Recognition of states: Is there a need for?
a) Declaratory theory at closer examination
According to James that fixed the kernel of the fundamental premiss made by scholars that substantiate declaratory theory, "recognition presupposes a state's existence; it does not create it". Legal effects of recognition are limited, given that recognition is solely a declaration or an acknowledgement by states of an already existing situation. It is observed that scholars often allude to the famous Tinoco Arbitration as juridical support for the declaratory theory. The theory was also upheld in the Charter of the Organization of American States, where it is affirmed that the political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other State (emphasis added).
Kelsen by means of differentiating two different types of recognition, legal and political, if closely examined, also supports the declaratory theory. In his opinion, legal recognition entails upon the recognizing state to consider the evolving political entity to be a state according to the tenets of international law, whereas political recognition implies the willingness of recognizing state to enter into diplomatic relations and to cooperate with the emergent entity. Kelsen stipulates that legal recognition may be implied, but political recognition may not. To exemplify the foregoing point, Kelsen notes demand of Great Britain for compensation from Israel for the downing of a British airplane, despite the fact that Great Britain had not recognized Israel as a state. Kelsen's interpretation suggests that when a state demands compensation from a community allegedly in violation of international law, the demanding state actually recognizes the other entity as a state. Therefore, by summarizing the aforementioned arguments, it can be concluded that a state exists in the international community independently of recognition.
b) Constitutive theory
It was Oppenheim who succinctly captured the key gist of the constitutive theory. Oppenheim claims that "a state is, and becomes, an International Person through recognition only and exclusively".
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht interpolated the basic premiss of the theory. Lauterpacht claimed provided that a political entity conformed to the conditions of statehood stipulated in Montevideo convention the international community would be under an obligation to afford to that entity the recognition that is the requirement to constitute a state.
Nevertheless the postulate suggested by Lauterpacht was harshly critiqued. Kunz, for instance, argues that a thesis is an "entirely untenable" and "not … in accord with positive law," and "a falsification of positive law." In addition, Chen outlined the "logical difficulties" of proclaiming a duty, which precedes the fact of recognition, vis-à-vis an entity which, because of the absence of recognition at the pre-recognition stage, is not in esse.
However, on the other hand, Lauterpacht did receive some support. Bot, for example, reckoned that “state practice has in fact never differed greatly from the Lauterpacht's conception in that it has largely ignored the existence of unstable regimes".
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the concept of recognition in international law is notoriously murky, prevalent view of recognition among international law scholars, officials and courts today is of the declaratory theory.
Self-determination as additional factor relevant to the criteria for statehood
Fawcett, the declaratist, suggested that the requirement of self-determination is also to be added to the Montevideo criteria of statehood.
Perhaps, the additional criterion of self-determination may emanate from the Southern Rhodesia case, when Southern Rhodesia, a British self-governing colony, declared its independence. As Crawford claims, the independence in the aforementioned case was achieved by means of vindication of the right to self-determination. In addition, the legal enforceability of this right emanates from the fact that the principle of self-determination lays at the crux of customary international law and is one of the guiding philosophies in the United Nations Charter, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Additionally, while considering the conceptual framework of self-determination as the additional criteria for statehood, it is crucial to note that it runs parallel with the notion of illegality. That is to say, the principle of self-determination largely overlaps with the essential maxim that a state cannot arise as a result of illegality. The issue of illegality can be applied to the Palestinian entity to question its validity on international plane. In that case, even if the Palestinian entity were to satisfy the criteria for statehood, the illegitimacy of a unilateral declaration of statehood would nullify its claim to statehood. In the ruling on the Succession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the invalidity of establishment of new states through illegal procedures that are prohibited under international law.
Other propositions
Throughout the debates legal academia suggested a few other propositions in regard to the conceptual criteria for statehood. American Law Institute, for instance, observed that though an entity may meet the requirements of statehood, it may not necessarily claim to be a state. In its Restatement (Third), American Law Institute elucidates that “entity must claim to be a state for it to be a state”. The inducement of American Law Institute to append the aforementioned requirement has evolved from state practice surrounding Taiwan. Apparently, despite the fact that Taiwan met the criteria for statehood often thought to constitute a state, as a matter of fact, it does not claim to be Taiwan, rather the Republic of China. As a result, few states recognize it as the Republic of China and no states granted recognition to it as Taiwan.
Grant claims that other instances strengthened the lesson drawn from Taiwan. Several sub-units of federations satisfy the criteria set out in Montevideo Convention, but the fact is that they do not claim to be states and, therefore, are not viewed as states. Grant suggests that California or Bavaria could position themselves as independent states more effectively than any number of members of the United Nations General Assembly.
It is also worth noting that, being not a criterion membership in the United Nations is undoubtedly related to statehood. According to the UN Charter provides that membership in the UN be open to "all … peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the (UN) Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." The statement embodies the conclusion that any entity that is a member of the United Nations is a state.
Nevertheless, the UN membership is not namely a must for statehood. Grant claims that the Holy See does not belong to the UN, but is considered as a state. The argument that statehood may not require UN membership can be proved via the foregoing case, but, as Grant supposes, “the association is too close to ignore, since UN membership is conclusive as to an entity's statehood”.
Attempting to define atypical quasi-state actors: the Holy See
It is noteworthy that there are certain actors on the international arena that are treated like states and are sometimes defined as states in spite of the fact that they do not meet all the criteria deemed essential for acquiring statehood.
Many scholars contend that the Holy See cannot be a state and argue about the impropriety of its international status.
Firstly, the population of the Vatican is different than the population of any other state. It is claimed that the population of a State comprises all individuals who reside in the country in a permanent way. The majority of Vatican citizens are either celibate priesthood or members of religious orders that inhabit the Vatican only during their term of office. The Vatican population is incapable of self-perpetuation and reproduction, making it very different from that of other States. Then, it can be concluded that the only correct member of the Vatican's "permanent" population is the Pope himself. That is to say, the population of the Vatican City may not succeed in fulfilling "permanent population" requirement of the Montevideo Convention, because it lacks a "human society stably united in its territory".
Secondly, the Vatican City is approximately one-fiftieth the size of Monaco, previously the smallest independent state. But, nevertheless, tiny size alone does not indicate that the Holy See cannot be a state. The Holy See, through the Vatican City, undoubtedly enjoys a defined territory and satisfies this Montevideo requirement for statehood.
Thirdly, the Holy See, being a true form of government over the Vatican City., exercises effective temporal authority over its inhabitants and employees. Article III of the Lateran Treaty documented the full possession, exclusive and absolute authority, and sovereign jurisdiction the Holy See has over the territory of the Vatican City.
The capacity of the Holy See is to be examined throughout its relations with other states, as well as its independence. It is noteworthy the Holy See currently enjoys full diplomatic relations with over 150 nations. In addition, the Holy See is a party to various conventions, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, The Holy See is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The independence of the Vatican City may also be observed with regard to Italy. Sometimes it is claimed that the Vatican City is significantly dependent upon Italy for numerous essential services. However, under Article IV of the Lateran Treaty, Italy recognized that it could not intervene in any way in the Vatican City, thus, confirming the sole authority of the Holy See.
Thus, taking into account the aforementioned arguments, it can be deducted that despite its debatable nature, the fact remains that the Holy See is present at the United Nations as a Non-Member State Permanent Observer at the United Nations.
Conclusion
These arguments lead to the conclusion that the profound nature of the concept of statehood integrates and addresses a variety of different doctrinal interpretations. However, the writer’s conviction is that the classical position entails the confirmation that there exists no clear definition of statehood other than that encapsulated in the Montevideo Convention.
It was also agreed that the declaratory theory is superior to the constitutive one as the practice of international law more extensively supports the former theory. The superiority of declaratists’ view implies the vainness of the proposition that suggests the inclusion of the recognition to the criteria for statehood. However, it should be asserted that while self determination is not an absolute criterion, it does influence the title of a political entity in question. It is required that an entity claiming statehood should demonstrate that it has not been established as the result of illegality, that it constitutes a viable entity, and that its claim to statehood is compatible with the right to self-determination.
Bibliography
Abdullah Y., The Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State or Church?, Columbia Law Review, vol. 96, 1996
Acquaviva G., Subjects of International Law: A power-based analysis, Vanderbilt Journal of International Law, volume 44, 1950
Bathon M., The atypical international status of the Holy See, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, May, vol. 34, 2001
Baty T., The Canons of International Law, 1930
Bernardez T., Territorial Sovereignty, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol 10, 1987
Bieberstein W., Zum Problem Der Volkerrechtlichen Anerkennung Der Beiden Deutschen Regierungen,
Bienvenu P., Secession by Constitutional Means: Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy, volume 21, 1999.
Booysen H., Volkereg, 1980
Bot B., Non-recognition and treaty relations, 1968
Brownlie I., Principles of public international law, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, 2003
Cardinale H. E., The Holy See and the International Order, 1976
Chen T., The International law of recognition with special reference to practice in Great Britain and the United States, L. Green ed., 1951
Crawford J., The Creation of States in International Law, 1979
Dugard J., Recognition and the United Nations, 1987
Duursma J., Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-determination and Statehood, 1996
Fawcett J., The law of Nations, 1971
Gemma S., Appunti di Diritto Internazionale, Diritto Pubblico, 1923
Grant T., Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents, Columbia Journal of Transnational law, 1999
Harris D., Cases and Material on International law, 5th ed., 1998
Henkin L. et al., International Law Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., 1993
James A., Sovereign statehood, 1986
Jellinek G., Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd ed., 1914
Kelsen H., The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, Harvard Law Review, 1941-1942
Kelsen H., Das Problem der Souveränität, 1920
Kelsen H., Tucker R., Principles of International Law, 2d. ed, 1966
Kunz J., Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht’s “Recognition in International law”, American Journal of Transnational Law, March, vol. 38, 2005, p. 356
Kunz J., The Status of the Holy See in International Law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 46, 1952
Lauterpacht H., Recognition in International Law, 1948
Lorimer J., The Institutes of the Law of Nations, 1883
Lukaschiuk I., Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo, 1999
Malanczuk P, Akehurst’s modern introduction to international law, 7th edn, Routledge, London and New York, 1997
McDowell E., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 71, 1977
Mugerwa, Subjects of International Law, Manual of Public International Law, Sorensen ed., 1968
Parry C., The function of law in the international community, in Manual of Public International Law, Max Srensen ed., 1968
Patel S., A Textbook of International Law, 1964
O'Connell D., International Law, 2nd ed., 1970
Oppenheim F., International Law: A Treatise, Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955
Peterson M., Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1997
Raic D., Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, New York, Kluwer Law International, 2002.
Roth B., Governmental Illegitimacy in International law, 1999
Rozakis C., Territorial integrity and political independence, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 10, 1987
Salmond J., On Jurisprudence, 7th ed., 1924
Shaw M., Territory in international law, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 13, 1982
Starke J., Introduction to International Law, 10th ed. 1989
Tomuschat C., International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, in 281 Hague Academy of International Law Collected Courses,1999
Vyver J., Statehood in international law, Emory International Law Review, Spring, 1991
Wheaton H, Elements of International Law, James Brown Scott ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1936
Web-sites
Canadian Content: Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. , date accessed – 01.11. 2005)
Palestinian declaration of statehood and May 4, 1999: frequently asked questions, Communicated by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 26, 1999,
International Recognition of a Unilaterally Declared Palestinian State: Legal and Policy Dilemmas, Becker T., Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, , date accessed – 10.11.2005
Notices of Governments
United States Department of State Press Relations Office Notice, Nov. 1, 1976
Cases
Island of Palmas case, RIAA II 829, at 839 (1928).
Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217
The North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judgment of 20 February, 1969, ICJ Reports 1969
Tinoco Arbitration, 1 RIAA, p. 369, (1923)
International instruments
Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 12, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 54 (1952)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations law
United Nations Charter
Hans Kelsen attempted to define statehood in terms of law: “the state is not its individuals; it is the specific union of individuals, and this union is the function of the order which regulates their mutual behavior… one of the distinctive results of pure theory of law is its recognition that the coercive order which constitutes the political community we call a state, is a legal order. What is usually called the legal order of the state or the legal order set up by the state is the state itself.” (Kelsen H., The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, Harvard Law Review, 1941-1942, p. 64-65)
Thomas Baty called a state “an organized people, that is, an assemblage of human beings among whom the will of an ascertainable number habitually prevails” (Baty T., The Canons of International Law, 1930, p. 9-10)
See Raic D., Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, New York, Kluwer Law International, 2002.
The basic distinction of the definition that gave Clive Parry, is that “the modern state represents the fullest expression of communal life”. It is obvious that the emphasis here is put on sociological elements of a state (Parry C., The function of law in the international community, in Manual of Public International Law, Max Srensen ed., 1968, p. 6)
See also Grant T., Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents, Columbia Journal of Transnational law, 1999, p. 404
Crawford J., The Creation of States in International Law, 1979, p. 31, 35
Tomuschat C., International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, in 281 Hague Academy of International Law Collected Courses,1999, p. 9, 96, Henkin L. et al., International Law Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., 1993, p. 246
The signatories were Honduras, the United States of America, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Cuba. Only Bolivia did not sign the Convention among other states represented at the Conference. The United States of America, Peru, and Brazil ratified the Convention with reservations directly attached to the document. (Canadian Content: Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. , date accessed – 01.11. 2005)
See also Grant T., Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents, Columbia Journal of Transnational law, 1999, p.414
In addition, the United States Department of State, for example, wrote in 1976: “In [judging whether to recognize an entity as a state], the United States has traditionally looked to the establishment of certain facts. These facts include effective control over a clearly defined territory and population; an organized governmental administration of that territory; and a capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign relations and to fulfill international obligations”. United States Department of State Press Relations Office Notice, Nov. 1, 1976, McDowell E., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 71, 1977, p. 337
Soviet and Russian legal publicists identify these three elements as “making up” the state. See Lukaschiuk I., Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo, 1999, p 293
It is also noteworthy that, historically, the definition of statehood set out in the Montevideo Convention can be traced back to the concepts of effectiveness, population, and territoriality. It was Georg Jellinek, who conceived and postulated a “Drei-Elementen-Lehre” – a "doctrine of three elements"- that is actually the essence of the foregoing criteria. (For more information see Jellinek G., Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd ed., 1914, p. 396, see also indications of three concepts in Wheaton H, Elements of International Law, James Brown Scott ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1936, p. 29; Lorimer J., The Institutes of the Law of Nations, 1883, p 109)
Shaw M., Territory in international law, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 13, 1982, pp. 61-91, See also Bernardez T., Territorial Sovereignty, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol 10, 1987, pp. 487-494, Rozakis C., Territorial integrity and political independence, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 10, 1987, pp. 481-487.
Island of Palmas case, RIAA II 829, at 839 (1928).
See Malanczuk P, Akehurst’s modern introduction to international law, 7th edn, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, p. 75; Brownlie I., Principles of public international law, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 71,
Albania was recognized as a state in spite of a lack of settled frontiers and Israel was admitted to the United Nations in spite of disputes over the borders.
In addition, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the International Court of Justice held:
“The appurtenance of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way governs the precise determination of its boundaries, any more than uncertainty as to boundaries can affect territorial rights. There is for instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and often in various places and for long periods they are not” (emphasis added). See the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judgment of 20 February, 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3 at 33, para. 46.
Malanczuk P, Akehurst’s modern introduction to international law, 7th edn, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, p.76
See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations law, Vol. 1, para. 201, Comment e, at 73
Crawford J., The Creation of States in International Law, 1979, p. 47. See Oppenheim F., International Law: A Treatise, Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955, p. 118, Salmond J., On Jurisprudence, 7th ed., 1924, p.145; Gemma S., Appunti di Diritto Internazionale, Diritto Pubblico, 1923, p. 180; Kelsen H., Das Problem der Souveränität, 1920, p. 70-76
Malanczuk P, Akehurst’s modern introduction to international law, 7th ed, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, p. 79
O'Connell D., International Law, 2nd ed., 1970, pp. 284-85.
Booysen H., Volkereg, 1980, pp. 168-170; Bot B., Non-recognition and treaty relations, 1968, pp. 16-19, 1968; Dugard J., Recognition and the United Nations, 1987, pp. 7-9; Lauterpacht H., Recognition in International Law, 1948, pp. 38-66; Patel S., A Textbook of International Law, 1964, pp. 46-51; Starke J., Introduction to International Law, 10th ed. 1989, pp. 132-34; Bieberstein W., Zum Problem Der Volkerrechtlichen Anerkennung Der Beiden Deutschen Regierungen, 1959, pp. 58-68; Mugerwa, Subjects of International Law, Manual of Public International Law, Sorensen ed., 1968, pp. 247, 275-77
James A., Sovereign statehood, 1986, p. 147
As Brownlie states:
“In that case, Great Britain was allowed to bring a claim on the basis of concessions granted by the former revolutionary government of Costa Rica which had not been recognized by some other states, including Great Britain”. (See Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed., Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 87). Chief Justice Taft, who was the sole arbitrator, envisaged the issue of recognition. In his obiter dictum, he claimed:
“The non-recognition by other nations of a government claiming to be a national personality is usually appropriate evidence that it has not attained the independence and control entitling it by international law to be classed as such. But when recognition vel non of a government is by such nations determined by inquiry, not into its de facto sovereignty and complete governmental control, but into its illegitimacy or irregularity or origin, their non-recognition loses something of evidential weight on the issue with which those applying the rules of international law are alone concerned ”. Tinoco Arbitration, 1 RIAA, p. 369, (1923)
Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 12, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 54 (1952)
Notably, Great Britain's memorandum demanding restitution was addressed to the "Jewish Authorities at Tel Aviv," not to the provisional Government of Israel, in order to indicate that Great Britain had not yet extended formal recognition (Kelsen H., Tucker R., Principles of International Law, 2d ed., 1966, p. 389
Kelsen H., Tucker R., Principles of International Law, 2d. ed, 1966, p. 394-395
Oppenheim L, International law: A treatise, H. Lauterpacht 8th ed., 1955, p. 125
Lauterpacht stated the "external independence and effective internal government within a reasonably well-defined territory" as conditions for statehood, Lauterpacht H., Recognition in International law, 1948, p. 31
Lauterpacht H., Recognition in International law, 1948, p. 31
Kunz J., Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht’s “Recognition in International law”, American Journal of International Law, volume 44, 1950, p. 713, 715
Chen T., The International law of recognition with special reference to practice in Great Britain and the United States, L. Green ed., 1951, pp. 50-55, pp. 74-75 Vyver J., Statehood in international law, Emory International Law Review, Spring, 1991
Bot B., Non-recognition and treaty relations, 1968, p. 17
Roth B., Governmental Illegitimacy in International law, 1999, p. 126, Peterson M., Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1997, p. 23 ("By 1975, the vast majority of specialists accepted the declaratory theory.")
He proclaimed that the indicium of "organized government" set out in Montevideo Convention as prerequisite of statehood would not be met as long as "there is a systematic and constitutional denial to a substantial minority, or still worse -- to a majority of the people, of a place and a say in the government." - Fawcett J., The law of Nations, 1971, p. 46
Crawford J., The creation of states in International law, 1979, p. 102, see also Harris D., Cases and Material on International law, 5th ed., 1998, p 111
Article 1(2), United Nations Charter
Article 1 of both Covenants
Palestinian declaration of statehood and May 4, 1999: frequently asked questions, Communicated by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 26, 1999, , date accessed – 12.11.2005, International Recognition of a Unilaterally Declared Palestinian State: Legal and Policy Dilemmas, Becker T., Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, , date accessed – 10.11.2005
Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, See also Bienvenu P., Secession by Constitutional Means: Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy, volume 21, 1999.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations law, Vol. 1, para. 201, Comment f
Grant T., Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1999, pp. 437-447
Grant T., Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1999, pp. 437-447
Grant T., Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1999, pp. 437-447
Grant T., Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1999, pp. 437-447
Grant T., Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1999, pp. 437-447
Kunz, for instance, argues that the Holy See should not be a member of the United Nations, because it is not a state. See Kunz J., The Status of the Holy See in International Law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 46, 1952, p. 313. Abdullah also finds that the Holy See does not meet the requirements for statehood. See Abdullah Y., The Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State or Church?, Columbia Law Review, vol. 96, 1996, p. 1867.
Cardinale H. E., The Holy See and the International Order, 1976, p. 107, Duursma J., Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-determination and Statehood, 1996, p. 117.
See also Bathon M., The atypical international status of the Holy See, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, May, vol. 34, 2001, p. 610
Cardinale H. E., The Holy See and the International Order, 1976, p. 107
Duursma J., Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-determination and Statehood, 1996, p. 412
Abdullah argues that the Holy See could not be considered a government because the Holy See directed a religion, rather than a nation, with a population capable of asserting statehood. This distinction is not overly essential for a determination regarding statehood, however, because the Holy See exercises his absolute authority through the Roman Curia over spiritual matters and the Pontifical Commission over temporal matters of the Vatican City. Abdullah Y., The Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State or Church?, Columbia Law Review, vol. 96, 1996, p.1865-66
Bathon M., The atypical international status of the Holy See, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, May, vol. 34, 2001, p. 628
The data are taken from Acquaviva G., Subjects of International Law: A power-based analysis, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, March, vol. 38, 2005, p. 356
Article IV states, "[t]he Sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction which Italy recognizes to the Holy See implies that there cannot be any interference whatsoever on the part of the Italian government, and that within Vatican city there will be no other authority other than the Holy See." Cardinale H. E., The Holy See and the International Order, 1976, p. 320.
