Critically analyse what makes for sufficient disclosure in the description of a patentable invention, focusing in particular on Biogen v Medeva and subsequent related cases. Is this a case of one rule for simple products and another for complex product-by-process claims?
The traditional law of insufficiency is derived from the conception of the disclosure in a patent specification as the patentee's consideration to provide to society at large as the quid pro quo for a patent monopoly in a contractual sense[1], and can be traced back to Liradet[2]. The general concept of disclosure in modern insufficiency established thereby was further developed and molded in UK statutory law[3] that most relevantly raises insufficiency as revocation ground[4]. The requirement set out thereby is that a patent specification shall constitute an enabling disclosure of the invention claimed in the claims[5], and thus, a specification is deemed insufficient if a person skilled in the art that follows the express teaching of the disclosure cannot perform the invention at all or without a prolonged, research, enquiry or experiment[6]. In addition, the common law doctrine of undue claim width comprises this insufficiency principle, in particular with regard to claim objections to an unduly breadth relative to the extent of disclosure, i.e. for covetous claiming[7]. The so-called Biogen insufficiency[8] goes further and hearkens back to the development of chemical product claims in the UK’s early 20th century when chemical inventions were limited to product-by-process claims[9]. At those times, any chemical product had to be defined by its distinct method of
![Consider the idea of inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality. [EPC2000, Article 53(a)] Contrast these types of patent subject matter with other related subject matter which has been found to be patentable. Where do the borders of morality/immorality seem to lie in current law?](https://mbt-essays-prod-public.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/1212315/listing/1212315_1.jpg)
Consider the idea of inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality. [EPC2000, Article 53(a)] Contrast these types of patent subject matter with other related subject matter which has been found to be patentable. Where do the borders of morality/immorality seem to lie in current law?
With regard to the excluded subject matters especially the exploitation of biotechnological inventions such as life patenting with regard to human related gene modifications, stem cell research, but also the breeding of plant and animal varieties has drawn lots of publicity[1]. But what inventions are deemed moral or immoral from a public ordre perspective in Europe? For subject matters which come under the respective provisions for not granting a right to inventions of which the commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality, the European Regime provided legislative guidance by issuing the EC Biotechnology Directive[2] which is reflected in the EPC 2000[3] and, despite some slight verbatim differences, is enacted in the statutes and schedules of the Patent Act 1977[4]. At the IPO, the threshold for moral issues goes beyond biotechnological invention, and thus, is broadly defined by the respective examination guidelines as to prevent the patent grant of an invention that would be expected to encourage offensive, immoral or antisocial behavior[5]. Nevertheless, the respective schedule focuses on biotechnology and sets out that processes for cloning human beings and modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings[6] are clearly excluded on grounds of immorality, whereas the uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes also come