Mens Rea of Assault. The issue in this case is whether Matthews admitted actions, which were carried out as a joke, would constitute as a relevant defence to the charge of assault held against him
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emmaduncan07gmailcom (student)
Matthew has been charged with assault. His victim, John, was an annoying man with whom Matthew frequently argued. John had a habit of sitting in his back garden listening to Radio 4 at a level which, while not excessive, was sufficient to irritate Matthew. One day, Matthew feels he has had enough of being forced to listen to Radio 4 from the other side of the fence. He dons a balaclava and rushes down the side of the house and into John’s garden, brandishing his son’s toy gun and shouting incoherently. John is naturally extremely alarmed by this, as is the old lady who lives on the other side of John, who witnesses this from her bedroom window. She phones for the police who arrive to find John in a state of shock, and the replica gun (complete with fingerprints) lying on the patio. On questioning John, it is clear that he thought the gun was real.
On being questioned, Matthew admits that it was him, but asserts that he only meant to get John to turn down the radio, and had thought it would be a bit of a joke.
Advise Matthew on the likely outcome of the case against him. You should not make reference to the law on assault, but focus on the mental element of crime which we have already covered in class.
The issue in this case is whether Matthew’s admitted actions, which were carried out as a joke, would constitute as a relevant defence to the charge of assault held against him.
The general rule is that before a person can be convicted of a criminal offence it must be shown that the alleged offender committed an act or omission proscribed by the criminal law at the time that the alleged crime or offence was committed. This wrongful act is usually expressed as the actus reus. An actus reus can consist of more than just an act, it comprises all the elements of the offence other than the state of mind of the defendant.[1] Along with this requirement it is essential that the conduct of the act be accompanied by a guilty state of mind, also known as the mens rea. When establishing the mens rea of the crime it is important to take a subjective approach to determine what the accused was thinking at that time.
On considering the actus reus of the crime within this case it is required that the act shows that the accused is capable of causing actual harm to society and that is prohibited under the criminal law.[2] It is evident from the facts of the case that Matthew was in conscious control of his actions as he had the power to stop what he was doing. This is regarded as a voluntary act. The actus reus in this situation is the wrongful act of assault. This could be established when the case describes Matthew brandishing the toy gun and shouting incoherently. It could be said that Matthew could be capable of causing harm to society because it was unbeknown to the other parties in the situation that the gun was only a toy. However, for Matthew to be criminally liable for the conviction of assault a guilty state of mind must be established.
The necessary mens rea must be proved in respect of those elements of the crime that are included within the definition of, but not those circumstances that lie outside, the actus reus.[3] Cubie suggests that ‘criminal guilt is not determined by the extent to which one’s outlook on the world is malicious or anti-social but by the intention with which one performs such acts as come under scrutiny of the courts’.[4] A similar scenario to the case at hand is described in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No.2 of 1992).[5] This case involved the accused who had entered a shop ...
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The necessary mens rea must be proved in respect of those elements of the crime that are included within the definition of, but not those circumstances that lie outside, the actus reus.[3] Cubie suggests that ‘criminal guilt is not determined by the extent to which one’s outlook on the world is malicious or anti-social but by the intention with which one performs such acts as come under scrutiny of the courts’.[4] A similar scenario to the case at hand is described in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No.2 of 1992).[5] This case involved the accused who had entered a shop with a replica gun and had demanded money from the shopkeepers and ordered them to lay on the ground. The accused left the shop shortly after when another member of staff appeared, who was also alarmed by the situation. Despite this, the accused insisted that it had all been a joke and that ‘he had no evil intent to assault or rob’.[6] At trial the judge directed the jury that if they believed the accused’s defence then they ought to acquit him, which they did. The Lord Advocate then referred the case to the High Court where it was held that the sheriff got his direction wrong and that he had confused motive and intention. It was held that for there to be a conviction, there must have been some form of evil intent. This was designed to ensure that assault, as a crime would always be one of intention rather than recklessness or negligence.[7] In this case the motive might have been to play a practical joke, but if you evilly intend to do something that constitutes assault this is all the intent that is required and therefore the accused was convicted of assault. Comparing the outcome of Lord Advocates Reference (No.2 of 1992)[8] with the case in question, we can clearly establish Matthew’s motive that brought him to carry out the act of assault. It is evident from the facts of the case that John had been getting on Matthew’s nerves for quite some time. Thus, eventually fuelled Matthew’s anger, establishing evil intent, which was enough to motivate him to take matters into his own hands against John. However, although Matthew’s plan was to get the music turned down his conduct constituted to the crime of assault and therefore he would be convicted on that basis. It is said that if the accused’s conduct clearly shows an intention to commit a crime, he cannot raise a successful defence by asserting that he was joking.[9]
The judgement of Lord Advocates Reference (No.2 of 1992)[10] was applied in the case of Quinn v Lees.[11] This case involved a man who set his dog on a group of young boys whilst commanding ‘Rover Bite’. The accused argued that it had all been part of a joke and he did not intend to assault the boys. The court on appeal held that it could not be suggested that the dog would be able to distinguish between a joke and a command.[12] Although there was enough sufficient evidence to prove that it wasn’t a joke, it was held that even if it was a joke it was not a defence and merely just a motive. Referring to this case we can provide that regardless of the accused’s actions it is merely impossible to use a joke as a defence in relation to the crime of assault.
A similar scenario can be seen again in the case of Baxter v HM Advocate.[13] This case describes an incident where a resident of a tenement would not move out during renovations to the building. Baxter had incited an employee to carry out the killing of his neighbour however the employee disagreed. Baxter’s defence was that he was joking. Nevertheless, he was convicted on the basis that he intended to be taken seriously due to the tone of his voice and the tenor of the conversation that had been taped.[14] Following these 3 cases it is absolute that Matthew’s defence plea would fail and he would most certainly be convicted of assault.
Nonetheless, intention is not the same as motive. A definition of intention was given in the case of Cunliffe v Goodman[15] as: ‘an intention…connotes a state of affairs which the party intending…does more than merely contemplate; it connotes a state of affairs which, on the contrary, he decided, so far as in him lies, to bring about, and which in point of possibility, he has a reasonable prospect of being able to bring about by his own act of volition’. An intentional act carried out by somebody is done so in the hope to bring about a particular result. An actor will have done so ‘without any real conscious thought about the nature of his intention and the best means of effecting that intention’.[16] It is impossible to determine what somebody was thinking at a time in question to understand what their intention would be. The only way to assume somebody’s intention is by looking at their actions. The case of HM Advocate v Rutherford[17] states, ‘intent must always be a matter of inference – inference mainly from what the person does, but partly from the whole surrounding circumstances of the case’. From this statement, we can prove whether Matthew had the necessary mens rea of assault by firstly looking at his actions. The facts of the case prove that Matthew was enraged by the situation as he ‘rushed’ down the side of John’s house and ‘brandished’ his sons toy gun. Matthews’s conduct could be regarded as intentionally evil by the way he addressed the situation. Matthew also shouted incoherently at John, which again concludes that he was in a state of anger and therefore potentially shouting abusive comments towards him. Although Matthew didn’t physically attack John, he put him in a state of fear by threatening him with the toy gun without any conscious thought about the nature of his actions and therefore this is enough evidence to constitute to the crime of assault. The second step to establishing Matthews’s intention of his actions is to look at the admissions that were made whilst under caution. When questioned, Matthew admitted that it was him but insisted that it was only meant as a joke so that John would turn the radio down. Referring to the statement given by Cubie, it is obvious that Matthew did more than merely contemplate the situation and thus proved that he was acting with intention. Therefore, it is evident that Matthew was thinking intentionally as he was seeking a result from his actions. The surrounding facts of the case amount to Matthew’s motive for his conduct that lead him to committing the assault. Because of these factors there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Matthew was acting with evil intent.
In conclusion, Matthew could try arguing that there was no mens rea for assault as he thought he was just playing a joke. Referring to the judgement of Lord Advocate’s Reference (No.2 of 1992)[18] it was specified that there must be evidence of evil intent to be convicted of assault. This is obvious from the outcome of the Quinn v Lees[19] case as well as the Baxter v HM Advocate[20] case. It is apparent from the judgements of these cases that the courts separately analyse the intention of the accused’s act and the accused’s motive for committing that act. Playing a joke on somebody is not the intention of the accused but the motive driving him or her to bring about their desired result. Matthew’s inferences at the time of the incident remain intentional and constitute to the conviction of assault.
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[1] Catherine Elliott & Frances Quinn, Criminal Law, <http://catalogue.pearsoned.co.uk/assets/hip/gb/hip_gb_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/140828071X.pdf>accessed 24/10/16
[2] Sarah Christie, An Introduction to Scots Criminal Law (2nd edn, Dundee University Press 2009) 19
[3] Sarah Christie, An Introduction to Scots Criminal Law (2nd edn, Dundee University Press 2009) 35
[4] Andrew Cubie, Scots Criminal Law (3rd edn, Bloomsbury Professional Limited 2010) para 2.1
[5] 1993 SLT 460
[6] Ibid 5
[7] Sarah Christie, An Introduction to Scots Criminal Law (2nd edn, Dundee University Press 2009) 132
[8] Ibid 5
[9] Sarah Christie, An Introduction to Scots Criminal Law (2nd edn, Dundee University Press 2009) 37
[10] Ibid 5
[11] 1994 SCCR 159
[12] Sarah Christie, An Introduction to Scots Criminal Law (2nd edn, Dundee University Press 2009) 36
[13] 1998 SLT 414
[14] Sarah Christie, An Introduction to Scots Criminal Law (2nd edn, Dundee University Press 2009) 36
[15] [1950] 2 KB 237 at 253
[16] Sarah Christie, An Introduction to Scots Criminal Law (2nd edn, Dundee University Press 2009) 37
[17] 1974 SLT 3
[18] Ibid 5
[19] Ibid 11
[20] Ibid 13