolitan police force that concerns itself with policing in London. The reason for separating these two are they have a slightly different structure and so should be considered both individually and in comparison to one another. The Commissioner is the most senior rank within MPD forces, followed by the Deputy Commissioner, then Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Assistant Commissioner and one or two commanders. Non MPD forces have Chief Constable and an Assistant Chief Constable. A key issues when considering police organisation is who they are answerable or accountable to. One of the notable features of British policing is its independence from political control, this of course has its downsides and such autonomy and distance from central government has been criticised1. The Police Act 1964 set up the basics of the police force as it operates today. The key feature of the British system of governance of the police is the tripartite structure of police accountability made up of local police authority, Government Home Secretary and police force chief constable. This system in fact reflects the traditional British constitutional doctrine of separation of power2. The police and Magistrates Act of 1994 made a few changes to the original design of the tripartite but the structure as explained above still exists. The police authority is charged with maintaining an efficient and effective police force for its area. It is responsible for policy but cannot make operational policing decisions. Police authority members comprise nine locally elected councillors, five 'independent' members appointed from a short list prepared by the Home Secretary, and three magistrates. There are very few requirements in statute with which the chief constable must comply. He/she has 'direction and control' of the force. He or she has operational independence and has flexibility in how the local police service is delivered. However, the chief officer must operate with regard to the policing plan, which is owned by the police authority 3. Police authorities are the means of local accountability for police forces throughout England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Their consultations with local people, which they are statutorily required to perform, provide an important and transparent link between the police and the public they serve. Following these consultations the police authority duty is to prepare a policing plan, setting out local priorities and targets, and to hold the chief constable to account for delivering an effective and efficient service. Police authorities also appoint chief officers and now have a more active role within police discipline procedures. And since April 1999 police authorities have a duty to deliver continuous improvement by conducting best value reviews of all aspects of policing performance and activity. The most important player in the structure has become the Home Secretary. The Government Minister can require a police authority to dismiss the chief constable, directly or indirectly controls about three quarters of police finance, and can use the Royal prerogative (residual Crown power now vested in the Government) to protect the Queen's Peace to override the wishes of the local police authority and elected representatives. The Home Secretary is answerable to Parliament and the public for the provision of an effective and efficient police service. He has a strategic role in setting ministerial priorities for the service and performance targets for those priorities4
The Metropolitan Police Force does not have a police authority and the Commissioner is directly answerable to the Home Secretary5. Although the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Kate Hoey, stated 'The House will know that we have plans to bring the arrangements in London closer to those that apply in the rest of England and Wales' on the 22nd June 19996. Indicating here her confidence in procedures that existed outside of the Metropolitan Police department. She went on to say 'The police authority also provides local democratic accountability through its members, the majority of whom ...
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The Metropolitan Police Force does not have a police authority and the Commissioner is directly answerable to the Home Secretary5. Although the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Kate Hoey, stated 'The House will know that we have plans to bring the arrangements in London closer to those that apply in the rest of England and Wales' on the 22nd June 19996. Indicating here her confidence in procedures that existed outside of the Metropolitan Police department. She went on to say 'The police authority also provides local democratic accountability through its members, the majority of whom are local councillors'. In regard to metropolitan police she also gave a small speech of confidence, stating 'However, the hon. Gentleman raised, among other questions, the issue of whether the Metropolitan police have operated objectively and fairly in deciding whether to investigate certain allegations, and in the conduct of the subsequent investigations.... I must emphasise that the police retain, as they must, independence in such operational decisions. That is necessary in the interests of the impartial maintenance of the law. However, it is vital that the police should be properly accountable for their operational decisions and investigations. They are, of course, answerable to the courts, but there are also special arrangements in place for making complaints against the police and for the investigation of such complaints'7.
Having discussed structure within the police force the question of accountability can be better explored. In the exercise of their duties the individual police officer is accountable to their superior, but they are also accountable to the law. They must both operate within the same laws as apply to the public and those rules specific to the police. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) is the primary legislation put in place to protect the public from abuse of police power. The act provides for the creation of Codes of Practice, which govern police behaviour. The breach of a code is not an offence in itself, but can be the basis of a complaint from which disciplinary action can be taken. Additionally, a significant transgression may lead to the exclusion of evidence in any subsequent trial8 The codes cover all areas of police work, including arrests procedures, searching of property, recording of interview and those rules relating to the handling of evidence. However, despite these safeguards which are admirable in attempt to ensure minimal misconduct, they are not always successful. In 1981, there were 1,542 substantiated complaints against police officers in England and Wales, and 847 in 1997-1998. Although the total of complaints increased, from 32,443 to 35,820, the number substantiated has fallen by nearly one half. When a complaint is made aggrieved citizens can complain to the force in question and there are certain practices in place to protect the citizen's interests9. Sir Robert Mark gave the creation of the police complaints board (PCB) in 1975 as reason for his resignation as Metropolitan police commissioner. Ten years later the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) replaced the PCB, and was granted a supervisory role in the investigation of complaints and disciplinary powers10. While a supervisory external body seems a good idea in theory it has been criticised as not being as effective as is necessary, an extract from the guardian paper makes this clear; 'Since the 1964 police act set the shape of the current arrangements for police accountability there have been several attempts to achieve a satisfactory system for making complaints against the police. None has so far succeeded in commanding the confidence of both police and public'11.
To properly judge the effectiveness of the police complaints procedure we must look at it in detail. Below is an outline of the procedure as stated by the Police Act 199612.
(1) Where a complaint is submitted to the chief officer of police for a police area, he shall take any steps that appear to him to be desirable for the purpose of obtaining or preserving evidence relating to the conduct complained of.
(2) After complying with subsection (1), the chief officer shall determine whether he is the appropriate authority in relation to the member of a police force whose conduct is the subject of the complaint.
(3) If the chief officer determines that he is not the appropriate authority, he shall-
(a) Send the complaint or, if it was submitted orally, particulars of it, to the appropriate authority, and
(b) Give notice that he has done so to the person by whom or on whose behalf the complaint was submitted.
From looking at this part only the procedure seems fairly foolproof. In all cases any complaint must be recorded to try and ensure that the citizen is protected. The act also gives clear instruction on what is to be done in the case of the complaint. It does however rely heavily on the initial subjective decision of the chief officer who is trusted to act appropriately.
(1) If a chief officer of police determines that he is the appropriate authority in relation to a member of a police force-
(a) Whose conduct is the subject of a complaint, and
(b) Who is not a senior officer,
he shall record the complaint.
(2) After recording a complaint under subsection (1), the chief officer of police shall consider whether the complaint is suitable for informal resolution and may appoint a member of his force to assist him.
(3) A complaint is not suitable for informal resolution unless-
(a) the member of the public concerned gives his consent, and
(b) the chief officer of police is satisfied that the conduct complained of, even if proved, would not justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings.
(4) If it appears to the chief officer of police that the complaint is suitable for informal resolution, he shall seek to resolve it informally and may appoint a member of his force to do so on his behalf.
In the case of the above if an informal resolution is deemed appropriate the majority of decision making is still the concern of the chief officer. Here however he can elect to have a member of his own force to help. This aids to some extent impartiality but not to a great extent.
6) If, after attempts have been made to resolve a complaint informally, it appears to the chief officer of police-
(a) that informal resolution of the complaint is impossible, or
(b) that the complaint is for any other reason not suitable for informal resolution,
he shall appoint a member of his own or some other force to investigate it formally.
By appointing an officer from another force, the citizen here is ensured of some greater impartiality, but the option to do this still falls to the chief officer. If he does however choose someone outside of his own force the act also ensures that the investigating officer has not been previously connected with the case. Also any formal investigations are supervised be PCA adding a further element of protection
) Where a complaint about the conduct of a senior officer-
(a) is submitted to the appropriate authority, or
(b) is sent to the appropriate authority under section 67(3),
the appropriate authority shall record and, subject to subsection (2), investigate it.
(2) If satisfied that the conduct complained of, even if proved, would not justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings, the appropriate authority may deal with the complaint according to the appropriate authority's discretion.
(3) In any other case, the appropriate authority shall appoint a member of the appropriate authority's force or of some other force to investigate the complaint.
In cases against senior officers a member of another force is nearly always assigned to investigate to ensure there is no misconduct. While in theory this a good idea, it still dies not eliminate the possibility of the case ineffectively handled either purposefully or otherwise.
In general, as can be seen above, the Police Complaints Procedure has attempted where possible to an effective method whereby the police are accountable for their actions. However the "who guards the guardians" is one of the most vexed issues in the art of governance. In the case of the investigation of a senior officer it is still the case of the police policing themselves13. The procedures in general are self-monitoring in nature, and only when the situation in of a very serious nature does any form of effective external monitoring come into play. However a major study evaluating the PCA suggests that it can operate effectively in its supervisory role resource constraints normally prevent more than token supervision14Yet other studies also show that the current system fails to command confidence among complainants, the police or the public at large15. When considering the suitability of another body investigating the police it must considered that while the police investigating their own officers has attracted criticism there are very few other professionals qualified to undertake such investigations16. By and large the general consensus seems to be a negative one. Due to a lack of faith in existing procedures increasingly, civil actions against the police have been resorted to. For example, miners who alleged police brutality at the Orgreave picket line during the 1984-1985-coal dispute had no faith in the complaint process and turned to the civil courts to pursue claims for compensation. In June 1991, 39 members of the National Union of Mineworkers collectively settled their action against the chief constable of South Yorkshire police for a total of £425,00017. Police misconduct exists in various guises - brutality, fabrication of evidence, corruption, racism, for example - all of which have attracted intense media attention in recent years18. The more private cases that are taken to court, and are made the subject of media attention, the more the public will lose faith in the existing measures. In this respect even if the manner in which police officers are held accountable was reasonably effective more of the time, individual cases such as that of Stephen Lawrence, would continue shatter public confidence.
However, the Police Complaints procedures shown above do not include the relevant sections whereby the complaint identifies possible criminal proceedings. In this case the crown prosecution service takes over, this external body does offer a better sense of impartiality in that police matters are being investigated not only by the police. Besides the complaints procedure other general criticisms that have been levelled at the police for their investigative role in their own affairs include that in court, in some cases the reality is often the police officers word against a defendants. Given police officers are trained to present evidence in court, they are likely to appear more credible witnesses, especially where they enjoy public confidence19. Also by employing officers from the same station to investigate complaints against another officer its not unreasonable to think they may not work as hard to uncover any misconduct. This could be a deliberate attempt to shield a friend or a subconscious action out of a desire to protect the station from criticism. On the whole I believe that while matters would be much worse if PACE and the PCA were not in existence, current procedures do not at the moment prove to be entirely effective.
Bibliography
Books
Davies Croall and Tyrer 1998 Criminal justice 2nd ed. Longman, England.
Reiner 1997 Policing and the Police in he Oxford Handbook of Criminology 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press, New York
Reiner 1991 Chief Constables, Oxford University Press, New York.
Web-Sites
European Information Service http://www.lgib.gov.uk/eis/2000/feb/articles/01.htm
Guardian Unlimited www.guardian.co.uk
Home Office Web-site www.hmso.gov.uk/
Parliament Stationary Office www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/
Davies 1998, Criminal Justice 2nd Ed Longman pp 104
2 http://www.lgib.gov.uk/eis/2000/feb/articles/01.htm
3 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990622/debtext/90622-48.htm
4 http://www.lgib.gov.uk/eis/2000/feb/articles/01.htm
5 Reiner 1991 Chief Constables pp250
6 www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990622/debtext/90622-48.htm
7 www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990622/debtext/90622-48.htm
8 Davies 1998, Criminal Justice 2nd Ed Longman pp 107
9 Davies 1998, Criminal Justice 2nd Ed Longman pp 106
0 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3879166,00.html
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3879166,00.html
2 All extracts from http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/96016--f.htm
3 Davies 1998, Criminal Justice 2nd Ed Longman pp 106
4 Reiner 1997Policing and the Police in he Oxford Handbook of Criminology 2nd Ed. Pp1028
5 Reiner 1997Policing and the Police in he Oxford Handbook of Criminology 2nd Ed. Pp1028
6 Davies 1998, Criminal Justice 2nd Ed Longman pp 106
7 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3879166,00.html
8 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3879166,00.html
9 Davies 1998, Criminal Justice 2nd Ed Longman pp 106