Pete could be liable for the psychiatric injury suffered by Alan. The term psychiatric injury, 'denotes a traumatic response to an act'[1], which in this case is the recurrence of depression suffered by Alan.

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(a) Pete could be liable for the psychiatric injury suffered by Alan.  The term psychiatric injury, ‘denotes a traumatic response to an act’, which in this case is the recurrence of depression suffered by Alan.  However before Alan can claim, he has to establish on the basis of medical evidence that he has suffered a definite psychiatric injury.  Alan is a primary victim as he is a participant in the incident which gives rise to the negligence action.  As in Page v Smith Alan sustains minor injuries caused by Pete’s negligent driving but no physical injury, although he does start suffering a recurrence of the depression he suffered three years earlier.  The key principle in Dulieu was where psychiatric injury was sustained through fear for the plaintiff’s own safety, there was no need for physical impact to establish a claim.  The question will therefore be whether it is upon Alan to prove that injury by nervous shock was reasonably foreseeable by Pete, or whether it suffices, that where Alan was himself involved in the accident and therefore a primary victim, it is for him to prove that personal injury of some kind was reasonably foreseeable as a result of it.  In Page it was held that in the case of a primary victim of an accident the test in all cases was to be the same; namely whether the defendant could reasonably foresee that his conduct would expose the plaintiff to the risk of personal injury, whether physical or psychiatric.  Where there was an affirmative answer, the duty of care would be established, even though physical injury did not in fact occur in any form.  The plaintiff was not required to prove that injury by nervous shock was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant and it was irrelevant that the defendant could not have foreseen that the plaintiff had an 'eggshell personality', since it was established by medical science that psychiatric illness could be suffered as a consequence of an accident, even though it was not caused directly through physical injury to the plaintiff.  Pete had consumed too much alcohol and was driving too fast in the particular conditions described and therefore Pete should have foreseen that his conduct could expose Alan to a risk of personal injury.  Therefore a duty of care is established and Alan will not have to prove that injury by nervous shock was foreseeable by Pete.  The depression that has reoccurred was a consequence of the accident, although it was not due to direct physical injury.  Alan, however, may be held to be contributory negligence, in that he contributed to his damage, as he chose to sit as a passenger in the car even though Pete had consumed too much alcohol.  If this is proved any damages, which are awarded, may be reduced in proportion to his fault.

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(b) Pete could be liable for the psychiatric injury suffered by Bill if it is established, amongst other factors, that on the basis of medical evidence he has suffered a definite psychiatric injury.  Bill does not seem to have a recognised psychiatric illness though the different elements could accumulate to post traumatic stress disorder.  If this is found to be the case then Bill will be able to continue with legal proceedings.  Bill is a secondary victim as he is a witness to the immediate aftermath of the accident involving both Pete and Alan.  Liability here will depend ...

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