Juries - an overview.

INTRODUCTION

“The lamp that shows that freedom lives”

This phrase was used by Lord Devlin to describe juries. I personally feel that this phrase had concisely and precisely describe the jury system. This is because the jury system gives opportunity to the layman to participate in the administration of legal system, to ensure that justice is done. It cannot be deny that the ‘lamp’ is shinning a little dimmer today, as the role of juries in court is declining. However, juries are still important, for its presence define truth and justice. Beside, it had also been accepted since our ancestor’s time that the jury of ’12 good men and true’ is the heartbeat of the British Legal System.

OVERVIEW OF JURY SYSTEM

A jury is a group of men and women who sit in court, listen to evidence and decide whether the court had establish beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases or on the balance of probability for civil cases, that the defendant had commit the offence charged.

Juries had been used in the English Legal System since a thousand years ago. The jury system was imported into Britain after the Norman Conquest. However, it must be recognise that the early function of jury is very different form what it is today. The very first jury had acted as witness and provides information to the court. Later, Henry II changed the function of jury to one who deliberates on evidence. Slowly, the jury system mold into the system we have today.

The main act that governs the jury system is the Jury Act 1974, which were largely amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Qualifications for Jury Service

Prior to 1972, only those who owned a house would be consider as eligible to serve as a jury. In 1965, the Morris Committee had concluded that 78% of the names in the annual electoral register did not qualify as a jury under the strict criteria. The committee had concluded that serving, as a juror should be the counterpart of citizenship. Hence, qualification for a jury had widened in the Criminal Justice Act 1972 by basing on the right to vote.

Besides, Section 321 of and Sched. 33 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 had also widened the pool of eligible jurors, which were considered as ineligible under the Juries Act 1974. The reform had been implemented due to Auld LJ’s recommendation, which suggested that a large portion of the community were not serving as juries when juries should be a representation of the whole society.

Thus, Section 1 of the Juries Act 1974 which is now substitute by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, provides that a person will be qualify as a jury if he is aged between 18 and 70 and register as a voter; a resident in the United Kingdom for at least 5 years since 13 years old; not disqualified for jury service; and not mentally disordered.

Summoning Jurors

The Central Jury Summoning Bureau was established in 2001 to administer the process of selecting enough jurors for the whole country. Since being a juror is a public duty, it is compulsory for citizens to perform their duty and failure to do so, will be subject to a £1,000 fine.

A random list of jurors is produce from the annual electoral register. Then, summons will be send out together with a form to return confirming that the person is not disqualify from serving as a jury. From there, a jury panel is form.

The Role of the Jury

Before juries settle into the jury box, they have to take an oath to ‘faithfully try the defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence’. Hence, weighing up evidence and decide what the truth is, would be the sole duty of jury.

The judge will direct the jury about the relevant laws and what they should consider when reaching a verdict. Juries have to follow the directions closely and reach a verdict.

In criminal cases, the jury will decide whether the defendant is guilty and the judge will decide on the appropriate sentence. On the other hand, in civil cases, jury have dual role. This mean that jury have to decide whether the claimant had successfully proved his case, and if the claimant had, the jury have to go on and decide on the amount of damages that the defendant is liable.

Independence of Jury

It had been explained that the jury is the sole arbiters of fact. Thus, their verdicts are final since they are the only one who can decide what really happened and what the truth is. So, even if the judge is not satisfied with the decision of a jury, he has no say in it. The independence of jury had been established in the year 1670 in Bushell’s case. The court in this case had held that jury is independent and the judge cannot challenge their decision.

CONFIDENTIALITY OF JURY DELIBERATIONS

Confidentiality of jury deliberations is also defined as jury secrecy. The law, which had, allows jury secrecy can be seen in both common law and statue. In common law, this principle can be traced back as far as 1785 and it prohibits the court from obtaining evidence from jury about anything said or done to reach the verdict. The rule applies as soon as the jury is empanelled.

Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 had later supplemented the common law in this area. In the case of Attorney- General v New Statesman, a lacuna had been revealed under common law. In this case, it had become clear that it is not contempt at common law if there were only mere disclosure of the secrets of the jury room unless it interferes with the finality of jury verdicts. Thus, Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 was enacted. In Section 1 of the statue, it was clearly laid down that ‘it is a contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, opinion expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in any legal proceedings’.

With both the common law and act of parliament, I can safely conclude that jury deliberations are taken place secretly and after the trial, it remains confidential. Hence, the court will not investigate whether deliberations had properly conducted.

There are parties, who had agreed with the jury confidentiality rule. However, on the other hand, there are also some parties who did not welcome its existence. Lord Steyn explained this in his dissenting judgment in R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock. This issue will be dealt later below.

Jury Secrecy and European Convention on Human Rights

Since jury secrecy bans the court from having any knowledge of what happen in the jury room, there is much debate on whether this had lead to fair trial. It is questionable whether a rule which had significantly curtails the ability of the court to investigate the impropriety of the jury is consider as compatible with Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which provides that everyone has the right to fair trial.

Recently, the House of Lords had a good opportunity to consider this issue in the conjoined appeals of R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock. In both of these cases, a juror, after conviction of the defendants, alleged that there had been misconduct during deliberations in the jury rooms. In Court of Appeal, both appeals were dismissed because it had been made clear by the common law and Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 that investigating the impropriety is not allowed. The decision of Mirza and Connor had also said to follow the decision of R v Qureshi. Subsequently, ...

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In the case of Mirza and Connor, the House of Lords had considered the issue of jury secrecy for the very first time. The majority of the judges had held that the confidentiality of jury deliberations did not breach Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and all the defendants had a fair trial. The judge did not merely decide that the rule was compatible, they had gave justification for their decision.

Although majority had agreed that rule of confidentiality is compatible with Article 6, Lord Steyn had came back with a dissenting judgment. Although he had accepted that the secrecy rule is important and there must have a general rule to make jury deliberations inadmissible, he also argued that the Court of Appeal should have the power ‘in exceptional cases’ to examine material regarding jury deliberations. Lord Steyn in his dissenting judgment explained that, if there is strong evidence suggesting that the jury is not impartial but the court is not allow to investigate jury deliberations, there would be no public confidence.

R v Mirza had resulted in Practice Direction (Crown Court: Guidance to Jurors). Under the practice direction, trial judge should direct the jury that it is jury’s duty to inform him immediately if there is any irregularity. This is because if the court investigates impartiality before the verdict is given, it does not consider as offending Section 8(1) of the 1981 Act.

R v Mirza had also gave a narrow definition to the word ‘deliberations’. Lord Hope of Craighead had held that deliberating by drawing lots or tossing a coin could be categorise into a totally different category. If that ever happened, it would amount to a complete repudiation by the jury of their only function, to give a true verdict according to evidence. Thus, confidentiality principle only limited to ‘deliberations’. If a jury had failed to deliberate at all, the rule will not apply.

EVALUATION ON WHETHER THE CONFIDENTIALITY PRINCIPLE SHOULD STAND

The secrecy rule exists since 1785 and people are still implementing it. Thus, there must have strong justification why it can survive until today. However, there are also people who had question its presence. Hence, whether secrecy rule should stand, can be argue in both way. Namely, yes and no.

Justification for Confidentiality Principle to Stand

Firstly, the confidentiality principle should stand to ensure finality of verdict. It is very important to have a clear cut off point where defendant cannot appeal any further. If after trial, defendants are allowed to argue that the jury is not impartial, the courts will be too busy investigating jury deliberations. Hence, it is important that the defendants have no power to question the verdict.

Next, confidentiality principle should stand to ensure that juries are free from pressure in their decision. Jurors who are free from outside influences can return an unpopular verdict. This ensures that jury can speak frankly without the fear of intimidation. A verdict should be reached at the jury’s freewill. If jury comes to a verdict because they fear of the possibility of threat, then the jury had repudiated their role to consider verdict basing solely on evidence.

Besides, the secrecy rule allows jury not to give reasons for their verdict. I personally am not ready to serve on a jury if I have to give reasons for my verdict. This is because by explaining a verdict, I am opening myself up for criticism. Public might assess and evaluate the reasons my fellow jury and I used to reach a verdict and when it is not good enough, we will be criticised.

In order to protect jury from harassments and uphold their privacy, the confidentiality principle has to stand. When the judge or the public knows about how jury deliberate, they will measure the quality of the jury with their own yardsticks. If they are not up to the expected standards, jury might be harassed to improve or change the way they deliberate.

In the case of Gregory v United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had stated that ‘the rule governing the secrecy of jury deliberation is a crucial role and legitimate feature of English trial law which serves to reinforce the jury’s role as the ultimate arbiter of fact and to guarantee open and frank deliberations among jurors’ Thus, even if ECHR had recognised the importance of jury secrecy and approve its presence, I can find no reasons why the United Kingdom’s courts should go against it. UK courts should be bound by ECHR.

Above are the justifications on why the confidentiality principle should stand.

Confidentiality Principle Should Not Stand

One of the reasons why confidentiality principle should not stand is because it allows miscarriages of justice goes unchallenged. Once the jury gave their verdict, the court is prohibited from investigating anything that happen in the jury room even if jury impropriety becomes clear later on. Thus, if there are miscarriages of justice, jury secrecy prohibits any efforts to put things right and that is justice not done.

It had been discussed earlier that the principle should stand in order to prevent jury from giving reasons for their verdict. However, I would also argue that the principle should not stand due to this as well. Jury secrecy rule provides that jury does not have to give reasons for the verdict. This can lead to perverse decisions. By just giving a verdict without any justifications, there is no way to ensure whether the jury understand the case and come to the decisions for the right reasons.

The confidentiality principle also banned any study of jury decision- making. If we want to improve on something, we have to know its shortcomings. Same applies to the effectiveness of jury too. To improve jury’s quality, the shortcomings of jury have to be known. Sadly, jury secrecy curtails all means to improve the effectiveness of jury since it does not allow the study of jury decision- making.

Section 8 of the 1981 Act was enacted with the purpose of preventing the media from pressuring jury to reveal their deliberations, but it is seem that the Act had been used to make jury’s life difficult by prosecuting those who reveal their deliberations. It is not uncommon that the jury had reached a verdict with impeccable thoroughness and objectivity but still talk about what happened in the jury room. Subsequently, they are charge, but there’s no harm done to anyone. Hence, it is argue that its unnecessary, unrealistic and somewhat absurd for the law to prosecute those type of jurors simply because there is a secrecy rule.

Lastly, in order for the jury secrecy rule to stand, the courts have to assume that juries act in a proper manner and they are the ‘model’ jury. As Lord Avonside had explained, “If this assumption is not made then trial by jury would be meaningless in this sense, that if it were accepted that directions in law might be regarded or disobeyed, justification for trial by jury in indictment proceedings would collapse.” This means that if the assumption is not made, then there is no point carrying out trial by jury. However, there is no guarantee that juries are the ‘ideal jury’ that the court expected them to be. They might not be impartial, might not focus solely on evidence to reach a verdict, or might not even follow the judge’s direction. This is seemed to be unfair for the defendants. Thus, the rule should not stand on the basis that the assumption of ‘model’ or ‘ideal’ jury cannot always be made.

There are both sides pulling the string on whether the confidentiality principle should stand. In my humble opinion, both arguments are of substance. It cannot be deny that this principle is an important one but there are also clear justifications that had weakened the rule. Hence, I personally feel that the principle should stand, but with modifications to make it a more desirable rule.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ON CONFIDENTIALITY PRINCIPLE

The United States

The use of juries to decide cases is also a distinguishing feature of the American legal system. There is a clear distinction on confidentiality principle between UK and US.

The very first case, which brought up the issue of jury secrecy in US, is United States v Smith. The court in this case had clearly stated that the confidentiality principle could be lifted when secrecy defeated its original purpose.

The First Amendment made to the US Constitution had once again weakened the jury secrecy rule. The amendment had prevented US courts from imposing restrictions to jury to discuss about what happen in the jury room and their experiences.

New Zealand

New Zealand is also not as conservative as the United Kingdom when dealing with jury confidentiality.

The New Zealand Law Commission had argued that jury secrecy would sometimes lead to miscarriages of justice. The Commission also recommended that when there is miscarriage of justice, evidence about jury impropriety should be made admissible.

US and New Zealand had adopted a more relax confidentiality principle compared to the UK. With such a rule, there might have certain advantages. For example, there would have lesser chance for miscarriages of justice because jury deliberations can be investigate. The public can also enquire into what happen in the jury room and reasons for their verdict will be known. All this will further promote public confidence. Besides, academics can also carry out study of the jury decision-making. This would not only increase knowledge of the law scholars but also improve the effectiveness of jury system since the shortcomings of the system are made known.

However, the US and New Zealand jury secrecy rule might not be a very attractive one too. This is because such a model will not incorporate those virtues a conservative confidentiality principle has. Example, jury will be open up to harassment, jury might not speak frankly during deliberations because they are fear of intimidation.

Canada

Canada jury confidentiality principle is as strict as UK’s.

In both the appeal case of R v Pan and R v Sawyer, the courts made it clear that no investigation could be done to jury deliberations.

The importance of putting Canada into my comparative study is to prove that UK has its supporters for the jury secrecy rule too. Canada had reinforced that there are justifications for the rule to stand and UK is not alone in this.

REFORMS ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY PRINCIPLE

It had been established that neither UK nor other countries, which uses jury, have the perfect jury confidentiality principle. Thus, it is important to have reforms in order to place the rule as close as possible to perfection. Focus will be given to reforms of UK jury confidentiality principle. It must be clear that reforming the confidentiality principal mean, making jury deliberation more accessible.

Recording Jury Deliberations

Firstly, recording jury’s deliberations can be use in order to achieve a looser jury secrecy rule. How the jury behaves in the jury room? How the jury reaches a verdict? Is there any impropriety? All these questions cannot be answered today as the confidentiality principle contempt people from asking just anything about jury deliberations.

By recording jury deliberation, the public can review the tape whenever necessary. If there is jury impropriety, investigation is still possible to carry out. Often, courts refused to investigate jury impropriety because of the difficulty to trace back what had been said. The recoded tapes would ease the investigation of jury deliberations by having records of what happened in the jury room. However, recoded tapes must be seal up and only review when miscarriages of justice becomes clear.

This reform has the advantage of not completely barring the public from knowing what happened in the jury room. The current situation suggested that even if there is clear miscarriage of justice, nothing could be done. If the jury deliberations are recorded, justice could be done by putting things right again.

Besides, reasons for arriving at the verdict can also be inquire. By knowing the reasons for such a verdict, the court can justify whether the verdict is one that should stand.

Employ an Assessor

Next reform is to have some ‘form of control’ as to jury deliberations by placing an assessor into the jury room. This will also relax the confidentiality of jury room and promotes fair trial.

One of the main problems of confidentiality principle is impropriety. In a secret jury room, jury might not be doing the right thing or having the correct behavior. This will later affect the verdict reach. The assessor will make sure that the jury follow as closely as possible to the directions given by the judge, they are acting in a proper manner and deliberations are discuss focusing solely on evidence. He will not involve in any discussion or voting. His presence is to merely act as a checkout. If anything went wrong, the assessor will correct the jury there and then.

By having this reform, the problem of jury impropriety can be reduced. This is because the quality of the jury would be increase. They are now doing exactly just what the court expect them to do. If they went off track, there will be someone leading them back to the track. Hence, situations as to what happened in R v Young, where jury had deliberated by using the Ouija board will not happened as the assessors will be certain enough to stop them from deliberating in that way.

Answer a Set of Questions

Jury confidentiality principle also allows jury to give a verdict without explaining the reasons of such decision. Perverse decision would be resulted. The last reform of the rule, which requires jury to answer questionnaires set by the trial judge would solve this problem.

By requiring jury to answer questions about the case, the judge can make sure that jury understand the case well for its deliberation job. From those questions, jury are also lead to reach a verdict for the right reasons since there would be some elements favourable to the prosecution while some favourable to the defendants.

CONCLUSION

It is a trite that “justice must not only be done, but must also seen to be done”.

I cannot deny that the jury secrecy rule is an important one, which must be sustained. However, there are too many loopholes in the confidentiality principle, which the United Kingdom is currently adopting. I thought that if the rule on jury secrecy remains stationary, sooner or later UK law would be face with challenges from majority parties. Hence, if the jury confidentiality rule were reform, the UK law would be a step closer to ‘justice had seen to be done’.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

REFERENCE BOOKS

Ingman, Terence, “The English Legal Process,” (11th Edition, 2006), Oxford.

Martin, Jacqueline, “The English Legal System,” (4th Edition, 2005), Hodder Arnold.

Slapper, Gary and Kelly, David, “The English Legal System,” (8th Edition, 2006), Routledge- Cavendish.

ARTICLES

Bindman, Geoffrey, “It’s good to talk,” 16th June 2006, New Law Journal.

Daly, Gillian, “Case Note: Jury Secrecy: R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock,” July 2004, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

Parry, R, Gwynedd, “Jury Service for All? Analysing Lawyers as Jurors,” 1st April 2006, Journal of Criminal Law.

Timmis, Cameron, “JURIES: Trial by error?” 28th September 2006, Law Society Gazette.

INTERNET RESOURCES

Anonymous, “Common Law Rule of Jury Secrecy,” 13th January 2008, <http://www.crimlaw.org/defbrief156.html>.

Kadish, Mark, “Behind the Locked Door of An American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process,” 13th January 2008, <http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/frames/241/kaditxt.html>.

Martin, Jacqueline, “The English Legal System,” (4th Edition, 2005), Hodder Arnold, 254.

Slapper, Gary and Kelly, David, “The English Legal System,” (8th Edition, 2006), Routledge- Cavendish, 299.

Martin, Jacqueline, “The English Legal System,” (4th Edition, 2005), Hodder Arnold, 254.

Ingman, Terence, “The English Legal Process,” (11th Edition, 2006), Oxford, 249.

Martin, Jacqueline, “The English Legal System,” (4th Edition, 2005), Hodder Arnold, 245- 246.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 had made it a requirement for lawyers, judges, police officers and those involved within the administration of justice to do jury service.

Parry, R, Gwynedd, “Jury Service for All? Analysing Lawyers as Jurors,” 1st April 2006, Journal of Criminal Law.

A person will be disqualify from jury service if he is on bail in criminal proceedings; sentence to imprisonment for life, detention for life, or custody for life during Her Majesty’s pleasure or during the pleasure of the Secretary of State for public protection; served any part of a sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of detention, or had passed on him a suspended sentence of imprisonment at any time over the last ten years; and had a community order or other community sentence passed on him at any time over the last ten years.

Ingman, Terence, “The English Legal Process,” (11th Edition, 2006), Oxford, 249.

Slapper, Gary and Kelly, David, “The English Legal System,” (8th Edition, 2006), Routledge- Cavendish, 307.

Martin, Jacqueline, “The English Legal System,” (4th Edition, 2005), Hodder Arnold, 248- 249.

Timmis, Cameron, “JURIES: Trial by error?” 28th September 2006, Law Society Gazette.

Martin, Jacqueline, “The English Legal System,” (4th Edition, 2005), Hodder Arnold, 243.

Id. 244.

Martin, Jacqueline, “The English Legal System,” (4th Edition, 2005), Hodder Arnold, 243.

In Bushell’s case (1670) Vaugh 135, several jurors refused to convict the defendant of unlawful assembly. The trial judge could not accept the not guilty verdict, and ordered the jurors to resume their deliberations without food and drink. When the jurors resist changing their verdict, the court fined them and sent them to prison until they pay their fines. On appeal, the court ordered the release of the jurors, holding that jurors cannot be punished for their verdict.

However, the common law does not apply to evidence received from a third party and evidence of an irregular occurrence of an extraneous nature.

Daly, Gillian, “Case Note: Jury Secrecy: R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock,” July 2004, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

[1980] 1 All ER 644, DC.

This case is about Jeremy Thorpe, a well-known politician. The jury, which hears the case of Jeremy Thorpe in 1979, had acquitted him from murder and incitement of murder. There were massive publicity surrounding the case and it was not easy to find an unbiased jury. Thus, the verdicts of not guilty were seen by many as a remarkable vindication of trial by jury. It soon become clear that extraneous factor had been at work on the minds of the jurors. After Mr. Thorpe had been acquitted, the New Stateman published an interview with one of the jurors. He expressed that the jury had decided to acquit Jeremy Thorpe even at the very first day of the trial.

Ingman, Terence, “The English Legal Process,” (11th Edition, 2006), Oxford, 272.

Contempt of Court Act 1981, Chapter 49, Section 8. Please refer to Appendix 1.

“Public confidence in the legitimacy of jury verdicts is a foundation of the criminal justice system. And there must be a general rule making inadmissible jury deliberations. But It is difficult to see how it would promote public confidence in the criminal justice system for the public to be informed that our appellant courts observe a self denying rule never to admit evidence of the deliberations of a jury even if such evidence strongly suggest that the jury was not impartial. In cases where there is cogent evidence demonstrating a real risk that the jury was not impartial and that general confidence in jury verdicts was in the particular case ill reposed, what possible public interest can there be in maintaining a dubious conviction?”

Daly, Gillian, “Case Note: Jury Secrecy: R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock,” July 2004, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

[2004] UKHL 2; [2004] 2 WLR 201.

In Mirza, the defendant was a Pakistani man who had stayed in the United Kingdom for 13 years. However, he still used an interpreter in the court. Following queries from the jury, the judge had gave a direction that no adverse inference should be drawn from this. The letter sent by the juror had clearly stated that the jury had failed to do that since they believe that the used of the interpreter was a ‘devious ploy’ and racial bias. In Connor, the defendants in the case were convicted in a joint trial. The letter wrote by one of the juror had suggested that the jury had failed to consider evidence in the right way. They were trying to safe time by convicting both defendants. The jury was unsure whether which one of them was actually guilty.

[2002] 1 WLR 518, CA. The Court of Appeal refused to make any investigation into the allegations made by a juror after the defendant’s conviction. There was evidence that some of the members of the jury had been racially prejudiced against the defendant and had decided that he was guilty from the very beginning of the trial. However, the Court of Appeal refused to investigate on such matter.

Daly, Gillian, “Case Note: Jury Secrecy: R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock,” July 2004, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

Firstly the rule of secrecy is compatible with Article 6 because there is the need to protect jury from pressure to explain their reasons. Next, the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Gregory v United Kingdom had recognized the common law rule. Thirdly, there were strong safeguards to prevent any allegations from arising. Lastly, without the confidentiality rule, there would have a lot of evidential problems.

Daly, Gillian, “Case Note: Jury Secrecy: R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock,” July 2004, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

[2004] 2 WLR 201.

[2004] 1 WLR 665.

Ingman, Terence, “The English Legal Process,” (11th Edition, 2006), Oxford, 273.

Parry, R, Gwynedd, “Jury Service for All? Analysing Lawyers as Jurors,” 1st April 2006, Journal of Criminal Law.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

Daly, Gillian, “Case Note: Jury Secrecy: R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock,” July 2004, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

Ibid.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

(1998) 25 EHRR 577.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

This is so because the United Kingdom had ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and the result of it is Human Rights Act 1998.

Timmis, Cameron, “JURIES: Trial by error?” 28th September 2006, Law Society Gazette.

Daly, Gillian, “Case Note: Jury Secrecy: R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock,” July 2004, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

Ibid.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

Bindman, Geoffrey, “It’s good to talk,” 16th June 2006, New Law Journal.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

F. Cas. 1186 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806). In this case, the prosecution argued against the lifting the veil of secrecy, claiming a plea in abatement could not be made against grand jury actions because secrecy made grand juries “indeoendent and irresponsible”. The defense however argues fair process and contended that secrecy should not shield an improper indictment.

Ibid.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

(1999), 134 C.C.C. (3d) 1. In Pan, testimony of jurors as to what happened during jury deliberations were held as inadmissible.

(1999), 134 C.C.C (3d) 152. In Sawyer, there was evidence that some of the jurors had made racist remarks but court held that no inquiry could be made.

Anonymous, “Common Law Rule of Jury Secrecy,” 13th January 2008, <http://www.crimlaw.org/defbrief156.html>. Please refer to Appendix 3.

Timmis, Cameron, “JURIES: Trial by error?” 28th September 2006, Law Society Gazette.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

[1995] 2 WLR 430.

Ferguson, Pamela R. “The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety,” 1st July 2006, International Journal of Evidence and Proof.

Ibid.